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Foreword 
 
This is the first volume entirely dedicated to the analysis of a violent confronta-
tion which has escalated in north-eastern Nigeria since the mid-2000s, between 
federal forces and an Islamic sectarian movement which gradually transformed 
into a radical jihadist armed rebellion. Commonly known as ‘Boko Haram’, the 
movement was unknown to most people outside Maiduguri before 2009, when 
federal forces launched a military offensive against its headquarters. Extremely 
violent, the crackdown eventually resulted – in addition to several hundred vic-
tims hastily buried in mass graves – in the transformation of a limited in scale but 
well-structured Islamic sectarian movement into an underground, clandestine 
armed organisation with possible connections to the ever-changing jihadist scene 
in Africa and beyond. 
Writing about Boko Haram is a difficult task, as researchers have very limited 
access to first-hand information. Indeed, foreign and national researchers find it 
almost impossible to conduct fieldwork in north-eastern Nigeria, where their  
security cannot be guaranteed. Recently, as the core of the conflict has seemed to 
be moving away from Maiduguri, capital of Borno, to the confines of Nigeria, 
the shores of Lake Chad and along the Cameroonian border, available infor-
mation on the conflict has become even scarcer.  
Such difficulties contrast with the pressing demand of the Nigerian public and 
the international community alike for intelligible analyses of the situation. Nige-
ria is the demographic and ideological centre of gravity of a very large part of 
West and Central Africa. The area we know today as northern Nigeria has long 
been a source of new ideas and knowledge that fed Islamic practice, thinking, 
and teaching far beyond its colonial borders. As such, the violent, poorly-
managed, spiralling confrontation between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and a 
seemingly well-entrenched, widespread, armed Islamic movement can generate 
only considerable anxiety among regional stakeholders, who fear the general un-
rest of a large part of West and Central Africa. 
The response of the academic community to such pressing demands has been 
largely disappointing, simply because the context is unfavourable to the produc-
tion of reliable knowledge. The fear of violence and reprisals against scholars 
living in exposed areas, the ideological biases or political correctness which para-
lyse many channels of thought when dealing with Islam and terrorism, and the 
lack of available data – all have contributed to a relatively repetitive and shallow 
academic production on the Boko Haram crisis.  
ix 
In this volume, edited by a leading French specialist on Nigeria, we have at-
tempted to adopt an original standpoint in publishing a limited number of essays 
which, taken together, are an attempt to renovate the way we produce scholarship 
on such an underground movement. We have brought together a large variety of 
scholars, many of them related to the French Institute for Research in Africa 
(IFRA-Nigeria) in a one way or another, from Nigeria, France, Germany, the UK 
and the US. Some immersed themselves in fieldwork a few years ago, when this 
was still possible. They brought back outstanding data on northern Nigeria that 
can no longer be collected today. Others used discourse analysis or existing data 
on violence in Nigeria in ways never attempted before. Some are well-known 
scholars in the field, while others have signed here their first scholarly publica-
tion. 
Far from being an univocal assemblage of papers, the book fosters debate in 
constructive ways. With this book, we hope to be able to stimulate new scholarly 
discussions on the fast-replicating emergence across the Sahelian belt of a series 
of movements that cannot be satisfactorily described only in simple terms as vio-
lent, terrorist or jihadist. For a movement such as Boko Haram to mutate from a 
sectarian group splitting away from the Izala movement to a full-grown rebellion 
threatening the integrity of the most powerful state in West Africa, you need 
more than religious fanatics, violent Salafist ideology, and intolerance. The in-
gredients that fuel the fire spreading across north-eastern Nigeria are yet to be 
fully described. Some are to be found within the existence of a political elite used 
to buying off the settlement of insurgencies and social crises and incapable of 
responding to a new type of threat, ideological in nature, otherwise than through 
the use of blunt force. Other elites among security forces also hide their own  
secret agendas, as sustained violence legitimates accrued budgets and assists 
them secure new lucrative markets for themselves, in ways inherited from the 
pre-1999 era.  
This book is not a cookbook. All the ingredients of the crisis are not identified, 
and it does not pretend to provide recipes to solve current issues. It merely offers 
a variety of glimpses into the Boko Haram phenomenon and fosters a better and 
more nuanced understanding of a crisis that threatens to destabilise a large part of 
Africa. 
     Boko Haram has redefined the way jihadists  challenge  the  post-colonial
state  in Africa. The  probabilities  are high  that this model will soon be exported 
outside Nigeria. This book is timely.
 
  
Gérard Chouin  
WAPOSO Series Editor 
Assistant Professor of History
The College of William & Mary 
Virginia, USA 
  
Figure 1.1 Map of Shariah-compliant States and the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria 
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Introduction and overview 
 
Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos  
 
 
As I write this introduction in November 2013, Boko Haram is making the head-
lines. Paradoxically, it is seen in the media as clandestine and invisible, accord-
ing to Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, who said he would not negotiate 
with “ghosts”. The sect of Mohammed Yusuf was not always famous, however. 
When I began to investigate the so-called Taliban on the Niger–Nigeria border in 
2005, no academics had written anything on Boko Haram. At that time, security 
analysts focused on violence in the oil-producing Niger Delta, and very few paid 
attention to a marginal group of extremists in remote Borno and Yobe states. 
Since then, the sect has become a fashionable topic of research as well as an 
international issue. More so than the Maiduguri uprising of July 2009, the attack 
on the UNDP office in Abuja in August 2011 attracted much attention. Thus a 
considerable number of articles on Boko Haram are now being written in the 
field of security studies. Many of them speculate on an Al-Qaeda franchise in 
Nigeria and possible links with AQIM (Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb) in Mali.1 
Some even suggest that the US should fund the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brother-
hoods to counter radical Islamism (Hill 2010). Such articles are oriented towards 
policy making. Accordingly, they make recommendations on the way to fight 
terrorism in the Nigerian context (see for instance Waldek & Jayasekara 2011; 
                                                            
1  See for instance the papers of Sean Gourley, Valarie Thomson and Shannon Connell in the special 
issue of Global Security Studies, Vol. 3, N° 3, 2012. Without any evidence, authors like Robert Crow-
ley and Henry Wilkinson even connect Boko Haram to drug trafficking in Mali (2013). As for Mi-
chael McCaul et al., they lobby so much for the sect to be listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization 
that they quote Nigerian journalists of Vanguard (who never went to Mali) to pretend that Boko Ha-
ram participated in the attack on the Algerian consulate in Gao in 2012. In this same report, however, 
the US Representatives admit that the explosives used by the group within Nigeria were not supplied 
by foreigners but probably stolen from mining operations in the Middle Belt or construction sites in 
Yobe (2013: 18). In any case, the French military of Operation Serval in 2013 did not find any Boko 
Haram training camp in northern Mali, just a few individuals hailing from Nigeria. Very few witness-
es can actually testify to a physical link between the two organisations. UN Special Envoy to the Re-
public of Niger and Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler is one of them (2013: 398). He was kidnapped 
by AQIM in 2008 and saw in their ranks a single unidentified Nigerian, presumably from a Boko Ha-
ram cell in Kano. For an opposite view according to which Boko Haram is unlikely to be a trans-
national organisation because the vast majority of its attacks and threats is directed against domestic 
targets, see also Eveslage (2013) and Pérouse de Montclos (2012). 
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Aghedo & Osumah 2012; Forest 2012; Onuoha 2012; Idowu 2013; Sampson 
2013). But they do not investigate Boko Haram from a political, sociological, 
religious, and anthropological academic perspective. 
Hence the necessity for a different type of analysis. Written by Nigerian, 
French, British, German, and American contributors, this book is the first of its 
kind. It not only offers different perspectives from northern and southern Nigeria, 
but also combines fieldwork and theory, qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
Moreover, it is not just another monograph study on Boko Haram. Rather, the 
following chapters investigate how radical Islamism destabilises the Nigerian 
state and challenges its secularity. In a pluralistic society, the jihad of Boko Ha-
ram raises many fears regarding Shariah, freedom of religion, the clash of civili-
sations, and the prospect of a civil war with Christians. Yet all these issues are 
usually oversimplified in the rhetoric of the war on terrorism. 
Shariah, for instance, is a whole way of life for Muslims. It should not be re-
duced to criminal law. Likewise, jihad is first and foremost an internal spiritual 
struggle, rather than a holy war against Christians (Cruise O’Brien & Coulon 
1988; Westerlund & Rosander 1997; Levtzion & Pouwels 2000; Vikør 2005; 
Soares 2007; Hefner 2011). As for freedom of religion, it is often understood by 
legal practitioners as a right to follow a rite, to preach, to express religious beliefs 
in public and, more generally, to be allowed to build a church, a mosque, or a 
temple. However, argues the French philosopher Rémi Brague, it is also the free-
dom to enter … or to leave a religion (AED 2013: 13). It is the right to convert, 
to be an atheist or to dissent within a religion, drawing the limits to a core doc-
trine, up to ‘excommunication’, anathema, and apostasy. 
In this regard, Boko Haram is above all a challenge to mainstream Islam in 
Nigeria. The sect tells the story of a dissent and a fight between Muslims. So it 
would be misleading to understand Boko Haram as a struggle to convert Chris-
tians to Islam. From its very beginning in the late 1990s, the sect mainly aimed to 
enforce a strict form of Shariah law. It began to target Christians at a much later 
stage, since 2009. In other words, the classical views and fears about a Nigerian 
war between religions reveal a very poor understanding of the doctrine and the 
fundamental drivers of Boko Haram. The secretive, mysterious, and stunning 
nature of the sect does not help either. 
In fact, analysts do not even agree on the name of the group. Followers of 
Mohammed Yusuf see themselves as the “People Committed to the Propagation 
of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal 
Jihad). Boko Haram, explains Andrea Brigaglia, is only a nickname which “cap-
tures all the stereotypes that have daily currency in islamophobic discourses”: 
obscurantism, primitivism, and the essentialist ferocity of Muslims (2012: 38). 
Moreover, specialists contest the meaning of Boko Haram, which is often trans-
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lated as “Western education is a sin”. According to Roman Loimeier, for in-
stance, ‘sin’ is a Christian concept that does not exist in Islam, and the Arabic 
term haram should be translated as ‘forbidden’, with a meaning of shame at-
tached to it (2012). Boko, adds linguist Paul Newman, does not come from Eng-
lish and never meant ‘book’; it refers rather to a sham, a fraud, and the Western 
type of education, karatun boko in Hausa (2013). 
Another challenge is to find reliable and relevant evidence on Boko Haram. 
Since 2009, the volatile security environment makes it very difficult to access 
Borno and Yobe states in order to conduct interviews and cross-check oral testi-
monies. The problem is also to analyse the sketchy material on the sect: writings, 
audio and video recordings, communiqués, and so on. Mohammed Yusuf’s only 
book is an important source, but authors do not agree on the date of its publica-
tion – sometime between 2005 and 2009. As for public statements, few research-
ers have attempted to use them as primary data (for an exception, see Eveslage 
2013). Many communiqués of Boko Haram in Hausa or Arabic are not properly 
and fully translated by the media. As a result, their analyses are sometimes mis-
leading. Professor Ricardo Laremont, for instance, claimed that in 2010 the head 
of the sect Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to AQIM leader Abdelmalek 
Droukdel, when actually he expressed his solidarity only with jihadist fighters in 
northern Mali (2011: 245). 
The same problem applies to Ansaru, the dissident group of Boko Haram, 
whose self-proclaimed spokesman, Abu Ja’afar, had to send an email to correct 
distortions in the translation of their video in the Nigerian newspaper Desert 
Herald on 1 June 2012 (McCaul 2013: 16). The controversy concerned the fate 
of Christians, who were indeed a prime target of Ansaru – unlike those of Boko 
Haram. To set the record straight, it was thus necessary to add in the Annexes to 
this book translations directly from Hausa and Arabic of the original video and 
charter of Jama’at Ansar Al Muslimin Fi Bilad al-Sudan, a.k.a. Ansaru, respec-
tively by Nathaniel Danjibo (University of Ibadan) and Mathieu Guidère (Uni-
versity of Toulouse). 
Regarding both Ansaru and Boko Haram, secondary sources and oral testimo-
nies are also rather confusing. As a matter of fact, they often contradict each oth-
er. For instance, there are different versions of the burial of the Boko Haram vic-
tims of a car accident that led to a first clash with the security forces in June 2009 
and, ultimately, to the uprising of July. At the time of the event, the press report-
ed that the police shot at members of the sect but killed no one. Since then, how-
ever, some analysts refer to a number of fatalities during the burial, without 
providing any evidence so far. 
Military propaganda and the war on terrorism have also contributed to blurring 
the line between reality and fantasy. Security is a profitable business, and some 
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attacks have been credited to Boko Haram without clear evidence and with no 
judicial follow-up. Popular rumours have also played a role. The fear of jihad and 
a Muslim invasion of the South sell well in Nigerian and international media. In 
Europe, for instance, attacks on Christian minorities in the North often make the 
headlines, but the massacres of Muslim communities go underreported. The same 
bias exists within Nigeria, where the press is based mainly in the South. In other 
words, there is always a marked difference between oral interviews in the North 
and written material in the South. Narratives from the North and the South are 
conflicting and confuse the whole story (Adibe 2012). 
Developed in the first part of this book, a major challenge is thus to under-
stand what exactly Boko Haram is from the available evidence we have. Writing 
from the North-East, Mohammed Kyari brings an important insight in this re-
gard, showing that the radicalisation of the sect of Mohammed Yusuf paralleled 
the brutality of its repression by Nigerian security forces. Both contributed to the 
escalation of violence, up to the emergence of Ansaru and a modern global form 
of terrorism. Of course, local politics also played a role. Writing from Yobe 
State, Johannes Harnischfeger analyses how Muslim clerics and politicians were 
deeply entangled in a “web of corruption” that linked villagers with the Nigerian 
administration. That might explain why Boko Haram did indeed enjoy some 
popular support. Yet the doctrinal vision of Mohammed Yusuf was so extreme 
that it had very little appeal. In fact, Boko Haram divided and weakened the Mus-
lim community. 
Such views obviously contradict current stereotypes on jihad, forced conver-
sion, imported terrorism, and a Muslim invasion of the South. Using the case of 
Kano, for instance, Hannah Hoechner argues that there is no evidence to substan-
tiate the claim that Quranic students (almajirai) are the “foot soldiers” of Boko 
Haram. There is no predisposition to terrorism, only prejudice against the poorest 
elements of society. As for Henry Mang, he analyses Christian perspectives from 
Plateau State, a place where recurrent fighting with Muslim minority communi-
ties also exacerbates stereotypes, misunderstandings, hard feelings, and the rheto-
ric of the “clash of civilisations”. The perception of “Islam’s bloody corridors”, 
he writes, changes according to various Christian schools of thought, with a vast 
spectrum from conservative to liberal views. In the same vein, Portia Roelofs 
shows that competing discourses over the meaning of the Boko Haram uprising 
in 2009 are characterised by different conceptions of the state. In the media, 
some argue for a government that should provide development and order, but 
others emphasise the state’s secular role in containing expansionist Islam and 
helping mainstream Islam to control deviant sects. 
Hence the issue is not only to know what Boko Haram is, but also to under-
stand what it stands for. In the second part of this book, we analyse the relation-
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ship of the sect to the ruling class and investigate how the fear of terrorism has 
transformed the political game. I argue that, despite its religious background, 
Boko Haram is political in nature because it contests Western values, challenges 
the secularity of the state, and reveals the corruption of a system that relies on a 
predatory ruling elite. Yet its leaders have never actually proposed a political 
programme to establish a caliphate and govern Nigeria according to Shariah law. 
In this regard, Boko Haram is first and foremost a challenge to a divided ummah 
that never succeeded in setting up a party to play the democratic game and con-
test elections with a religious programme instead of resorting to violence as an 
alternative channel for reform. 
Writing from the National Defence College in Abuja, Freedom Onuoha then 
focuses on the international context of the global Salafi Jihadist ideology rather 
than on local dynamics. He shows that the professionalisation and the radicalisa-
tion of the sect now pose significant threats to sub-regional security, beyond Ni-
geria. In his view, the audacity of Boko Haram reflects the weakness of the Nige-
rian state and its inability to build government legitimacy, to deliver public 
goods, to strengthen moderate Islam, and to implement a robust programme on 
countering ideological support for extremism and terrorism. By the same token, 
Rafael Serrano and Zacharias Pieri, from the University of South Florida, focus 
on the brutality of the JTF (Joint Task Force) and its inability to contain the sect 
and conduct a coherent strategy in an asymmetric war. In their chapter, the au-
thors show that Nigeria ranks highest in terms of the ratio of militant to security 
force deaths compared with other counter-insurgency operations, in Northern 
Ireland, Colombia, and Chechnya. Their quantitative investigation also reveals 
that the ratio between arrests and killings has increasingly shifted towards killing, 
with a corresponding rise in abuses and collateral damage amongst civilians. 
In the final chapter, Gérard Chouin, Manuel Reinert and Elodie Apard exam-
ine the targeting of Christians by Boko Haram. They first caution us against a 
quick reading of the body count. It is often difficult, they explain, to identify vic-
tims and perpetrators. In addition, the faith of most victims remains unknown. As 
a result, it is extremely perilous to discuss the relative percentage of victims 
amongst Muslims and Christians. The authors did not find any reports about 
Boko Haram attacks against Christians before the crisis of July 2009. They had 
to combine demographic studies and a careful analysis of fatalities recorded in 
the Nigeria Watch database up until December 2012 to provide some of the most 
refined tools available so far to discuss such a sensitive issue. Their findings sug-
gest that the majority of the victims – around two thirds – were Muslims. Alt-
hough it cannot be denied that Christians have been subjected to targeted attacks 
from Boko Haram militants since July 2009, their conclusion challenges the 
common wisdom on the crisis as a war between religions. 
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Part I 
 
What is Boko Haram? 
Some evidence and a lot of confusion 
  
 
 
  
2 
The message and methods  
of Boko Haram 
 
Kyari Mohammed 
 
 
Abstract 
Boko Haram emerged from a tiny group of Islamist militants who openly chal-
lenged the Nigerian state between December 2003 and October 2004 without 
success. Thereafter, the remains of the group joined Mohammed Yusuf, who 
had returned from self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia and proselytised in Bor-
no until 2009, when the movement turned openly violent and was militarily 
suppressed. The group evolved, remodelled itself, and changed its tactics and 
strategies after a year’s lull, essentially in response to the state’s high-handed 
and brutal force. It moved from the dawah (proselytisation) phase marked by 
fiery speeches to the armed struggle phase in July 2009. Following a severe 
military crackdown and changing sub-regional dynamics in the Sahel, Boko 
Haram increasingly adopted the tactics of global Salafi Jihadist groups, includ-
ing targeted assassinations, suicide bombings, and hostage taking. Although it 
emerged as a home-grown group with local grievances, developments in Mali 
and the international scene are increasingly drawing it into regional and global 
jihadi networks.  
Introduction 
Boko Haram is an Islamist movement which operated in north-eastern Nigeria 
and came to prominence in 2009. It was a fringe group under the leadership of 
Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, a fiery scholar resident in Maiduguri, who had not 
fully committed to violence before 2009. Through subtle and open harassment, 
Boko Haram was goaded into an open confrontation with the Nigerian state and 
violently suppressed in July 2009. Thereafter, it went underground, rebuilt, and 
resurfaced in October 2010 with a remarkable prison break at Bauchi and has 
since changed its tactics to targeted assassinations, drive-by shootings, suicide 
bombings, and massive deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ve-
hicle-borne IEDs, and, lately, kidnapping and hostage taking.  
The message of the movement has transformed over the years. Before 2009, it 
was characterised by the blistering speeches of its leader Mohammed Yusuf. This 
period was characterised by proselytisation (dawah), which included verbal as-
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saults on secular authority, both traditional and modern – democratic. However, 
from 2010 onwards, Boko Haram committed itself to asymmetric warfare. Since 
its re-emergence the group had tried to mimic and adopt the tactics and strategies 
of global Salafist movements such as Al-Qaeda. Although heavily influenced by 
the message of Al-Qaeda and external developments, Boko Haram’s grievances 
remained local at inception; however, there have been attempts to link local 
grievances to international developments in Mali and beyond.  
Three distinct and yet overlapping phases can be discerned in the evolution of 
Boko Haram. The first phase is what can be termed the Kanama phase (2003-05), 
when a militant jihadist group waged war on the Nigerian state but was repelled 
with casualties on both sides. This group was led by Muhammad Ali, a Nigerian 
who was radicalised by jihadi literature in Saudi Arabia and was believed to have 
fought alongside the mujahideen in Afghanistan. The second phase began with 
the collapse of the Kanama uprising and ended with the suppression of Boko Ha-
ram proper in July 2009. This period, which can be dubbed the dawah phase, was 
devoted to intensive proselytisation, recruitment, indoctrination, and radicalisa-
tion of its members. This phase involved extensive criticism of the extant secular 
system; debates with opposing ulama (clerics) on the propriety or otherwise of 
Western education, Westernisation, democracy, and secularism; and unceasing 
criticism of the corruption and bad governance under Governor Ali Modu Sheriff 
(2003-2011) of Borno State as well as the conspicuous consumption and opu-
lence of the Western-educated elite in the midst of poverty. The third phase be-
gan with the 2009 suppression of the movement and the killing of its leadership 
in gory and barbaric form by Nigerian security agencies. Boko Haram went un-
derground, re-organised, and resurfaced in 2010 with a vengeance. They not only 
targeted their perceived opponents, but indiscriminately attacked security offi-
cials, politicians associated with the ruling All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) 
government in Borno State, and resorted to bombing high profile targets in Abuja 
such as the Nigerian Police Headquarters as well as UN offices, in June and Au-
gust 2011 respectively. As the military crackdown intensified, they became des-
perate and more militant, thereby resorting to more desperate measures, which 
they had despised in the past, such as burning of school buildings, attacking tele-
communications base stations, killing and kidnapping of foreigners, slaughtering 
as opposed to shooting of opponents, and killing of health officials at routine 
vaccination clinics, as well as random shooting of pupils and teachers at schools.  
This chapter attempts a reconstruction of the message and methods of Boko 
Haram before and after 2009, indicating the ebbs, flows, and nuances, as well as 
the contours of both the message and the methods. Boko Haram emerges as an 
amoebic group, continuously shaping and remodelling itself and its message to 
changing local and international developments. 
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Historical background 
Nigeria’s pre-colonial history and mode of incorporation into the global capitalist 
system under British colonial rule determined, to a large extent, the pattern and 
development of its geo-cultural and religious influences. The northern areas of 
the country are predominantly Muslim due to centuries of contact with Muslim 
North Africa through trans-Saharan trade, the agency of the Kanem-Borno em-
pire prior to the nineteenth century, and the Sokoto Caliphate since the 1804 ji-
had. In contemporary times, modern means of mass communication and globali-
sation have opened up the country to foreign influences at an incredibly rapid 
rate. The southern part of the country is predominantly Christian, with a substan-
tial Muslim population. This is partly due to prolonged contact with European 
influences dating back to the fifteenth century. However, there are substantial 
and vibrant minorities and animists in both regions. Colonial policies of divide-
and-rule reinforced perceptions of North-South separateness, thereby not only 
blocking the emergence of a pan-Nigerian movement against colonial rule, but 
also fossilising the differences and separateness. The emergence and consolida-
tion of a tripodal regional structure and ethno-regional political parties in the late 
1940s solidified these positions. These regional identities and policies continue to 
shape Nigerian politics and governance to this day (Osaghae 2002). 
Muslim identity and thought in Nigeria derive from the Sufi brotherhoods of 
Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya, primarily as a result of the historical role of the Kanem-
Borno and Sokoto caliphates in the spread of Islam. The Sufi orders and the 
Izalatul Bidi’a wa Ikhamatis Sunnah (People Committed to the Removal of In-
novations in Islam; hereafter Izala) are the two dominant contemporary Muslim 
foci of identity. The disdain towards and fear of boko (Western education) arose 
from its historically close association with the colonial state and Christian mis-
sionaries. This also suited colonial educational policy well, as the British had no 
intention of widespread education anyway. The aim of colonial education, partic-
ularly in northern Nigeria, was to maintain the existing status quo by “imparting 
some literacy to the aristocratic class, to the exclusion of the commoner classes” 
(Tukur 1979: 866). By the 1930s, colonial education had produced a limited ca-
dre of Western-educated elite, who were conscious of their education and were 
yearning to play a role in society. Mainly children of the aristocratic class, the 
type of education they received was “different from the traditional education in 
their various societies, and this by itself was enough to mark them out as a 
group” (Kwanashie 2002: 50). This new education enabled them to climb the 
social and economic ladder over and above their peers who had a different kind 
of education, Quranic education. This was the origin of the animosity and distrust 
between the traditionally educated and Western-educated elite in northern Nige-
ria. Though subordinate to the Europeans, these educated elite were perceived as 
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collaborators by their Arabic-educated fellows. Thus the antagonism towards 
Western education continues in many northern Nigerian communities, which 
have defied government campaigns for school enrolment to this day. Mohammed 
Yusuf simply resurrected and built on an existing historical narrative.  
Evolution of Boko Haram 
The first open challenge to government authority in this area was by a tiny group 
of people who withdrew from the urban landscape of Maiduguri to rural Kanama 
in the Yunusari local government area of Yobe State in north-eastern Nigeria in 
December 2003. They referred to themselves as the “Nigerian Taleban” (sic). 
Their choice of rural Kanama as camp was made with an eye for military details. 
This site was carefully chosen for its remoteness and defensibility. The Kanama 
camp was forested and ensconced between two bodies of water near the Nigeria–
Niger border. Trenches were dug and camouflaged across the only two access 
roads from Kanama and the exit road to Niger Republic, and sandbags were used 
to reinforce the defences.1 The militants then launched attacks on police stations 
and government buildings and generally wreaked havoc on the Yunusari, Tar-
muwa, Borsari, Geidam, and Damaturu local government areas of Yobe State 
between 21 December 2003 and 1 January 2004.  
Between January and September 2004, this tiny group resurfaced and terror-
ised the inhabitants of Damaturu, the Yobe State capital and Damboa, Bama, and 
Gwoza in neighbouring Borno State, attacking police stations and attempting 
prison breaks (Cook 2011: 10). They finally took a last stand atop the Mandara 
Mountains, from where they were dislodged by the Nigerian military using artil-
lery shells (ibid.). In October 2004, they took 12 policemen hostage in Kala 
Balge and not much was heard of the captives for a long time.  
Members of this group were mostly young people in their twenties. This was a 
very diverse group, which also included females assigned domestic chores such 
as cooking and fetching firewood and water. Some of them were children of no-
table public figures, including a nephew of the then serving Governor of Yobe 
State, a son of the secretary to Borno State government, and five children of a 
local wealthy contractor.2 
Mohammed Yusuf was neither an active physical participant nor a prominent 
figure at Kanama.3 However, he shared the same ideology as the group. The re-
                                                            
1  Interview: Anonymous, security officer who took part in the investigations at Kanama, 11 April 2010. 
2  Nephew to Bukar Abba Ibrahim, Governor of Yobe State (1999-2007), now a serving senator; son of 
Abbagana Terab, secretary to the Borno State government;  and five sons of Alhaji Kambar Adam. In-
terview: Anonymous, security officer who took part in the investigations at Kanama, 11 April 2010. 
3  Mohammed Yusuf’s role along with Abu Umar and Ibrahim Abdulganiyu was talent spotting, re-
cruitment, and indoctrination of members; however, he escaped to Saudi Arabia and remained there 
throughout the uprising. Interview, Audu Maisaje, Maiduguri, 13 February 2010. 
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mainder of those who survived the Kanama misadventure joined Mohammed 
Yusuf upon his return from exile in Saudi Arabia in 2005 to swell the group. The 
survivors of Kanama became the hawks within the Yusufiyya movement. Mu-
hammad Ali, the leader of this incipient group, was in part responsible for initiat-
ing Mohammed Yusuf into militant jihadi ideology and world view.4 Yusuf’s 
conversion from the mainstream Islam prevalent in his area of operation to the 
fringe Islamic movement which he nurtured and led occurred c. 2005. Even 
though Muhammad Ali was the dominant influence in the indoctrination of Mo-
hammed Yusuf, it was the years under Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam that radi-
calised as well as apparently legitimised the dawah. This largely accounts for the 
sense of betrayal and the stupendous energy expended in attempts to dissuade 
Yusuf from his new-found ideology and chosen course by very prominent Wah-
habi scholars such as Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, Sheikh Muhammad Abba Aji, and 
Imam Ali Gabchiya. Mohammed Yusuf usually agreed with Sheikh Ja’afar on 
the shortcomings and baselessness of his position in private disputations but re-
verted to his original position as soon as he conferred with his followers.5 
The dawah phase 
The period between the Kanama fiasco and the violent suppression of Boko Ha-
ram in July 2009 may be referred to as the second or dawah phase. Mohammed 
Yusuf returned from his self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia after a rapproche-
ment with the state, brokered by Borno State deputy governor, Adamu Shettima 
Dibal and Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, during the 2005 pilgrimage in Mecca, 
Saudi Arabia. According to Sheikh Ja’afar, Mohammed Yusuf had assured them 
that he was not a party to the Kanama uprising and swore never to espouse such 
violent jihadi ideology.6 This was the basis upon which Mohammed Yusuf was 
permitted to return to Nigeria, where he continued to preach in and around Mai-
duguri. At this time and up to the July 2009 crushing by the Nigerian state, the 
Yusufiyya movement had no official name for itself.7 It referred to itself as 
dawah, identified its mission as a return to the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’a (Ad-
herents to the Sunnah and the Community of Muslims), and referred to its mem-
bers as “brothers”. The first reference to its current preferred name of Ahlus Sun-
                                                            
4  Interview, Ali Mowar, Maiduguri, 10 November 2009. 
5  Interview with several Wahhabi scholars in Maiduguri between 2009 and 2011. 
6  Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, taped sermon on his relationship with Mohammed Yusuf, dated 6 June 
2006. This tape was released by Mohammed Yusuf. However, the tape must have been released by 
Ja’afar earlier, probably in 2005. Copy in my possession. 
7  This was the name by which they were known. They later adopted the name Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah 
Lidda’awati wal Jihad (People Committed to the Removal of Innovation and Jihad), as against the 
popular but derisive Boko Haram, which they abhor. 
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nah liddawa’ati wal Jihad came in the aftermath of the Bauchi prison break in 
September 2010 (ICG 2010: 36 & n; Adamu 2012: 32-3). 
The dawah is a major feature of radical Islam in the Muslim world. It is, in the 
words of Emmanuel Sivan (2003: 27), 
[an] Islamist term which denotes a combination of propaganda, education, medical and wel-
fare action – and its practitioners. Yet the da’awa has an importance beyond that of being a 
possible cradle for violence. It is bringing about change in many Muslim societies, and 
sometimes plays a role – albeit indirect – in politics. 
Mohammed Yusuf had adopted the dawah, a major plank of Islamic jihadi 
strategy, very early in his peripatetic career. The narratives of the movement and 
the counter narratives were all developed at this stage in the evolution of the 
movement.  
The narratives of Boko Haram  
The message of Boko Haram, as outlined by Mohammed Yusuf, derived from 
and fed into the extant discourse and ideology of Islamism worldwide. Boko Ha-
ram narratives were framed within the radical Islamic discourse with which Mo-
hammed Yusuf had become conversant. The main narratives of the sect, as out-
lined in Yusuf’s sermons, were distributed widely throughout northern Nigeria 
via the Islamist media of choice (audio tapes) and through open-air sermons. The 
rejection of secularism, democracy, Western education, and Westernisation were 
the major planks of the narratives. 
The rejection of secularism and the pursuit of its replacement by Shariah is a 
current in radical Islam that goes back to the fourteenth century Damascene 
scholar Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (1268-1328 CE). Ibn Taymiyyah wrote much on 
jihad and even elevated it above the Islamic pillars of fasting and pilgrimage 
(Bukay 2006: 4). Many modern scholars have used his fatwas (rulings) urging 
Muslims to rise against the Mongols to justify suicide bombings today (ibid.). 
However, the rejection of Western democracy partly derives from the same rejec-
tion of secularism but was further sharpened by the Saudi Arabian establish-
ment’s aversion to democracy’s subversive element and the potential threat it 
could pose to the monarchy if unchecked. Therefore, Saudi scholars such as 
Sheikh Bakr Ibn Abdallah Abu Zaid (1944-2008) consistently attacked democra-
cy and the freedoms it flaunted as anti-Islamic. Incidentally, none of Yusuf’s op-
ponents in the various debates took him up on the issue of democracy, therefore 
making its un-Islamic nature look settled. They all concentrated on the issue of 
Western education, Westernisation, and the propriety or impropriety of working 
for government institutions. 
The Yusufiyya dawah was built around a close-knit group of followers, who 
believed in the justness of their cause and offered unalloyed loyalty to their lead-
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er. Mohammed Yusuf believed in what he preached and constantly exhorted his 
followers that the road will be rough and tough, and only a select few who perse-
vere and are rightly guided by Allah will make it. In a sermon delivered on 30 
June 2006, he said:8 
In this dawah we agreed that we are going to suffer like Bilal9 was dragged on the ground, 
just like Ammar Ibn Yasir10 was tortured, just like a spear was thrust unto Summayyah’s 
vagina.11 These are trials we are awaiting ... These are the hurdles we want to cross. Anyone 
who dies in the process goes to Paradise. This is our dawah. 
He prepared the minds of his followers for possible consequences of their deci-
sion thus:12 
In the process they will abuse you, call you names and some of you may even die. They will 
shoot some of you, and we will just pray “may Allah give you aljanna” [Paradise] and pro-
ceed without any qualms. Can we endure? We ought to endure. May Allah give us the will to 
endure? This is how our dawah is. Patience: this is what we need, brothers. And persever-
ance upon the truth. Allah is watching us. Victory is certain. What we lack are the helpers. 
We are not yet primed for victory, but we are working towards getting ready for victory. 
This is what we are looking for, brothers. This is an incipient dawah, but it cannot be 
crushed. It cannot be killed. If we really stand by what the Prophet says we should stand by, 
even if we die in the process, this dawah will continue – even after a hundred years. Once 
the truth comes out, you13 are in trouble. 
The main planks of Yusuf’s narratives were framed, though not exclusively, 
around the following issues or variants of them: (1) the concept of taghut (idola-
try), including secularism, democracy, and partisan politics; (2) Western educa-
tion and Westernisation; (3) working for an un-Islamic government; and (4) re-
pudiation of the charge of Kharijism levelled against them by the local ulama, 
especially his former colleagues in the Wahhabi group in Borno. The fight with 
the local Borno Izala in the run-up to the 2009 crisis was extremely acrimonious, 
but is outside the scope of this chapter.  
The concept of taghut and its rejection and replacement by Shariah is a current 
in radical Islamic discourse that goes back to Ibn Taymiyyah, the scholar after 
whom the Yusufiyya named their mosque, Markaz Ibn Taymiyyah.14 Ibn Taymiy-
yah was a puritan Salafi scholar, who strove to ensure Islam’s adherence to Sha-
riah, eradicate alien innovations, and rejuvenate correct Islamic thought and prac-
tice. Ibn Taymiyyah’s ruling on the Mongols has infused radical Islamic move-
                                                            
8  Audio tape, dated 30 June 2006, in Hausa language. All translations are mine.  
9  Bilal Ibn Rabah al-Habashi (580-640 CE), an African slave companion of the Prophet Mohammed, 
who endured serious torture upon his conversion to Islam but still remained steadfast. 
10  Another convert and companion of the Prophet, who along with his mother, Summayyah, was tortured 
for his conversion. 
11  Summayyah bint Khayyat, mother to the aforementioned Ammar Ibn Yasir. She did not survive the 
tortures and is considered the first Muslim martyr.  
12  Muhamed Yusuf sermon, audio tape, dated 30 June 2006. 
13  Reference to his adversaries, which at this time included Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam, the staunch-
est critic of Mohammed Yusuf in his lifetime. 
14   Ibn Taymiyyah Centre. 
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ments from Hassan al-Banna to Osama bin Laden (Euben & Zaman 2009). Mo-
hammed Yusuf was heavily influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah, as seen by the copious 
references to him in his only book (Yusuf 2009a) and his sermons. 
Quoting copiously from Ibn Taymiyyah, Mohammed Yusuf describes as 
taghut (idolatry) any form of executive, legislative, or judicial function derived 
from a secular constitution rather than from Islamic Shariah law. This is at the 
root of his opposition to secularism, democracy, and partisan politics as practised 
in Nigeria, and it led him on a collision course with Nigerian authorities on sev-
eral occasions, culminating in the 2009 crisis. As far as he was concerned, fideli-
ty to the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and subjecting oneself to 
the institutions created by it amount to unbelief.  
Those who formulate evil laws in their parliaments have made themselves partners to Allah, 
whether or not they feel it, whether or not they agree to this or disagree, whether or not they 
meant it … Those who follow the legislative [sic] system and agree to take their cases to 
these courts are in agreement with taghut and are idolaters. (Yusuf 2009a: 66) 
Even the symbolic bowing to the mace in the legislature did not escape Moham-
med Yusuf’s (2009a: 67) censure, who insisted: 
Parliamentarians and members of assemblies have combined between [sic] them making 
themselves gods and ascribing partners to Allah. This is because their mace is their object of 
worship in various ways such as bowing to it, subjecting themselves to it, loving it and using 
it as a symbol of shirk (apostasy), as they do not pass any bill or make decisions without it. 
[Without the mace] such decisions are unacceptable and has [sic] no legal backing. 
Therefore, in Mohammed Yusuf’s conception, anyone who superintends or 
abides by the laws and regulations within Nigeria’s secular system is an unbe-
liever simpliciter. This was the cause of the protracted and often acrimonious 
debate with the Izala in the run-up to the 2009 violence.  
The rejection of Western democracy derives from the same rejection of secu-
larism but was further sharpened by the Saudi Arabian establishment’s aversion 
to democracy’s subversive streak and the threat it posed to the Saudi monarchy if 
unleashed. Saudi scholars such as Sheikh Bakr Ibn Abu Zaid consistently at-
tacked democracy and the freedoms it flaunted as anti-Islamic. Mohammed 
Yusuf was heavily influenced by the writings of Saudi-based scholars such as 
Bakr Ibn Abu Zaid, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Abd-Allah Ibn Baaz (1910-99), and 
Sheikh Muhammad al-Amin ash Shanqiti (1907-73). As mentioned before, all of 
Yusuf’s opponents side-stepped the issue of democracy being un-Islamic, there-
by making the issue appear incontestable or settled.  
For the same reason that a government not based on Shariah is illegal, serving 
such a government is also illegitimate. Yusuf (2009a: 11) said: 
Our call refuses employment under the government which does not rule by what Allah has 
revealed such as the French law, the American law, the British law or any other constitution 
or system that goes against the teachings of Islam and negates the Qur’an and Sunnah.  
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The legality or otherwise of Western education (Hausa: boko) and of serving 
in government became the main points of contention and debate with the Izala 
preachers. Yusuf was categorical that boko and serving the extant government 
were abhorrent and could lead to unbelief. When pressed to the wall in the de-
bates with Isa Ibrahim Ali Pantami (Pantami-Yusuf 2006) and Idris Abdul Aziz 
Bauchi,15 Mohammed Yusuf was definitive that they are haram (“forbidden”). 
Among types of knowledge which he decreed as haram are the physical and ap-
plied sciences, which deal with subjects such as Darwinism, evolution, and rain-
fall.  
The rejection of Western education and Westernisation were the twin pillars 
which defined the movement. There exists a strand of anti-Western education 
views in Islamist discourse, but its trenchant manifestations are relatively new. 
Many prominent leaders of the Islamist movement in other parts of the Muslim 
world, such as Sayed Qutb (1906-66) and Hassan al-Banna (1906-49) in Egypt 
and Abu’l-Al’a Mawdudi (1903-79) in Pakistan, were trained in modern secular 
institutions and not traditional madrassahs (Euben & Zaman 2009: 10).  
The aversion to Western education was derived in part from local conditions 
in northern Nigeria, and in part from the views of Saudi scholars, including 
Sheikh Bakr Ibn Abu Zaid. Asked what his views on Western education were in 
the debate with Sheikh Isa Pantami, Mohammed Yusuf responded thus: 
There are three perspectives on knowledge in Islam. The first is knowledge which is in line 
with what the Quran and the Hadith taught. The second perspective is where such knowledge 
differs with what the Quran and the Hadith contain. The third is a neutral perspective – 
which neither contradicts nor supports the Quran and Hadith; for as the Prophet said in a 
Hadith relating to People of the Book – “If they bring to you anything agreeable to the 
Quran, accept it; but if they bring anything that contradicts Islam, reject it; and if they bring 
anything that neither contradicts nor supports the Quran, it is your choice to accept or reject 
it.” Well, this is the perspective I accept. If any form of knowledge is to be pursued for its 
sake, not following the structure of any government form of education, then I have my own 
reservations. (CD, Pantami-Yusuf Debate, 2006) 
Mallam Yusuf is clear about the colonial origins of Western education. He ar-
gues: 
Western education is the body of knowledge that came to us through European colonialists, 
and includes medicine, technology, geography, physics and so on. And of course the English 
language. They can all be used if they do not clash with the teachings of the Prophet Mo-
hammed (may the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), and we can teach these sub-
jects to our own children in our own schools, so long as they do not contradict Islamic teach-
ings. If they do, then we should discard them. (CD, Pantami-Yusuf Debate, 2006)  
There are some subjects, such as geography, geology, and sociology, which 
Mohammed Yusuf categorically says are forbidden (haram).  
                                                            
15  This DVD was created in February 2008, and the debate may have taken place in January or February 
of the same year (Adamu 2012: 22).  
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I have a book that discusses the knowledge of geography, geology, and sociology. These 
branches of knowledge are not knowledge but full of unbelief. Even those studying it are 
aware if they are fair to Allah, except if they haven’t studied Islam. If you have read geogra-
phy, you’ll know that in geography there is danger. If you have studied Islam, you’ll know, 
whoever you are, that in sociology there is danger. (Yusuf tape, 30 June 2006)  
An unrepentant and fiery Yusuf insists that Western education amounts to un-
belief: 
We are ready to debate any one on this creed. Western education is destructive. We didn’t 
say knowledge is bad but that the unbelief inside it is more than its usefulness. I have Eng-
lish books in my possession which I read regularly. I didn’t say English amounts to unbelief 
but the unbelief contained therein and the polytheism inside. In the process of becoming ed-
ucated, you become a mushrik [idolater]. This is our only fear … Destruction is destruction, 
whoever it comes from. Because it is the white man that brought it, does it amount to civili-
sation? Yes, our own is traditional, as you call it, but yours is ‘shirkasiation’.16 (Yusuf tape, 
30 June 2006) 
The charge of Kharijism, levelled against them by the local Izala group, was 
the most painful and apparently distasteful to Boko Haram. The spirited attempt 
to repudiate this charge was perhaps the main reason that compelled Mohammed 
Yusuf to write his book Hazihi Aqeedatun wa Minhaju Da’awatuna.17 Both the 
charge and the repudiation did not seriously enter the debates, since most of the 
debates took place in 2006, three years before the allegations became public 
knowledge. The allegations of Kharijism emerged in the debates and audio-taped 
responses in the run-up to the July 2009 eruption of violence in Maiduguri. It is 
remarkable to note that the charge of Kharijism was mainly a local affair. How-
ever, the ease with which they label other Muslims as unbelievers, the lack of 
distinction between sin and unbelief, the quarrelsomeness and predisposition to 
easily kill for even minor infractions – all these mirror Khariji inclinations. 
By early 2009 Mohammed Yusuf had openly attacked the local Izala ulama 
for hobnobbing with the corrupt and kleptocratic government of Governor Ali 
Modu Sheriff of Borno State. Yusuf had on numerous occasions addressed Gov-
ernor Ali Sheriff as taghut and condemned the excesses of the government as un-
Islamic and autocratic. The ulama that were patronised by and in the good books 
of the government were equally chastised for serving the kuffur (non-believing) 
government. Essentially, for this reason the local Izala, led by Mallam Bashir 
Mustafa (alias Kashar’ra), dubbed Boko Haram as Kharijite, especially because 
they easily label any sinner an unbeliever. The characterisation as Kharijites le-
                                                            
16  Derived from shirk, the Arabic word for apostasy or unbelief. 
17  Translated as “This is our belief and method of call” by A. S. Abdul-Mumini, who has graciously 
allowed me to use his translations, which are still in progress. Adamu (2012) translates the same work 
as “This is our manifesto and our path”.  
 The message and methods of Boko Haram 19 
 
gitimised their killing. Thus, many scholars, but especially Bashir Kashar’ra, 
openly called on the state to exterminate them.18  
The repudiation of this charge of Kharijism was the subject of many sermons 
and a book. Mohammed Yusuf says in the preface to Aqeedatun: 
When I saw some people talking about us and our call attempting to relate us to some beliefs 
– which Allah knows we are innocent of – such as al-Khawarij, Shi’ite, Quraniyun, or some 
secret groups … I set out to explain our belief and method of call/propagation because this is 
what explains the way for us and for anyone who wants fairness for himself and for others.  
I have entitled the book “This is Our Belief and Method of Call”, and in it attempted to ex-
plain what we believe in regarding Allah, His Angels, Books, Messengers, the Last Day, des-
tiny (good or bad). I explained in it that we are together with Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’a 
(mainstream Islam) in the principles of belief and method of worship and conduct and Shari-
ah. This is social justice: that a person expresses himself and his belief, conduct and method 
of his predecessors. (Yusuf 2009a: 10) 
And he chastised his opponents for the wrong accusations thus: 
It is not fair for someone else, unrelated to him, who has neither heard from him nor read his 
book or treatise, to relate him to any belief that person wants. This is injustice and it is unfair 
and Islam prohibits it. (Yusuf 2009a: 10) 
In spite of spirited attempts to dispel the accusation of Kharijism, it has stuck. 
Developments since the killing of Mohammed Yusuf and the targeted killing of 
Muslim ulama and many others seem to have confirmed Boko Haram’s Kharijite 
tendencies.  
Government service was another interesting area of discourse on which disa-
greement with the Izala came to the fore. Yusuf likened working for an un-
Islamic government not based on Shariah as amounting to unbelief. This was the 
source of a polemical debate with the Izala, who even though better armed with 
proofs and evidence could neither convince Mohammed Yusuf nor dissuade his 
members because of the widespread disenchantment with government. The im-
portant issue was not who had better reasoning but the appeal of the message. In 
this, Mohammed Yusuf had the upper hand because he was not only a gifted 
demagogue and persuasive debater, but the government was perceived by most 
citizens to be corrupt and insensitive.  
In part because of their puritan views, Boko Haram have perceived Christians 
and those Muslims who do not share their world view as enemies, and therefore 
legitimate targets of attack. Boko Haram has been attacking Christians and their 
places of worship and creating social tension and disharmony between Christians 
and Muslims in the northern states of Nigeria, and between northerners and 
southerners. Some southerners perceive Boko Haram as a mechanism for Islam-
                                                            
18  The Kharijites (Arabic: Khawarij, sing. Khariji), literally “those who went out”, is a generic term for 
Muslim dissenters in the early history of Islam. They challenged the authority of Caliph Ali Ibn Abu 
Talib. They are usually known for their extreme position of declaring other Muslims unbelievers at the 
slightest transgression and thereby justifying their killing.  
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ising the country. The leadership of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) 
has also seen the insurgency as a ploy to impose Shariah law and Islam on the 
country. According to Human Rights Watch (2012: 44), Boko Haram attacked at 
least 18 churches and killed 127 Christians between 2010 and 2012. These fig-
ures may be understated, as a Christian leader told Human Rights Watch that, in 
Borno State alone, not fewer than 142 Christians were killed between 7 June 
2011 and 17 January 2012 in what appears to be a “systematic plan of violence 
and intimidation” (HRW 2012: 44). The main aim of Boko Haram in killing 
Christians is to “start a full scale war between the Muslims and the Christians” 
(ibid. 45). It seems their ploy has worked, as CAN seems to blame Muslims and 
Muslim leaders for the actions of Boko Haram.  
While Boko Haram undoubtedly attack Christians, there are rogue elements 
acting on their own that are also attacking Christians using Boko Haram-style 
tactics. The case of Lydia Joseph and the “Miya Barkate Eight” in Bauchi State 
indicate that some Christian elements also attack churches in the name of Boko 
Haram, especially in areas with a history of inter-religious violence, either to stir 
up discontent or to settle scores due to intra-religious disputes. On 29 August 
2011, Lydia Joseph was apprehended while trying to burn St. John’s Cathedral in 
Bauchi.19 Similarly, on 9 January 2012, eight young men, all Christians, were 
apprehended attempting to bomb the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) at 
Miya Barkate in Bauchi State.20 This could have successfully passed as a Boko 
Haram attack, and some Boko Haram “spokesman” might even have claimed 
responsibility if it had succeeded. In spite of the fact that the perpetrators were 
caught in the act, Rev. Lawi Pokti, the Bauchi State CAN chairman, absolved his 
men of responsibility. However, he confirmed that there was an argument within 
the church over the location of its headquarters between Tilden Fulani and Miya 
Barkate.21  
The national leadership of CAN seems to fuel the crisis. Fortunately, Christian 
leaders in the North, especially Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah and Bishop Josi-
ah Idowu Fearon, have continuously called for restraint against reprisal attacks. 
Bishop Kukah condemned the “grand standing, demagoguery, rave and rant” by 
some religious leaders. He asked rhetorically: 
When Christians or Muslims claim self-defense, are they replacing the Commander-in-Chief 
of [all] the Armed Forces of Nigeria? Do these religious leaders who make such calls have a 
judiciary to try suspects, or a Barracks/Posts to hold suspects? Do these religious leaders be-
                                                            
19  “Police arrest prostitute over alleged attempt to burn down church”, Vanguard News, 30 August 2011. 
www.vanguardngr.com/2011/08/police-arrest-prostitute-over-allaged-attempt-to-burn-down-church) 
Accessed  23 April 2013). 
20  “Suspects of church bombing moved to Abuja”, Daily Trust, 1 March 2012.  
www.dailytrust.com.ng/index.php/news-news/9302-suspects-of-church-bombing-in-bauchi-moved-to-
abuja (Accessed 23 April 2013). 
21  Ibid. 
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lieve they can resolve political and administrative problems of law enforcement and justice? 
Or are they calling on their people to take the laws into their hands? (Kukah 2012)  
Like most issues in Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency has been politicised 
along ethnic, regional, and religious lines. The recent withdrawal of the Catholic 
Church from CAN may not be unconnected with the open partisanship and in-
flammatory statements of CAN President Ayo Oritsejeafor, who has fanned the 
embers of hatred rather than seeking solutions. The Catholic Church gave as its 
reasons for withdrawal the “polarizing statements of some Christian leaders” and 
the need to “promote Christian unity and peaceful coexistence with Christians 
and non-Christians alike”, an obvious reference to the quarrelsome leadership of 
Oritsejeafor.22 
The dynamics of Islamic radicalisation 
The drivers of radicalisation of Islamic groups include both internal and external 
developments. Although the grievances of Boko Haram are largely local, its ma-
jor influences have been foreign. The influential scholar that most shaped the 
thinking of Mohammed Yusuf, as mentioned earlier, was Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah. 
The basic message of radical Islam, whether in the Middle East, North Africa, or 
northern Nigeria, is the same: it is the duty of Muslims to revolt against and 
change apostate rulers and governments in order to help re-establish a proper Is-
lamic state. The main differences among radical groups are in the methods and 
not the ideals. 
Internal factors of Islamic radicalisation in Nigeria go back to the onset of co-
lonial rule, when Islam became the focal point of opposition to the British take-
over of the Sokoto Caliphate. British occupation of the caliphate began with the 
sacking of Bida in 1897 and was completed with the occupation of Sokoto in 
1902. By 1903 all emirates had been conquered, even though there were still 
pockets of resistance. For the leadership of the caliphate there was the problem of 
how to respond to this new anomalous situation – by resistance, collaboration, or 
emigration – while for the British the problem was the difficulty of administering 
an Islamic society on the basis of a secular and non-Islamic ideology.  
On the debate as to whether to collaborate or emigrate, the Gwandu jurist Ah-
mad Ibn Sa’id compared the situation in Sokoto to the Qaramanthian invasion of 
Mecca in 930 CE and the Mongolian invasion of Baghdad in 1258 CE and con-
cluded that an interim compromise with the colonial state was possible as long as 
they did not interfere openly with practice of the faith. Collaboration with the 
British, he posited, did not amount to unbelief “as long as the resident does not 
                                                            
22  “Nigerian Catholic Church ‘Temporarily’ Withdraws Membership of CAN”, 23 January 2013. www. 
saharareporters.com/news-page/nigerian-catholic-church-‘temporarily’-withdraws-membership-can 
(Accessed 23 April 2013). 
22 Mohammed  
 
himself become an unbeliever. It is disobedience if done voluntarily, but permis-
sible if done under compulsion” (cited by Al-Hajj 1973: 162; See Adeleye: 
1968). Thus, for most of the early colonial period a policy of non-cooperation, 
known as taqiyya (“dissimulation”), became the main pillar of resistance against 
colonial rule. After 1906, most emirs who had not been removed had grudgingly 
accepted their subordination.  
In spite of the acquiescence of the emirs, the citizenry still remained sceptical 
of British intentions, and avoidance remained the preferred policy. This partly 
accounts for the disdain for Western education. The need to domesticate Islam 
and administer a Muslim society through indigenous institutions rather than by 
brute force was the most important consideration in the introduction of the colo-
nial policy of indirect rule. The disdain for Western education is as old as the 
imposition of colonial rule, but the resort to violence to overturn it is entirely 
new. 
The birth of the Wahhabi inspired Izala in 1978 under Sheikh Mahmud Abu-
bakar Gumi (1922-92) was a major impetus in the radicalisation of Muslims in 
northern Nigeria. Although not anti-establishment, the Izala became critical of 
traditional rulers, of corruption in government, and of declining moral values of 
the society, without calling for a wholesale overthrow of the system.  
The 1979 Iranian Revolution, which overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty and estab-
lished an Islamic republic in its place in spite of US resistance, became another 
major source of Islamic radicalisation. It created the impression and instilled in 
many Muslim youths the possibility and practicability of using Islam as a vehicle 
for political and social transformation. The 1980s witnessed a proliferation of 
Iranian revolutionary literature in Nigeria, which inspired the Islamic Movement 
of Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. The revolutionary ideas of the Islamic Movement de-
rived from Sayed Qutb’s famous jihadi book Al-Ma’alim fi’l-Tariq, which has 
been rendered in English under the title of Milestones (1964) and which became 
a basic primer for its membership. Qutb’s thesis of irreconcilable difference be-
tween Islam and jahiliyya (pre-Islamic unbelief) was central to shaping the 
group’s thought. Many students who were radicalised in the Islamic Movement 
later on ended up in mainstream Sunni groups.  
The introduction of Shariah law, with a full range of criminal law punish-
ments, in Zamfara State and its whirlwind adoption by eleven other northern Ni-
gerian states since 2000 accelerated the pace of radicalisation. The protagonists 
of Shariah created the impression that it would lead to a qualitative improvement 
in the lives of the inhabitants of Shariah states. However, the operation of Shari-
ah as an adjunct to, and its subordination to, the secular constitution was anathe-
ma to radical Islamists, who now demanded a full complement of Shariah law as 
against the Zamfara model, which Boko Haram ridiculed and rejected. The ina-
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bility of the Shariah states to implement the law in full led to the rejection of the 
Zamfara model of Shariah by Boko Haram, who insisted on a full Shariah or 
nothing. The imposition of full Shariah has remained a consistent demand by 
Boko Haram. 
American foreign policy in the Middle East and especially its unalloyed sup-
port for Israel, along with the Israeli suppression of Palestinians, are important 
reasons for the radicalisation of Muslims in northern Nigeria. Nigerian Muslims 
are conversant with Islamic literature, which continuously condemns these ac-
tions. Closely related to this were the 11 September 2001 attacks on US soil and 
the reactions thereto, which also fed into an existing radicalisation channel. The 
militants of Kanama and Mohammed Yusuf were all aware of and incensed by 
the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the declaration of a ‘global 
war on terror’. These events and the war on terror were perceived as a war on 
Muslims and their religion – and this further fed into the radicalisation process 
(Mohammed 2004).  
While these external factors fed into the radicalisation of Muslims, and espe-
cially those of fringe Muslim groups in northern Nigeria, the main drivers of rad-
icalisation leading to violent conflicts are primarily internal. The retreating state 
and declining economic fortunes of the 1980s consequent upon structural ad-
justment programmes had further pauperised Nigerians. These conditions and the 
mismanagement of the limited resources and crass display of wealth by the ruling 
class, in the midst of widespread poverty, are all conducive to anger and frustra-
tion, which are expressed in religious terms. The poor existential condition of 
people in the northern states of Nigeria, in both relative and absolute terms, has 
been documented (Mohammed et al. 2000). These factors, coupled with a large 
unemployed youthful population, feed into a vicious circle of poverty. 
In times of crisis and uncertainty, Muslim societies naturally react in religious 
terms. Indeed, Mohammed Yusuf’s evangelism began in the form of a Muslim 
social movement: catering for orphans, widows, and the vulnerable. The exclud-
ed, especially the almajirai (itinerant students) who had flocked in large numbers 
to the urban areas owing to rural destitution, became a ready pool for recruitment 
and mobilisation. In difficult times, the vulnerable and excluded can be easily 
mobilised, especially by a movement such as Boko Haram, which preaches the 
brotherhood of all Muslims while attacking a system that has evidently excluded 
them as irreligious. This message has a natural appeal.  
Security agencies and the escalation of violence 
The metamorphosis of Boko Haram from a dawah to an arms-bearing sect was in 
part the making of security agencies, which approached the situation as one of 
‘law and order’ and responded as such, with disastrous consequences. There was 
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no attempt to perceive the issues raised by the movement in its broader multi-
faceted prism as political, social, and economic. The crisis in Borno State began 
over a contest for ownership of a place of worship with the Izala at Monguno in 
December 2008. Boko Haram members had been thrown out of Izala mosques as 
a result of a complete break with the Izala over the Izala’s inability to dissuade 
Mohammed Yusuf from his firmly held convictions. Owing to the close associa-
tion between the two groups up to this period, and because they had worshipped 
together in the same mosques before then, the ownership of mosques became the 
subject of bitter disputes. In one such incident while on their way to Monguno to 
reclaim a mosque from the Izala, 67 Boko Haram members, including Abubakar 
Shekau, were arrested and locked up at the Maiduguri prison by state authorities, 
apparently at the instigation of their rivals. Mohammed Yusuf vowed to recover 
the disputed mosque through due process.23  
The security agencies serially mismanaged the crisis from the outset, and in 
the process pushed the movement to the extreme end of the spectrum. First was 
the setting up of the joint military operations, code named Operation Flush II, 
which tried to draw Boko Haram out for a fight by harassing members going to 
or returning from dawah, as they called their preaching activities. Restriction of 
movement of motorcycles at night and the attempt to enforce the use of crash 
helmets were all aimed at achieving this. The mandatory use of crash helmets by 
motorcycle riders, although a national policy, was not enforced in other places 
with the same zeal. In fact, the enforcement policy stopped once the movement 
was crushed in July 2009.24  
Second was the onslaught on Boko Haram by Operation Flush II, and the 
shooting of its members at the Gwange cemetery in June 2009, which precipitat-
ed the violence at Maiduguri. Boko Haram members were going to bury their 
dead, who had died in a car crash, when security agents shot and wounded 17 of 
them. They were further provoked by being refused access to the wounded in 
hospital. This action was seen by Boko Haram as a declaration of war (Yusuf 
2009b).  
Third, the massive onslaught on the sect and the killing of its members and the 
extrajudicial killing of the sect leadership, including Mohammed Yusuf and other 
members, further radicalised members. Those who fled either went for further 
military training or went into hiding without renouncing their beliefs. These ex-
trajudicial killings and the widespread dissemination of the video footage locally 
                                                            
23  Interview, Masta’a Monguno, 10 October 2010. Mohammed Yusuf vowed to revenge this unlawful 
act and urged his supporters to use the prison to proselytise. 
24  The use of motorcycles has been banned in a number of urban areas, including Maiduguri, since June 
2010. This is because of the ease with which Boko Haram used motorcycles as getaway vehicles after 
targeted assassinations or in planting IEDs. 
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and its broadcast by the Al Jazeera cable satellite network further enraged mem-
bers.  
Once the sect was militarily crushed and their headquarters, the Markaz Ibn 
Taymiyyah, burnt and razed to the ground, the remainder of the leadership went 
underground while most members either fled or melted into the local population. 
The state compelled traditional rulers not to conceal Boko Haram members in 
their domain and in the process many were identified and handed over to security 
agencies. However, lack of confidentiality within the security system and Boko 
Haram’s intelligence network ensured that they got to know who gave infor-
mation on them to state authorities. The first phase of resurgence was marked by 
targeted killing of ward and village heads that had collaborated with state securi-
ty agents, prison officials whom they accused of torturing or poisoning their 
members in detention, prominent politicians of the ruling All Nigeria Peoples 
Party (ANPP) government of Borno State, and all security officials.  
The successes recorded against security officers in urban warfare and the fear 
instilled in them and the general public seems to have further emboldened Boko 
Haram and cowed their opponents. The inability of the state to guarantee the se-
curity of citizens – in fact, their failure to defend even their own installations and 
officers – not only emboldened sect members but had the effect of remobilising 
passive members into action. Thereafter, they used the cowed civilian population 
as a shield to perpetrate their activities. Anyone who challenged Boko Haram in 
the community was killed, and the state had no capacity to defend such people or 
identify and punish the culprits. 
The tactics of Boko Haram and those of the military differed. While Boko Ha-
ram was, at least at inception, committed to not harming those who had not an-
tagonised them and alerting people in areas where they intended to fight, the se-
curity agencies were known for their brutality in retaliation against the popula-
tion for the actions of their opponents, especially where the agencies had incurred 
fatalities. The military Joint Task Force-Operation Restore Order (JTF) func-
tioned like an army of occupation. Unable to distinguish Boko Haram members 
from unarmed civilians, they resorted to taking vengeance on the whole civilian 
population. This had the effect of alienating them from the community. In fact, 
the strategy of Boko Haram was to provoke the military by attacking and killing 
them, knowing full well that the military would kill defenceless citizens. This 
tactic has worked very well, such that local communities now openly affirm that 
Boko Haram, in spite of its excesses, is better than the military. The 19 April 
2013 killing of at least 185 unarmed civilians and the burning of over 2,000 
houses by the military, after their patrol vehicle was attacked and sustained fatali-
ties at Baga in Kukawa local government area of Borno State, clearly demon-
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strate the pattern of military response.25 Boko Haram will consciously provoke 
the military, knowing full well that the military will retaliate against the local 
population. According to an informant, Boko Haram says: “When we kill the big 
unbelievers, they will kill the lesser unbelievers.”26 The big unbelievers are mili-
tary personnel, and the lesser unbelievers are the local population: Muslim or 
Christian. 
There are numerous cases of documented atrocities by the JTF, including ex-
trajudicial killings, arbitrary dragnet arrests, illegal and arbitrary detentions, ar-
son, rape, and stealing (see Amnesty International 2012; HRW 2012).27 The fol-
lowing incidents illustrate the pattern of military response in Maiduguri.  
On 9 December 2010 soldiers stormed the Zannari zone of Maiduguri and ar-
rested sixty men shortly after their patrol vehicle was attacked in the area.28 Simi-
larly, in the Jajiri ward of Maiduguri, Sheriff Bukhari recounts how “soldiers 
broke into homes waking people up, seizing money and cell phones” and lament-
ed “it is unfortunate that the people deployed to protect us have turned against 
us”.29  
Following a skirmish between Boko Haram and security forces at the Kaleri 
ward of Maiduguri on 9 July 2011, security operatives killed more than forty 
people and underdeclared the number of those killed as only eight Boko Haram 
(Tell, 26 July 2011). Saudi and Habiba, widows of Mohammed Abdul, recounted 
how their husband was dragged out of his room and killed in cold blood (ibid.). 
Talatu, widow of Adamu Fulani, said soldiers not only killed her husband in the 
presence of his children but ransacked his room and stole N 250,000 (ibid.). 
Adamu Abdullahi, a staff member of the University of Maiduguri, was killed in 
the Kaleri incident in spite of his having identified himself to security officials.30 
In the Budum area of Maiduguri, 23 people were killed, the Budum market was 
burnt, and parked cars were sprayed with bullets when an IED planted by sect 
members exploded and injured three soldiers. There were numerous such inci-
                                                            
25  “Bloodbath in Maiduguri: 185 killed as soldiers, Boko Haram clash”,  
www.vanguardngr.com/2013/04/bloodbath-in-maiduguri-185-killed-as-soldiers-boko-haram-clash/ 
Accessed 23 April, 2013). 
26  Interview, Anonymous, Maiduguri, 11 February 2013.  
27  The atrocities of both Boko Haram and the JTF have been documented. See Amnesty International 
(2012), Nigeria: Trapped in a cycle of violence. London; Human Rights Watch (2012), Spiraling vio-
lence: Boko Haram attacks and security force abuses in Nigeria. Chicago. See www.hrw.org.  
28  Newspublisher, 27 December 2010. 
29  Ibid.  
30  At least four professors of the University of Maiduguri have been killed by Boko Haram in the last 
two years: Murtala Mohammed Aliyu (d. 4 November 2011) in Damaturu; Adamu Abdullahi (d. 9 Ju-
ly 2011); Mohammed Shettima Larduma (d. 28 November 2011); and Mohammed Murtala in Maidu-
guri (d. 31 March 2013). Meanwhile, Dr. Abba Kagu (abducted 26 February 2013) and Dr. Moham-
med Mai (abducted 20 April 2013) have been kidnapped and are being held hostage, presumably by 
Boko Haram.    
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dents at Dala Alamderi, Bulum-Kuttu, and Baga Road Fish Market. The situation 
is similar in other settings, such as Damaturu, Potiskum, and Kano. 
The Borno Elders and Leaders of Thought pressure group condemned these 
excesses and called for the withdrawal of troops from Maiduguri, but to no avail. 
They accused the JTF of “killing innocent young men and raping of married 
women and young girls by soldiers”.31 The JTF not unexpectedly denied all these 
allegations and insisted that all those “killed were members of the Boko Haram 
sect”.32 The JTF, through its spokesman Col. Victor Ebhalome, resorted to cheap 
blackmail by accusing all those alleging gross violations against them as “spon-
sors, sympathisers and members of the sect aimed at discrediting the task force 
so as to have a field day to operate”.33 
Aminu Sani, chairman of the Borno State branch of the Nigerian Bar Associa-
tion, condemned the killings and called on the federal government to set up a ju-
dicial commission of inquiry to “probe the genocide and extrajudicial killings of 
innocent civilians”. He also called for troop withdrawal.34 Kashim Zannah, chief 
judge of Borno State, also deplored the extrajudicial killings and all attempts to 
infringe people’s rights, no matter what the temptation. According to Justice 
Zannah (2011), “peace cannot be restored by means of injustices through depar-
ture from the rule of law and breach of due process”, and he concluded that such 
actions can lead only to “hunting innocent persons, alienating the citizenry and 
aggravating the security situation”. He ended rather prophetically, saying that 
“justice is the only route to enduring peace and security” because “injustice 
breeds insecurity” (Zannah 2011). 
In January 2012 the federal government declared a state of emergency in 15 
local government areas of four affected states, which gave security officials extra 
powers without legal encumbrances.35 These emergency powers further embold-
ened the JTF, which had been accused of serious rights abuses. An unintended 
effect of the new military strategy of amassing troops in the urban areas is the 
export and escalation of the violence to rural areas where military presence is 
low. Most areas of northern Borno State are not under effective government con-
trol now, as Boko Haram move about and terrorise peasant farmers and herders 
unhindered. Local government functionaries have all abandoned their duty posts 
and taken refuge in the state capital owing to insecurity in the outlying provinces. 
Boko Haram have some toehold in the following ten local government areas of 
                                                            
31  Daily Trust, 15 July 2011.  
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Peoples Daily, 15 July 2010. 
35  The affected local government areas are the following: Maiduguri Metropolitan Council, Jere, Ngala, 
Bama, and Biu in Borno State; Damaturu, Geidam, Potiskum, Gujba, and Bade in Yobe State; Jos 
North, Jos South, Barkin Ladi, and Riyom in Plateau State; and Suleja in Niger State.   
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Borno State far from government presence: Marte, Magumeri, Mobbar, Gubio, 
Guzamala, Abadam, Kukawa, Kaza, Nganzai, and Monguno.36  
The security agencies have completely lost the hearts and minds’ war through 
high-handedness and brutality. The sentiment of the residents of Maiduguri and 
its environs is echoed by 60-year old Adamu Mohammed of Bulum-Kuttu: “We 
don’t have problem with Boko Haram; our problem is the police and the military 
that harass and kill our innocent people. They call every Muslim a Boko Ha-
ram”.37  
Changing tactics and shopping for causes 
Boko Haram changed its tactics, remodelled itself, and shopped for causes as the 
security forces continued to pummel them and seemingly diminished their capac-
ity. Since mid-2010 their modus operandi has changed and they have become 
unpredictable. Old methods such as the targeted killing of traditional ward and 
village heads, security officials, prominent politicians, and opposing ulama con-
tinued unabated, but new fronts were also opened in the fight. They now targeted 
media houses and journalists, schools (including teachers and pupils), telecom-
munication base stations, and, recently, kidnapping of locals and foreigners.  
The burning of schools was a new weapon employed by the group. A number 
of schools were burnt in the July 2009 violence in Maiduguri as symbols of gov-
ernment and Western education, which they abhor, along with police stations and 
other government buildings. However, the burning of schools in retaliation for 
the ill treatment of Quranic school teachers and pupils is a new development. The 
group insist they are attacking schools in retaliation for JTF atrocities. According 
to its spokesman, Abul Qaqa:38  
We attacked the schools because security operatives are going to Islamiyyah schools and 
picking teachers. We are attacking the public schools at night because we don’t want to kill 
innocent pupils. Unless [Islamic school teachers] are allowed to be, we would be compelled 
to continue attacking schools.  
However, the attack on schools, school teachers, and pupils has forced many 
schools to close down in Maiduguri since February 2013. 
 It seems Boko Haram is losing its initial focus as old members are lost and 
security forces close in on them. As the situation changed on the ground, Boko 
Haram changed its methods and style. Kidnapping, a style they had rejected and 
vehemently denied using, now became acceptable. They dissociated themselves 
                                                            
36  “Boko Haram taking over Northern Borno”, Weekly Trust, 20 April 2013.  
www.weeklytrust.com.ng/index.php/top-stories/12338-boko-haram-taking-over-northern-borno  
(Accessed 22 April 2013). 
37  Tell, 26 July 2011. 
38  Daily Trust, 29 February 2012; Amnesty International (2012), Nigeria: Trapped in the cycle of vio-
lence, p. 17. 
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from the kidnapping of Chris MacManus and Franco Lamolinara, two Europeans 
killed in a botched rescue attempt at Sokoto in March 2012. Up to this period, 
Boko Haram was not involved in kidnapping. According to its spokesman Abul 
Qaqa: “(W)e have never been engaged in hostage taking and it is not part of our 
style, and we never ask for ransom”.39 It seems an affiliate or a splinter group 
which operates in central and north-western Nigeria, or a criminal gang which is 
in the business for money, may have been responsible for the kidnappings. 
There has been an upsurge in the killing and kidnapping of foreigners by Boko 
Haram since 2012, indicating a change of tactics arising from desperation. There 
are numerous such incidents in the north-east of Nigeria. These include the kill-
ing of road construction workers and Korean doctors in Borno and Yobe states, 
the kidnapping and subsequent killing of employees of a construction firm, 
Setraco, in Jama’are town of Bauchi State, and the kidnap of the French family 
of Tanguy Moulin-Fournier, his wife, brother and four children at Waza National 
Park in Northern Cameroon.40 All these indicate both a change of tactics and fur-
ther splintering of the movement into smaller groups, arising from internal and 
external developments. 
The weakening of Boko Haram positions and the damage done to their capaci-
ty in Borno and Yobe states pushed them out to the outlying areas, out of reach 
of the military. Thus, the kidnapping and killing of foreigners may be another 
tactic to expose the weakness of the Nigerian state by showing its inability to 
protect both its citizens and foreigners alike. Besides, the kidnapping of Europe-
ans is newsworthy and adds to their profile in Salafist jihadi circles. The Algerian 
incident, where foreign oil workers were rescued, albeit with a large number of 
casualties, seems to have sent signals that kidnapping may be an acceptable 
weapon among some jihadi groups.  
The Ansaru challenge 
There has been tension both within the membership of Boko Haram and between 
it and outsiders over tactics and cruelty by some of its militants against the civil-
ian population. The Kawar Maila killings, where 11 members were slaughtered 
for informing on their fellow members, and the tensions between members native 
to Borno, who can easily evade capture by melting into the local population, and 
non-natives – these indicate cracks within the movement. The issue of targeting 
non-combatants by Boko Haram has also worried some members. These tensions 
had been building up for a long time but came to the fore with the Kano attacks 
of 20 January 2012, when over 180 people lost their lives. 
                                                            
39  Sahara Reporters, “Boko Haram denies kidnapping and killing European citizens involved in botched 
rescue”, 9 March 2012. 
40  The French family was released unharmed and returned to Paris on 19 April 2013. 
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The formation of Jama’atul Ansaru Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (“Vanguard 
for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa”), which event was announced on 
26 January 2012, was both “a reaction to the loss of Muslim lives” as well as a 
desire for change of tactics by a splinter group within Boko Haram.41 Ansaru is a 
splinter from the main body of Boko Haram and has its nucleus around north-
west and central Nigeria, as distinct from the main body with its main strengths 
in the north-east epicentre of Boko Haram insurgency.  
Ansaru shares the ideology and doctrines of Boko Haram, although there are 
differences in tactics. First, unlike Boko Haram, even from inception Ansaru 
committed itself to not harming innocent Muslims except in self-defence. Sec-
ond, Ansaru condemns the killing of “innocent security operatives”, a group 
which Boko Haram has attacked serially and with relish since July 2009. Third, 
Ansaru proclaimed itself the defender of Islamic interests all over West Africa 
and indeed Africa as a whole, as distinct from Boko Haram’s localisation in the 
north of Nigeria.  
Although Ansaru was newly formed, it had formerly existed and operated un-
der different names. Apparently, it was the same group which had earlier called 
itself “Al-Qaeda in the Lands Beyond the Sahel”, a group which had claimed 
responsibility for the kidnapping of Chris MacManus and Franco Lamolinara in 
May 2011. The targeting of foreigners and foreign interests was the main direc-
tion of Ansaru’s development. As early as December 2012, the group warned 
France that it would target its citizens for “its ban on Islamic veil and its ‘major 
role’ in the planned intervention in Northern Mali”.42 
Ansaru also claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of seven construction 
workers in Jama’are in Bauchi State, which it said it had killed in retaliation for 
the anti-Islamic activities of European nations in Mali and Afghanistan. French 
military engagement and Nigeria’s deployment of troops to Mali seem to have 
further excited a section of Boko Haram. This provided them an opportunity to 
present themselves as regional and global players. 
Conclusion  
The development of radical Islamist ideology in north-eastern Nigeria has drawn 
its inspiration from both internal and external sources. The external factors in-
clude the worldwide resurgence of radical Islam owing to the US global war on 
terror and the general decline in the living conditions in Muslim-majority coun-
tries, coupled with internal economic problems of urban destitution and rural de-
                                                            
41  Vanguard, 1 February 2012. 
42  ThisDay, 24 December 2012. 
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cay in this part of Nigeria. A large pool of the almajirai and urban unemployed 
were conducive to the emergence of Boko Haram. 
The state’s inability to manage the crisis at inception and its stoking of the 
embers of discontent through serial mismanagement, coupled with an all-out mil-
itary assault, all added to the conflagration. Massive military deployment and 
tactics akin to that of an army of occupation alienated the civilian population and 
worsened the state of insecurity. Although the spate of bombings has declined, 
the theatre of conflict has widened to encompass other outlying urban and rural 
areas, including Kano and Kaduna. The solution to the challenge posed by Boko 
Haram lies in an integrated holistic approach to addressing the issues raised. The 
state must also live up to its role of providing jobs and other basic amenities and 
guaranteeing the lives and property of the citizenry. The current approach of 
military force is unlikely to resolve the insurgency. The problem can only be 
solved through a negotiated settlement with moderate members of the group.  
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Abstract 
The campaign to transform state and society on the basis of Shariah was begun 
by Muslim politicians in 1999, when military rule ended and power shifted to 
the Christian South. Although the pious campaign was mainly a matter of polit-
ical intrigues, it established a paradigm that still frames political debates. Few 
Muslims in the far north of Nigeria would openly question what the imams are 
preaching: that the will of God takes precedence over man-made laws and con-
stitutions. Like most other Islamic organisations, Boko Haram refers to this 
principle. With its call for a consequent Islamisation, it seeks to achieve what 
Muslim politicians in the North have promised, but failed to deliver. This 
makes it difficult to denounce the aims of the rebels, and the Islamic establish-
ment appears unable to formulate a coherent counter-paradigm. – My article 
will take a closer look at the disputes which Boko Haram has provoked among 
Muslims. In doing so, I will draw on recent observations in some rural com-
munities in Yobe State. Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, and 
Abubakar Shekau, its present leader, hail from Yobe; here and in neighbouring 
Borno, the insurgents enjoy some popular support. Yet my impression is that 
Boko Haram’s vision of a caliphate has very limited appeal. Most people do 
not want to live under a strict Shariah regime. However, Muslim critics of 
Boko Haram are themselves deeply divided. The two dominant religious or-
ganisations in north-east Nigeria, the Tijaniyya brotherhood and the Salafist 
Izala, cannot agree on an alternative model of an Islamic society which they 
might set against the orthodoxy of the militants. Concepts of divine justice are 
vague and contradictory, and there are no clear boundaries between moderate 
and radical Muslims. In order to appease Boko Haram, villagers suggested a 
more consequent application of Shariah by eradicating drinking and gambling 
and by placing females under stricter supervision. However, they have shown 
little interest in using the divine laws to reform the dysfunctional public admin-
istration. Most citizens, including Izala and Tijaniyya functionaries, are entan-
gled in the web of corruption that links villagers with the local government 
administration. They complain about the hypocrisy of politicians, who do not 
obey the laws they profess, but resemble them as they break their religious  
obligations at will. 
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Religious populism 
What Boko Haram is fighting for – the Islamisation of state and society through a 
strict application of Shariah – was propagated by Hausa and Fulani politicians 
more than ten years ago. They suddenly declared that the moderate form of Sha-
riah which had been in force in most northern states since Independence in 1960 
was no longer acceptable: state governments should enact proper Shariah. At-
tempts to extend the competence of Islamic Law courts had long been central to 
the disputes between Muslims and Christians, and the political elites in the North 
knew that the introduction of harsher Islamic laws would spark violent conflicts. 
When ‘Shariah clashes’ in February and May 2000 killed an estimated 2,000 
people, President Obasanjo appealed to the authorities in Zamfara, Kaduna, and 
other northern states to suspend the new legislation in order to prevent more 
bloodshed. Yet the political establishment in the Far North stood firm. After in-
tensive consultations, the pro-Shariah line prevailed, and most political and reli-
gious leaders declared that a moderate form of Shariah was not compatible with 
their religious convictions: God’s law must not be restricted to cases of inher-
itance, matrimonial affairs, and other civil matters but had to be practised in full. 
In order to achieve this religious mission, some politicians went as far as de-
manding total commitment and self-sacrifice. Muhammadu Buhari, the most 
prominent politician in the Far North, assured his followers: “I can die for the 
cause of Islam”,1 and the Governor of Yobe State, Bukar Abba Ibrahim, added: “If 
necessary, we are prepared to fight another civil war. We cannot be blackmailed into 
killing Sharia”.2 
Buhari, Shagari, Balaraba Musa, and all the other big men who enlisted their 
support for the Shariah project knew that Governor Ahmed Sani of Zamfara, who 
had begun the process of passing strict Islamic laws, had done so for self-serving 
reasons. As one of Babangida’s henchmen, with a lucrative position in Nigeria’s 
central bank, Sani had become accustomed to living a life of luxury and lust. Af-
ter the end of military rule, when he refashioned himself as an “apostle of Sha-
ria”,3 he openly renounced his former life of sin and apologised for having stolen 
public money. But when asked whether he would repay the money that he had 
embezzled, he said No.4 Campaigning on a Shariah ticket in 1999 had enabled 
him to oust a formidable contender: former National Security Adviser Lt.-Gene-
ral Aliyu Gusau. Following Governor Sani’s success, other politicians also de-
picted themselves as uncompromising fighters for the cause of Islam. Jumping on 
                                                            
1  In Y. Olowolabi, “Anarchists threaten nation’s unity”, Tell (print edition), 29 October 2001, 36. 
2  Freedom House, Talibanization, 51. 
3  Zamfara Government Advertorial, “Zamfara State One Year of Purposeful Leadership”, Hotline (print 
edition), 4 June 2000, 24. 
4  Maier, This house, 186. 
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the Shariah bandwagon was, above all, a means to advance their political careers. 
Shariah, however, was also used to strengthen the position of the northern politi-
cal establishment as a whole. After power had shifted to the South, northerners 
used Shariah as a “bargaining chip” to put pressure on the Christian president.5 
The government of Zamfara promised that “all spheres of public life are being 
transformed into Islamic oriented institutions”.6 However, these transformations 
did not make the authorities any more responsive to the plight of the people. In 
some respects, the situation in Zamfara had even deteriorated: “Reports of force-
ful acquisition of land and other properties of the less-privileged by those in au-
thority, particularly village and districts heads, have reached … alarming propor-
tion(s)”.7 As in other parts of Nigeria, poverty has increased while the ruling 
elites, behind a façade of Muslim piety, have continued to enjoy the way of life 
to which they are accustomed: “[W]e have formed a habit of sending our girl-
friends to London and Paris to make their hair and do shopping in London and 
America. We steal the money from the oil”.8  
Turning Shariah against the elites 
Young militants in Maiduguri or Kano have good reasons to hate the representa-
tives of the state. Their rebellion is born out of poverty, illiteracy, and unem-
ployment; it is a response to corruption and social neglect. Given the shocking 
disparities in wealth, analysts in the West have argued that government, in order 
to stop the violence, has to address the root causes of the crisis. It has to reach out 
to those it has alienated and offer them employment, better education, and other 
services to raise the standard of living. A top official in the US State Department, 
who was calling for political reforms, claimed that “[r]eligion is not driving ex-
tremist violence in Nigeria”; instead, he blamed “the underlying political and 
social economic problems in the north”.9 However, interpreting the rebellion as a 
protest against deteriorating living conditions is at odds with the statements of 
Boko Haram leaders, who insist on the religious motives of their insurrection: 
“[T]his is a war between Muslims and non-[M]uslims. … this is not a tribal war, 
nor is it … a war for financial gains, it is solely a religious war”.10 Commentators 
                                                            
5  Mazrui, Shariacracy, (chapter ‘Globalization and Islamic revivalism’); Harnischfeger, Democratiza-
tion, 112-54. 
6  Zamfara Government Advertorial, “Zamfara State One Year of Purposeful Leadership”, Hotline (print 
edition), 4 June 2000, 24.  
7  Abdul-Azeez Suleiman, “Shari’a: Yarima vs. the Mallams”, Kaduna Weekly Trust, 26 July 2003, in 
Paden, Muslim Civic Cultures, 166. 
8  Maitama Sule. In: N. Ebije, “FG must empower north”, Daily Sun, 11 May 2012. 
9  Johnnie Carson, Ass. Secretary of State for African Affairs, in (Anon.), “US Official: Violence in 
Nigeria isn’t about religion”, Daily Trust (print edition), 6 April 2012, 29. 
10  Abubakar Shekau in a video message, in (Anon.), “Jos Bombing: Text of video Statement by Jama’atu 
Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad”, Elombah, 28 December 2010. 
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in Europe and North America, writing for a secular readership, have sought to 
make this war comprehensible by identifying poverty and social injustice as the 
real causes of the rebellion. However, it does not lead to a deeper understanding 
of Boko Haram (and Muslim resistance to it) when analysts leave aside that the 
rebels, when responding to the Nigerian crisis, seek a religious solution to it:  
The group’s preaching – available on cassettes across the region – concerned almost exclu-
sively detailed points of religious doctrine and what actions can and cannot be permitted 
within Islam. While this did include debates on the relations between democracy and Islam, 
it would be incorrect to think that Yusuf (the founder of Boko Haram) was a social reformer 
or was overly concerned with corruption. His concern was a pure interpretation of Islamic 
texts. (Crisis Group, Northern Nigeria, 38)11 
For most Muslims in the North it makes sense to turn to religion in order to 
liberate themselves from decades of moral and economic decay. Secular institu-
tions, which were brought to Africa by white colonisers, have failed, particularly 
in northern Nigeria, where citizens are disillusioned with Western ways of devel-
opment. A vast majority no longer believes that democracy, human rights, and a 
market economy offer a way out. Nigeria’s Fourth Republic was modelled along 
the lines of the US Constitution, but its citizens have not been able to make use 
of its democratic institutions to submit their rulers to public control: “Not a single 
one of those Northern governors has deemed it his duty to worry about [the] 
plight of the people”.12 The number of people living on less than 2 USD a day 
has increased, although the governors in the North (like their counterparts in the 
South) have received far more revenues from the federation account than in the 
late 1990s, under General Abacha, when a barrel of oil sold for 10 USD.  
Since citizens have never found ways to control their rulers, they can only 
hope that politicians will submit at least to the authority of God. Theocratic rule 
is regarded as an alternative to democracy; it derives its attraction from the sense 
that Western concepts of modernisation have led to a dead end. While party de-
mocracy seems to encourage strife and ruthless competition, Shariah is conceived 
as a force that may check the excesses of the ruling class. The immutable law of 
God, which is the same all over the world, will be the yardstick by which all 
segments of the society, rich and poor, must be judged. Thus, the arrogant elite 
would be integrated into a moral community, in which rulers and ruled are united 
by a shared culture, as they had been in the mythical beginnings of Islam. 
                                                            
11  A detailed study on sermons, interviews and debates between Boko Haram leaders and some of their 
Izala critics arrives at a similar conclusion: “misrule and poor governance resulting from the legendary 
corruption of Nigerian political leaders are not the explicit concerns of these discourses and counter-
discourses on Boko Haram …. Yusuf was chiefly concerned with avenging his followers’ injuries ra-
ther than raising Nigerian citizens’ objections to the abuse of power by security forces, nor does he 
voice any criticism against the broader problem of poor governance and misrule by Nigerian political 
elites that many commentators claim to be the explanation for the Boko Haram insurrection” (Anon., 
Popular Discourses, 119, 130-31). 
12  Adamu Adamu, “Gazafication of the North”, Daily Trust (print edition), 16 March 2012, 64. 
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It was rumoured that the Sultan of Sokoto, like many other Muslim dignitaries, 
was unhappy with Shariah, but he could not openly declare that God’s law 
should no longer be binding. At the height of the Shariah campaign, most politi-
cal and religious leaders in the Far North supported the introduction of harsher 
Islamic laws, yet made sure that these laws were implemented only in a selective 
and half-hearted way.13 Boko Haram’s militancy is, in part, a reaction to the cyn-
ical game of politicians who mobilised religious sentiments in the interests of 
their political ambitions. By posing as campaigners of an Islamic renewal, they 
have discredited themselves. To make matters worse, by declaring that their 
states must be run according to divine laws, they have empowered religious ex-
perts who can speak more competently about the will of God. This counter-elite 
has turned into a dangerous rival, because imams – especially those who stress 
their radical distance from the political class – have the capacity to mobilise the 
masses against the hypocrisy of the big men. One way of putting pressure on pol-
iticians is to insist that they abide by the standards of rectitude enshrined in the 
divine law. All sections of the ummah (the community of the faithful) had com-
mitted themselves to these standards when they insisted, against Christian pres-
sure, on the necessity of living according to Shariah. Thus Shariah can be used 
against the same elites who propagated it. No prominent Muslim politician has 
dared to confront religious leaders by suggesting that the Shariah laws passed 
between 2000 and 2002 be scrapped. This makes it difficult for the Islamic estab-
lishment to denounce militants like Boko Haram, who are simply demanding 
what politicians promised but failed to deliver.  
Shariah as a dividing force 
Ordinary Muslims are disillusioned with the selective form of Shariah imple-
mented by politicians. However, the idea of Shariah, as depicted by imams, is 
still popular among them.14 This does not mean that radicals like Boko Haram, 
who fight for an undiluted form of divine law, can count on widespread support. 
Most Muslims in the North do not want to live under a Taliban-like regime, alt-
hough they find it difficult to formulate a counter-model when distancing them-
selves from the militants. Ideas about Shariah are diverse and often vague. Ad-
herents of the Tijaniyya brotherhood, the dominant Muslim grouping in the 
North-East, tended to be lax in matters of Islamic Law and came under attack 
from more zealous Muslims who entered the scene in the 1970s: preachers with a 
                                                            
13  Some governors made it clear that they dislike Shariah. In Kano, Rabiu Kwankwaso announced that 
no cleric could tell him what to do, “no matter how long his beard is” (Anon.), “Paralysed by Fear”, 
The Economist (print edition, 10 January 2004, 32). Yet he was forced to pass comprehensive Shariah 
laws and set up a Shariah vigilante. Moreover, he was voted out of office after just one term. 
14  Crisis Group, Northern Nigeria, 21, 38; (Anon.), “Most Nigerians reject Boko Haram”, Daily Trust 
(print edition), 21 February 2012, 10. 
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certificate in Islamic studies (acquired in Saudi Arabia or at some university in 
Nigeria), who toured the countryside in order to impose, with the followers they 
gained, their purist version of a righteous life, often inspired by Salafist ideas or 
by Shia publications from Iran. Against these foreign doctrines, adherents of Ti-
janiyya tried to defend what little personal freedom they still had. However, their 
rejection of undue religious interference does not mean that they were fighting 
for tolerance and equal rights. Like other Muslims in the North, they want a soci-
ety dominated by Islam, where infidels and women know their place.  
The other major organisation, the Salafist Izala (“Society for the Eradication 
of (un-Islamic) Innovations and the Establishment of the Sunnah”), comes closer 
to Boko Haram in that it emphasises the necessity of scrupulously following 
God’s commandments as revealed in the Quran and the Sunnah. Yet a literal in-
terpretation of the holy texts, as suggested by Izala, does not necessarily lead to a 
strategy of violence: instead of attacking the state apparatus, as Boko Haram 
suggests, it is better to take it over. By engaging with the state, Muslims have a 
chance to Islamise it, pushing for reforms that will gradually expand the official, 
state-enforced Shariah legislation. If they are to enhance their political influence, 
Muslims have to acquire Western-style education; without school certificates 
they cannot apply for senior positions in the state bureaucracy. This reformist 
apology of appropriating secular education and accepting jobs in an un-Islamic 
government appeals to those who have found employment, especially if they are 
young and better educated. But it is less attractive to the millions of jobless 
youths. Most of them just attended Quranic schools, where they learnt little else 
but to copy and memorise suwar (sing.: surah) written and pronounced in a lan-
guage they did not understand (Arabic). Products of an almajiri education used to 
stick to the teachings of the two main Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa), the Qadiriyya 
and Tijaniyya, yet they are also drawn to the message of Boko Haram: that West-
ern schools, by spreading alien, materialist values, have corrupted society and 
must be banned.  
When comparing the statements of religious organisations, it becomes clear 
that there is no major ideological difference between moderates and radicals. I 
will illustrate this, at the end of this contribution, by looking at three topics which 
have been at the centre of controversies generated by Boko Haram: the rejection 
of Western education; the declaration that some fellow Muslims are infidels who 
may be killed with impunity; and the attacks on Christians. In reconstructing 
some features of these debates, I will quote from newspaper articles and other 
materials available on the Internet, and I will draw on my own observations in 
2011 and 2012 when I spent a few months in some remote locations in Yobe (and 
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Borno) State.15 In these rural towns and villages, questions of religious doctrine 
were widely discussed, among both local government employees and illiterate 
farmers. However, theological disputes are just one aspect of the present crisis. 
They reflect social divisions between old and young, between illiterate and West-
ern-educated Nigerians. In addition, they are shaped by political interests and 
intrigues. Thus, I will first discuss the political setting within which groups like 
Tijaniyya, Izala, and Boko Haram operate. Then I will look at the social compo-
sition of their members, their relationship with the political class, and the bitter 
antagonisms among these groups: not just between Boko Haram and the religious 
establishment but also between Izala and Tijaniyya.  
Given these deep divisions, it is unlikely that Muslims in northern Nigeria will 
direct the rigour of God’s law against their oppressors. Clerics may decry a de-
praved and godless ruling class, but the faithful will not muster the common 
strength to confront those who are mainly responsible for the social and econom-
ic decline. Another reason why the project of a religious renewal of society will 
fail is the absence of credible leaders, as many imams have an ambivalent rela-
tionship towards the political establishment. Even Yusuf, the founder of Boko 
Haram, was close to the corrupt authorities in Borno State, sometimes working 
with them and sometimes confronting them. Although he was preaching jihad, 
his political patrons still bailed him out in January 2009 when he was detained in 
Abuja. On his return to Maiduguri, where he received a triumphant welcome, the 
streets at the reception venue were lined with exotic cars.16 There is a further rea-
son why religion will fail to domesticate the political elite: despite popular re-
sentment of the rapacious elites, there is considerable complicity with them. Poli-
ticians and citizens work hand in hand to defraud the state, and they both take a 
very selective interest in Shariah. They observe their ritual obligations and main-
tain some Islamic decorum but have few qualms violating the holy injunctions 
against adultery and other vices. 
The failure of democracy 
Elections in Nigeria are very competitive, with a high turnover of incumbents. 
However, citizens have little influence on this process, as crucial decisions are 
taken by cliques of politicians behind the scenes. During the Shariah campaign, 
however, it looked as if ordinary people would be able to have some effect on 
government policies. In Borno, for instance, the incumbent governor lost out in 
                                                            
15  The purpose of my visits to Nigeria, from January to April 2011 and 2012, was not to study Boko 
Haram, and I did not try to contact members of the group. I can refer only to conversations I had with 
ordinary Muslims, who often spoke about the rebellion and the state of emergency that had been im-
posed on parts of Yobe, Borno and a few other states. 
16  Shehu Sani, Boko Haram, (chapter ‘His Threats’). 
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2003 to his rival within the ruling All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), Modu 
Sheriff, who promised to be serious about the implementation of Shariah and 
who won the backing of Islamists like Mohammed Yusuf, the Boko Haram lead-
er. After being elected, Sheriff created a ministry of religious affairs and put a 
close confidante of Yusuf in charge of it (in return for the support Boko Haram 
gangs had rendered him during the election campaign). But aside from that, he 
did not care much about divine justice. In early 2011, when his two terms drew to 
a close, the main concern of the ruling party was keeping the governor’s family 
in power. Political controversies revolved around the question of whether Sher-
iff’s cousin or his younger brother would succeed him. Pro-Shariah activists felt 
tricked: Sheriff had turned into a traitor; he had sided with the secular govern-
ment in Abuja and called in the soldiers and policemen who murdered Yusuf in 
2009.  
The elections of 2011 were greeted by many international observers as an im-
portant step in consolidating democracy.17 The chairman of the Independent 
Electoral Commission had clearly been independent, and there was less rigging 
than during the Obasanjo era. However, in those rural settlements of Yobe State 
where I witnessed the election campaign, people did not have much choice. Civil 
servants had been warned not to support the main opposition party, and some 
who did lost their jobs. On election day, the higher ranks of the administration, 
including chiefs and village heads, were expected to display their ballots so that 
everybody at the polling stations could see where they had cast their vote. After 
the incumbent governor had been confirmed in office, he consolidated his hold 
on power by cancelling local government elections and appointing ANPP men as 
caretaker chairmen and councillors. Many citizens were upset about the high-
handedness of their governor, but they knew that his main challenger, a busi-
nessman who had bought the PDP governorship ticket, was not any better. I 
learnt that he normally lived abroad and only flew in for the election campaign. 
Even when inside the country he preferred spending his time in Abuja to visiting 
the state he wanted to rule. 
People were fed up with party politics. They complained that everything had 
become politicised: the distribution of jobs, the sale of subsidised fertiliser, and 
the appointment of village and ward heads. Whatever resources state officials 
were dishing out were turned into a means to build up political patronage. A man 
who benefited from an ANPP politician was bound to him and could not support 
the main opposition party. Even a night watchman or a borehole operator risked 
losing his job if he did. Or a farmer might find himself without protection when 
wealthier neighbours tried to push him from his land. Although people grumbled 
about the rot in the local government and state administration, they did not unite 
                                                            
17  Campbell: The morning after. 
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to force politicians to stick to the laws. They preferred to participate in misap-
propriating public funds, if given a chance. And they were willing to back cor-
rupt politicians, if they received something in return. Especially the poor and 
vulnerable could not afford to antagonise the big men. They were too much con-
cerned with individual survival to form a common front against those on whose 
generosity they depended. There is not much solidarity among impoverished 
farmers and jobless youth. As they compete over the means of survival, they are 
rivals for the favours of the rich and powerful.  
Ordinary people and those in authority were accomplices in the embezzlement 
of public property. Their behaviour was guided by similar maxims; thus, it was 
difficult to take a principled stance against social vices. Both rich and poor pre-
sented themselves as pious Muslims but took a very limited, selfish interest in the 
law of God. Most kept their wives in purdah but had little compunction commit-
ting adultery with unmarried girls. 
Muddling through 
Boko Haram was perceived, above all, as a nuisance because the insurgency 
made life more difficult. Economic activities were hindered, travelling became 
inconvenient owing to the many roadblocks, and the enhanced presence of po-
licemen brought more chicanery and extortion. However, much of the blame for 
the insecurity was placed on the federal government, as it was widely assumed 
that President Jonathan could reach a settlement with Boko Haram, if only he 
wanted to. The rebels – I was told – were ready to make a deal with the govern-
ment, just like the militants in the Niger Delta, who had attacked oil installations 
in order to extort money from the federal authorities. Such assertions about the 
aims of Boko Haram were of course mere speculation, for people had no direct 
contact with the insurgents. They followed the news on BBC and Voice of Amer-
ica, and some had seen interviews with Yusuf on Nigerian television. A few men 
were known to harbour sympathy for Boko Haram, but they kept a low profile 
since they had been interrogated by the state security service and warned not to 
make a mistake. Many others, in particular the younger ones, may have secretly 
admired Boko Haram’s courageous attacks on the hated authorities. However, the 
general attitude towards the insurrection was rather negative. When discussing 
the attacks in the state capital Damaturu and other towns, it was often pointed out 
that innocent people had to suffer from the cycle of violence and counter-
violence, although some commentators held that Boko Haram’s ruthless attacks 
might, in the end, have a beneficial effect: the escalation of violence made it clear 
that the rotten political system in the North was no longer sustainable. The ruling 
elite had to completely change its ways and assume responsibility for the masses, 
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improving the living conditions and bringing social justice. Otherwise Nigeria 
would fall apart, and the political class would lose its sources of income.18 
Whatever the outcome of the conflict, it seemed best not to be drawn into it. 
The majority of the people wanted to be left alone, and this was only possible if 
they did not offend either side. Local authorities had a similar interest. Thus they 
convened, at the instigation of the Yobe governor, town and village meetings in 
order to discuss what could be done to appease the rebels. I learnt that those who 
contributed to the discussions reiterated their commitment to Islam and their sup-
port for Shariah. It was suggested that the community get tough on gambling and 
drinking, which were still tolerated behind the scenes.19 Moreover, it seemed ad-
visable to tighten control over women and no longer allow them to talk to men 
when in public. One of the conveners of the meetings declared that any man who 
impregnated a girlfriend should marry her. Everybody knew of course that this 
was not the orthodox way of dealing with adultery, but they hoped that Boko Ha-
ram would spare them if they maintained some semblance of Islamic piety. 
The rejection of Boko Haram’s narrow Islamist vision was not born out of 
democratic convictions. People found it legitimate to impose an Islamic order on 
the state, and Shariah was accepted, in principle, as the appropriate means to 
strengthen the Islamic identity of their towns and villages. Christians were not 
seen as members of the community, even if they had been living there as farmers 
or artisans for two or three decades. They were not allowed to construct churches 
along the main roads but had to ask for a piece of land on the outskirts of town or 
in the bush. 
The quest for orthodoxy 
All Muslim organisations that operated in Borno and Yobe State rejected the 
separation of religion and politics and welcomed the strict Shariah laws adopted 
in 2000.20 Yet, they were polarised over the implementation of these laws and 
                                                            
18  I heard the same argument by northern intellectuals, for instance at the University of Maiduguri: Boko 
Haram, though a nasty organisation, may achieve through massive bombing what progressives in the 
North had always called for, namely good governance. Faced with the prospect that Nigeria might de-
scend into chaos, the ruling class had no choice but to initiate a radical change lest they lose the basis 
of their existence: the oil rents. 
19  Beer had become expensive; thus, villagers crossed into Gombe State and bought their bottles at a 
private club attached to the Ashaka Cement Company. Yet the club stopped selling alcohol when 
Boko Haram extended its bombing campaign into Gombe. This did not prevent rich people from get-
ting their alcohol, while the poor had to accept that Shariah in Nigeria had a clear class bias. Instead of 
drinking alcohol, some men in the streets were sniffing glue. And on the university campuses, the 
ground was littered with empty bottles of cough syrup, which students drank to become intoxicated 
(see (Anon.), “Codeine Abuse Spreading Like Wild Fire“, Daily Trust, 29 December 2012). 
20  In a study of the Shariah campaign in Kano, T. H. Gwarzo (Civic Associations, 311-13) found that all 
Muslim organisations, from the conservative brotherhoods to the radical ‘Shiites’, called for the estab-
lishment of an Islamic state. M. Last (Charia, 143, 147) insisted that support for the extension of Sha-
riah was not a matter of Islamic radicalism or ‘fundamentalism’: “Parmi tous les musulmans, un con-
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argued over the composition of Hisbah vigilantes that were meant to enforce 
them. Boko Haram has rekindled these controversies, as it brought the quest for 
an orthodox Shariah back onto the political agenda. Some twenty or thirty years 
ago, matters of doctrine had played a minor role, and most people outside the 
urban centres had not been aware that rival forms of Islam existed. The indigenes 
of those peripheral settlements where I followed the debates on Boko Haram 
were members of ethnic minorities, and Islam had spread among them only in 
colonial times. Until the 1980s, village chiefs had been in the centre of rural Is-
lam, although they were illiterates with only rudimentary knowledge of religious 
doctrines. Being a Muslim made only modest demands on their way of life. The 
faithful had to participate in communal prayers, observe Ramadan, and wear 
some form of Islamic dress. Otherwise, they were not much curtailed by religious 
prescriptions. A few itinerant mallams, sent by the Shehu of Borno, toured these 
outlying regions, but they did not challenge the authority of the chiefs. Islamic 
teachers were expected to support the traditional rulers. Thus, it was acceptable 
for a newly elected chief to dismiss the imam of his predecessor and bring in a 
new one. Tijaniyya, as long as it was not challenged by other Muslim organisa-
tions, gave traditional rulers much latitude. They could continue to participate in 
ancient rites, as long as they supported the spread of Islam. 
All this changed in the 1990s, when Izala entered the scene. Inspired by Wah-
habi doctrines, it sought to purify a lax and adulterated Islam. Its activists polar-
ised town and village communities because they drew a clear line between them-
selves and members of other Muslim organisations. Whoever did not follow their 
literal interpretation of Islam was ritually impure. It was therefore prohibited to 
eat with such a person or to submit to his authority. This message of a religious 
self-purification attracted, above all, young and educated men, who used the lan-
guage of orthodox Islam to distance themselves from their elders, blaming them 
for not being consistent in their rejection of pagan traditions. While the old vil-
lage culture, with its exuberant festivals and lavish sacrifices, appeared to be 
steeped in magic and superstition, Islamic Law, as Izala presented it, was ration-
al, transparent, and straightforward. It taught the faithful to avoid needless ex-
penses and reject pompous ceremonies and ostentatious displays of wealth.21 
Bride price payments and other social obligations should be modest, so that every 
man could afford to create a family. Such rules favoured the young, as did some 
of the legal reforms advocated by Izala. The Islamic law of inheritance, for in-
stance, appeared preferable to many, because it divided the land of the deceased 
among the family members and gave each heir full control over his or her share, 
                                                            
sensus se fait autour de l’idée, que la charia est juste. (…) ceux qui soutiennent l’application de la 
charia ne sont pas des radicaux, mais plutôt des musulmans modérés”.  
21  Kane, Muslim modernity, 136-38. 
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including the right to sell it. ‘Traditional’ law, by contrast, treated farmland as 
family property and kept it intact under the supervision of the eldest son or some 
other relative. Each family member was allotted land for farming, but he or she 
was allowed only to cultivate, not to sell it. The new system instead allowed for 
individual initiative and facilitated the sale of land. 
For young people, the Izala programme was attractive because it levelled so-
cial differences. Nobody should bow before his parents and other authorities, and 
nobody should command respect only because of his wealth. What mattered, 
when measuring the status of a person, was piety and religious knowledge – 
characteristics which anybody could achieve, irrespective of his social origin. By 
de-emphasising social differences, the teachings of Izala also sought to obliterate 
ethnic antagonisms. All faithful, no matter what their tribal background, should 
live according to the same set of rules. This rejection of cultural diversity was 
attractive for Muslims from ethnic minorities, especially those who were willing 
to renounce their tribal heritage and assimilate to the dominant Hausa culture. 
When becoming Hausa, they entered a stratified society where differences of 
birth continued to be of importance. In most places, the Hausa, and to a greater 
extent the Fulani, forget neither their own origins nor those of others. Ethnic out-
siders, by contrast, wanted a level playing field, and this fit with the radicalism of 
Izala and other reformers, who denounced ethnic prerogatives as un-Islamic: 
[A]ll Muslims, irrespective of race, language or nationality, must constitute a single brother-
hood, one Umma. ... the Umma, from one end of the world to the other, is but one single na-
tion, its diverse peoples sharing but one faith, one law, one culture and one destiny”.22  
However, the universal law of Islam is not as clear and unequivocal as Salafist 
clerics suggest. In 1990 Izala split, and the two hostile factions were shouting at 
each other with loudspeakers. An old woman, whose house stood close to an 
Izala mosque, told me that she tried not to listen to the preaching, but the noise 
was so enervating that she had gone to the Izala leaders a couple of times to curse 
at them. She wanted them to pack up and go. She explained to me that there was 
no religion she hated more than Izala because it undermined family ties: “When 
your father cuts a ram, and you are not allowed to eat it, what religion is this?” A 
titleholder whose five children had all joined Izala also deplored that the youth 
turned away from their parents: “We [elders] slaughter our animals according to 
Islamic Law, yet our children call us infidels and do not touch our food.” Moreo-
ver, the children no longer asked them about the history of their family or their 
village. The transmission of knowledge from one generation to the next had 
stopped, because “Izala tells them not to listen”. Encouraged to acquire book 
knowledge and study the Quran, they judged with it the crude and hybrid Islam 
of their fathers. 
                                                            
22  Sulaiman, Islam and secularism, 11.  
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For adherents of Tijaniyya it was difficult to distance themselves from Izala, 
because its doctrine seemed to follow scrupulously the original message of the 
Prophet. All those who deviated from such orthodoxy ran the risk of being 
branded insincere Muslims. A Tijaniyya imam, who was the vice chairmen of a 
Shariah implementation committee, acknowledged that it was difficult to justify 
his more lenient form of Islam. In order not to expose himself to Izala criticism, 
he had adopted many demands formulated by the purists: women should not 
work on farms, and their whole body should be covered when in public. Yet he 
defended the ancient naming and burial ceremonies which used to be costly so-
cial events. The Quran, he argued, did not talk about these exercises; thus they 
were not prohibited. Boycotting them, as Izala did, was not – in his eyes – based 
on religious considerations, but motivated by a wish to save money and to evade 
social obligations.  
In its official pronouncements, Tijaniyya shared Izala’s position that all as-
pects of public and private life have to conform to Islamic injunctions. However, 
Nigeria’s brotherhoods, like other religious movements, assemble people of di-
verse persuasions, many of whom would disagree with the official self-
representation of their leaders. An elderly Tijaniyya imam, for instance, defended 
some of the traditional agricultural rituals, such as fertility rites, which had been 
more effective than mere prayers to Allah. He bemoaned that the village authori-
ties, under Izala pressure, had stopped participating in the rain-making proces-
sions which had benefited the whole community. The imam’s defence of his an-
cestral heritage went hand in hand with a meticulous observance of his ritual ob-
ligations under Islam. From his perspective, Izala members were bad Muslims 
because they prayed in a simplified, ‘incorrect’ way. They entered mosques 
without covering their head, wearing blue jeans and t-shirts: “They are just like 
pagans.” Since most young people were attracted by this informality, he assumed 
that his own dignified form of Islam would be pushed aside: “Izala will win.” He 
also identified another reason for their superiority: “They are stronger, because 
they have money, and their people are in government. Governors, commissioners 
are all Izala.” 
A religion for the dispossessed 
Others judged the prospect of the Tijaniyya less pessimistically: “As long as 
there are almajirai, the brotherhoods will have a large following.” Students of 
Quranic schools spend years copying and memorising God’s revelation in its 
original Arabic form, but most of them never learn to properly read and under-
stand the meaning of these alien words. To them, an organisation like Izala that 
stresses the value of literacy and the exegesis of holy scriptures has little appeal. 
They are more at ease with the old brotherhoods, which are less concerned with 
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rigid dogmas but allow for mystical experiences. Tijaniyya mallams sell charms 
to their customers and facilitate contact with the spirit world. However, for many 
illiterates – and especially for the uprooted urban youth who hope for a radical 
change – Boko Haram may also be an attractive option. By internalising the mes-
sage that Western education is corrupt and that true knowledge can be acquired 
without it, young men without literacy (and other vocational skills) may recover 
some dignity. For those who join Boko Haram, an almajiri background is not a 
stigma; it does not hinder them making it to the top. The group’s founder Yusuf, 
like its present leader Shekau, started as an almajiri, but made an impressive ca-
reer by diligently acquiring Islamic knowledge. Like millions of other young 
men without school certificates,23 Yusuf suffered from constant humiliations. 
Fellow Muslims derided him an as “amateur cleric”24 and ridiculed his insuffi-
cient knowledge,25 although it was clear from his lectures and interviews and his 
participation in public debates that he was an erudite man. As a favourite disciple 
of the famous Sheikh Ja’far Adam,26 he was a member of Izala (until 2000), yet 
was barred from preaching at certain occasions because he did not possess a cer-
tificate from a university in Saudi Arabia or some other prestigious Islamic insti-
tution.27 Yusuf refused to accept this discrimination; he insisted that he was guid-
ed in his words and deeds by a comprehensive knowledge of the holy scriptures. 
Unlike Maitatsine, the leader of an Islamist uprising in 1980, he did not make it 
easy for his critics to dismiss his teachings as heterodox. While Maitatsine styled 
himself a prophet and abrogated long-standing rituals such as praying five times 
a day, Yusuf took great pains to convince fellow Muslims that his call for a jihad 
resulted from a meticulous reading of the sacred texts. In his attempt to present 
himself as a custodian of Islamic orthodoxy, it was helpful to copy the rhetoric 
and outward appearance of transnational jihadists (a possibility Maitatsine did 
not have in 1980). His successor Shekau and other Boko Haram leaders, who 
lacked Yusuf’s eloquence, knowledge, and charisma, took even greater care to 
accentuate these global models, claiming that they were “spiritual followers of al-
Qaida”.28 Since Osama bin Laden was highly respected in Izala as well as tariqa 
circles,29 it was difficult for the Muslim establishment to doubt the Islamic cre-
                                                            
23  The Federal Ministry of Education estimated that “about 9.5 million school children are currently 
outside the conventional school system” ()Anon.), “FG and Almajiri schools”, Daily Sun, 13 April 
2012). 
24  Ahmad Sakida, “Reporting terrorism in Africa”, Blueprint, 19 April 2012. 
25  (Anon.), Popular Discourses, 136-37. 
26  Sani, Boko Haram, (Chapter: Who are Boko Haram); (Anon.), Popular Discourses, 122. 
27  Pérouse de Montclos, Boko Haram, 6, 8, 16. 
28  Abul Qaqa, spokesman of Boko Haram. In: M. Mark, “Boko Haram vows to fight until Nigeria estab-
lishes Sharia law”, The Guardian (London), 27 January 2012. 
29  (Anon.), Popular Discourses, 133. – Following the attacks of September 11, 2011, ‘Osama’ became 
the most popular name for new born sons, just like ‘Saddam’ had become popular at the time of the 
Iraq war (Krings, Osama Bin Laden, 255-258; J. Nwokocha, “Gusau in the Grip of Extremists”, Van-
 Boko Haram and its Muslim critics 47 
 
dentials of a Nigerian rebel group that acted like an affiliate of Al-Qaeda. Styling 
themselves in the image of international jihadists had still other advantages for 
self-made religious leaders like Yusuf and Shekau. It provided them with an or-
ganisational model that sanctioned obedience and a culture of self-sacrifice.  
Dining with the rich 
Boko Haram, as a “spiritual off shoot” of Izala,30 has maintained a number of 
features which are characteristic of Izala’s preaching, such as the hostility to Ti-
janiyya and its Sufi ‘mysticism’. However, the emergence of Boko Haram also 
marked a break with Izala; it was a protest against clerics who appeared too 
friendly with corrupt politicians. Izala acted as an anti-establishment movement 
that articulated popular anger against the political class, yet on a local level poli-
ticians and religious leaders often found ways of getting along with and profiting 
from each other. In Yobe State, the governor and members of his cabinet attend-
ed Izala prayers (at least occasionally), and some local government chairmen 
paid allowances to Izala imams and donated public funds for the building of Izala 
mosques.31 Certainly, most politicians and rich businessmen had little personal 
interest in the austere lifestyle propagated by the reformers, yet they had to ap-
pease religious critics by making religiously correct statements and by donating a 
part of their ill-gotten wealth to the construction of mosques and the subsidisa-
tion of Islamic clerics:  
These mosques are known colloquially as Allah ga naka (“Allah here’s your share”) – and 
the owner may hire a young imam for the mosque as part of his ‘good works’. Many young 
students go round preaching, or perform other ritual services for people (such as repeating 
for them 10,000 prayers). (Last 2008/9: 9) 
Despite (or because) of its tendency to compromise, Izala had much support 
among intellectuals, university students, and civil servants who loathed Nigeria’s 
dysfunctional state but were at the same time forced to live off it. This paradoxi-
cal attitude – abhorring the political system and being part of it – prevented them 
from being serious in their fight against corruption. And the same inner disunity 
haunted Izala. By spreading a message of moral rectitude and obedience to God, 
it was still the most important force of a spiritual renewal, yet it was tainted by its 
collaboration with the rich and powerful. I heard many stories about the greed 
and hypocrisy of individual Izala representatives. It was even said that Izala’s 
                                                            
guard (print edition), 11 November 2001, 14). In 2010, a poll conducted by the Pew Research Global 
Attitudes Project (Osama bin Laden, 1) found that “confidence” in the Al-Qaeda leader was still high. 
Among Muslims in Nigeria as a whole, the approval rate was 48 per cent (and in the North probably 
higher). This was the highest rate in all countries analysed in the survey. 
30  Ulama of the Caucus, in Alkali (a.o.), Overview, 13; M.Q.S. Isa, “Controversy over Proposed FG, 
Boko Haram Dialogue”, Daily Trust, 15 June 2012. 
31  See Alkali (a. o.), Overview, 30, for Borno and other states in north-east Nigeria. 
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split in 1990 was not motivated only by ideological differences but also by rival-
ry over the distribution of funds from abroad.32 
A saviour 
Religious associations offer citizens a chance to organise themselves outside the 
networks of political patronage; hence, these organisations could be used by Ni-
geria’s discontents to submit the ruling class to public control. However, reli-
gious activists have not found ways to overcome their differences and cooperate. 
Even the campaign for a common goal – Shariah – failed to unite them. Ordinary 
Muslims often watched with disgust the petty strife among preachers competing 
for followers and/or political patronage. Some individual clerics with a reputation 
of scholarliness and integrity were held in high esteem, but none rose above reli-
gious factionalism. The only person who enjoyed almost universal support 
among the Muslims I met in Borno and Yobe states was Muhammadu Buhari, a 
former general who had ruled Nigeria from January 1984 to August 1985 and 
who had tried to become head of state again as an opposition candidate in the 
elections of 2003, 2007 and 2011. He combined a tough anti-corruption stance 
with a strong commitment to Islam. Moreover, he was known for carrying out his 
announcements without compromising them. Thus, he seemed capable of rising 
above his fellow politicians, forcing them to bow to the laws. However, the belief 
that a strong and upright leader like Buhari would be able to achieve what mil-
lions of citizens could not – checking the lawlessness of the ruling elites – is na-
ïve. If he were elected president in 2015, militant Muslims might lay down their 
arms, trusting in his good intentions. But he would not have the means to radical-
ly transform the country. As an army general who ruled by decree, he had arro-
gated to himself the power to arrest and detain any citizen indefinitely. Govern-
ment critics had been intimidated by extremely harsh laws. Whoever exposed 
army members and other state agents to public ridicule faced lengthy prison sen-
tences.33 In a democratic setting, Buhari would have to seek approval for all the 
measures he suggested as a president. As the present federal constitution, with its 
system of checks and balances, curtails the power of the executive, Buhari would 
have to accept compromises, accommodate political antagonists, and reconcile 
hostile factions. However, he is not known as someone who can listen to and win 
over his opponents. He was not even able to manage his own political parties and 
win the loyalty of ANPP and CPC politicians who had made him their presiden-
tial candidate. 
                                                            
32  The Bushawa faction, with its headquarters in Jos, followed the policy of Saudi Arabia by supporting 
President Bush’s war against Iraq, while the Saddamawa faction, based in Kaduna, denounced the US 
intervention as an attack against fellow Muslims. 
33  Diamond, Nigeria, 441-42. 
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During the Shariah campaign, Buhari alienated Christians when he demanded 
the spread of Shariah to all parts of the country,34 and when he called on fellow 
Muslims not to vote for a Christian as president.35 In the 2011 presidential elec-
tion, he won a majority in the 12 Shariah states of the Far North but was defeated 
in all others. Although he had kept the implementation of Shariah and other reli-
gious issues out of his election campaign, many adherents perceived his defeat in 
religious terms: Christians (and their Muslim collaborators) had kept out of pow-
er the only candidate capable of bringing sanity to the decadent land.36 In a deep-
ly divided society, democracy does not work. Pious Muslims, as the losers of the 
election, were denied the right to be ruled by a fellow Muslim whom they could 
trust. Southerners, mainly Christians, had prevented them from purifying their 
social and political environment. Through their resistance to a sincere Islamic 
politician, Christians had aborted a project of self-purification that might have 
healed Nigeria’s broken society. 
How to avoid a religious confrontation 
Passing Shariah laws that discriminate between Muslims and infidels and be-
tween men and women and that impose penalties such as amputation and stoning 
was a blatant breach of Nigeria’s constitution.37 When President Obasanjo had to 
react to it, he consulted Benjamin Adekunle, a fellow officer during the civil war 
of 1967-70. Adekunle later disclosed that he suggested immediately sacking 
Governor Sani and imposing a state of emergency in Zamfara State.38 As Nige-
ria’s president, Obasanjo had sworn to defend the constitution, but I guess it was 
a reasonable decision by the head of state to let the Shariah campaign run its 
course, for it is unlikely that the intervention of a Christian politician would have 
stopped the agitation for Shariah and the emergence of groups like Boko Haram. 
There is little that politicians in the South can do to end the violence in the 
North. They have prevented their angry young men from staging counter-attacks 
and killing members of the Hausa and Fulani communities living in Lagos or 
Enugu. Now it is up to the Muslim authorities in the North to prevail on their 
militants: “religious leaders must (…) call to order their followers who preach 
                                                            
34  Peters, Islamic Criminal Law, 55. 
35  I. Bwala, “Riding the Sharia Tiger”, Tell (print edition), 30 July 2001, 66. 
36  In the riots following the 2011 presidential election, more than 400 churches were burnt or destroyed 
in northern Nigeria (United States Commission, Annual Report, 109). Angry protesters also set fire to 
the private houses of the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emir of Kano, and the Emir of Zaria, who were forced 
to go into hiding temporarily (Campbell: The Morning After). 
37  The areas where Shariah contravenes the Nigerian Constitution are analysed in Peters, Islamic crimi-
nal law, 31-42. 
38  I. Ibrahim, “How Obasanjo, IBB created Boko Haram”, Insider Weekly (print edition), 26 March 
2012, 15. 
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and promote violence”.39 It has often been alleged that Muslim leaders were 
afraid of speaking out against Boko Haram. However, many prominent Muslims 
have clearly condemned terrorist attacks. Some of the highest religious authori-
ties stated that Islam preaches tolerance, and Governor Aliyu of Niger State re-
minded his co-religionists that “Islam is known to be a religion of peace and does 
not condone violence and crime in any form”.40 However, such declarations did 
not have much effect. Therefore, a Presidential Committee on the Security Chal-
lenges in the North-East recommended bolder pro-active measures, such as ban-
ning provocative, inciting preaching. In addition, it suggested that state govern-
ments engage “renowned Islamic scholars and jurists that could rationally chal-
lenge the doctrines of (Boko Haram) and convince them to renounce their be-
liefs”.41 
Western commentators have argued in a similar way: Muslim authorities 
should speak out more clearly and propagate a tolerant Islam. By engaging Boko 
Haram members and their sympathisers in an open debate, they should isolate the 
radical core, so that the moderates regain the initiative. However, such sugges-
tions have ignored that ‘moderates’ and ‘militants’ have led intensive debates 
since the formation of the group. In a series of disputations with renowned schol-
ars, Yusuf sought to justify his ideas on Western education and the necessity of a 
jihad. As the arguments and counter-arguments were recorded on video and au-
dio cassettes, they became known to a wide audience of Muslim scholars as well 
as illiterate youth. Yet the results were not as encouraging as Western observers 
would have wished:  
When the Boko Haram movement began to gather momentum … the Ulama were fully 
aware of the trend. A number of initiatives from prominent Muslim scholars and Islamic or-
ganisations were put forward to intervene and resolve the misunderstanding amicably. Dia-
logues and debates with the Boko Haram leadership and their followers were staged to either 
use Islamic rationale to convince them to back down on their fatawah or to dissuade the in-
flux of membership to them. [However] the debates drifted to being counter-productive in 
many incidences. Instead of achieving the desired response, therefore, the movement became 
more emboldened and they even won more public sympathy. (Mohammed 2010: 58-59) 
The failure of religious leaders to restrain the militants is mainly due to their 
lack of moral authority. The Sultan of Sokoto has condemned violence against 
non-Muslims, yet the former army officer owes his office as the highest Islamic 
authority in Nigeria only to the fact that he, like all other sultans since 1815, is a 
direct descendant of Usman dan Fodio, a Fulani preacher, who in 1804 declared a 
                                                            
39  Rev. Fr. Omonokhua of the Catholic Secretariat, in C. Omonokhua, “The need for inter-religious 
dialogue”, The Guardian (Lagos), 2 July 2012. 
40  Dr. Mu’azu Aliyu, in Wikipedia, article on “Boko Haram” (Accessed 7 May 2012). 
41  White Paper based on the report of the Ambassador Usman G. Galtimari committee, partly reproduced 
in T. Abbah, “White paper on insecurity: Report Links Boko Haram with London Scholar”, Sunday 
Trust, 3 June 2012. 
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jihad and established through a series of conquests the largest empire in West 
Africa. Official accounts of Islamic history still portray Usman dan Fodio as role 
model of a religious reformer, and the caliphate he founded is depicted as the 
culmination of Islamic civilisation.42 The leaders of Boko Haram have taken up 
this tradition by calling on all Muslims to “fight for the restoration of the Cali-
phate of Usman Danfodio which the white man fought and fragmented”.43 By 
trying to “restore our lost glory”,44 the rebels present themselves as the true heirs 
of Nigeria’s pre-colonial Islam, while the sultan and his emirs appear as traitors: 
“the Sultan is just a traditional ruler who revolted against the teachings of his 
ancestors and put the Nigerian Constitution ahead of the teachings of the Holy 
Qur’an”.45 Gambling with Shariah has discredited the religious establishment. 
After declaring that the law of God takes precedence over man-made law, they 
could not give plausible reasons for failing to push for a strict application of the 
divine prescriptions. 
From the perspective of pious Muslims, it was just greed and opportunism that 
had destroyed the project of religious self-transformation. Political and religious 
leaders, who needed the oil wealth from the South to finance their extravagant 
lifestyle, continued to make deals with infidels and to collaborate with a godless 
state. Talking about ‘peace’ and ‘tolerance’ when denouncing Boko Haram did 
nothing for their credibility. Governors who operated armed gangs to intimidate 
their opponents were ill-qualified to lecture ‘extremists’ on the merits of non-
violence. Given their lack of religious knowledge, it is unlikely that they will 
succeed in banning ‘provocative, inciting preaching’, as the Presidential Commit-
tee on the Security Challenges in the North-East recommended. Muslims will not 
accept that politicians and their cronies among the clergy supervise preachers by 
giving out licenses. How can representatives of a secular government decide 
which type of preaching is in line with Islamic doctrines? Furthermore, what is 
the true Islamic position on Western education? What do the holy scriptures have 
to say on the relationship with infidels? Is it a God-given dictum that all citizens 
have equal rights, as enshrined in Nigeria’s Constitution? Or should Muslims 
reject Western notions of tolerance? Religious and political authorities, when 
challenging Boko Haram, have no clear message, as I will show in the remaining 
part of this chapter. 
                                                            
42  This official view has shaped the attitudes of Muslims in the Far North, no matter what their organisa-
tional affiliation: “most of the Tarika, Izala and Shiites interviewed view the 19th century Fulani Ji-
hadist, Othman Danfodio’s Hausaland as a model” (Alkali (a.o.), Overview, 29). 
43  Abul Qaqa, spokesman of Boko Haram. In: H. Idiris, “Boko Haram says no more talks with FG”, 
Daily Trust, 21 March 2012. 
44  Ibid. 
45  Abul Qaqa. In: H. Idris, “Boko Haram: Why we won’t listen to sultan”, Daily Trust, 3 October 2011. 
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Western education 
When the rebels began to attack schools and universities, in February 2012,46 
many citizens were upset with what they saw as unwarranted interference in their 
life. Local elites and many others who wanted their children to get ahead sent 
them to government schools, as this was a prerequisite for a career in the state 
administration and other modern sectors. Apart from this personal interest in us-
ing the secular education system, they also believed that participation in the 
Western system of education was necessary for the welfare of the Muslim com-
munity as a whole: “If you do not want Christian doctors to attend to your wife 
when she gives birth, you have to make sure that Muslims are enabled to study 
medicine.” Some Izala leaders blamed Boko Haram for spreading the misconcep-
tion that Islam and modern sciences are incompatible.47 However, Yusuf and his 
successor Shekau were not anti-modernists like Maitatsine. They declared that 
Muslims should use science and technology developed in the West, and reject 
only the un-Islamic ideas mixed into it:  
[T]he Prophet [Muhammad] said in his hadith concerning People of the Book, “if they bring 
to you anything that [is] agreeable in Qur’an, accept it; but if they bring anything that con-
tradicts Islam, reject it; and if they bring anything that neither contradict nor support the 
Qur’an, it is your choice to accept or reject it.” … Western education is the body of 
knowledge that came to us through European colonialists, and included learning medicine, 
technology, Geography, Physics and so on. … They can all be used if they do not clash with 
the teachings of the Prophet. (Mohammed Yusuf, in Adamu 2010: 15, 16)48 
In this respect Boko Haram did not differ from other Muslim organisations in 
the North. Izala clerics also maintained that Western education had been polluted 
by ungodly ideas and that the mixing of male and female students was immoral. 
Yet, as long as Muslims lacked the power to purge the school curricula, they 
grudgingly accepted secular education because it was indispensable to enhance 
their influence in the state apparatus. As a temporary measure, they could only 
supplement and partially correct the official syllabus by offering additional after-
noon classes in Islamic studies. This pragmatic attitude of Izala appealed to Mus-
lims who resented the immorality of the state but were forced to live on govern-
ment jobs and contracts. It was less attractive, however, for the losers in modern-
isation, and these included not just the products of almajiri education but also 
many of those who had spent some years in Western-type schools without gain-
ing any significant qualification.49 To them, Western education might indeed 
                                                            
46  Human Rights Watch, Boko Haram. 
47  Mohammed, Boko Haram, 41. 
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49  Prof. M. Modibbo, the executive general of the Universal Basic Education Commission, stated that 
“more than half of the teachers in some Northern states cannot read or write” (in (Anon.), “50% Illit-
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look harmful as it only benefited those who had decoupled themselves from the 
fate of the ordinary people: “western-style education … equips you for the mod-
ern corrupt life of Nigerian politics and business”.50 
The resentment towards Western education dates to early colonial times and 
has often been fuelled by Muslims elites, such as Sultan Ibrahim Dasuki, a mem-
ber of the Qadiriyya brotherhood, who led the ummah until 1996. As a scion of a 
royal family, he had studied at Oxford, and his son majored in political science at 
Harvard. Yet he warned his subjects against acquiring alien, non-Islamic 
knowledge: “Western education undermines our culture.”51 Another Muslim in-
tellectual declared: “Western education is useless, it is polluted, it is immoral! 
(…) what do you need it for? You need it to work in the government service, and 
there are no longer government jobs.”52 For university graduates, it is difficult to 
find government employment, yet there is intense competition for it because po-
sitions in the civil service have become more lucrative since the transition to de-
mocracy. At the end of the military regime, policemen, teachers, and administra-
tive officers had a basic salary equivalent to ten, twenty, or thirty dollars a month 
(and even these meagre salaries were often not paid). Two years after the death 
of General Abacha in 1998, state employees earned ten times more. This rekin-
dled interest in school and university degrees so that dozens of new universities 
were hastily erected all over Nigeria. The standards of learning, however, have 
continued to decrease, as students are mainly interested in attaining certificates 
by whatever means. Some lecturers with a long teaching experience told me that 
many of those who had passed through primary school in the 1960s and 1970s 
were better educated than today’s university graduates.53 Aliyu Tilde, a Fulani 
politician, wrote a provocative essay in which he claimed that the lack of genuine 
interest in what is taught at school is a major drawback for northern Muslims:  
[W]e go to school only [to] obtain a certificate that will earn us a job without imbibing the 
principles and fundamentals that enabled the West to excel in such knowledge and technolo-
gy … Our general contempt for knowledge is outstanding, making us to prefer ignorance as 
a companion. … we are culturally repulsive to any thing modern, from whatever direction it 
comes. Simply put, we are boko haram. Otherwise, what could explain our backwardness in 
every national endeavour, economic, social, political? Why do we have, for example, the 
lowest per capita income in the country, the lowest life expectancy, the lowest academic 
achievements ... highest poverty and highest maternal and infant mortality rates? (Tilde 
2009) 
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Killing fellow Muslims 
Most victims of Boko Haram attacks have been other Muslims. In some cases it 
was obvious why the rebels had killed them; for instance, when they executed a 
comptroller of customs in his residence in Potiskum. People in Yobe State knew 
that the customs officer had issued an order to murder detained Boko Haram sus-
pects, allegedly by poisoning their food or by driving nails into their head. In 
other cases, however, the victims had just committed minor offences such as 
playing cards, selling bush meat, or drinking in beer parlours. Boko Haram’s 
leadership justified these executions, insisting that everyone must follow Shariah: 
“There are no exceptions. Even if you are a Muslim and you don’t abide by Sha-
riah, we will kill you. Even if you are my own father, we will kill you.”54 
Such extreme enforcement of Islamic Law alienated many Muslims. Critics 
pointed out that gambling and drinking, although forbidden in Islam, did not car-
ry the death penalty, and it seems some Boko Haram leaders were aware that 
their arbitrary executions could not be justified in the light of Islamic orthodoxy. 
After an attack on a beer parlour, Shekau claimed that their aim had not been to 
punish drinkers but to kill security forces of the secular government:  
[W]e do not kill those who drink alcohol. It is mere propaganda that we attacked a beer par-
lour. We had heard that it was purely soldiers who gathered there to drink, and we confirmed 
it, that was why we went there and killed them. … we don’t kill a Muslim; if you hear that 
we have killed a Muslim, we must have found out that he was collaborating with the unbe-
lievers … We are just fighting those who are fighting us, soldiers and police and the rest; and 
anybody, even if he is a learned Muslim teacher, if we confirm that he exposes us to the gov-
ernment, his children will become orphans and his wife will become a widow, in God’s 
name. That is our way. But the ordinary people in town, we seek your forgiveness; I swear 
we will not harm you.55 
Many Boko Haram operations show that great care was taken not to antago-
nise ordinary Muslims. When attacking police stations and other government in-
stitutions, the rebels urged passers-by to flee, lest they be hit by stray bullets. 
And when burning down schools, they also tried, at least initially, to avoid civil-
ian casualties: “We are attacking the public schools at night because we don’t 
want to kill innocent pupils.”56 
The Quran (in Surah 49, 10-11) forbids Muslims to kill fellow Muslims. But 
after the death of the Prophet, who had left no male heir, his disciples fought over 
the leadership of the caliphate; wars broke out, and the factions accused each 
other of not being genuine Muslims. In order to stop these intra-religious wars, 
which were threatening the very existence of the ummah, the great schools of 
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Islamic jurisprudence sought to ban fighting over religious doctrines and the 
proper implementation of Shariah. They acknowledged that many faithful were 
lax Muslims who broke divine injunctions, but this did not make them infidels 
who merited death. Whoever claimed to be a Muslim should be treated as such. 
There were, however, exceptions, namely those who supported the enemies of 
Islam. For the early adherents of Islam it was obvious that they had the right to 
attack those who had betrayed the ummah and abandoned the cause of Islam.57 
The most famous scholar and warrior in pre-colonial Nigeria, Usman dan 
Fodio, the founder of the Sokoto Caliphate, referred to this ban against traitors 
(or apostates) when he declared war against the kings of Hausaland, who claimed 
to be Muslims. He even justified the attack on the Sultanate of Bornu, the oldest 
Islamic polity in the central Sudan, on the grounds that the Mai of Borno had sid-
ed with the enemies of Islam.58 In 1808, the jihadists destroyed the ancient capital 
of Borno and devastated the whole western half of the empire, taking away many 
of its inhabitants as slaves.59 Given that Boko Haram has its home base in the 
Borno region, it is strange that its leaders have idealised the Fulani rulers of So-
koto and their jihad, calling on all Muslims to “fight for the restoration of the 
Caliphate of Usman Danfodio”.60 I suspect that Boko Haram leaders wanted to 
overcome the age-old divisions between the various Islamic regions and gain a 
foothold in north-west Nigeria. In former years, the legacy of Usman dan Fodio 
was claimed mainly by Fulani (and some Hausa) politicians, such as Ahmadu 
Bello, who was Premier of the Northern Region until his assassination in 1966. 
As a direct descendant of Usman dan Fodio, he often used the imagery of the 
jihad61 and promised to continue the religious project of his famous ancestor: 
“(T)he work of salvation for all the people which he so nobly undertook has now 
been handed to me. I dedicate myself totally to its completion.”62 The tradition of 
Islamic militancy was also revived by religious leaders, such as Abubakar Gumi, 
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who inspired the foundation of Izala. Calling for a purification of Islam, Gumi 
opposed the mysticism and the belief in miracles on the part of the Sufi brother-
hoods, especially the Tijaniyya. Whoever adopted the prayer posture and the 
recitations of this group made himself an unbeliever, someone whom anyone was 
allowed to kill.63 
The status of Christians 
Boko Haram leaders chose their targets carefully. When operating in a Muslim 
environment, they were cautious not to harm ordinary people. School buildings, 
for instance, were burnt at night to ensure that pupils were not directly affected. 
When attacking Christians, however, they killed indiscriminately. Churches were 
bombed during Sunday services in order to produce as many casualties as possi-
ble: men, women, and children. Yet these attacks on infidels only began after the 
execution of Yusuf in July 2009, and the purpose of this new strategy has not 
become clear. In an interview with Daily Trust, Boko Haram’s spokesman gave 
southern Nigerians, most of whom are Christians, an ultimatum to leave the 
North.64 This call for a physical separation sounded like a prelude to secession. 
Yet in another statement, the group demanded that all Christians in Nigeria, in-
cluding President Jonathan, convert to Islam.65 And in a third statement, Abul 
Qaqa assured Christians that they would be protected under an Islamic state.66 
Islamic orthodoxy prescribes that Christians (and Jews) enjoy security of life 
and property under a Muslim government. When Boko Haram’s spokesman ex-
plained his organisation’s policy towards Christians, he referred to this principle 
but insisted that it was not applicable in the present situation. Christians were not 
entitled to enjoy the peace assured by Islamic authorities because they had not 
asked to be placed under Islamic protection.67 They were not ready to submit to 
Muslim rule but resisted the extension of Shariah and engaged in violent con-
flicts in order to stop it. It is understandable that many Muslims in the North 
were embittered by this resistance. The Christian minority in the North hindered 
them pursuing their dream of a religious renewal. Although Muslims formed a 
clear majority of the population, they were not allowed to shape their own social 
and political environment. In Zamfara State, where Christians were too insignifi-
cant in number to offer much resistance, Muslims could introduce far-reaching 
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legal reforms; but in Kaduna State, where Christians accounted for at least a third 
of the population, only a restricted version of the Islamic penal code could be 
passed. Moreover, it was clear to the politicians who had initiated the Shariah 
project that the secular government in Abuja would not tolerate a consequent ap-
plication of the new legislation. What they had promised – a far-reaching Islami-
sation of state and society – could not be achieved. Critics of this insincere, polit-
ically motivated Shariah – like Ibrahim Zakzaky, who had been inspired by the 
Iranian revolution – argued that the pious campaign was a farce. The instigators 
had known in advance that true Shariah was not possible as long as the power of 
infidels was not broken. Zakzaky assumed that the time was not ripe for an Is-
lamic republic and that Nigeria’s Muslims had to accept compromises when 
fighting to strengthen their position vis-à-vis infidels. His main rival, the Saudi-
oriented Izala, also assumed that it would take a long time to transform Nigeria 
into an Islamic state. The Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, the most 
comprehensive umbrella organisation, concurred: “an Islamic State, … although 
desirable in the eyes of every Muslim, is not attainable in Nigeria, given the pre-
sent realities of the country”.68 Boko Haram, by contrast, proclaimed that the 
secular government could be toppled and that Nigeria’s Muslims should stop col-
laborating with it. The time had come to revive the jihadist tradition. However, 
there is nothing in the classical doctrine of jihad that would justify the deliberate 
killing of women and children. Islamic orthodoxy demands that violence be di-
rected only against male combatants, while women and children, who form part 
of the war booty and may be enslaved, have to be spared.69 
The Prophet, as he is remembered in the canonical texts, was not a campaigner 
for religious tolerance. When conquering Mecca, he desecrated the main ‘pagan’ 
sanctuary and smashed, with his own hands, ‘idols’ belonging to the shrine. Ac-
cording to the classical schools of Islamic Law, idol worship is a capital offence 
punishable by death. This view informed legislators in Nigeria when they began 
in early 2000 to enact ‘full Shariah’. The Shariah Penal Code of Zamfara, which was 
largely adopted by most other Shariah states, decreed: “Whoever ... takes part in the 
worship or invocation of any juju ... shall be punished with death.”70 This para-
graph of the new law has never been enforced. Nevertheless, adherents of the 
indigenous African religions have learnt that they cannot count on protection 
from state authorities, when their religious freedom is violated. Most of them 
have been put under pressure to abandon their ancient shrines, discontinue reli-
gious festivals, and give up dancing and drumming. Christians (and Jews), who 
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worship the same Abrahamic God as the Muslims, are in a better position. The 
divine law, as it was reconstructed in Medina, Kufa, and Baghdad, grants them 
the right to retain their faith, though only with certain restrictions. They are not 
allowed to evangelise, to build new churches, and to display their religious sym-
bols. They enjoy some autonomy when regulating internal affairs but otherwise 
have to accept the legal and political order established by Muslims. 
Nigerian clerics, businessmen, and politicians, many of whom have gone on 
pilgrimage to Mecca, are aware that the strict regulation of public and private 
life, which Shariah prescribes, affects Muslims as well as non-Muslims, and that 
physical punishments such as flogging and amputation are meant for any offend-
er, no matter what his faith. Why should a Christian thief be treated more lenient-
ly than a Muslim thief? However, Nigeria’s Shariah campaigners found it advis-
able not to inform Christians about their legal status under Shariah, assuring them 
that they had nothing to fear: “all practicing Muslims know that God had said 
that there is no compulsion in religion. Therefore Shari’a will not be forced on 
anybody. It will only be forced on the Muslims.”71 However, the assertion that 
“Shari’a has never had anything to do with non-Muslims”72 and that Christians 
have no reason to reject it is grossly misleading. Muslims “expected Christians to 
be ignorant of the status of non-Muslims according to the classical treatises on an 
Islamic state”.73 
The intricacies of Islamic Law were not known to most of the Muslims I met 
in rural Yobe. However, they generally agreed that infidels should not be granted 
equal rights and that public affairs should be determined by those who were 
guided by God. Christians were not perceived as part of one’s community; they 
were an alien influence that had to be kept in check. The brunt of the resentment 
was directed against Igbo Christians from south-east Nigeria, who had settled all 
over the North as traders, artisans, and small-scale businessmen. They were 
widely seen as representatives of Western civilisation, who had brought with 
them all the vices of the West: greed, permissiveness, and lack of respect. As 
their way of life was supposed to have a corrupting influence on Islamic socie-
ties, it seemed best not to allow them to have any impact on public life. One way 
of excluding them was by stressing the Islamic identity of the indigenous popula-
tion. If the Muslim majority decided to run its affairs on the basis of Islamic 
laws, then there was no place for infidels to participate in law-making and deter-
mine public life. 
The Shariah paradigm does not contain principles that would give non-
Muslims equal rights. It is true that Shariah in northern Nigeria has been en-
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forced at best half-heartedly and one can get away with breaking the law, but 
there are no legal safeguards that guarantee individual rights. Christians can only 
protect their rights granted by the Nigerian Constitution, as long as they are 
strong enough to contain the spread of Islamic Law. As the Catholic Bishop of 
Sokoto put it, there is “no alternative to democracy [and] secularity of the 
state”.74 Separating state and religion would limit the politicisation of religion, 
and it would make it easier for the adherents of different religions to get along 
with each other, provided that all sides felt bound to a secular arrangement. Reli-
gious communities would not be forced to compete for control of the state, if 
they agreed not to use the state apparatus to enforce their divine injunctions. 
However, it is unlikely that Muslims in the North will come to share this view. 
With the Shariah campaign, more than ten years ago, Muslim politicians, intel-
lectuals, and religious leaders discarded the secular principles of the constitution; 
now they have no other rules on which a common polity with Christians and tra-
ditionalists can be built. When condemning Boko Haram, northern politicians 
said that Islam means peace, but they did not specify what a peace based on Is-
lamic principles would look like.  
The way out 
Western observers have called upon the Nigerian authorities to get serious about 
the eradication of poverty and social injustice. Instead of focusing on military 
repression, they should tackle the causes of the crisis and improve the living con-
ditions in the backward states of the North. The governors of these states argued 
similarly, underlining the need for a sustainable development, mass economic 
empowerment, skills acquisition, and an effective administration. In order to 
achieve this, they demanded that the federal government give them additional 
funds. However, the problem with the North is not so much a lack of money but 
how it is spent. For nearly four decades northern politicians and army officers 
dominated the Nigerian state and appropriated for themselves the largest share of 
the oil revenues, yet their part of the country is the least developed. Giving them 
more money will not eliminate poverty. The governor of Borno, who called for a 
Marshall Plan in support of the impoverished North, promised to create half a 
million jobs.75 However, this is neither realistic nor would it lead to a viable solu-
tion, because Nigeria’s public administration already has too many employees on 
its payroll. Seventy-two per cent of the federal government’s budget is spent on 
the salaries and pensions of its staff. Little money is left for investments in the 
country’s infrastructure, yet the pressure on politicians to provide more jobs will 
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not relent, because the Far North has virtually no industries to absorb the rising 
number of young men entering the job market: “[O]urs after all, is still an econ-
omy that imports everything including used underwear.”76 With the economy 
declining, state authorities will be confronted with a tidal wave of popular anger:  
Nigeria is sitting on a keg of gun powder if the population growth of the coun-
try continues to rise without putting in place deliberate policies that would pro-
vide job opportunities … From what I saw in the affected areas, hundreds of 
youths were still in the houses of their parents doing nothing.77  
Most factories in the urban centres have closed down, and even the agricultur-
al sector is in crisis, as the country does not produce enough food to feed its own 
population. In Yobe State, arable land has become so scarce that peasants are 
driven off their property. Villages fight over boundaries; family members are 
cheated out of their plots; sons try to sell the land of their fathers, and fathers sell 
away family land that should have been inherited by their sons. 
Nigerians cannot wait for their country and its citizens to become affluent. 
They have to find ways to contain the violence and get along with each other. 
However, an agreement that would end the insurgency in the North is not in 
sight. Boko Haram raised the question of a social transformation through reli-
gion; it brought Shariah back into the centre of political controversy, a Shariah 
that can be turned against the religious and political establishment. In order to 
end the crisis, Muslims in the North have to discuss what type of Shariah – if any 
– they want. This debate is largely an intra-Islamic affair, because Christians 
cannot contribute much to it. As infidels, who have rejected the teaching of the 
Prophet, they cannot tell Muslims how to go about their religious obligations. 
Muslim critics of Boko Haram suggested that the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Affairs and other mainline organisations “ought to be proactive in educating the 
masses about the true Islam”.78 The problem is that religious experts hold widely 
divergent views about Islam and the demands it may make on its adherents. Most 
ordinary Muslims agree that Shariah should play a role in the organisation of 
state and society, but they cannot agree to what extent the divine laws should 
govern their lives. Many politicians pay only lip service to Shariah and obstruct 
its implementation, but do not openly call for its abrogation. They cannot risk a 
confrontation with Muslim clerics, as they have discredited themselves with their 
Shariah gamble. Islam is a dangerous religion to play with. Since the political 
class started to campaign for the extension of Islamic Law, it has been snared in 
the Shariah trap. There is no easy way for it to extricate itself. 
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Traditional Quranic students  
(almajirai) in Nigeria: Fair 
game for unfair accusations? 
 
Hannah Hoechner 
 
 
Abstract 
The enrolment of many boys and young men in traditional Quranic schools ra-
ther than in formal education has become an issue of growing concern in 
northern Nigeria. The almajirai, the students of such schools, have attracted at-
tention in the context of increased attempts to universalise primary education 
and growing concerns about child welfare. They have also been discussed as 
potential ‘foot soldiers’ for violence in the context of Boko Haram. As system-
atic evidence does not exist to substantiate such claims, the link between 
almajirai and violence is often made with reference to the conditions of their 
upbringing. That the almajirai grow up defying the norms of ‘modern’ child-
hood is taken as proof of a violent predisposition. This chapter shows the prob-
lems of such reasoning. In terms of skills and future prospects, little differenti-
ates the almajirai from other poor undereducated youth from rural households. 
Young people frequently move between different educational systems, which 
means few children are ‘pure’ almajirai. Lingering at the bottom of the status 
hierarchy, the almajirai often lack the power to refute unjustified accusations. 
These feed negative stereotypes, which may give rise to fresh accusations. 
Widespread prejudice and stigma are major concerns to the almajirai.  
 
Introduction 
The issues at stake  
The enrolment of many boys and young men in traditional Quranic schools rather 
than in formal education has become an issue of growing concern in northern 
Nigeria. The students of such schools, many of whom while young beg for a liv-
ing, have attracted attention in the context of increased attempts to universalise 
primary education and growing concerns about child welfare. The almajirai, as 
they are called, have also been rightly or wrongly associated with Islamic radical-
isation, militancy, and the periodic riots that have blighted many northern Nigeri-
an cities. The current spate of Boko Haram violence in northern Nigeria has car-
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ried such modes of thinking to the extreme. Many have jumped to the conclusion 
that the Islamist sect finds easy recruits in traditional Quranic schools. Nobel lau-
reate Wole Soyinka (2012), for example, declared in an article in Newsweek 
magazine about Boko Haram that the “butchers of Nigeria”:  
[have] been deliberately bred, nurtured, sheltered, rendered pliant, obedient to only one line 
of command, ready to be unleashed at the rest of society. They were bred in madrassas and 
are generally known as the almajiris. From knives and machetes, bows and poisoned arrows 
they have graduated to AK-47s, homemade bombs, and explosive-packed vehicles.  
Other authors have declared the almajirai’s deprived living conditions respon-
sible for violence. Former Minister of Education Aishatu Jibrin Dukku, for in-
stance, found that “[m]ost of these children, because of the harsh realities they 
found themselves in, end up becoming juvenile delinquents and, subsequently, 
adult criminals” (Alkali 2009). 
Some almajirai may well be, and probably are, amongst the followers of Boko 
Haram. But there is no systematic evidence to support such assertions. What em-
pirical evidence exists refutes the “simplistic application of economic deprivation 
theory” (Anon. 2012: 118). This chapter asks why, in the absence of sound data, 
the almajirai have become such a popular target for accusations and explores the 
mechanisms that make the almajirai convenient scapegoats.  
I argue that the people participating in the almajiri system are often imagined 
to be opposed to ‘modern’ developments and even as the quintessential challenge 
to a ‘modern’ Nigeria because they defy the norms of ‘modern’ childhood as a 
protected phase of economic dependence, embedded within the nuclear family 
and the formal education system. Many take the fact that the almajirai do not 
conform to such blueprints of ‘modern’ childhood as a sure indication of their 
violent potential and inability to become functional members of society. There 
are undeniably problems and dangers related to the circumstances under which 
many almajirai grow up. Yet, many narratives construe negative outcomes as an 
automatic and inevitable result of almajirci (the practice of living as almajiri). As 
they overly simplify matters, such narratives have little explanatory power  
The argumentative logic underpinning most accusations against the almajirai, 
I argue, builds on problematic assumptions. Contrary to received wisdom, many 
almajirai and many parents of almajirai are anything but opposed to ‘modern’ 
education. Rather, they struggle to access ‘modern’ education that is affordable 
and of acceptable quality. While the link between almajirai and violence is often 
made with reference to their putative refusal to acquire ‘modern’ skills and 
knowledge, the almajirai are hardly alone in lacking skills to safeguard their 
economic futures, and educational disadvantage extends far beyond them. In 
brief, if educational disadvantage and opposition to ‘modern’ developments con-
stitute the causal link between young people and violence, then we have little 
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reason to conclude that our concern should focus merely on the almajirai. I argue 
in this chapter that they do not constitute the neatly separable social category 
they are often portrayed as. Clearly, we need to be mindful of the broader dynam-
ics that produce problematic outcomes. 
I argue in the second part of this chapter that, regardless of whether or not 
almajirai actually engage in problematic behaviour, for many it may be conven-
ient to accuse them. They mostly lack the economic and cultural resources to par-
ticipate in displays of status in their places of study. In addition, they often do not 
have social superiors to speak for them. Blaming almajirai carries little risk of 
stepping on the toes of powerful protectors, which makes them convenient 
scapegoats. What is more, low status can engender even lower status. As almaji-
rai often lack the power to refute unjustified accusations, these feed negative ste-
reotypes, which may give rise to fresh accusations. 
Widespread prejudice and stigma against the almajirai is anything but incon-
sequential. Aware of the negative views people hold of them, the almajirai strug-
gle to defend their sense of self and of purpose by embracing self-conceptions as 
devoted scholars migrating in search of sacred knowledge. In their experiences of 
being treated as underdogs and nuisances lies a source of frustration and aliena-
tion. Being shown respect as human beings would be as important for the almaji-
rai’s well-being as improvements to their living conditions and access to ‘mod-
ern’ skills and knowledge. On a more general note, offloading the blame for vio-
lence and militancy onto the shoulders of the almajirai alone and thus framing 
the challenges the Nigerian nation-state is facing today in terms of the presumed 
backwardness and conservatism of a specific group is problematic. It risks ob-
scuring widespread inequality, poverty, and alienation from the values ‘modern’ 
Nigeria has come to represent. 
The remainder of this introduction discusses the methods and data collected 
and introduces the almajirai in more depth. The second section engages with the 
discourses surrounding the almajirai. The third section juxtaposes the discourses 
about the almajirai with their lived realities and experiences. The Conclusion 
summarises the argument and emphasises the importance of an empirically in-
formed analysis of the almajiri system.  
 
Methods and data 
The material for this chapter stems from media records (national and internation-
al English-language news, and Internet sources including blogs and online fo-
rums), official narratives, institutional publications (from local and international 
organisations working with children), and local academic production. I collected 
the newspaper material through keyword searches (‘almajiri’) on individual 
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newspapers’ homepages,1 including both Abuja- and Lagos-based newspapers, 
and via the online newspaper database allafrica. Most articles were published 
after 2009. I collected blog and online forum entries2 via the Google search en-
gine, using ‘almajiri’ as a search term. As my searches yielded over 900 results, I 
conducted an NVivo word frequency query (search terms ‘almajiri’ / ‘almajirai’) 
to identify the most pertinent articles.  
In addition, I build on 13 months of fieldwork that I carried out as part of my 
master’s and doctoral research in Kano State between 2009 and 2011. My field-
work included four months in Albasu, a small rural town in Albasu local gov-
ernment area in the east of Kano State. For the remaining time, I lived at Sabu-
war Kofa within Kano’s Old City. I collected data in the form of fieldwork ob-
servations, as well as semi-structured interviews, group conversations and casual 
interactions with almajirai, their parents, caregivers, and teachers as well as 
some former almajirai. Furthermore, I use translated and transcribed ‘radio in-
terviews’ the young almajirai conducted amongst each other with my tape re-
corder and discussions of the photographs they took with disposable cameras.  
In addition, I draw on data from the production process of a participatory doc-
umentary film/docu-drama about the perspectives of almajirai on their lives and 
the challenges they face.3 This includes stories narrated or written down during 
the script-writing process, as well as discussions about the way they would like 
to see their lives and identities represented on screen. The nine participating 
youths were aged 15-20 years and came from three different Quranic schools in 
both urban and rural Kano, in which I had previously taught English.  
 
Who are the almajirai? External ascriptions and internal self-conceptions 
Many people conceive of young almajirai as ‘neglected’, ‘exploited’ or ‘aban-
doned’, as “an eyesore or a pest” (Tilde 2009), and as a “generation lost” 
(Ekaette in Abubakar 2009). When they are adolescents, the almajirai appear in 
the public imagination as potential “[b]utchers of Nigeria” (Soyinka 2012) and 
“monsters” in the “breeding” (“Rehabilitating our almajiris” 2011). The almaji-
rai that I conducted my research with conceived of themselves neither as “child 
urchins” (Olagunju 2012) nor as a “cancer” in society (Suleiman 2009, commen-
tator). Rather, they saw themselves as matafiyi mai neman ilimi (Hausa: “those 
who have left their homes in search of knowledge”). I was told by almajirai that 
the syllable AL in almajiri stood for Allah, whereas MA was short for the Proph-
                                                            
1  Among them, 234NEXT (Lagos); BBC Africa; Business Day (Lagos); CNN; Daily Times (Lagos); 
The Guardian (Lagos); Leadership (Abuja); The Nation (Lagos); Punch (Lagos); Sun News (Lagos); 
ThisDay (Abuja); Nigerian/Saturday Tribune (Ibadan); Daily/Sunday Triumph (Kano); Daily/Week-
ly/Sunday Trust (Abuja); and Vanguard (Lagos). 
2  Among them, Nairaland; Nigerian Village Square; and gamji.com. 
3  Available online at: http://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/research/video/video-hlg 
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et Mohammed, and JIRI for the angel Jibril. While this interpretation does not 
reflect the word’s actual etymology (almajiri derives from the Arabic word al-
muhajir, which means ‘migrant’), it captures well how almajirai manipulate the 
word’s meaning, making it a category still able to instil a certain degree of pride 
and self-worth. The gap between external ascriptions of what it means to be an 
almajiri and internal self-conceptions of those young people living as almajirai 
could hardly be wider. 
Discourses about young people often address and open up for debate issues at 
the heart of the social imaginary (Durham 2004). Comaroff & Comaroff (2006: 
268) describe youth as: 
complex signifiers, the stuff of mythic extremes … simultaneously idealizations and mon-
strosities, pathologies and panaceas… [Y]outh stands for many things at once: for the terrors 
of the present, the errors of the past, the prospect of a future … In all of these tropic guises, 
of course, they are figures of a popular imagination far removed from more nuanced social 
realities.  
The claim that children/youth are ‘lost’ or, given the circumstances under 
which they grow up, have ‘lost out on’ certain experiences deemed essential for 
their life stage may well reveal wider fears about the social reproduction of socie-
ty (see Durham 2004: 591). But the almajirai are not only young but also male. 
Whitehead & Barrett (2001: 8) suggest that: 
whenever larger social and public concerns raise their head … very quickly the issue of 
boys/men comes to the fore; usually how to change them, control them, provide them with 
purpose, or simply avoid the worst excesses of anti-social male behaviour. What emerges, in 
fact, is a moral panic around men and masculinity. 
Considering that prevailing ideals of childhood/youth and masculinity – and 
corresponding notions of deviance – bear the impress of wider societal concerns 
helps us understand and analyse popular discourses about the almajirai. 
This chapter is about boys and young men self-identifying as almajirai – who 
may or may not conform to the mental picture that people have of them. What 
makes them almajirai, in their view, is that they are away from home and living 
with a Quranic teacher (mallam) to study the Quran. Using Arabic script, they 
learn to read, write, and recite it. They are young males from primary-school age 
to their early twenties, mostly (though not exclusively) from poor rural families. 
Their schools are largely beyond the state’s purview and regulatory interventions, 
the teacher receiving no salary but living off the support given by the local com-
munity, the alms given in exchange for his spiritual services, the contributions of 
his students, and supplementary income-generating activities. Most teachers are 
not formally certified but are themselves products of the almajiri system. Many 
schools lack physical infrastructure beyond a canopied forecourt where the teach-
ing takes place. The students do not necessarily sleep, eat, and bath on the actual 
school ‘premises’, but often cohabit in other spaces, for example mosques and 
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neighbours’/employers’ houses. To sustain themselves, the almajirai engage in a 
plethora of activities, ranging from begging for food and money, to farm work, 
petty jobs, and trade. Secular subjects do not form part of the almajirai’s curricu-
lum, and Islamic subjects other than the Quran are the preserve of advanced 
learners. 
Enrolment in Quranic schools all over Nigeria is estimated to exceed 9.5 mil-
lion, with more than 8.5 million in the northern part of the country (UBEC 2010). 
How many of these students are almajirai, however, is subject to speculation, as 
the existing statistics do not differentiate between day-students (who stay with 
their parents, potentially attend ‘modern’ school in addition to Quranic school, 
and include females) and ‘boarding’ students. The most reliable estimate for Ka-
no suggests that some 300,000 boys and young men – more than an eighth of all 
6-21-year olds – live as almajirai in that state (Ministry of Education 2008).  
Modernity, appropriate childhoods, and the future of the nation 
Almajirci as antipode of modernity/development 
Concerned discourses about the almajirai can be traced back to the early years of 
the newly independent state, when modernist nation builders called into question 
the ability of the ‘traditional’ Quranic education system to forge a ‘modern’ citi-
zenry for a united Nigeria. The British during sixty years of indirect colonial rule 
in northern Nigeria had neither reformed the Islamic education sector nor intro-
duced secular education on any noteworthy scale. In this way they sought to 
avoid tensions with their Muslim subjects, as Christian missionaries provided 
most early secular schooling. But financial reasons and fear of self-assertive op-
ponents to colonial rule (as had emerged in southern Nigeria from mission 
schools) also motivated their lack of engagement in the education sector (see Fa-
funwa 1974; Umar 2001). The needs of the colonial administration were met by 
employing secular-educated southerners and by offering ‘modern’ education only 
to a small section of society (Abdurrahman & Canham 1978). 
Mustapha (2004: 11) writes that regional differences in education had “a 
knock-on effect on the regional formation of human capital, and general econom-
ic development” and that “a destabilizing inequality in educational attainment 
was built into the fabric of the Nigerian state” (ibid. 12). At the time of Inde-
pendence, “Islamic education … appeared to many people to be a positive hin-
drance to the creation of a united and independent nation”. In 1978 Abdurrahman 
& Canham (1978: 63) wrote that “[t]his impression, which is often deliberately 
encouraged for political reasons, still persists in many areas of Nigeria”. More 
than thirty years on, discourses about the almajirai continue to reflect similar 
concerns.  
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Often, the almajirai are considered the quintessential challenge to a ‘modern’ 
Nigeria. “We are modern now; we don’t send our children on almajiranci”, I was 
told by an official of the local government education area in Kunchi when I asked 
whether any children in his family were almajirai. The almajirai are imagined as 
relics from the past, “stuck in a time warp” (Fabiyi 2008), their schools being 
likened to ‘typewriters’ in an era of ‘computers’ (Tilde n.d.). The almajiri sys-
tem, it is claimed, needs “to be overhauled in order to conform with the new 
economy and modern realities” (“Almajiris: Towards Creating Brighter Future” 
2012). It “has locked its students (out of modernity)”, students who can neither 
“read newspapers nor partake in the running of government” (Tilde 2009). The 
almajirai are considered to lack “the practical skills required in the real world to 
contribute meaningfully to modern society, or even to earn a livelihood” (Sulei-
man 2009).  
As a matter of fact, educational disadvantage in northern Nigeria extends far 
beyond the almajirai, as the low secular school enrolment rates for girls, or the 
poor achievements of even those children who do attend secular school, attest. 
According to the Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey, 35 per cent of 
school-aged girls attend primary school in the North-West as compared with 47 
per cent of boys. In contrast, in the South-East 80 per cent of both girls and boys 
attend. In Sokoto State, 91 per cent of children aged 5-16 years cannot at all read 
a simple sentence in their preferred language; in Lagos State, on the other hand, 
92 per cent of children can either read the entire sentence or at least parts of it. 
Only 14 per cent of children of that age group in Sokoto manage to add two sin-
gle-digit numbers correctly (National Population Commission 2011: 44-59, 159-
177).  
In terms of skills and future prospects, not much sets the almajirai apart from 
other poor undereducated youth from rural households. That the almajirai defy 
what have been argued to be globalised norms of ‘modern’ childhood today may 
contribute to the persistence/prevalence of the idea that they are in fundamental 
opposition to ‘modern’ Nigeria and that they, more than others, constitute a prob-
lem for development.  
 
‘Modern’ children for a ‘modern’ nation 
‘Modern’ Western ideals of childhood as a protected phase of economic depend-
ence, embedded within the nuclear family and the formal education system, be-
came a ‘good’ for “global export”, Boyden (1997: 190) says. These ideals have 
become enshrined in international children’s rights legislation and have influ-
enced social policy doctrines.4 Also, I would argue that they have been em-
                                                            
4  Nigeria is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child since 1991. Owing 
to resistance from different segments of society on religious and cultural grounds, it was not domesti-
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braced, in theory if not practice, by many ‘modern’, urbanised, better-off Nigeri-
ans. I would venture that the almajirai’s apparent defiance of ‘modern’ norms of 
childhood as a protected phase of economic dependence, embedded within the 
nuclear family and the formal education system, reinforces their association with 
‘backwardness’ and ‘conservatism’. Their failure to fit into blueprints of ‘mod-
ern’ childhood is construed as problematic. Supposedly, the almajirai grow up 
deprived of the “hopes and dreams of a normal childhood” and with “their hu-
manity stolen” (“Picture Of President GEJ With Students” 2012) – as a “genera-
tion lost” (Ekaette in Abubakar 2009). They “experience lumpenhood with no 
substance of childhood”, Amzat (2008: 57) writes. Almajirci has been regarded 
as being on the same level as female circumcision and the killing of twins and 
child witches (Owuamanam et al. 2012).  
As the almajirai do not live inside nuclear families, they are often considered 
to grow up outside appropriate adult care and control. Alternative upbringing 
arrangements are considered as being, per se, unable to provide sufficient sup-
port. The National Council for the Welfare of the Destitute, for instance, states 
that the “lack of parental participation in the moral up-bringing of the Almajiri 
pupils” predisposes them to become delinquents (NCWD 2001: 95). Jumare 
writes that many almajirai “have never known the love and care of parents, and 
living the hard life, they grow up generally without emotions or a humane side to 
them” (2012). 
The fact that students often farm with their teacher and, if earning an income 
through other means, contribute financially to his livelihood has been equated 
with abuse. Ahmed Bello of the Nigerian National Agency for the Prohibition of 
Traffic in Persons is quoted as saying the almajirai’s provision of free labour on 
their teachers’ farms amounts to “sheer exploitation” (Abubakar 2009). Begging, 
in particular, has been criticised for being “harmful to both (the almajirai’s) 
physical and mental health with attendant physical and psychological conse-
quences” (Okoye & Yau 1999: 45). 
The street as a corrupting space is a recurrent theme. According to Aluaigba, 
researcher at Bayero University Kano, street begging exposes almajirai “to all 
sorts of vile and deviant behaviors and immoral acts because they interact freely 
with people of low virtue like prostitutes, drug addicts and gamblers” (2009: 22). 
Defying the norms of ‘modern’ childhood, the almajirai are described as a 
threat to the project of the ‘modern’ Nigerian nation in its entirety. President 
Goodluck Jonathan calls them “dangerous to national development” (Kumolu 
2012) and adds that “the time has come for the nation to build on the moral foun-
                                                            
cated until 2003. To date, not all states have passed the Child’s Rights Act into law. Norms prohibit-
ing child trafficking are frequently considered applicable to the almajirai (e.g. Amali 2005; Olujuwon 
2008). 
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dations of the traditional school system by providing the Almajiri with conven-
tional knowledge and skills”. An article in the Nigerian Tribune is titled “Almaji-
rai, street kids and a nation’s future”, implying an immediate connection between 
the three (Olagunju 2012). M.E. Fabiyi, a blogger on NigeriaWorld, claims that 
“(i)t is imperative for Nigerian unity to ensure that the Northern Almajirai are 
provided with every opportunity to advance themselves” (2008). 
It is widely acknowledged that many almajirai grow up in difficult conditions. 
However, we need to be careful when drawing conclusions about what this im-
plies. Not every child living away from his parents is ‘abandoned’; not every 
form of work carried out by children amounts to ‘exploitation’; not every beg-
ging child falls prey to corrupting influences. What is more, for many poor chil-
dren in Nigeria – and elsewhere – contributing to their families’ subsistence 
through work (both within and outside the household) is a matter-of-course fea-
ture of everyday survival (see Boyden, Ling & Myers 1998). It is a widespread 
practice in West Africa to place children with guardians other than their biologi-
cal parents, not only to forge links with other households but also to ease the 
family’s subsistence burden and to allow children to seize educational or income 
opportunities absent at home (see Goody 1982; Bledsoe 1990; Notermans 2008). 
To consider economic dependence and the setting of a nuclear family as neces-
sary ingredients of a ‘proper’ childhood means to dismiss the lived realities of the 
vast majority of young people around the globe as pathological.  
 
Backward and neglectful parents; rogue and gullible children 
The notion that the parents of almajirai wilfully forfeit ‘modern’ careers for their 
children is a recurrent theme in discourses about almajirci. Often, the parents are 
described as hostile to change and ready to “defy every effort aimed at address-
ing” the system (Kumolu 2012). Moreover, almajirai’s parents are frequently 
depicted as negligent and oblivious of their parental duties. Bala Muhammad, 
then head of a Kano State directorate created to promote morals and good behav-
iour, for instance, chides “parents who have more children than they can afford 
and see Koranic schools as a means to rid themselves of the extra burden” (Abu-
bakar 2009; see Sule-Kano 2008).  
As their parents are dubbed backward and neglectful, the almajirai themselves 
are considered gullible and rogue. The circumstances of their upbringing are of-
ten presented as sufficient conditions to make them inherently dangerous. Sauda-
tu Sani, a federal legislator from Kano State, claimed about the almajirai that 
“[t]he pathetic life they live ... breeds heartless criminals” (Abubakar 2009). It 
has been asserted that, “[h]ungry and angry”, the almajirai can easily be mobi-
lised to engage in looting and killings during ethno-religious clashes so as to pay 
society back (ibid.). Awofeso et al. (2003: 320) write of the “immense” “terrorist 
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potential of having about one million hungry and gullible children roaming aim-
lessly in Nigeria’s northern cities, from whom any fanatic, religious or otherwise, 
could readily recruit disciples for antisocial purposes”.  
To my knowledge, the claim that the almajirai participate in violence, whether 
interreligious or sectarian, has been investigated systematically only on one occa-
sion, namely in the aftermath of the Maitatsine crisis of the 1980s. A federal 
government-constituted Tribunal of Inquiry established that children aged 10-14 
years, unaccompanied by their parents, were amongst Maitatsine’s followers.5 
Yet, it would be hasty to conclude from this that almajirai are violent per se. As-
suming that violence results automatically from some inherent feature of the 
almajiri education system aborts prematurely the search for more meaningful 
explanations of violent behaviour. Some 9.5 million boys and girls all over Nige-
ria attend Quranic schools, either in addition to attendance in a secular school, or 
as their only educational experience (UBEC 2010). Clearly, little is gained by 
suspecting all Quranic students indiscriminately of becoming violent militants. 
On the contrary, such general suspicion may even be dangerous as it can alienate 
the constituencies of the traditional Quranic education system. 
Last (2009a: 4) argues that it is easy to declare disengagement from the na-
tional project to be ‘backward’ and ‘conservative’, “but that is to take on, un-
thinkingly, the perception of the modernising faction in the country, with its dif-
ferent moral values and modes of living”. Those parts of society commonly asso-
ciated with the new Nigeria, amongst them non-Muslims, ‘southerners’, the nou-
veaux riches, and ‘modern youth’, often do not conform to Muslim / Hausa codes 
of behaviour, which emphasise “truthfulness, restraint (in words and actions), 
courtesy to others including strangers, [and] deference to seniors” (ibid. 6). To 
juxtapose ‘Muslim/Hausa values’ with ‘modern Nigerian values’ assumes that 
they can be told apart neatly and overlooks their historical entanglement. But 
there is an argument to be made about the disjuncture between the norms (if not 
behaviour) reigning among many ‘commoners’/poor (talakawa) in Hausaland – 
among them the constituencies of the almajiri system – and the more cosmopoli-
tanised Nigerian middle and upper classes (be they Hausa/Muslim or not) that 
have larger stakes and a greater presence in the ‘modern’ Nigerian project. 
Framing the challenges the Nigerian nation-state is facing today in terms of 
the presumed backwardness and conservatism of a specific group carries the 
danger of dismissing alienation from the values ‘modern’ Nigeria has come to 
represent as a mere cultural defect. If having an ‘non-modern’, ‘conservative’ or 
‘backward’ childhood can explain problematic behaviour and even violence, one 
is spared having to look further for reasons accounting for the current crisis, and 
                                                            
5  Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981): Report of Tribunal of Inquiry on Kano Disturbances (Maitatsine) 
(cited in Awofeso, Ritchie & Degeling 2003). 
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especially for reasons that might be corollaries of specifically ‘modern’ devel-
opments in Nigeria – such as the growing inequalities and individualism brought 
about by economic change. As long as the inadequacies of the almajiri system 
can serve to explain the Boko Haram-related violence, it is possible to blank out 
more complicated questions about poverty, inequality, and alienation. 
The almajirai’s lived experiences 
Complex social realities defying one-dimensional narratives 
The narrative of ‘backward’ parents refusing their children access to ‘beneficial’ 
knowledge is easily digestible. It does not call into question the set-up of Nigeri-
an society or dominant conceptions of appropriate ‘development’ interventions 
(such as universal basic education). It also suggests that apposite policy respons-
es to the almajiri system are an uncontroversial and straightforward choice. 
Could the ‘problem’ posed by the almajirai not be ‘solved’ with a ban on the 
system? The Northern Traditional Rulers’ Council at least suggests such a ban 
(Folaranmi 2011), as does Senate President David Mark (Ogunmade 2013). Plat-
eau State outlawed street begging by school-aged children in 2009, and on the 
federal level a similar law is in the legislative pipeline. Unfortunately, however, 
social realities are more complex than the dominant narrative suggests, making 
punitive and abolitionist approaches a problematic choice.  
It is a commonplace that the parents enrolling their children as almajirai do 
not appreciate secular knowledge. Yet, throughout my research, I have not actu-
ally met anyone who considered secular education as principally haram (forbid-
den) and met very few who thought it not particularly desirable (see e.g. 
Brigaglia 2008). Appreciation of different forms of knowledge is reflected in 
children’s educational trajectories. Many young people do not live as almajirai 
throughout their childhood and youth, but – voluntarily or forced by circum-
stances – switch between different educational options. Their schooling trajecto-
ries may, for example, include episodes in so-called Islamiyya schools. These are 
modernised Islamic schools that teach the Quran but also other Islamic, and in 
some instances ‘modern’/secular subjects. Many almajirai also attend secular 
school for a couple of years before enrolling as Quranic students and plan to fur-
ther their secular education in the future. Former almajirai are likely to make up 
a large part of the clientele of adult evening schools.6  
Various people in Albasu informed me that in the past people did not value 
secular education, but now most had come to understand its benefits. Yet, in-
creasing acceptance on principle has been thwarted by state withdrawal from the 
                                                            
6  This impression is based on visits to two different adult evening education centres in Kano City and 
on information from older/former almajirai. 
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education sector since structural adjustment (Umar 2003; Baba 2011). While 
basic education is officially free, in reality it involves recurrent expenses: for text 
books and writing materials, uniforms, transportation where necessary, levies for 
the rehabilitation of school facilities (which are often in a deplorable state), levies 
to buy chalk, brooms, report cards, and such sundry running costs. Post-primary 
education in particular has its price – beginning with the bribe sometimes required 
to secure one of the limited places7 – and often requires students to com-
mute/board. Poor-quality teaching (see Johnson 2010), costs – including lost op-
portunity costs in terms of foregone children’s work (see Tomasevski 2005) – 
insecurity about transitions to the next level of schooling, and more than insecure 
pay-offs in terms of future opportunities: all these make parents wonder whether 
secular school is quite worth the investment. 
Admittedly, my research may underestimate remaining resentments on ideo-
logical grounds against secular education, as people opposed to anything ‘West-
ern’ may have avoided meeting me/talking to me, and as interviewees may have 
concealed critical views thinking they would make me, a secular school product, 
uncomfortable. Several people I spoke to felt that secular knowledge comes sec-
ond in importance to religious knowledge. Whereas parents may find it excusable 
to let their children’s boko education slide, most felt strongly about ensuring their 
wards acquire at least a modicum of Quranic knowledge. But whatever the role 
of remaining resentments against boko education, given the financial difficulties 
poor parents face attempting to enrol and sustain their children in secular educa-
tion, we cannot jump to the conclusion that it is necessarily a dislike for secular 
education that makes children drop out of secular school / enrol as almajirai. Al-
so, to dismiss critical views on boko education out of hand as ‘backward’ is prob-
lematic. It ignores the fact that negative attitudes towards boko education origi-
nate, in part at least, in contemporary social and political conditions. Boko Ha-
ram, for example, links its rejection of boko to the corruption and depravity of 
today’s elites, most of whom are ‘modern’ school products (see Last 2009b).  
People make reasoned decisions based on the options available to them, and 
costly and poor-quality secular education may not make for a particularly attrac-
tive choice. The almajiri system, on the other hand, offers redress for a number 
of situations. Gathering the resources to launch an adult career – that is, to build a 
room for prospective bride(s) and children, and to marry – affords a real chal-
lenge to adolescent boys and young men in an eroding rural economy where op-
portunities to earn cash income are scarce. Seasonal or permanent migration to 
the cities, which offer petty income opportunities as street vendors and odd-job 
                                                            
7  I was told on several occasions that children did not proceed to secondary school, even though they 
would have liked to and had performed well in primary school, because they could not secure admis-
sion. I was told that admission certificates – a scarce and prized item, as the number of secondary 
school places is limited – are often distributed based not on merit but on ‘purchasing power’. 
 Traditional Quranic students in Nigeria 75 
 
men, promises redress. Migration, especially during the agriculturally unproduc-
tive dry season, is indeed a common strategy of Sahelian peasant households to 
reduce their subsistence burden and allows boys to acquire livelihood skills ap-
propriate to the ecology of the region (Mustapha & Meagher 1992; Mortimore 
1998). 
Divorce is frequent and easy to attain in Hausaland. In 1959, Smith (1959: 
244) wrote that “[t]he average Hausa woman probably makes three or four mar-
riages before the menopause”. The repeated efforts of Kano State governor Rabiu 
Kwankwaso to marry off divorcees suggest that divorce continues to be perva-
sive (“Another 1,000 divorcees, widows up for wedding in Kano” 2013; see also 
Solivetti 1994). Many marriages end in divorce because husbands fail to take 
care of the basic subsistence needs of their families, or because of fights be-
tween/over co-wives. In the case of divorce, the need may arise to re-accom-
modate children. Divorced mothers, who are expected to re-marry soon, can rare-
ly move into new marriages with children from previous ones. Children left with 
fathers are at risk of suffering neglect and of abuse from stepmothers. High ma-
ternal mortality also renders children motherless (Federal Ministry of Health 
2011). For boys, the almajiri system offers a way out under such constrained cir-
cumstances. 
In summary, multiple economic, cultural, and religious factors interact togeth-
er to make some parents prefer almajirci over other options. Poverty is a major 
factor constraining choice; ‘modern’ secular education often does not constitute a 
meaningful option; high divorce rates necessitate the re-accommodation of chil-
dren. Norms about the gender-appropriate upbringing of children, religious be-
liefs in the need to prepare for the Hereafter, and a concern with boys’ acquisi-
tion of livelihood skills appropriate to the peasant economy and ecology of the 
region – all these factors also play a role in enrolment decisions. To shrug off all 
cultural/religious motives for almajirci as ‘backward’ means to dismiss the po-
tential for change that lies in understanding them. What is more, an exclusive 
focus on the almajiri system as putative radicalising agent in young people’s 
lives overlooks the fact that the almajirai do not constitute the neatly separable 
social category which they are often portrayed as. Many young men are not 
‘pure’ products of the almajiri system but have also experienced other strands of 
education. Any serious assessment of processes of Islamist radicalisation and 
militancy needs to take into account the sum total of these experiences.  
Meanwhile, it is convenient for many to point accusing fingers at the almaji-
rai. The next section explores why this is the case and what the consequences are 
for the almajirai’s well-being and sense of dignity. 
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Scapegoats at the bottom of the status hierarchy  
Most almajirai do not know that the media write about them as “cancer” (Sulei-
man 2009, commentator) and about their schools as “breeding grounds” for 
“monsters” (“Rehabilitating our almajiris” 2011). But they know that the people 
in the urban neighbourhoods to which they come to study talk about them as ur-
chins and hoodlums. While they felt fairly well accepted within their rural com-
munities, most almajirai I worked with – from very young ones to almost-adults 
– had experienced rejection and contempt in urban areas, ranging from insults, to 
‘donations’ of spoilt food, to physical assaults. They were painfully aware of 
negative opinions about them and frequently voiced their distress about being 
denied even a minimum of respect as human beings. Bashir,8 an almajiri at 
Sabuwar Kofa in urban Kano (12 years old), felt they were treated as even less 
than animals, for no reason other than being almajirai: 
Some of them don’t think almajirai are human. To some, a dog is better than an almajiri9 … 
To some, an almajiri, as long as he is an almajiri, they just take him to be a bad person. They 
think he is an animal, that a donkey is even better than an almajiri. 
As newcomers/strangers at their places of study, the almajirai feel they are 
vulnerable to abuses they would not be exposed to back home, and which young 
‘yan gari (“children of the town”), youngsters living at home with their parents, 
are not exposed to. In a society in which individuals derive their social standing 
from the people they ‘belong’ to, be it family members or patrons, being unable 
to display such belonging means to be vulnerable/defenceless.10 The term gata 
connotes a person whom you can legitimately expect to stand up, as well as pro-
vide materially, for you. The almajirai I conducted my research with often ex-
plained the abuses they suffered with reference to the apparent absence of such 
guardians/protectors. During the script-writing process for the film, for instance, 
the participating boys noted that almajirai are often mistreated because 
people see he (the almajiri) doesn’t have a guardian/protector (gata); and if they mistreat 
him, nothing will happen to them. And the almajirai’s teachers want to live in peace with the 
people from town. That’s why even if almajirai have been mistreated, they’ll tell them to 
have patience. (Script-writing, 22 July 2011) 
                                                            
8  I have changed the names of informants where I felt it necessary to protect their identity. Where in-
formants were comfortable with statements being publicised in their name and where I considered this 
safe for them, I have left names unchanged. 
9  Unlike cats, which may be kept as pets, dogs entertain little sympathy in Hausa society. They are 
considered polluting, and Prophet Mohammed also disliked them (personal communication with Mur-
ray Last, 7 December 2010). 
10  Conversely, being unable to protect one’s ‘own people’ is a sign of weakness. Last argues with refer-
ence to the Biafran war that “[t]o kill a leader's defenceless, dependent women and children is to strike 
where he is most vulnerable, and to inflict on him maximum hurt … their weakness is his weakness. 
To attack them is not seen necessarily as immoral” (Last 2000b). The threat of Boko Haram spokes-
person Shekau to retaliate against policemen’s women and children is a case in point (http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=kBemHl-tnsc [Accessed on 27 January 2012]). 
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I would not go so far as to suggest that it is considered legitimate to treat 
someone badly for lack of gata, but as an explanation for bad/heedless treatment 
it makes immediate sense to people. Command over / claims to other people’s 
respect, I would venture, inhere not in the individual but in the social hierarchy 
she/he belongs to. To fend off assaults on their dignity, the almajirai participat-
ing in the film project declared they too had their supporters/protectors, rather 
than demanding that everyone should be treated with respect and dignity irre-
spective of whether or not he has gata. Buhari, for example, an almajiri in Al-
basu and part of the crew with whom I produced the film/docu-drama about the 
lives of almajirai, proclaims at the end credits where the almajirai spell out their 
messages to the public: 
I want those people who abuse almajirai to understand that they (the almajirai) also have 
people who care about them (gata). 
There are other sources of vulnerability for almajirai, apart from their difficul-
ties in displaying ‘belonging’. Unlike in a village context where nearly everyone 
knows nearly everyone else’s family background, in an urban environment ano-
nymity characterises many encounters. Displays of belonging have thus been 
complemented with novel ways of signalling one’s status. Demonstrations of 
wealth are of course a popular default option for those wishing to make claims to 
high rank: posh cars are the preserve of the rich; flashy mobile phones and glam-
orous clothes belong to the symbolic repertoire also of the somewhat less-
lavishly endowed. Finally, shows of one’s mastery of prestigious and hard-to-
attain forms of knowledge – for example, conversing in English (preferably in 
the presence of Hausa-only speakers!), reciting the Quran in the qira’a of Hafs 
(rather than the ‘folk’ Warsh version), or at least greeting (Assalamu alaikum wa 
rahmatullah he wa barakatuhu) with an Arabic accent – work effectively to cre-
ate instantaneous hierarchies. Unfortunately, most almajirai lack the economic 
and cultural capital required to participate in such new styles of differentiation. 
For the most part, they do not command the financial resources for displays of 
wealth, and ‘modern’ forms of knowledge are difficult to acquire, especially for 
those attending Quranic school only.  
On top of this, their often precarious access to food compounds the almajirai’s 
low status. In Hausaland, the language of food is often used to express social re-
lationships. Eating (ci) plays a central role in metaphors of power, the word ‘eat-
ing’ being used to describe situations such as winning a victory, conquering a 
place, or having coitus with a woman (see Last 2000a: 374). Having sta-
ble/secure access to food signals status. Almajirai, conversely, often toil to find 
enough food for the day. “Not to eat is to experience what it is to lack power,” 
Last writes (ibid.). Not to be in a position to choose whose food to accept and 
whose food to refuse means to lack leverage to signal discontent, protest against 
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bad treatment, or pass moral judgement. Social harmony is sealed/expressed by 
the exchange of food. Refusing somebody’s food, on the contrary, subtly signals 
dissent in a culture where open confrontation is shunned. Yet, this option is not 
always open to almajirai. The almajirai I befriended knew of fellow students 
who are so hungry that they would dry and re-boil food that had gone off. Food is 
usually eaten communally, and refusing to share with the members of one’s 
community is hardly legitimate. Going hungry means to be excluded from the 
benefits of community membership.  
Altogether, there is little to protect the almajirai from lingering at the bottom 
of the status hierarchy. This makes them easy prey to those searching for scape-
goats. The almajirai involved in the film project were upset about having to 
serve as scapegoats for all kinds of incidents in their neighbourhoods. Without 
someone answering for them close by, they felt they had become fair game for 
unfair accusations. Auwalu, for example, stated during the script-writing for the 
film: 
Some offences, it’s not an almajiri who committed them; it’s the people/kids from town 
(‘yan gari). But they’ll just say an almajiri committed it. If there’s a school close by, they’ll 
just go and tell the mallam [Quranic teacher]: “Look what your almajirai did”; whereas it 
wasn’t them who did it. The people from the neighbourhood don’t see their own children’s 
faults. (Script-writing, 22 July 2011) 
It is handy for people to blame almajirai for petty incidents in their neigh-
bourhoods, as it carries little risk of stepping on the toes of powerful protectors. 
The children in my neighbourhood at Sabuwar Kofa had understood this very 
well. On two occasions, I witnessed how young thieves in my house attempted to 
put the blame on the almajirai studying with my neighbour, a teacher of the 
Quran, after they had been discovered. Low status, then, can engender even low-
er status: since almajirai often lack the power to refute unjustified accusations, 
these feed negative stereotypes.  
 
Struggling to come to terms with prejudice and stigma 
What are the consequences of widespread prejudice and stigma for the young 
people living as almajirai? Aware of the negative views people hold of them, 
they struggle to defend their sense of self and of purpose. The almajirai I got to 
know well embraced time and again self-definitions as devoted scholars migrat-
ing in search of sacred knowledge, in order to challenge narratives that cast them 
and their fellow students as the product of parental neglect and poverty. During 
the script-writing for our film/docu-drama, for example, the boys involved in the 
film project invoked any number of social, cultural, and religious arguments to 
justify enrolment as an almajiri: 
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 At home, he [a child] becomes stubborn, quarrelsome with other children and disrespect-
ful towards elders. If he’s told to go to school, he doesn’t go. He just goes for a stroll, an-
noying the people in the neighbourhood. 
 Some are worried about the kind of kids their children associate with. That is why they 
decide to take them to school. Because if they left them at home, they might become 
spoiled; but if they take them to school, someone is looking after them because it’s the 
mallam’s work to look after them. 
 Parents want their children to get to know their religion, and know people, and know how 
to live together with people. 
On other occasions, the almajirai categorically refuted explanations invoking 
poverty or difficult conditions at home as reasons for almajiri enrolment. Nasiru, 
for instance, an almajiri at Sabuwar Kofa (15 years), contended that  
especially now that there is boko, if you come for almajirci, some people think it’s because 
you don’t have food in your house: that’s why you come out to beg. But it’s not like that; it’s 
because you’re searching for knowledge.  
Habibu (15 years) refuted the claim of parental neglect, suggesting that  
people bring their children to Quranic school not because they hate them, but because they 
want them to have the knowledge. 
Being vilified as miscreants leaves its mark on the young people living as 
almajirai. How strongly a concern respect was felt by the almajirai participating 
in the film project becomes apparent in the messages to the public they included 
in the end credits of the film. Six of the nine participants voice respect as their 
biggest worry and call for a more sympathetic view on almajirai. For example: 
 I want those who think almajirai are bad people, to know that they aren’t. Either speak 
good about us, or keep quiet. (Kabiru Idris) 
 I call upon you to stop accusing almajirai of things they didn’t do. Please inquire first be-
fore you just accuse the almajirai. (Naziru Usman) 
 I call upon those people who insult us, who think we are useless, to stop as of today, for 
the sake of Allah. (Auwalu Mahdmud) 
Elsewhere I have described how the almajirai struggle to maintain their sense 
of self and self-worth in this context of rejection and denigration (Hoechner 
2011). The young people I got to know during my research embraced an explicit-
ly moral conception of what it means to be an almajiri that allowed them to take 
pride in their identity as almajirai despite widespread societal disapproval. To 
know that they knew how to ‘behave well’ and possessed the ‘moral knowledge’ 
society often claimed they lacked helped them to maintain dignity in the face of 
negative attitudes. By asserting their moral superiority over their traducers – for 
example, behaving well and properly when treated in an obviously ungodly way 
– they could win at least a moral victory. Also, the almajirai frequently shifted 
(justifiably or not) the blame they felt was unfairly offloaded unto their shoulders 
to ‘yan daba, the members of urban ward gangs (see Casey 2007, 2008). Yet, 
such strategies cannot dispel completely the frustration caused by repeated con-
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frontation with negative attitudes. The almajirai I spent considerable time with 
during the film production were quite frustrated with the rich and ruling classes, 
who in their view did not live up to their obligation to provide for the almajirai 
in the same way as they provide for the students of boko school (‘yan boko).11 As 
citizens (‘yan ƙasa), the almajirai felt that they deserved to be accorded the same 
rights (‘yanci).  
Conclusion 
Since the violence related to Boko Haram has escalated in northern Nigeria, the 
almajirai, already low in the social status hierarchy before the crisis began, have 
emerged as a popular target for accusations. Many think that traditional Quranic 
schools supply the ‘cannon fodder’ for Boko Haram (“Rehabilitating our almaji-
ris” 2011). So far, however, there is no conclusive empirical evidence to justify 
such conclusions. This chapter has probed why the almajirai are nevertheless so 
commonly associated with Islamist militancy and violence. I have argued that the 
almajirai’s apparent defiance of the norms of ‘modern’ childhood is often inter-
preted as a wilful rejection of ‘modern’ institutions and developments. Judging 
the conditions of their upbringing as unsuitable for children, many predict patho-
logical results for the almajirai. Yet, such reasoning overlooks that the blueprints 
for ‘modern’ childhood prove unattainable for many poor children. It also hides 
from view that often it is poverty and the absence of meaningful secular educa-
tion rather than a rejection of boko that makes parents enrol their sons as almaji-
rai. What is more, if inadequate formal and vocational skills cause violence (as 
many discussing the almajirai as thugs- and militants-to-be assume), we are ill-
advised to focus our attention merely on the almajirai: educational disadvantage 
in northern Nigeria extends far beyond them. 
The second part of this chapter illustrated the practical mechanisms that make 
the almajirai convenient scapegoats. The almajirai are at the bottom of the status 
hierarchy and lack guardians to speak for them in their places of study. Blaming 
almajirai carries little risk of stepping on the toes of powerful protectors. But 
accusations that are experienced as unfair not only alienate and frustrate those 
whom they target; they also develop a reality of their own. As almajirai often 
lack the power to disprove unfounded accusations, these accusations remain in 
the air and feed negative stereotypes, which may lead to fresh accusations. 
To improve the almajirai’s situation, rethinking stereotypes is necessary. Ra-
ther than reviling the system, viable alternatives need to be made available to 
poor rural households. The almajirai (and other poor undereducated youth) must 
                                                            
11  Given the low standards and limited resources of most government boko schools in northern Nigeria, 
it is somewhat ironic that someone would envy them for the support they receive. 
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be offered opportunities to further their education and to find work. These are 
more demanding tasks for governments than simply drafting legislation to ban 
the system. This chapter aimed to show that the presumably easy answers pro-
vided by punitive and abolitionist approaches to the almajiri system are chimae-
ras. Banning the system without providing alternatives will not help the current 
crisis in Nigeria’s North. Blaming the almajiri system for negative outcomes 
without thinking about the larger societal forces underpinning the crisis – ine-
quality, poverty, and alienation from the values ‘modern’ Nigeria has come to 
represent – may well compound rather than solve Nigeria’s problems. 
References 
ABDURRAHMAN, A.M. & P. CANHAM (1978), The ink of the scholar: The Islamic tradition of 
education in Nigeria. Lagos: Macmillan Nigeria. 
ABUBAKAR, A. (2009), “Nigeria struggles to curb rise in child beggars”, The Telegraph, 18 
November. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6596232/Nigeria-struggles-to-curb-
rise-in-child-beggars.html (Accessed on 25 September 2013). 
ALKALI, A. (2009), “10 Million Kids Beg in the North – Minister”, Leadership, Abuja, Nigeria, 
22 November. http://allafrica.com/stories/200911231395.html (Accessed on 25 September 
2013). 
“ALMAJIRIS: TOWARDS CREATING BRIGHTER FUTURE FOR THE STREET KIDS” (2012), ThisDay, 
22 April. http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/almajiris-towards-creating-brighter-future-for-
the-street-kids/114304/ (Accessed on 25 September 2013). 
ALUAIGBA, M.T. (2009), “Circumventing or superimposing poverty on the African child? The 
Almajiri syndrome in Northern Nigeria”, Childhood in Africa 1(1): 1-37. 
http://www.afrchild.ohio.edu/CAJ/articles/AluaigbaCAJ2009.pdf (Accessed on 25  
September 2013). 
AMALI, A.U. (2005), “Almajirci as child trafficking”, Daily Trust, 14 October. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200510140663.html (Accessed on 25 September 2013). 
AMZAT, J. (2008), Lumpen childhood in Nigeria: A case of the Almajirai in Northern Nigeria, 
Hemispheres 23: 55-66.  
ANONYMOUS (2012), “The popular discourses of Salafi radicalism and Salafi counter-
radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram”, Journal of Religion in Africa 42:  
118-144.  
“ANOTHER 1,000 DIVORCEES, WIDOWS UP FOR WEDDING IN KANO” (2013), Premium Times,  
23 May. http://premiumtimesng.com/regional/135915-another-1-000-divorcees-widows-up-
for-wedding-in-kano.html (Accessed 25 September 2013). 
AWOFESO, N., J. RITCHIE & P. DEGELING (2003), “The Almajirih and the threat of non-state 
terrorism in Northern Nigeria – Lessons from Central Asia and Pakistan”, Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism 26(4): 311-325.  
BABA, N.M. (2011), “Islamic schools, the Ulama, and the state in the educational development 
of Northern Nigeria”, Bulletin de L’APAD 33. 
BLEDSOE, C. (1990), “No success without struggle: Social mobility and hardship for foster  
children in Sierra Leone”, Man 25(1): 70-88.  
BOYDEN, J. (1997), “Childhood and the policy makers: A comparative perspective on the  
globalization of childhood”. In: A. James & A. Prout, eds, Constructing and reconstructing 
childhood (2nd ed.). London: Falmer Press, pp. 190-229. 
BOYDEN, J., B. LING & W.E. MYERS (1998), What works for working children. Stockholm, 
Sweden: Rädda Barnen. 
82 Hoechner  
 
BRIGAGLIA, A. (2008), “‘We ain’t coming to take people away’: A Sufi praise-song and the 
representation of police forces in Northern Nigeria”, Annual Review of Islam in Africa 10: 
50-57. 
CASEY, C. (2007), “‘Policing’ through violence: Fear, vigilantism, and the politics of Islam in 
northern Nigeria”. In: D. Pratten & A. Sen, eds, Global vigilantes. London: Hurst,  
pp. 93-124. 
CASEY, C. (2008), “‘Marginal Muslims’: Politics and the perceptual bounds of Islamic  
authenticity in Northern Nigeria”, Africa Today 54(3): 67-92.  
COMAROFF, J. & J. COMAROFF (2006), “Reflections on youth, from the past to the postcolony”. 
In: M.S. Fisher & G. Downey, eds, Frontiers of capital: Ethnographic reflections on the new 
economy. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 267-281. 
DURHAM, D. (2004), “Disappearing youth”, American Ethnologist 31(4): 589-605. 
FABIYI, M.E. (2008), “Misconceptions in analyzing northern Nigeria and the implications for 
Nigerian unity: contextualizing & addressing the almajirai challenge”, NigeriaWorld. 
http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/publication/fabiyi/121908.htm (Accessed 23 July 2012). 
FAFUNWA, B.A. (1974), History of education in Nigeria. London: Allen and Unwin. 
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF HEALTH (2011), Saving newborn Lives in Nigeria: Newborn health in 
the context of the integrated maternal, newborn and child health strategy (Revised 2nd 
edn.), Abuja, Nigeria: Federal Ministry of Health, Save the Children, Johns Hopkins  
University’s Health Organisation. 
FOLARANMI, F.Y. (2011), “Fallout of Boko Haram bombings: Emirs spit fire”, Sun News 
Online, 19 November. 
http://www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/news/national/2011/nov/19/national-19-11-2011-
09.html (Accessed 14 January 2012). 
GOODY, E. (1982), Parenthood and social reproduction: fostering and occupational roles in 
West Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
HOECHNER, H. (2011), “Striving for knowledge and dignity: How qur’anic students in Kano, 
Nigeria, learn to live with rejection and educational disadvantage”, European Journal of  
Development Research 23(5): 712-728.  
JOHNSON, D. (2010), An assessment of the professional working knowledge of teachers in  
Nigeria: Implications for teacher development, policy and implementation. Kano, Nigeria: 
Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria. 
JUMARE, F.I. (2012), “Almajiri : The invisible child”, The Politico, August. http://the-
politico.com/development/almajiri-the-invisible-child/ (Accessed 25 September 2013). 
KUMOLU, C. (2012), “Almajiri education: Modern gang up against ancient tradition?”,  
Vanguard,  26 April. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/04/almajiri-education-modern-
gang-up-against-ancient-tradition/ (Accessed 25 September 2013). 
LAST, M. (2000a), “Children and the experience of violence: Contrasting cultures of punishment 
in Northern Nigeria”, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 70(3): 359-393. 
LAST, M. (2000b), “Reconciliation and memory in postwar Nigeria”. In: V. Das, ed., Violence 
and subjectivity. London: University of California Press, pp. 315-332. 
LAST, M. (2009a), “Nation-breaking & not-belonging in Nigeria – withdrawal, resistance,  
riot?”, Leipzig. http://www.uni-
leipzig.de/~ecas2009/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=57&Itemid=24 
(Accessed 25 September 2013). 
LAST, M. (2009b), “The pattern of dissent : Boko haram in Nigeria 2009”, Annual Review of 
Islam in Africa 10: 7-11. 
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (2008), Educational Sector Analysis. Kano, Nigeria. 
MORTIMORE, M. (1998), Roots in the African dust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
MUSTAPHA, A. (2004), Ethnic structure, inequality and governance of the public sector in  
Nigeria. UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development). 
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/240da49ca467a53f80256b4f005ef245/c
6a23857ba3934ccc12572ce0024bb9e/$FILE/Mustapha.pdf (Accessed 25 September 2013). 
 Traditional Quranic students in Nigeria 83 
 
MUSTAPHA, A.R. & K. MEAGHER (1992), “Stress, adaptation, and resilience in rural Kano”, 
Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 5(2): 107-117. 
NATIONAL POPULATION COMMISSION (2011), Nigeria demographic and health survey (DHS) 
EdData profile 1990, 2003, and 2008: Education data for decision-making. Washington, 
DC, USA: National Population Commission and RTI International. 
NCWD (2001), Almajiri and Qur’anic education. Kaduna, Nigeria: National Council for the 
Welfare of the Destitute, Almajirci Directorate. 
NOTERMANS, C. (2008), “The emotional world of Kinship: Children’s experiences of fosterage 
in East Cameroon”, Childhood 15(3): 355-377.  
OGUNMADE, O. (2013), “Mark Urges Northern Govs to Ban Almajiri System”, ThisDay, 23 
May. http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/mark-urges-northern-govs-to-ban-almajiri-
system/148259/ (Accessed 25 September 2013). 
OKOYE, F. & Y. YAU (1999), The condition of almajirai in the North West Zone of Nigeria. 
Kaduna, Nigeria: Human Rights Monitor & UNICEF. 
OLAGUNJU, L. (2012, ), “Almajirai, street kids and a nation’s future”, Nigerian Tribune, 20 
April.  http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/the-friday-edition/39559-almajirai-street-kids-and-a-
nations-future (Accessed 7 June 2012). 
OLUJUWON, T. (2008), “Combating trafficking in person: A case study of Nigeria”, European 
Journal of Scientific Research 24(1): 23-32. 
OWUAMANAM, J., S. ABORISADE, O. UBABUKOH & D. ATTAH (2012), “Almajiri schools: Civil 
rights group disagrees with Afenifere, ACF”, The Punch, 13 April. 
http://www.punchng.com/education/almajiri-schools-civil-rights-group-disagrees-with-
afenifere-acf/ (Accessed 25 September 2013). 
PICTURE OF PRESIDENT GEJ WITH STUDENTS OF THE NEW ALMAJIRI SCHOOL IN SOKOTO – 
POLITICS (4) – NAIRALAND (2012), Nairaland Forum. 
http://www.nairaland.com/912445/picture-president-gej-students-new/4 (Accessed 12 July 
2012). 
“REHABILITATING OUR ALMAJIRIS” (2011), 234NEXT, 22 June. 
http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/Opinion/5716077-146/story.csp (Accessed 22 July 
2012). 
SMITH, M.G. (1959), “The Hausa system of social status”, Africa 29(3): 239-252. 
SOLIVETTI, L.M. (1994), “Family, marriage and divorce in a Hausa community: A sociological 
model”, Africa 64(2): 252-271. 
SOYINKA, W. (2012), “The butchers Of Nigeria”, Newsweek, 16 January, pp. 1-5. 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/01/15/wole-soyinka-on-nigeria-s-anti-
christian-terror-sect-boko-haram.html (Accessed 25 September 2013). 
SULE-KANO, A. (2008), Poverty and the traditional Qur’anic school system in Northern  
Nigeria: The politics of the Almajiri-phenomenon. Paper prepared for the Conference on  
Nigerian Youth and National Development, Centre for Democratic Research and Training, 
Mambayya House, Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria, August 5–6. 
SULEIMAN, S. (2009,), “Iliya, the Almajiri”, 234NEXT, 25 September, pp. 1-6. 
http://www.saharareporters.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3793:ili
ya-the-almajiri&catid=81:external-contrib&Itemid=300 (Accessed 23 January 2012). 
TILDE, A.U. (n.d.), “The future of the Almajiri (3)”, Gamji. 
http://www.gamji.com/tilde/tilde107.htm (Accessed 26 September 2012). 
TILDE, A.U. (2009), “The future of the Almajiri (2)”, Gamji. 
http://www.gamji.com/tilde/tilde106.htm (Accessed 26 September 2012). 
TOMASEVSKI, K. (2005), “Not education for all, only for those who can pay: The World Bank’s 
model for financing primary education”, Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal 
9(1): 1-19. 
UBEC (2010), National framework for the development and integration of Almajiri education 
into UBE programme. Abuja, Nigeria: Universal Basic Education Commission, 1-26. 
84 Hoechner  
 
UMAR, M. (2001), “Education and Islamic trends in northern Nigeria: 1970s–1990s”, Africa 
Today 48(2): 127-150.  
UMAR, M. (2003), “Profiles of new Islamic schools in Northern Nigeria”, The Maghreb Review 
28(2-3): 146-169.  
WHITEHEAD, S.M. & F.J. BARRETT (2001), The masculinities reader. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
  
5 
Christian perceptions of Islam  
and society in relation to Boko  
Haram and recent events in Jos 
and northern Nigeria 
 
Henry Gyang Mang 
 
 
Abstract 
The rhetoric on and around religious conflict in Nigeria has revolved around 
the two main religions of Christianity and Islam. Although the growth of the 
two religions in the country has afforded them the latitude of being instruments 
for broad national negotiations, the growing diversity within them has led only 
to growing antipathy between their adherents. This has been further worsened 
by the emergence of Boko Haram, a phenomenon which has not only added 
new perspectives to the discourse on religion and national unity in Nigeria, but 
has also encouraged strong desires for reciprocal action among those affected 
by the movement’s violence, and a growing militancy within various agencies 
of Christianity. This work gauges the various perceptions and perspectives of 
Christians towards Islam in contemporary Nigeria, considering factors such as 
identity, geography, and the growing dynamism in Christian belief and doctrine 
concerning ‘the other’. It argues that there are four main divisions into which 
Christianity in Nigeria has evolved based on issues surrounding Islam. These 
divisions (Conservative Hierarchical, Conservative Egalitarian, Liberal Politi-
cal, and Radical) have presented various reactions based on their histories and 
present predicaments. And although it cannot be conclusively argued that 
Christians have a single, general point of view on Islam’s ‘bloody corridors’, 
the increasing violence, which has affected Christians, has created an atmos-
phere in which the rhetoric can easily slide towards calls for revenge, even 
when there is no true logic for it. 
Introduction 
Recent violent events in northern Nigeria, and worldwide generally, seem to reaf-
firm Huntington’s hypothesis of a ‘Clash in Civilisations’. Although the phrase 
itself has attained cliché status from both its opponents and proponents, there is 
little denying the fact that historically dynamic identity leanings have become the 
major factors for conflict in contemporary times; and even where they do not 
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seem to be present, they in one way or the other emerge subliminally in the wider 
configurations and designs of belligerents of almost all contemporary conflicts.  
The case of Islam and Christianity in Nigeria presents a compelling thrust to 
this argument. In general, since 2001 after the World Trade Center bombings in 
New York, many Christians in Nigeria have joined in the fray of the narrative 
about ‘the bloody corridors’ of Islam. This was significantly more so for Chris-
tians in the north-central state of Plateau. Just three days before the New York 
events, their own violent event occurred. The Jos Crisis, as it came to be known, 
occurred on a Friday, and significantly after the Jum’maat prayers of 7 Septem-
ber. Although different narratives, both remote and immediate, have been pre-
sented, quite a number of Christians in Jos conclusively alleged that a Muslim 
agenda to overwhelm a predominantly Christian area was in the offing. Hence, 
just before its internationalisation on 11 September 2001, the perceptions of Is-
lam’s bloody corridors had begun to sow a seed within the rhetoric in Jos and the 
neighbourhood of Central Nigeria. This ignored Christianity’s own bloody past, a 
past upon which the average Nigerian Christian has hardly been enlightened. 
Christianity in Nigeria came with more of a promise of individual opportunity in 
Western values and systems than with the collective promise of heavenly bliss 
and community which Islam gave. Therefore, while Nigerian Christianity carried 
an air of civility, it looked down upon the traditionalism of Islam and its adher-
ents – most especially in northern Nigeria – who had initially rejected Western 
opportunities. In contrast, northern Islam looked down on a people they saw as 
gullible to the West and its values. This conflict of perceptions, which should 
have phased out with time, has only been transformed into a variety of instru-
ments which are now the roots of new conflicts and even new negotiations.  
Although the symbolisms of the two religions have become the main instru-
ments for broad negotiations and the general building of perceptions, these sym-
bolisms present false pictures of strong unified religious civilisations, powerful 
enough to control their adherents and thereby holding forth the flag of their peo-
ple. In reality, the religions do not hold forth these flags; instead, shattered frag-
ments within them have torn apart their unity, dividing them into small groups in 
attrition, which, although bearing definite features of the religious civilisation, 
wave the different pieces of the flag to the gallery. These different flags in rela-
tion to the perception of a religion being a unified civilisation have primarily 
prompted the reasons by which conflicts have not only emerged but are escalat-
ed. Nigeria presents an interesting case in that its size and the proportions of the 
various adherents of the two religions have further increased the complication of 
its religious perceptions and determinations. This has further placed the nation’s 
politics onto the platform of the two religions.  
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Modern Christianity, unlike Islam in most secular states, has come to terms 
uncomfortably with the realisation of modernism’s anti-religious stance on so-
ciety and on the apparatus of the state. Islam’s theology, on the other hand,  
legitimately places it within the organs of society and state (Falola 1998). This 
has thereby placed it in direct conflict with secularism in quite a large number of 
states and with both modernists and peoples of other religions. In defining poli-
tics in Islam, there are considerations on whether one deals with the relationship 
between Islam, its history, and politics in societies as a whole (Hassan 2002), or 
singles out various cases and relationships observed from different circumstances 
of “dissent to dissidence” of some purveyors of the religion based on their desire 
for reform within the religion (Last 2013). In both cases, one thing stands out: the 
question of tolerance by Islam for certain Muslims or of Muslims for non-Islamic 
tendencies both politically or individually. In the latter case, what predicates an 
acceptable level of ‘the other’s’ points of view by Muslims, and vice-versa? Do 
these determinations encourage a sort of reciprocity of perceptions between Mus-
lims and non-Muslims, or does it plunge the two into polarities? Furthermore, 
how does the discourse around Islam in the case of Nigeria affect the credo and 
the perspectives of ‘the others’?  
For the most part, Nigeria’s case brings to mind Huntington’s ‘clash’ – but is 
it the clash of ‘civilisations’ or, as Abdu (2010) argues, of ‘identities’? The local-
ised Nigerian conflict discourse has encouraged the migration of identity groups 
into the arena of ‘civilisations’. It is common for most of the distinct (and even 
hardly distinguishable) linguistic groups to carry the mantra of a ‘nation’. And 
since Nigerian Independence in 1960, smaller groups have continually struggled 
to ‘emancipate’ themselves from the narratives and perceived influences of the 
dominant groups. This struggle has propagated hybrids of identity which have 
relied on various re-creations of history and legend (Mang 2012). Among these 
various categories of identity delineations, Christianity and Islam have carved out 
not just polarising niches, but have also inscribed within their adherents new con-
structs about themselves and of ‘the others’. These two religions have, in many 
cases, either fused with the narratives and traditions of the emerging ‘civilisa-
tions’ or ‘identities’ or, in other cases, have eased out conflicting narratives or 
traditions. These fused identities have helped to establish a larger Nigerian polar-
ity between Christianity and Islam, and thus there is a convenience of symbolis-
ing most conflicts as either religious or carrying ethnic strings. 
This chapter analyses Christian perceptions of the influence and impact of Is-
lam on society since the 1999 issues of Shariah, and relates the various issues 
with the present events concerning Boko Haram. What do Christians perceive as 
the politics of Islam, in the light of what they assume are the emerging and re-
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emerging attempts at asserting Islam and Islamic values in northern Nigeria’s 
polity and society? 
The paper first briefly looks into historical cases of post-colonial Islamic dis-
sent in northern Nigeria, discussing approaches towards dissension from secular 
authority and the immediate causes of uprisings which occurred. It also looks at 
how Christians and other non-Muslims have been affected in these cases. In rela-
tion to this, it further discusses the perceptions of contemporary Christian society 
and tries to relate how much their insight into the history of Islamic dissent in the 
country has affected their present perceptions since the emergence of Boko Ha-
ram. The chapter revolves around the following questions: 
- Is there a general Nigerian Christian view of Islam’s influence in politics? If there 
is, what is it? 
- How much of the history of Islam in Nigeria has influenced these views? 
- Do Christians see deprivation or the lack of “entitlements”,1 as is being asserted 
by many, as an integral reason for some Muslim scholars calling for dissent, or do 
they see the cause of dissension as arising from a broader agenda(s)? 
- What is (are) the broader agenda(s)? 
- What are the changing Christian perceptions of traditional Islam when considering 
the effect of violence by Boko Haram? 
- Is contemporary Christian leadership (most especially the fast-growing Pentecos-
tal Church) influencing a radical change in tolerance and dissension within Chris-
tian society and politics against political Islam? 
There is a growing quantity of literature on Christian–Muslim relations in 
northern Nigeria, mainly historical and focusing on the central areas. This is 
based on the fact that the spread of Christianity in the area was in essence limited 
to areas that had less contact with Islam or where there were non-Muslim popula-
tions. Boer (1979: 161-163) and Crampton (1976: 72-80) describe the process by 
which access to various northern groups by missionaries was restricted, and how 
restrictions on missionary work or any show of Christianity were imposed within 
the emirates, with exceptions in areas designated as sabon garuruwa (Hausa for 
“visitors’ quarters”; sing.: sabon gari) and within Zaria. Ozigi & Ocho (1981: 
18-27) give detailed accounts of the process in Zaria and other predominantly 
Muslim areas. In general, Christian scholars, whether from the West or Nigeria, 
have argued there was a concerted effort by the colonial authorities to sustain the 
status quo and support the Muslim North. In contrast, scholars such as Ayandele 
(1966: 129-133) differed on the Christian narrative of a concerted process by the 
colonial government to restrict Christianity and missionary activity in the North. 
He instead points out that there was a realisation of the possibility that liberal 
Christian perspectives would conflict with Muslim society – which had an organ-
ised, controlled hierarchy and social structure that provided a relatively better 
                                                            
1  Borrowing from Sen’s (1981) work. 
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system of pre-colonial rulership than other areas, a situation which added value 
to colonial bureaucracy (Last 2008: 43-44). 
Nevertheless, some authors, mainly northern Christian scholarly elites and 
largely from within the minority ethnicities (Ozigi & Ocho 1981; Turaki 1993; 
Logams 2004), have emphasised an obvious identity demarcation based on both 
ethnic and religious divides. Logams, for example, argues that Christian identity 
within the minorities helped foster a bond which was built upon the following 
tripod: Christian evangelism, which tried to homogenise the minority groups; 
Western medicine, which showed promise and worked its own miracles; and ed-
ucation, which helped to produce a new social class of egalitarian minorities, 
who saw themselves on a par and even higher than certain classes within the 
North (Logams 2004: 246-273). These elites of the Christian North regularly at-
tempted to raise issues about the dominance of Islam and Islamic traditions, 
questioning the convenience of the relationship between the Muslim hegemony 
and colonial authorities. Even where the colonial authorities tried to balance 
these seeming imbalances,2 animosities and complaints continued and, with time, 
various missionary and church organisations in these minority areas began to 
emerge as homogeneous monoliths, garnering collective support within a grow-
ing group. Although Christian populations in northern Nigeria are relatively few-
er than Muslims, there are indications of a slight increase in the number of Chris-
tians between 1950 and the present (see Ibrahim 1991: 116; Ostien 2012: 3). 
Some have postulated that this growth might have been greater if not for the pro-
cess establishing the colonial North, which protected and propped up Islam 
above other religions. This eventually continued even after Independence, re-
stricting most of the North to Islamic tradition (Turaki 1993: 143-175). 
These views of the protection and propping up of Islam and Islamic traditions 
to the disadvantage of Christianity have been held mainly by Christian scholars 
(most of them theologians, clergymen, and prominent northern Christian apolo-
gists). And at no other time before now did the narrative become louder than dur-
ing the events propagating Shariah from 1999 onwards. Ostien bluntly (and right-
ly) states that Nigeria’s Christians deplored the revival of Shariah from 1999 and 
have postulated “many theories about its causes” (Ostien 2006: 221). He further 
argues that “Christians missed an opportunity to settle with the Muslims the 
place of Islamic law in Nigeria on reasonable, honorable, and stable terms” by 
continuously fighting, from the time of Independence, against legislation which 
would have created a balance between the inherited British legal system and Sha-
riah (Ostien 2006: 224-229). Whether this argument holds water, considering 
                                                            
2  A case in point is what happened in 1955, when the British colonial administration instituted the for-
mation of a minority Berom Gbong Gwom traditional institution in Jos. The area, although largely 
Berom, had traditionally been run by a Hausa chief, a process initiated by the British.   
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current events, depends on a sense of objectivity uncommon in the discourse on 
religion in Nigeria generally; but even more so, it depends on the various percep-
tions Christians have of Muslim reactions to, and narratives for, the insurgencies 
instigated by fundamentalists carrying the flag of Islam. 
Christian narratives and views of Islam  
In recent times, Christian churches and umbrella bodies in northern Nigeria have 
found it difficult to agree on a common perspective on political Islam. Although 
there is a general perspective that Islam in Nigeria has historically had a violent 
past, with trickles of it still existing (Tyoden 1993: Logams 2004), Christians in 
Nigeria present a variety of narratives around issues of the theocracy of Islam in 
contrast to the ‘Christian’ attempt at separating religion and state. A large num-
ber point to issues of political dominance and in some cases violence indicative 
of Islam in the North. This seeming threat is interpreted differently within the 
Christian population in Nigeria. Most conservative Christians take a cautionary 
look at pockets of Islamic dissent as unitary actions which must be addressed as 
such, through either dialogue or soft threats. The more radical Christian groups 
present the narrative of a jihadist game plan to overwhelm Nigeria with a reli-
gious and ethnic agenda. The latter find dialogue rather deceitful, and this de-
mography mainly comprises a largely youthful population that has grown up in a 
Nigeria that has acquired with time new identity constructions, which have re-
volved around ethnicity and religion.  
The customary divide between Catholics and Protestants has given way to 
more fundamental Pentecostals or Pentecostal-like groups. The growth of Pente-
costalism (which has virtually invaded both Catholic and Protestant churches) 
has inspired a growing extremism. With the Christian rhetoric of ‘salvation’ 
propped up with a heavenly mandate to conquer the world with God-given suc-
cess, Pentecostals view themselves as placed between the nexus of salvation and 
conquering the world. A completely different worldview is found among the pi-
ous conservatives, who desire heaven as their final goal and see the world’s 
pleasures as ephemeral (Marshall 2009: 81). Although, since colonial times, 
Western influences and modernism have influenced a perceived class elevation 
for Christians relative to Muslims, the relative poverty and deprivation evidenced 
in the North compared with the South has encouraged an illogical but evidentiary 
sense of advantage in one religion relative to the other. The dominant narrative of 
prosperity and success through faith attracted a “new thinking” and eventually 
new class stratifications (ibid. 84-85).  
The value of Western education and exposure and other attributes of modern-
ism have encouraged the relativism of dynamic or progressive religion mainly 
among Christians, both within the religion and outside it. The church in the North 
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was even more prone to this, because, to many converts of Christianity in north-
ern Nigeria, the religion came with these modern opportunities, thereby making it 
a rich alternative to Islam. Considering that most of the groups which accepted 
Christianity in these northern areas had one story or another of alienation from 
the Islamic establishment throughout history (Tambo 1978: 213; Turaki 1993: 
63-79; Logams 2004: 29-53), the new religion did two things principally: firstly, 
it helped remove the nomenclature of denigration that had been used for a long 
time for the minorities; and secondly, Western education further elevated their 
social status. Most of the early missions were established in areas already ex-
posed to Islam either through peaceful relations or through a history of conflict. 
Also, in most cases, these new Christians had, before conversion, been labelled 
“pagans” and “heathen” (Tambo 1978: 203-205; Ibrahim 1991: 116), and there-
fore Christianity not only presented itself as an avenue for finding God but also 
as an instrument for elevating these pagans and heathen up to a higher social 
class of monotheism and modern European values (Ibrahim 1991: 119). This nar-
rative further helped to strengthen a pro-Christian identity within the minorities 
in the North. Thus, within the more evangelical groups which became established 
in these areas, there grew a commonality. These evangelical groups had a distinct 
identity leaning, from the more elitist Anglican and, in some cases, Catholic 
churches which had carried with them a large following from the South. In most 
cases (with exceptions in the case of the Church Missionary Society (Anglican 
Church) and Roman Catholic Missions in Zaria, Kano, and the Benue/Plateau 
areas) these churches had very little contact with natives in these northern mi-
nority areas. The more proactive Sudan United Mission/Sudan Interior Mission 
groups, both promoted by evangelical groups in the UK and US, and splinters of 
the Baptist, Lutheran, and Methodist missions had greater depth within the re-
mote areas of the minorities, with most of them working on and assimilating as-
pects of these societies with a blend of Christianity which more or less encour-
aged piety and submission.  
This modernism associated with Christianity now turned the tables in terms of 
perceptions. The pagans and heathen now became an elite class, transiting from 
obscurity to an internationalised religious identity, comparable to Islam and with 
a padding of modernity. A large proportion of Christians, not only in northern 
Nigeria, but also in the South, have perceived the slow growth in modernity in 
most northern areas as a product of the peoples’ adherence to a rigid Islamic tra-
dition with restricted options for modernity. Western education was a prized pro-
spect and was aggressively acquired by the minorities (largely Christian) relative 
to the Hausa and Fulani (mainly Muslim). This growing number of educated 
elites in these areas, further spurred by developments in the south of the country, 
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encouraged a persona of ‘Christian modernism’, relative to ‘Muslim inflexibil-
ity’.  
The other issue, referred to earlier, is that of a common fear by most Christians 
of the theocratic character of Islam. Although evident throughout the late colonial 
era and most especially in relation to the politics of Independence and the First 
Republic, two events stood out over time. The first was the controversy sur-
rounding Nigeria’s membership of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC) in 1986, with a resurgence of the issue in 2001 (Falola 1998: 69, 89-94). 
This controversy not only raised concerns about the secular identity of Nigeria, 
but also invigorated the claims by Christian apologists of the seeming growth and 
dominance of Islamism in Nigerian politics. These apologists and quite a number 
of non-Muslim intellectuals had fought throughout post-Independence against 
what they saw as a threat from Islam, first in the strength of a northern party led 
by an influential religious hegemony, and secondly, the already established Sha-
riah judicial system which was prevalent in the North. Quoting Anderson (1976), 
Ostien presents the fact that modernity tried to overshadow a long-standing reli-
gious tradition unique in the Muslim world at its time:  
The case of Northern Nigeria was, indeed, almost unique, for up till (1960) this was the only 
place outside the Arabian peninsula in which the Islamic law, both substantive and procedur-
al, was applied in criminal litigation – sometimes even in regard to capital offences. [Ostien 
(2006), citing Anderson (1976: 27-28)] 
The growing modern (Christian) perspective, mainly among the largely non-
Muslim educated elite, stifled any attempt at enabling a compromise between 
English law (generally perceived by the Muslim North as ‘Christian’) and the 
existing Shariah (which was the norm). This was further worsened by the consti-
tutionalism of 1976-78, which seemed to relegate Shariah to the realm of small 
unitary customary litigations and, worse, limit its space (Ostien 2006: 240-241). 
This ‘Debacle of 1979’, in Ostien’s (2006: 241) view, spurred a re-strategising of 
options in 1999 and a new wave of discontent and fear of a subtle attempt at po-
litical Islamisation of the Nigerian state. Most Christians in post-Independence 
Nigeria, irrespective of their inclinations, have perceived Islam (more specifical-
ly, northern Islam) as an overwhelming force on the polity generally (Ibrahim 
1991). It has become convenient to see any symbolism of Islam as a threat to an 
established modern and secular system. This is seen in the context where secular-
ism in the Nigerian case revolves around the two main religions. Christianity and 
Islam dominate the religious system, and other beliefs, although not necessarily 
harshly discriminated against, hardly stand on the same level of recognition. 
Muslims in Nigeria, as with Muslims the world over, jealously guard their tradi-
tions; and this jealousy, combined with the strong influence which belief general-
ly wields, often creates fear within other groups. Kukah (1993: 9) describes this 
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jealous guarding of Islam in northern Nigeria by using Hiskett’s (1975: 109) Is-
lamic verse: 
As for the Christian, what he desires is gain 
To cast you, our Mallams aside, 
And to cause you to stop applying our Sharia 
Which Allah sent down through our Prophet. 
This sort of rhetoric and the continuous issues around Nigeria’s secularism and 
Shariah have increased the fears of Christians in Nigeria; and because of the con-
temporary history of Islam in the Middle East and North Africa bearing theocrat-
ic potency, Christian apologists and secular jingoists within the Nigerian state 
have harped on the likelihood of an Islamisation agenda, most especially in cases 
where structures and elements of the state open up to Islamic symbolisms. 
The politics of Christianity and Islam in Nigeria  
In commenting on issues surrounding the Shariah controversy in 1978 (an issue 
we discuss in detail later), Laitin (1982: 412) pointed out with a somewhat vi-
sionary phrase that “the politics of religion, where there is no room for flexibility, 
can rock a political system to its very foundations”. The Shariah controversy, 
since Independence, not only exacerbated tensions between the north and south 
of Nigeria, but seemed to be the groundswell to which outbursts of violence over 
issues like the unholy use of the Muslim holy book by a non-Muslim or the hul-
labaloo over a beauty pageant could be released. Although incomprehensible to 
Christians, it made perfect sense to quite a number of Muslims, who assume that 
the alleged abuse and decadence of non-Muslims in relation to Islamic symbols 
or the moral statutes of their religion goes to show the lacuna which their loss of 
Shariah from colonial times had caused within the context of Islamic theocracy. 
Additional perceptions, of greater socio-economic leverage of the South relative 
to the North, and the convenient stereotype of southern educated and professional 
elite relative to peasant northerners, further opened doors to grievances (whether 
appropriate or not) towards both government and the largely Christian South.  
Central Nigeria, or what is commonly called the Middle Belt, introduced a fur-
ther dimension to the circumstances. The groups in this area, which had in pre-
colonial times and even during colonial times been of little political value, began 
to become more assertive towards the time when Independence came. Their as-
sertiveness gradually developed into antagonism, owing to the growth of Christi-
anity in these areas. During the events leading to Independence in 1960, Logams 
(1993: 11-20) describes a concerted effort by the Hausa- and Muslim-dominated 
Northern People’s Congress (NPC) to stifle any attempt at a growing opposition 
in the North, which was largely composed of ethnic minorities who were mainly 
either animists or Christians. A phrase he coined was ‘internal colonialism’. Are-
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as like the Tiv Division, which comprised the present Benue and Kogi states, saw 
a series of politically motivated acts of violence in the 1960s, among mainly Tiv 
groups. Their primary anger was what they saw as an attempt by the Hau-
sa/Muslim-dominated NPC – using a few rogue elements from within the Tiv 
Division – to hijack the political structure of the United Middle Belt Congress 
(UMBC), then led by a Tiv Christian, Joseph Tarka (Logams 1993: 644).  
In the Plateau area, on the other hand, the politics was more subtle. First of all, 
from the late 1950s, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto (a Muslim), be-
gan a proselytisation drive in the central region. His main aim then was to con-
vert the traditional heads, who would subsequently encourage the conversion of 
their subjects. A particular case in point is made by Joseph Garba, a prominent 
military officer from Plateau, whose father, a traditional ruler and animist, was 
caught in a dilemma as to whether or not he should convert to Islam after being 
entreated to by emissaries of the Sardauna, preceding a visit by the latter to Gar-
ba’s domain. Mallam Garba felt he needed his son’s advice, his son being edu-
cated and working as a top military officer (Garba 1982: 55-58). 
From elder statesmen to local politicians, and from radical Christian clerics to 
youth leaders and even academics, there have been calls within the Middle Belt 
groups to fight these attempts at internal colonialism; and even though the area 
has been highly heterogeneous, their largely Christian identity has been a source 
of homogeneity.  
In Plateau State most especially, the attempt at deconstructing Islam and its 
politics, and the problem of ethnic and religious conflict in the state, have be-
come arduous. To make matters worse, the rhetoric and incursions of Boko Ha-
ram in recent times have only further bolted the hinges in the doors of Christian 
historical memory of a large concerted Islamic agenda. Since 2011, the perspec-
tive has been that the Muslim North in Nigeria has been uncomfortable with the 
politics of Plateau State. It is a fact that apart from Benue and Plateau states in 
the political northern Nigeria arena, in every other state either both the governor 
and his deputy are Muslim, or, in most cases, there is a compromise of one or the 
other being shared between Christians and Muslims (Imo 2001: 109). The case of 
Plateau is even more complicated by the sequence of changes in political dimen-
sions and determinations. In earlier work (Mang 2012) I tried to highlight these 
dynamics in relation to changes in geopolitical space in Plateau State. Between 
1967 and 1994, Plateau State was broken down into smaller states, and in all cas-
es, most especially in the latter two, ethnic and religious instrumentations laced 
the geopolitics of the state, leading to a wave of gerrymandering (Mang 2012: 
275-279). 
The loudest chord was struck in 2011 in the contentious politics of Plateau 
State; and since then, the causes and dimensions of the violence have continually 
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changed, and with them, the rhetoric. By 2008, the diameter of the violent arena 
had increased from the cities into villages, and also, the frequency of occurrences 
increased. The rhetoric, which had been political, between the autochthonous 
ethnic groups – the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom and the Hausa – transited into 
one of Christians versus Muslims. Allegations on both sides described harrowing 
experiences of violence and other human rights abuses, dividing Jos and Bukuru, 
the main metropolitan areas, into pockets of religious identity communities. Fur-
thermore, the violence in the villages between the Berom and Fulani was alleged 
to have escalated owing to the appearance of foreign mercenaries. Events led to 
the death of serving senator Gyang Dantong and member of the state house of 
assembly Gyang Fulani after trying to bury the dead from an alleged Fulani inva-
sion, which took place on Saturday 7 July 2012 leading to the death of over sixty 
people. Both men were of Berom extraction and prominent within the Plateau 
Christian community. This occurrence inflamed passions and further intensified 
the rhetoric of a grand Muslim design to overwhelm Plateau State as a whole 
through a concerted ‘terrorist incursion’ (Olagunju 2011; Online Nigeria 2013). 
With this, and over four incidents of bomb blasts in the state, for which Boko 
Haram itself claimed responsibility, Christians in Plateau State fed better on the 
narratives of a concerted Muslim agenda (The Messenger Voice 2012). This and 
the growing Boko Haram threat encouraged a new wave, in which random vio-
lent attacks on any Islamic symbol or persons with such symbols became ac-
ceptable within the Christian community. The rationale to deconstruct the reli-
gion from its fundamentalism was lost, since as one pastor put it: “You can not 
distinguish Islam from its politics, so how can you distinguish it from its vio-
lence?”3   
Perspectives of Christians on fundamentalist  
dissensions like Boko Haram 
There seems to be a convenience for Christians in alluding to the inflexibility of 
Islamic doctrine in cases where Islam (which is wrongly seen by many Christians 
as a unified system) seems to be imploding. The common assumption is that 
Muslims, unlike Christians who hold on to denominational values, are relatively 
more homogenous. This assumption is not necessarily true. The different sects 
and dogmas of these sects have caused more conflict within Islam than outside it 
(Last 2012). But even these (most especially in contemporary times) have been 
seen by Christians as plans gone awry. One common phrase, ‘confusion in the 
enemy’s camp’,4 dominated the interviews used for this work when questions 
                                                            
3  A. Dogo, pastor of a Pentecostal church. Interview by Henry Mang, Bukuru, 15 March 2012.   
4  In two separate focus group discussions (one in Kaduna and the other in Jos) most Christian youth 
insisted that the Boko Haram issue was a calculated and largely organised plan by northern Muslims, 
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were asked in relation to the fact that cases of violence (most especially in the 
case of Boko Haram) indicate that Muslims are the relatively more affected. The 
idea behind the phrase was that even though it was true that more Muslims have 
died, it was only indicative of a common plan gone awry owing to either clashes 
between ideologues and politicians or even between contending ideologues. This 
argument is commonly associated with the narratives surrounding the death of 
Mohammed Yusuf. Yusuf’s death, most especially, has shaped new myths, not 
only among Muslims but also to a large extent among Christians, who like many 
Muslims build their knowledge on word from the street. The media too, in certain 
ways, has helped in hyping up the rhetoric of the birth, growth, and present  
nature of Boko Haram (Ayoob 2008; Idris 2011; Salkida 2011). Most Christian 
respondents primarily rely on two mediums for information about Islam: the 
clergy or the growing number of para-clergy5 that now wield various spheres of 
influence; and the news media. These two mediums, most especially the former, 
have highly influenced the Christian laity into taking an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ stance 
in the events related to the two religions and Boko Haram. Relatively few Chris-
tians in southern Kaduna and Plateau states distinguish Islam and Muslims from 
Boko Haram. In Plateau State particularly, in the few cases in which bomb blasts 
occurred and Boko Haram claimed responsibility, violent reprisals erupted 
against anyone suspected to be Muslim. In a 2012 focus group discussion with 
Christian youth involved in violence at Anguwan Rukuba and Gada Biyu (Jos), 
there was a clear indication that to be Christian primarily meant not being Mus-
lim. By implication, one’s Christian link or identity was a sort of shibboleth. He 
or she could choose to take on occult, ‘magic’, or ‘primitive religious’ agencies, 
if their cause was against any form of Islam.6 Muslim converts or those with 
Muslim backgrounds were still not within the Christian circle, even though they 
were tolerated. To members of this group, Christianity and Islam were principal-
ly about identity and not necessarily about belief. As seen with the commerce of 
meat in Jos and its environs, owing to the agency of conflict, meat has built on an 
identity (Mang 2012).7 And when the violence stretches out to these non-
                                                            
with political and jihadist ends. To their minds, even though there has been more violence within Is-
lam in northern Nigeria, this has occurred owing to what they see as the failure of evil plans. 
5  Those whom Marshall refers to without “standardized or institutionalized process of accreditation of 
religious authority”. 
6  Focus group discussion with youths in Anguwan Rukuba/Tinna Junction area, with Henry Mang at 
Gondola, Jos North, 15 April 2012. 
7  The study looked at the establishment of a new market in a community after aggrieved parties were 
relocated from another market owing to violent conflict in 2010. This new market creation was influ-
ential in inspiring similar occurrences in other markets and could lead to further replication in more 
areas. This is due to the fact that there are political and economic advantages to the aggrieved or dis-
advantaged actors, who through the connivance of their power brokers have created their own sphere 
of influence. In addition, the agency of religion and its position as an instrument within the meat mar-
ket provides an interesting dimension to the use of religion for economic advantage. In applying sys-
tems which mirror the process of Muslim halal practice in the meat market, Christian butchers instinc-
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Muslims, the narrative harps on that as the main agenda. This narrative in the 
recent past has been further encouraged by the seeming silence or ambiguity of 
the Muslim ummah and ulama on the subject of violence against others. The ar-
gument here by some Christians is that Muslim violence is their personal matter; 
and whatever the cause may be, they should not drag Christians into it. Ibrahim 
(1991: 122-124) gives clear examples of these intra-religious crises which Mus-
lims have been contending with for a long time. Christians have been aware of 
these and have, in most cases, been left out of them. After all, even Christian 
sects have these issues. But the disturbing issue has been the rhetoric and actions 
of Boko Haram against Christians. Considering the already built-in constructs by 
Christians of what they choose to see as ‘Islamic tendencies’, Boko Haram ap-
pears as a mouthpiece for Islam, most especially in Nigeria’s North. Rarely do 
Christians see the situation as the product of any sort of grievance that should 
affect them. That is why the once growing narrative of deprivation of the north-
east of the country as a primary factor is rejected by most Christians. As one 
clergyman informant put it: “Poverty is like a common cloth in Nigeria; in fact, 
most Africans wear it, so they cannot bring the issue of too much poverty in their 
areas.” Poverty, although a predisposing factor to violence, cannot account for 
issues surrounding what Christians view as an Islamisation agenda by the North. 
This is not helped by the historical narratives of the proselytisation agenda of the 
late Sardauna of Sokoto from the 1950s in the minority areas (Garba 1982). This, 
and the largely one-track politics of the Hausa-dominated Northern Peoples’ 
Congress (NPC) after Independence, have only helped to shore up the already-
fed fears of minorities, as expressed in the Willink’s Commission Report (Lea-
gue for Human Rights 2003).  
Owing to this general insinuation of a grand design, narratives within the vari-
ous Christian communities are rarely presented only within the local situation. 
The narratives are extended to include the existing narrative of Islamic terrorism 
worldwide. This narrative expands most especially when dissidence by Muslims 
leads to large-scale violence against Christians, such as attacks on churches and 
specific targets in predominantly Christian domains. This allusion, which thrives 
with the increased violence perpetuated by groups like Boko Haram, ignores the 
fact that Christianity has also had its bloody corridors, and similar narratives can 
be linked to Christian violence. Why has the narrative on Islam increasingly be-
come bloodied and given a highly generalised rhetoric, instead of being assessed 
as incidental?  
 
                                                            
tively created a form of legitimacy for their meat, which was previously labelled as ‘unclean’, thereby 
increasing the value of their business. 
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Strands and cords in Christian perspectives of Islam 
and Islamism 
There is in truth no general Christian perspective on the influence of Islam on 
Nigeria’s society and politics; and judging from recent conflicting comments by 
various members of the clergy, the Christian church is obviously divided into 
several strands of perspective, with the potential to form cords as the Boko Ha-
ram issue seems unlikely to abate. A further latency is provided by the silence or 
ambiguity of the Muslim ummah and ulama towards the violence which has af-
fected Nigerian Christians.  
Four observable strands seem to have emerged within the context of the Boko 
Haram issue among Christians in Nigeria. Although all express grievances to-
wards violent actions against Christians, each strand argues a distinct view and 
process for making headway in these trying situations. I have grouped them into 
the following:  
- Conservative Hierarchical  
- Conservative Egalitarian  
- Liberal Political Christian  
- Radical Christian Identity  
 
 
Figure 4.1  The divisions of CAN (Christian Association of Nigeria) 
 
Source: Mang (2013) 
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Conservative hierarchical  
Issues of hierarchy both within and between churches, and the level to which 
these hierarchies are influential on the laity, present us with this construct. But it 
does not just stop there. The level of exposure of those in this group is another 
determinant, because even within Christian groups that are seen to be egalitarian, 
hierarchies exist between institutors and guardians of doctrine, and the laity. Ex-
posure is the strong point of this group. By exposure here, we refer to the levels 
to which these hierarchies have interacted with Islam and Muslims. For this 
group, their interaction with Islam is not just superficial; in most cases they have 
in-depth knowledge of Islam and its traditions. One can conveniently place the 
Nigerian Anglican Communion and the Nigerian Catholic Church within this 
group. Apart from their being some of the oldest church organisations in the 
country, their background knowledge both within and outside the Bible has en-
couraged a relatively higher sense of discretion when it comes to issues of inter-
religious dialogue. These churches, owing to their history, growth, and following 
in Nigeria, have claimed a traditional sense of superiority over less-established 
churches. Their history has also encouraged the state to, in more cases than not, 
relate more with them where the need arises. They are seen as conservative in 
relation to the dynamic doctrinal and philosophical character of Pentecostals. In 
relation to Islam and its politics in Nigeria, this group presents a high sense of 
maturity in its desire for dialogue, even when it seems that the other side has the 
upper hand. Two significant pieces of evidence stand out for them: their calculat-
ed placements of significantly influential strategists in conflict-prone areas and in 
areas where Islamic power reigns.8 
 
Conservative egalitarian  
These groups in most cases comprise localised church organisations based on 
certain identity leanings such as ethnicity, linguistics, or culture. They are in 
most cases Protestant evangelicals, brought up within the confines of certain 
mixed doctrines combining Christianity and traditions of their identity. To these 
groups, identity is quite important, even though they are open to outsiders in lim-
ited circumstances. With their common sense of identity arises a level of egalitar-
ianism, and because they are relatively sparse geographically and are in many 
cases surrounded by larger Muslim communities, they are bound by the need to 
be cohesive and do not necessarily adhere to doctrinal or canonical restraints. 
This group is prominently influential in the minority non-Muslim areas of north-
ern Nigeria. Their main perception of Islam in northern Nigeria, unlike that of the 
Conservative Hierarchical group, is one of an ethnicised religious domination 
                                                            
8  Bishop Josiah Idowu-Fearon and Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah in Kaduna and Sokoto, respectively, 
are the cases in point. This is discussed in further detail in the coming section. 
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which subjugates them. Their drive for equality has become influential in their 
changing theology; therefore, they have less desire for dialogue, even though 
they are open to it if it seems genuine.  
 
Liberal political Christian 
This group comprises either clergy or non-clergy who build constructs which 
relate together the state, politics, and Christianity. When they become involved in 
politics, their primary constituents are usually Christians who purposely or inad-
vertently campaign using the rhetoric of domination or of an ungodly world 
which needs the reform that Christianity can supposedly give. This group refrains 
as much as possible from promoting any form of division which presents itself in 
the wider church. Instead, their rhetoric is filled with calls for Christian ecumen-
ism as a starting point in fighting the ‘forces of evil’. This group, being political-
ly driven and ecumenical in its outlook, seeks dialogue with Islam only as a route 
to fostering political and religious power bases. Its whole agenda in the end is to 
produce what have come to be called ‘prominent Christian leaders or politicians’, 
most of whom stand as symbols of Christianity within the secular system of the 
state, which itself has permitted the two religions (Christianity and Islam) to 
dominate.  
 
Radical Christian identity 
This group thrives on the symbolism which Christianity provides and not neces-
sarily on its significance or value. To them, Christian identity presents a vehicle 
for either ethnic or traditional authority or protest. By being Christian, they claim 
a commonality with others, while still pursuing other agendas. Even within this 
group there exist two distinct groups. One thrives on the syncretism of Christiani-
ty and local traditions, while the other thrives on its claim to a long history of 
Christian identity due to pre-colonial interactions with the religion through ex-
plorers and voyagers in the Niger Delta.9  
Strands that separate  
New issues surrounding Boko Haram have emerged since I began writing this 
chapter. The most prominent has been the call for an amnesty for the group, as an 
avenue of pacifying them and also as a means of correcting certain social issues 
attributed to influencing people to join the group.10 
                                                            
9  It is important for the reader to note that these strands are not necessarily clearly divided. They are 
present in the same way as all social stratifications: variables which interweave. This categorisation 
simply helps to provide an idea of the basic variables that help build perceptions by Christians in Ni-
geria of Islam and politics.  
10  There are generally two broad points of view in the arguments on an amnesty for Boko Haram. The 
first looks at the antecedents of the group in relation to the socio-economy of the area and concludes 
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Calls to government for amnesty for Boko Haram were made by well-known 
Muslims, the most prominent being the Sultan of Sokoto. These calls sparked off 
a series of dismissals and counter-dismissals, and this drew a main dividing line 
between two sides. Christians, on the one hand, dismissed it as an excuse by the 
northern oligarchy to institutionalise the situation for economic advantage, fol-
lowing the line of the Niger Delta situation, which led to a similar amnesty. 
Some Christians have harped on the fact that a call for amnesty is callous, con-
sidering the fact that criminal elements have killed and maimed many innocent 
people, with the government doing hardly anything to provide proper restitution. 
Now it seems as if the same restitution will be given to the criminals in the form 
of an amnesty. Most Muslims, on the other hand, argue that the north-east of the 
country particularly has been underfunded within the federation, thereby foster-
ing extreme poverty and leading to a high level of gullibility towards preachers 
and politicians, who in turn provided seemingly valid reasons for things being 
hard and society unfriendly. This lack of a social contract has been worsened by 
what most Muslim politicians and religious leaders see as the heavy hand of gov-
ernment through the use of its own instruments of violence. 
The plan for amnesty helped to further broaden Christian perspectives about 
Boko Haram and Islam, introducing a cohort of philosophically inclined views, 
expressed mainly by the clergy and a number of politicians. These views have 
varied, and looked at from the perspective of the divisions created for this work, 
the discourse can be viewed thus: 
The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), which has served as an umbrella 
for Nigerian Christians since the 1980s, became embroiled in a battle of wits 
since June 2010. Although CAN has always had its own dose of intrigues, 2010 
introduced a new dimension. For the first time, the influence of the Pentecostal 
Church was being felt. Previously, the presidency of CAN revolved around the 
mould of the Conservative Hierarchical group. From Catholic archbishops to 
Anglican or Methodist primates, the authority of CAN revolved around these 
more accommodating elite of the clergy, and they found it convenient to moder-
ately relate with government and Islam, with a sense of reciprocity.11 The Pente-
costal Church in Nigeria had during this time preoccupied itself with building a 
followership. Their growing numbers, which had emerged from the activity of 
adherents mainly of the more conservative churches, became their major pre-
                                                            
that poverty, although not the most prominent factor influencing the group, has helped in the intensifi-
cation of its actions and the growth in its following. The second line of argument looks at the high-
handedness of the government’s use of instruments of coercion, at allegations of brutality towards 
members of the sect, and at the high level of collateral damage. These have led to much outcry from 
both within and outside Nigeria, indicating human rights violations and, in the case of the outcry with-
in Nigeria, allegations of gross corruption and unaccountability having led to extreme poverty. 
11  The case is seen in the 1980s’ demand by CAN for the sponsorship of Christian pilgrims to their holy 
lands in equivalence to Muslims who were benefiting from a similar service. See CAN (1989: 12-20)   
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occupation until the political system provided an avenue through growing cor-
ruption and radicalism, a system which with time became highly influenced by 
the Pentecostals. With this new influence, a more politically Pentecostal move-
ment emerged.  
As an informant pointed out: “We [Pentecostals] have hardly been interested 
in politics or even ecumenism, but we realised that Christianity was not well rep-
resented in Nigerian politics.”12 The choice of Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, a popular 
Pentecostal preacher from the South-South of Nigeria, had a strategic attraction. 
First of all, the fact that he was from the same region as the president encouraged 
a growing political support for Oritsejafor. Unlike the era of old, a large support 
grew from both the Pentecostal clergy and laity which could be found within the 
Conservative Egalitarian and the Liberal Political Christian groups. This trig-
gered great discomfort within the Conservative Hierarchical group, which had 
previously held sway. This group had attained a political status quo which was 
acceptable to all groups, government and Muslims included. Their non-radical 
stance and their propensity for dialogue made them amenable and convenient for 
the politics of Nigerian religious dialogue. Unlike them, the Pentecostals had a 
narrower view, both of religious dialogue and tolerance, because they had a 
close-knit and family-like feature which encouraged a collective will. As Lamle 
(2013) puts it: 
Through the [Pentecostal] church, people that had come together from different socio-
political and socio-economic status are brought together into one family. They come together 
in one brotherhood that helps them to withstand the socio-political and economic chaos in 
Nigeria. This bond becomes the crutch upon which the people are able to come together into 
one single-family unit and domesticate their problems together. 
Thus, choices and debates, ranging from domestic issues to national politics, 
have been influenced by the nature of the bond which Pentecostalism – or as 
Lamle (2013) calls it, “neo-Pentecostalism” – has created, with its extension into 
the more established churches. 
The June 2010 emergence of Oritsejafor13 jolted the hierarchical groups. Be-
fore this time, all CAN presidents had emerged from the hierarchical group, and 
the doors revolved around them. In fact, when the growing rate of ethnic and re-
ligious conflict caused President Obasanjo to inaugurate The Nigeria Inter-
Religious Council (NIREC) on 29 September 1999, the co-chairmanship on the 
Christian side was shared by two people, both of the Conservative Hierarchical 
group.14 The subsequent emergence of the Catholic Archbishop of Abuja Dr. 
                                                            
12  Interview with A. Dogo. 
13  And his re-election, which occurred while writing this chapter. 
14  They were Dr. Sunday Mbang, CON, the Primate of the Methodist Church of Nigeria and Archbishop 
J. Akinola, CON, the Primate of the Nigerian Anglican Communion. Both were at one time presidents 
of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). http://nirecng.org/history.html. 
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John Onaiyekan presented an opportunity for another from this group. Coinci-
dentally, Onaiyekan was to co-chair with a new Muslim leader, Alhaji Muham-
mad Sa’ad Abubakar, the Sultan of Sokoto. The relationship between the sultan 
and the archbishop was a highly praised one; with these men at the helm of af-
fairs, there was a high level of tolerance and wide acceptance of the need for dia-
logue. Thus, it was not surprising when, in a strategic move, one of the Nigerian 
church’s most vocal and cerebral priests, Matthew Hassan Kukah, was appointed 
Bishop of Sokoto. Furthermore, the Vatican, under the papacy of Pope Benedict 
XVI, appointed Bishop Kukah as a member of the Pontifical Council for Inter-
Religious Dialogue, a 13-member council primarily geared towards dialogue.15 
Kukah’s academic and public profile has made him and the Catholic Church a 
veritable tool for dialogue in Nigeria. The church’s nationwide presence has ena-
bled it to gain wide acceptance from both government and the Nigerian Islamic 
community. But the Catholic Church’s largest opposition seems to have emerged 
from two groups particularly: the Conservative Egalitarian and the Liberal Polit-
ical Christian groups. Each group obviously had its own reasons for having res-
ervations about the Catholic Church, but in the context of this chapter, both 
groups have had histories which places them at variance with religious dialogue. 
Mbachirin (2006a: 174-188), in discussing the history of CAN, introduces the 
arguments between various Christian groups on who should take the credit for 
the formation of CAN. From the narrative he presents, there was a clear indica-
tion that the arguments were between the evangelicals (mainly present in north-
ern Nigeria) and Catholics. The evangelicals from the North claimed that CAN 
emerged from the Northern Christian Association (NCA), an association which 
emerged from northern fears: 
Christian operation in the North was different from that in the South because the South was 
just mainly for church Unionism [meaning CCN’s16 attempt to form a Union Church] but the 
North saw the threat of the Sardauna’s policies of Islam coming. So [the northern Christians] 
felt that for anything that had to do with Government, the Christians of all denominations 
must come together and speak with a similar voice. So, usually the Christian operation was 
relatively strong in the North and a little weak in the South because the problems were dif-
ferent. (ibid. 176)  
Most Catholic and southern Nigerian scholars, on the other hand, saw CAN as 
emerging from the collaboration between the Christian Council of Nigeria (CCN) 
and the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria (CSN), both of which financed and 
                                                            
15  “A special department of the Roman Curia for relations with the people of other religions. Known at 
first as the Secretariat for Non-Christians, in 1988 it was renamed the Pontifical Council for Interreli-
gious Dialogue (PCID).”  
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/interelg/documents/rc_pc_interelg_pro_20051
996_en.html  
16  Christian Council of Nigeria, formed in 1929 as a mainly Protestant body and a mainly southern un-
ion, comprising Anglicans, Methodists, Presbyterians, etc. 
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housed CAN at its inception and for a long time after its formation. With this 
parenting, it became traditional for these groups to share the leadership of CAN 
over the years. But the fight over claims of origin became a reason to wrench 
authority in 2010 when the competition for the presidency of CAN saw factions 
emerging. The Conservative Hierarchical groups were insistent on maintaining 
the status quo, while the Conservative Egalitarian and the Liberal Political 
Christian groups strove to change the pattern. The Radical Christian Identity had 
in most cases found it difficult to join the mainstream owing to questions about 
their integrity arising from the others; therefore, they had little influence in these 
determinations. The success of Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor over Archbishop John 
Onaiyekan indicates the growing strength of a more liberal leaning, even among 
the historically conservative. Two things have accounted for this. The first is 
what seems to be the growing threat of Islamism and, as earlier discussed, a 
threat narrated as a concerted process of Islamising Nigeria (mainly the North). 
The second is the growing Pentecostal Church, which has less tolerance for dia-
logue even with fellow Christian groups, let alone with Muslims. As Ojo (2007: 
176) points out: “Ideologically, while Islamic groups seek to solve the problems 
of the ambiguities of the modern state, Pentecostal groups are concerned with 
solving problems confronting the individual.” This can also be likened to the re-
lationship between Pentecostalism and the other Christians in Nigeria. Pentecos-
talism in the north of Nigeria, as Ojo notes (ibid. 181), became highly politicised 
when its presence in northern universities during the 1970s and 1980s encour-
aged a radical defence of Christianity and Christian values against what they saw 
as the fundamentalist orientation of Muslim organisations in the institutions. Alt-
hough the North’s Christians had lived for a long time with this, their stance was 
primarily not one of collective physical violence against Muslims but either ideo-
logical or political rejection. Events which led to violence in institutions of high-
er learning were indicative only of radical Christians who saw themselves as hav-
ing to fight to defend Christianity, very much unlike the generality of Christians 
in the North at that time. But this influence grew with the growth of Pentecostal-
ism and the seeping of its values into the largely evangelical North.  
Northern Christians, mainly within the evangelical groups, had for long been 
weary of what they perceived as the friendliness and tolerance of the Conserva-
tive Hierarchical groups towards Islam. Most clergy and laity from this hierar-
chical group in colonial times were either European, from English West Africa, 
or from Nigeria’s South. These people were little influenced by the history of 
Islam, unlike the indigenous minorities who eventually converted to Christianity 
had been, and therefore, under the convenience of Pax Britannica, they held their 
own in northern Nigeria. The indigenous minorities, on the other hand, had to 
contend with both history and the colonial rhetoric of their being a lower class. 
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The Catholic and Anglican churches did not experience as rapid a growth as the 
evangelicals owing to the former’s search for convenient converts, while evan-
gelicals took on the more uphill task of searching the interiors for converts. 
Therefore, the relationship of the Conservative Hierarchical groups with Islam 
was one of a sense of mutuality, while that of the Conservative Egalitarian and 
Liberal Political Christian groups with Islam was not. This could explain why it 
has been easier for the Conservative Hierarchical groups to emphasise the need 
for dialogue and tolerance, in contrast to the others.  
Apart from the obvious attempt of the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria to en-
courage dialogue and to present light at the end of the tunnel, Anglicans – pri-
marily through the Archbishop of the province of Kaduna (northern Nigeria), 
Josiah Idowu-Fearon – have also argued for Christians to avail of the routes for 
dialogue. Being a co-founder of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christiani-
ty at Kaduna, the archbishop has introduced a significant pathway for dialogue 
with Islam – but not without criticism. His background as an academic is a rare 
one in Nigeria. With a PhD in Islamic Studies and fluency in Arabic, Idowu-
Fearon stands out amongst his peers in both religions. Like some bishops and 
archbishops of the Catholic Church, Idowu-Fearon has been highly criticised by 
the Conservative Egalitarian, Liberal Political Christian, and Radical Christian 
Identity groups as being rather romantic about the situation of Islamism in north-
ern Nigeria, and their insistence on a less radical Christian approach (Mudashir 
2012; Idowu-Fearon 2013; Midat 2013). He, like Onaiyekan and Kukah, has in 
recent times supported the call by the Sultan of Sokoto Alhaji Muhammad Sa’ad 
Abubakar for an amnesty to be granted to Boko Haram. While Onaiyekan and 
Kukah harp on the twin issues of politics and the economy as the primary cause 
of Boko Haram (Aminu 2013; PM News 2013), Idowu-Fearon argues that there 
is a growing intolerance among Christians, which he blames on individuals and 
groups with ethnic or economic agendas who use the platform of Christianity to 
influence even genuine Christians towards violence (Kawu 2012). Although 
these views are tenable, the meta-narrative amongst a large number of northern 
Christians has been that of a resurgence of Ahmadu Bello’s proselytisation 
drives, but this time without the subtlety of the Sardauna. A series of events have 
helped intensify and strengthen perceptions supporting these sorts of narratives. 
With the return to a more extended version of the Shariah legal system in 1999, 
equating it with the inherited Western legal system, the coming of a new Shariah 
jolted most Christians, most especially Christians in the North. According to 
Alubo (2006) – who does not provide consistent data to support his claim – of 
thirty major violent incidents, based on magnitude, between 1999 and January 
2012, only two were not in northern Nigeria and only one did not involve Mus-
lims and Christians. Within the Middle Belt areas, continuous conflict between 
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the mainly Muslim Hausa or Fulani majority and other ethnicities (in some cases 
mainly Christian) has further increased the fears of domination by a network of 
the more northern groups connected by Islam. 
The Conservative Egalitarian, Liberal Political Christian and Radical Chris-
tian Identity groups, most especially within the Nigerian North, have outrightly 
rejected the passive and discursive style of the Conservative Hierarchical groups. 
The divide created by the struggle for presidency in CAN showed this. Moreo-
ver, nationally and internationally, there were indications that individuals and not 
necessarily the organisations themselves were credited as defenders of peace, and 
it was alleged that Onaiyekan and the sultan had been nominated for the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 2012. Also, within that period, various awards were conferred on 
this duo. This served as a clear affront to CAN, considering that while the sultan 
in his capacity represented Islam in Nigeria, Onaiyekan represented just one fac-
tion of Nigerian Christians, and this was at a time when Onaiyekan had stepped 
down as president of CAN. To a number of Christians, the relationship of this 
one group (the Catholic Secretariat) with Islam and its leadership provided a 
symbolic sign which showed that the Catholic Church was ready and available 
for dialogue, while the other Christian groups were not as friendly and therefore 
not ready for a path to peaceful coexistence.17 These latter groups, from the gen-
eral narratives in preparing this study, obviously have less tolerance for Islam 
and are clearly more weary of dialogue. But even with this, there seems to be a 
stronger desire for dialogue within the generally more accepting groups, rather 
than the whole. This partitioning in desire for dialogue has encouraged animosi-
ties amongst the Christian groups, with some even alleging a conspiracy by the 
Catholic Church to destroy CAN (Atonko 2013; Eyieyien 2013). Even though 
these assertions seem to hold some water, owing to the obvious conflict within 
CAN over the past few years, there is a need for proper quantitative sampling of 
opinions from Christians to obtain confirmable data on these perspectives. 
Conclusion  
In summary, the clear fact is that Christians have become more apprehensive of 
Islam since the introduction of the Shariah regime of 1999. Democracy had not 
only provided freedom for society, but opened doors to a freer expression of 
grievances. This is now seen as weakened in the light of the stubborn implemen-
tation of Shariah and the violence between Muslims and Christians in Plateau 
and other north–central states, a violence that Christians view as being based on 
alleged hegemonic tendencies. Central Nigerian Christians, most especially, feel 
                                                            
17  Rev J. Bistu, S. Dasit and P. Gyang: president and executive members of Youth CAN Plateau State. 
Focus group interview by Henry Gyang Mang at COCIN Headquarters, Jos, 18 January 2013. 
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caught between the Biblical call to be at peace and the increasing threat coming 
from pockets of violence attributed to Islam. In their case, it is easy for narratives 
to trigger strong emotions.  
This chapter has presented the four main divisions which Christianity has 
grown into based on issues surrounding Islam. These divisions (Conservative 
Hierarchical, Conservative Egalitarian, Liberal Political, and Radical) have pre-
sented various reactions based on their histories and present predicaments. It 
cannot be concluded that Christians have a single, general point of view, apart 
from their rejection of features of Islamism such as Boko Haram’s violence. Re-
actions have varied, but with increasing violence affecting Christians, the rhetoric 
can easily slide towards calls for revenge, even when there is no proper logic for 
it. 
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Abstract 
Competing discourses are involved in a meta-conflict over the meaning of the 
Boko Haram uprising in northern Nigeria in July 2009. These discourses are 
characterised by different conceptions of the state. This study analyses the 
struggle over the meaning of the uprising, using the theoretical framework of 
‘meta-conflict’ set out by Horowitz and Brass, and a discourse analysis meth-
odology based on the work of Foucault, and Lakoff and Johnson. An analysis 
of media reports in the five weeks following the uprising reveals that embed-
ded within reports on Boko Haram there are four competing conceptions of the 
state. The Socio-Economic discourse argues for the state as the provider of  
development, whereas the Political Agency discourse posits the state as the 
provider of order. The Religious Structural discourse emphasises the state’s 
secular role in containing expansionist Islam, and the Religious Agency dis-
course calls on the state to help mainstream Islam maintain control over devi-
ant sects.  
Introduction 
Research on violent conflict tends to focus on trying to answer the primary-level 
questions about the cause and nature of violence. Equally important, however, is 
how the idea of violence is constructed and instrumentalised to support wider 
political narratives. This article analyses how different actors have given differ-
ent meanings to the violence related to the Boko Haram uprising in 2009, and 
                                                            
1  I am grateful to Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, Ruadhan Hayes, Manuel Reinert and 
Gérard Chouin for their helpful comments. I would like to thank Bala Mohammad Liman, 
Athanasius Atta Barkindo and Steve Itugbu for valuable discussions.  
This research would not have been possible without funding from the Economic and So-
cial Research Council Overseas Institutional Visit programme, and the generous support of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (SOAS) Queen’s Anniver-
sary Fund, which enabled me to pursue postgraduate study at SOAS, where this article was 
originally submitted as a Master’s Dissertation on 14 September 2012. 
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how those meanings have been reproduced through discourse. The language used 
to describe the conflict represents divergent understandings of conflict. This 
study asks what metaphors are used to describe the Boko Haram uprising and 
what model of the causation is assumed by such metaphors.  
As Boko Haram-related violence continues to be a central political issue in 
Nigeria and in Nigeria’s relations with external states, the need for reliable em-
pirical data on the violence, including details of the victims and transparency 
over government actions, is obvious. However, equally important is the need to 
understand what is at stake in discussions about Boko Haram. In talking about 
Boko Haram, commentators make implicit claims about how the state in Nigeria 
should operate. The main argument of this article is that the meta-conflict over 
the meaning of the July 2009 Boko Haram uprising in northern Nigeria is be-
tween competing discourses which are characterised by different conceptions of 
the state: the state as provider of development, the secular state, the state as pro-
vider of order, and the state as protector of the moral order. Each of the four ma-
jor discourses employs metaphorical structures to imply different models of cau-
sation. Despite the differences in causation, all of them suggest that the state has 
responsibility to control the causes of violence. All argue that to solve the con-
flict, the state must perform its role better, but disagree over the state’s proper 
role.  
As such, this study uses the discourses about Boko Haram as a window to ex-
plore salient themes and tensions in Nigerian politics and the international politi-
cal environment. An analysis of how people talk about Boko Haram, and the 
themes and tensions within different accounts of the conflict, is relevant to  
understanding and situating the Boko Haram conflict in wider concerns. Depend-
ing on whether one believes that the root causes of the conflict are underdevel-
opment and bad governance, a lack of police control, the expansionist desires of 
Muslims, or a lack of regulation of Islamic teachings, one will come to different 
conclusions as to how peace and stability can be returned to the north-eastern 
states. The analysis below demonstrates that such core beliefs are often not stated 
explicitly, but embedded in the language used to frame the Boko Haram conflict.  
The article has five sections. The first sets out the theoretical framework, de-
fining two key concepts: discourse and meta-conflict. The second section reviews 
the literature on the Boko Haram uprising in July 2009, highlighting the confu-
sion and lack of clarity concerning the group’s genesis due to uncritical use of 
sources. The third section sets out the methodology based on discourse analysis 
of newspaper reports between 26 July and 31 August 2009 and highlights the 
methodology’s limitations. In the fourth section I set out four major discourses 
about the meaning of the uprising; the Socio-Economic discourse, the Religious 
Structural discourse, the Political Agency discourse, and the Religious Agency 
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discourse. The fifth section picks up on specific tensions between the discourses 
and highlights how discourse analysis allows for the identification of metaphors 
that mask questions of causation. The article concludes with a warning to com-
mentators to critically examine the sources they use and the hidden assumptions 
of the discourses they employ in discussing the Boko Haram conflict.  
For the sake of brevity and clarity I use the phrase the ‘Boko Haram uprising’ 
to describe the period of violence in northern states from 26 July to 30 July 2009. 
The label is misleading insofar as violence was perpetrated by a variety of actors, 
not just by those referred to as Boko Haram. Moreover, the word ‘uprising’ has 
specific connotations of a unified political project with goals of overthrowing an 
oppressor. The appropriateness of this term is debatable, but beyond the scope of 
this article.  
Meaning, representation and framing 
There is the conflict itself, and there is the meta-conflict – the conflict over the nature of the 
conflict. Neither is coterminous with the other; neither can be reduced to the other. 
(Horowitz 1991: 2) 
Discourse constructs the conceptual framework through which we interpret the 
world around us. Through the establishment of metaphors, exclusion of rival ex-
planations and actors, and objectification of social groups into entities, discourses 
build up overarching narratives. In politics, discourse shapes how we conceive of 
our interests and identity (Horowitz 1991: 31). When conflict arises, discourse 
determines not only which side we take, but what we believe the conflict is 
about. This is evident in the current debates over Boko Haram: if the group is 
essentially a symptom of poverty and deprivation, then it is a conflict between 
those whose duty is to provide development (typically the state) and those who 
are the victims of their incompetence (in this case, unemployed northern youth). 
Alternatively, if the conflict is caused by deep religious antagonisms, then the 
only choice is whether to side with the Christians or Muslims. The scope of such 
discourses extends into the past to find causes for current violence and into the 
future by setting up expectations of future behaviour (Brass 1996: 2). 
For some scholars, discourse is a pejorative term which denotes a gap between 
what is said and what is true. On this view, discourse is something which ob-
scures truth and must be ‘cut through’ to get to the truth underneath. The result-
ing scholarly account will not be a discourse; it will just be a neutral analysis of 
the conflict (McGarry & O’Leary 1995: 1; Lemarchand 1996: 17). However, 
there is no way of escaping the need to interpret the world around us. The use of 
discourse is neither optional nor inherently deceptive. Mills emphasises that, fol-
lowing Foucault, discourse is a universal filter, or lens of interpretation (Mills 
2003: 55-56). 
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The purpose of analysing discourse is not to find out which discourse has the 
best claim to truth, because the criteria by which we might measure truth are in-
ternal to specific discourses and cannot be used to evaluate various discourses 
from an external, ‘objective’ standpoint (Mills 2003: 58). Rather, discourse ana-
lysis can help us to de-naturalise certain ways of interpreting the world and see 
things we would otherwise miss. Ordinarily, the ways in which discourse struc-
tures our understanding may seem so natural and automatic as to be invisible to 
us (Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 108). 
The concept of meta-conflict originates in Horowitz’s work on South Africa 
(1991), but has since been applied more widely to analyse the 1992 Los Angeles 
riots and the Troubles in Northern Ireland (McGarry & O’Leary 1995; Mac 
Ginty, Roger & du Toit 2007). The concept of a meta-conflict can be seen as ap-
plying the tools of Critical Discourse Analysis to discussions on violent conflict. 
All conflicts are accompanied by a struggle for their meaning, explanation, and 
cause. Brass defines a meta-conflict as “the struggle for control over the mean-
ing” of acts of violence and for “the right to represent them properly”. He argues 
that the struggle is not simply between parties to the conflict but includes the 
contributions to discourse from academics and journalists (Brass 1996: 1).  
A meta-conflict is characterised by a “fundamental dissensus” about who is 
fighting whom and why (Horowitz 1991: 26). The different narratives interact in 
a conflictual manner. A key function of each narrative is to assign blame and re-
sponsibility. These are not just rival explanations which sit side by side; they ac-
tively attack the other explanations offered. Discourses seek to silence or margin-
alise other competing discourses, presenting rival explanations as attempts to 
whitewash the real causes of violence, or else discounting them as superficial and 
self-serving. This happens in two ways. Firstly, through rarefaction, discourse 
defines who has the authority to speak truth on a certain subject (Foucault 1982: 
64; Mills 2003: 67-68; Foucault 2006). Secondly, via exclusion, discourse can 
exclude rival explanations. In addition to rarefaction and exclusion, discourse 
engages in objectification: the simplification of the messy and disparate elements 
of human experience into entities with defined properties as if they were physical 
objects. 
An analysis of discourse is impotent without reference to the power struggles 
it relates to. For this it is necessary to have knowledge of the local context the 
discourse occurs in; otherwise, the significance of the ‘words’ and how they re-
late to pertinent local, national, and international interests will be lost.  
Lakoff and Johnson argue that “our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of 
which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature”. They 
give the example of an argument as a war. We do not simply talk about argument 
as if it is war; crucially, we also think about argument as if it is war. The linguis-
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tic framework of the metaphor structures our conceptual reality, that is, the way 
we think about the world (Lakoff & Johnson 1981: 3). The analysis of metaphor-
ical language in descriptions of violence in news reports, often in subtle ways, is 
a key aspect of Critical Discourse Analysis. The discourses on Boko Haram pre-
sent events via metaphors in order to simplify and explain them.  
Contested chronology and uncritical use of sources 
There has been a steady increase in interest in Boko Haram from academics, 
government, and NGOs in the years since 2009, with an attendant increase in 
research output about the group. However, there is a lack of clarity over the 
chronology of events and the genesis of the group – what Eltringham calls the 
“factual chronicle” (2003). Not only are commentators interpreting events differ-
ently, but they do not even agree on what the events are.  
There are a number of discrepancies in different descriptions of the history of 
Boko Haram. Onuoha (2010: 56) says that “the exact date of the emergence of 
the Boko Haram sect is mired in controversy”, but a survey of the literature re-
veals confusion rather than disagreement. Writers unintentionally contradict each 
other. Accounts of how Boko Haram developed are so profoundly different as to 
indicate a general lack of clarity and knowledge about the group, rather than a 
range of interpretations of agreed facts. Many authors cite unverified media re-
ports, without critically assessing the reliability of such sources. A pair of news 
articles in Tell Magazine in August 2009 are cited for large parts of the descrip-
tion of Boko Haram’s activities and history by Adesoji (2011), Danjibo (2009) 
and Onuoha (2010), who are then cited, among others, in Bagaji (2012), Pham 
(2012), Aghedo & Osumah (2012) and Cline (2011). Ekanem et al. (2005: 
190191) quote from Wikipedia. Other articles do not use citations at all for key 
claims, such as when Essiet talks about the “rapping [sic] of Christian women in 
Maiduguri” (Essiet 2010: 4) The Christian Solidarity Worldwide report on inter-
communal violence in the years preceding the uprising attempts to evade the 
need for references by using phrases such as “it is widely held that” or “it appears 
that” (Christian Solidarity Worldwide 2004: 2). 
Owing to the low visibility of the group before 2009, they attracted little aca-
demic interest before the uprising. Moreover, the difficulty of researching violent 
groups first-hand, combined with the escalating risks associated with doing re-
search in the areas where Boko Haram operates in Borno, Yobe, and Bauchi 
states, means the prospects for empirical study of the group at present remain 
dim. Journalists, policy makers, and commentators should critically examine 
their sources when analysing Boko Haram and ensure that the confidence of any 
subsequent claims reflect the strength of the evidence available.  
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There is confusion over when Boko Haram first appeared. Onuoha presents 
one of the most detailed accounts. He quotes the Nigerian Director of Defence 
Information, who says the sect started in 1995 under Abubakah Lawan’s leader-
ship and then changed name several times from Ahulsunna wal’jam’ah hijra, to 
the Nigerian Taliban, to Yusufiyya sect, to Boko Haram (Onuoha 2010: 55). 
However, the group have never referred to themselves as Boko Haram, calling 
themselves first ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama‘a wa-l-hijra, and then from late 2009 
onwards, jama‘at ahl al-sunna li-l-da‘wa wa-l-jihad ‘ala minhaj al-salaf (Loi-
meier 2012: 151-152). It appears that Yusuf and the group became associated 
with the phrase boko haram from 2005 onwards, thanks to Yusuf’s frequent de-
crying of “boko” in his sermons. However, up until 2009, press reports call group 
members “Nigerian Talibans” (Chouin, Reinert & Apard, this volume). 
Aghedo and Osumah cite Onuoha for their historical overview section and yet 
say that Yusuf was the leader of the group since the mid-1990s (Aghedo & Osu-
mah 2012: 858). Cook claims that Boko Haram first manifested in 2002, which is 
later than Onuoha’s 2001 date for their establishment but before his estimate of 
their first attack, 2003 (Onuoha 2010: 56; Cook 2011: 9). Danjibo agrees that 
Boko Haram has at times been called the Yusufiyya sect but that it was Yusuf 
who established it in 2001 not Lawan in 1995, whilst Cline says that in 2002 
Yusuf merely took over the group, despite using Danjibo as his reference (Dan-
jibo 2009: 6; Cline 2011: 281). 
Onuoha argues that the first public attacks by Boko Haram came in Kanama 
and Geidam, Yobe State, in 2003, before the group was “dislodged” by the army 
and dispersed, returning to set up base in Kanama in 2004. The same year, the 
group attacked police stations in Gwoza and Bama, Borno State, which was met 
with police counterattacks (Onuoha 2010: 56). Cook echoes the 2003 and 2004 
Kanama stories, but asserts that there were two other attacks in 2004, resulting in 
deaths and arrests before this, which Onuoha does not mention, in Damboa and 
Damaturu (Cook 2011: 9-10). Cline says Boko Haram started armed operations 
in 2004, which could refer to Kanama, but he does not give details (Cline 2011: 
281). Okpaga et al. and Boas suggest that Yusuf operated in Maiduguri, not 
Kanama, in that time period, with Boas presenting Boko Haram as a different 
group from the ones that launched attacks in 2004 (Okpaga, Chijioke & Eme 
2012: 82). Boas suggests that whilst the other more violent groups were crushed, 
before 2009 Boko Haram appeared to be a “harmless” complex comprising a 
school and mosque (Boas 2012: 3). Pham suggests that this period of “relative 
calm” only emerged sometime after they were repelled by security forces in 2004 
(Pham 2012: 2-3). 
According to Onuoha, skirmishes with the police continued at a low level until 
2007, when Yusuf and a fellow member of Boko Haram were tried for terror-
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related crimes (Onuoha 2010: 56-57). However, Danjibo and Bagaji both cite an 
article from Tell Magazine in 2009 that claims Yusuf and others from Boko Ha-
ram were arrested as part of Operation Sawdust in 2005 and held in police custo-
dy until 2007 (Danjibo 2009: 15; Bagaji et al. 2012: 38). Onuoha says that Yusuf 
was arrested again in 2008 and held until January 2009, though Danjibo does not 
mention this (Onuoha 2010: 56). Cook and Le Sage do not mention any arrests 
and say that between 2004/2005 and 2009 there was a period of truce between 
Boko Haram and the government (Cook 2011: 10), or at least an “inactive phase” 
(Le Sage 2011: 7). 
In terms of the July 2009 uprising, it appears that there was an initial incident 
at a funeral procession in Maiduguri in June 2009 where 17 Boko Haram mem-
bers were shot and wounded by police after a confrontation over motorbike taxi 
drivers not wearing helmets (Last 2008: 7; Okpaga, Chijioke & Eme 2012: 82-
83). A police raid in Bauchi town, advised by the Nigerian intelligence services, 
then came in early July, resulting in a shoot-out at a police station where some 
Boko Haram members who were arrested in the raid were being held. Soon af-
terwards, Boko Haram members began to congregate in Maiduguri in preparation 
for more confrontations (Last 2008: 7; Danjibo 2009: 15).  
Recently, rigorous work has been done to establish a reliable chronology of 
events, both in terms of the group’s development in the context of Islamic con-
testation in the northern states over a number of decades (Loimeier 2012) and in 
terms of lethal incidents in the Boko Haram conflict.2 My aim in this study is not 
to resolve the discrepancies in the factual record but to analyse how the debate 
about the conflict illuminates wider political themes in Nigerian politics. 
Despite the differences between different accounts of what happened, when, 
and why, there are three main events during the course of the uprising between 
26 and 30 July that each discourse has to interpret. In rough chronological order 
they are the following: the uprising and associated violence perpetrated by Boko 
Haram between 26 and 30 July, whether in Maiduguri, Borno State, Bauchi, 
Bauchi State, Damaturu and Potiskum, Yobe State, or Wudil, Kano State; the 
response of the state, which involved immediate retaliation by police and then a 
military operation in Maiduguri starting on 27 July; and the death of the leader of 
Boko Haram, Mohammad Yusuf, in police custody on 30 July. In addition to 
these key nodes of analysis, articles refer to a range of other events in an effort to 
place the Boko Haram uprising in a broader context. This contributes to ideologi-
cal discourses whose significance extends beyond the uprising. 
 
                                                            
2  www.nigeriawatch.org 
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Methodology and limitations 
My analysis was conducted on 186 newspaper reports from a five-week window 
extending from 26 July to the end of August 2009. The vast majority of articles I 
looked at were news reports rather than analysis or editorials, meaning that the 
process of interpretation is manifested in how the author tells the story, rather 
than in explicit editorial opinions. Articles from outside that period, or from other 
news sources, are included where they help illuminate an overarching discourse 
which articles from the time period fit into.  
Discourse is not limited to the written word; however, for the purposes of this 
study the primary sources selected come solely from the national and inter-
national newspaper press. Non-literate media, such as TV and radio, were ex-
cluded from the dataset, as were news sources such as BBC Hausa Service and 
Aminiya, which do not broadcast in English. There are difficulties in ascertaining 
the size of the readership of newspapers and thus in determining how representa-
tive of the views of the general population discourses reproduced by newspapers 
are. However, there are reasons to believe that newspapers reach a significant 
portion of the Nigerian population (Bakker 2011: 5-6). Copies are passed from 
person to person, around offices and workplaces, and archived in libraries.3 Fur-
thermore, this does not include online readership. This means the real readership 
is likely to be many multiples higher than the sales figures.  
For domestic newspapers, I looked at Daily Trust, perhaps the largest-selling 
English-language newspaper in the North; The Nation, aimed at the business 
elite; The Guardian, secular and aimed at the educated elite; and ThisDay, with a 
similar audience and genre to The Guardian (Stanford University Libraries). Not 
all Nigerian newspapers have online archives going back to 2009, so I was una-
ble to include Punch in my analysis, despite its apparently having the highest 
circulation. For others (including The Nation and The Guardian), archives were 
available only on news aggregation websites, meaning that they may have pub-
lished articles which were not picked up by the website and thus not included in 
my analysis. Therefore I chose my sources based on the following criteria: 
whether they were available online, whether they had a significant readership, 
and whether across all the sources there was a good cross-section of the views 
available. Newspaper publishing is concentrated around Lagos, with the Daily 
Trust being the only major ‘northern’ newspaper included in the study. The New 
Nigerian, established by Sir Ahmadu Bello in 1963, was for a long time the 
mouth-piece of the northern establishment. In 2009 it was still active, yet ar-
chives are unavailable online and it is therefore not included in the analysis.  
                                                            
3  Newspapers are archived at, among other places, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, and 
the National Archives, in Ibadan, Kaduna, Enugu. For more information about the holdings of various 
Nigerian archives, see http://archiveswiki.historians.org/index.php/National_Archives_of_Nigeria 
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For foreign newspapers, I applied the added criteria of whether they discussed 
the Boko Haram crisis, as the coverage was patchy. From the foreign press, I 
looked at Foreign Policy, BBC News Online, Al Jazeera English, and the British 
newspaper The Guardian (from here on, The Guardian [UK]).  
The Boko Haram conflict has expanded in geographic scope, number of cau-
salities, and political and social consequences since 2009. Several different phas-
es have developed, with substantial shifts in the leadership of the group, their 
methods, their communications, and their international links and outlook. Ac-
cordingly, the number of media and academic reports on the conflict has explod-
ed. A full analysis of the meta-conflict over the meaning of the violence would 
take account of these growing bodies of discourse. Notably, some key discourses 
have emerged which are not touched on in this study but have been dominant in 
certain sectors: the discourse of foreign influence as the cause of Boko Haram 
violence; of Boko Haram being used as political thugs by ex-Borno State Gover-
nor Ali Modu Sheriff; and a growing discourse of civil war between Muslim 
North and Christian South, linking Boko Haram to violations of the Presidential 
zoning agreement. Rather, this study takes only a small snapshot of discourses 
that were in circulation in a limited number of newspapers very early on in the 
conflict. This snapshot is then used as an opening to analyse more general themes 
and concerns in Nigerian politics, through the lens of the Boko Haram conflict.  
Framing and blaming: Discourses on Boko Haram  
In the media in the five weeks during and after the uprising, there are four major 
discourses on the meaning of the Boko Haram uprising: the Socio-Economic dis-
course, the Religious Structural discourse, the Political Agency discourse, and 
the Religious Agency discourse. All offer an explanation of the conflict whereby 
it fits with a broader worldview. The discourses locate the violence related to the 
Boko Haram uprising in different contexts, identifying its causes and assigning 
blame. Through this interpretive process each viewpoint contains a conception of 
the state which links context, cause, and blame to an implied understanding of 
how the state should respond to violence. These conceptions are in conflict: each 
discourse seeks to undermine rival discourses via exclusion and rarefaction.  
 
Socio-Economic discourse: The roots of underdevelopment 
The socio-economic view holds that the Boko Haram crisis is merely a symptom 
of the larger underlying problem of poverty and exclusion, which is at the heart 
of all violence in Nigeria whether in the Delta, Jos or Maiduguri. Foreign Policy 
(FP) magazine summarises the socio-economic view: 
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With Yusuf out of the picture, it would be silly to assume that the trouble is over. These sorts 
of episodes will keep popping up as they have throughout the North for the last decades until 
the root of the problem is fixed. (Dickinson 2009a) 
The discourse uses metaphorical language to suggest that all incidents of vio-
lence have the same cause. This objectifies the cause of violence into a single 
entity, like a root, and homogenises all violent incidents, as if they are plants 
linked by an underground root system. This is evident in phrases such as “these 
sorts of episodes”, “uprisings like this”, “this most recent eruption”, and the  
description of Boko Haram as “the northern Nigerian version” of violence in the 
Niger Delta (Dickinson 2009a; Herskovits 2009). 
The role of religion in the conflict is acknowledged but presented as epiphe-
nomenal and relatively unimportant. The metaphors of depth are used to charac-
terise the ‘real’ causes of violence, reinforcing the idea of the causes of violence 
as a root of a plant which spread below the surface. In contrast, rival accounts of 
the conflict are excluded by labelling them as superficial, using metaphors of 
shallowness. FP writes: “Religious violence is a much simpler answer – and on 
the surface, a correct one” (Dickinson 2009a). The ‘surface’ is irrelevant because 
the real cause – deprivation – “digs deeper” and it “stretches all the way back to 
Abuja” (ibid.). The root cause lies under the surface ready to be triggered: “the 
only question is what will trigger the next spate of armed mayhem, and where. It 
could be anywhere” (Herskovits 2009). 
Even explicitly religious events cannot be explained with reference to religion, 
but by socio-economic factors. The cause of violence is socio-economic depriva-
tion, and the blame lies with the corrupt political elite, which has failed in the 
state’s primary task to provide development. Conflict should be seen in the con-
text of Nigeria as a weak or failing state. For example, in 2000 “secular institu-
tions were not delivering justice. Sharia, it was hoped, would do a better job” 
(ibid.). The FP blog argues that people were indifferent to Shariah “as a religious 
tool” but interested in it as a solution to a “backwards system” (Dickinson 
2009a). 
The solution is to replace the failing state with one that delivers development 
according to good governance models. The failure is not of the model of the state 
but of the individual office holders’ inability to perform the functions required by 
the Western liberal free-market model of the state. The root cause of socio-
economic deprivation would be solved if the state operated correctly. The opposi-
tion ANPP support this view, arguing that the problem would be solvable were 
different actors, namely the ANPP, in charge at a federal level (Bisalla 2009). 
The socio-economic view criticises the government as part of a process of rar-
efaction. Officials are portrayed as incompetent and not a credible source of 
knowledge. FP calls the government “unprepared” and its views “silly” (Dickin-
son 2009a; Herskovits 2009). It mocks the president for going on a “jaunt” to 
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Brazil during the uprising (Dickinson 2009b). This discourse is largely held by 
Western commentators, including Foreign Policy magazine and the United States 
government, who position themselves as experts or representatives of the state as 
provider of development. 
It empowers those who can be presented as the victims of state-led underde-
velopment, such as Boko Haram, because their grievances are seen as somewhat 
justified. The socio-economic view downplays the threat of Boko Haram and 
contrasts it with “the excessive force” of the state’s response (Herskovits 2009; 
Kawu 2009). Descriptions of Boko Haram attacks are absent or brief and are re-
ferred to as “attacks on police stations” and then “clashes between” the group and 
the security services. In contrast, the focus is on the aggression of the police, say-
ing that the military “compounded the misery of people in Maiduguri” thanks to 
the “indiscriminate killing of guilty and innocent alike” (Herskovits 2009). 
 
Religious Structural discourse: Muslims versus the rest 
The religious structural view presents the Boko Haram crisis as just one example 
of an intrinsic tendency within Islam, which causes periodic episodes of violence. 
The Boko Haram uprising is essentially a religious conflict, like past instances of 
communal violence in Jos and Kano. Conflict should be seen in the context of 
northern Nigeria as the site of repeated jihad, going back to 1804, and as part of a 
global struggle against Islamism and terrorism. 
Violence is described in religious terms and with a focus on details which 
highlight the Islamic-ness of the actors involved – that they were “chanting ‘God 
is Great!’” (Smith 2009a), or were “wearing long-beards” (Smith 2009b). Mus-
lims are objectified and portrayed as having essential characteristics. The specif-
ics of Boko Haram are only relevant insofar as they uncover deeper, more essen-
tial characteristics that all Muslims share.  
The objectification of Muslims can be seen in the wider literature on religious 
violence in Nigeria. Christian Solidarity Worldwide groups all Muslims into a 
single monolithic entity and then homogenises ‘the rest’, constructing a binary 
between Muslim and non-Muslims. ‘Non-Muslims’ becomes a unitary actor 
which thinks and acts as one. For example, “the non-Muslims of Plateau State 
view the situation altogether differently” (Christian Solidarity Worldwide 2004: 
1).  
The entity of ‘Muslims’ is extended in two directions to form a spectrum of 
‘extremist’ to ‘moderate’ Muslims. At one pole are Al-Qaeda terrorists (Clark 
2009) and at the other are everyday Nigerian Muslim social customs (Essiet 
2010). Yet, because everything on the spectrum shares the same basic character-
istic of being Muslim, the differences between them are presented as being of 
degree rather than categorical. On this view, extremists are therefore simply un-
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inhibited moderates. Moderates and extremists share a desire to impose their be-
liefs, but moderates will not act upon them. This supports the idea that the threat 
of Islam is bubbling below the surface. An individual Muslim might appear to be 
moderate but beneath their inhibited, civilised front lie threatening Islamic 
tendencies: extremism can erupt from seeming moderacy. The religious structural 
view implies that violence will stop only when the underlying cause of structural 
religious antagonism is resolved.  
Furthermore, the religious structural view merges state and society, to create 
an impression of Islam as all-consuming. Bagaji et al. (2012) use the phrases 
“secular state” and “secular society” interchangeably, both of which are present-
ed as the target for Muslim aggression. Individual liberty and safety, therefore, 
are equated with a secular state. The conception of the state this implies can be 
seen in the following quote: 
The church, which blamed the Federal Government for the proliferation of the Boko Haram 
movement, urged government to take urgent steps to contain the current upsurge in religious 
militancy in the country as propagated by the sect. (The Guardian 2009c) 
Therefore the problem is one of religion, but it has a political solution for 
which the state is responsible. The biggest threat to society is the inherent expan-
sionist tendency of Islam, and therefore the primary function of the state is to 
protect against it. The state can be judged by how well it protects its secular sta-
tus to keep Islam at bay. But the major conflict is not between two religions – 
Islam and Christianity – but Islam and ‘the rest’. Therefore the state’s role is to 
protect its secular status, which mainly involves containing or repelling the ex-
pansionist tendencies of Islam. When the state fails in this role, the state is to 
blame for the violence, because it has neglected its responsibilities. 
In terms of the wider power hierarchies reinforced by this discourse, Christian 
groups such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) gain authority to rep-
resent the conflict in such a way that it emphasises religious difference and posi-
tion themselves as speaking for the innocent victims of the struggle against ex-
pansionist Islam. Newspapers like The Guardian often give column inches to 
Christian organisations condemning the violence (The Guardian 2009c). Mus-
lims are seen as perpetrators of violence and Christians as peace-loving victims 
(The Guardian 2009f). The Guardian (UK) repeats four times in one article that 
Mohammad Yusuf said he and his followers will fight to the death, reinforcing 
the idea that he is mad or irrational (Smith 2009a). This excludes discourses 
which advocate negotiation with the group or appeasement through development 
in the North. This discourse undermines the ability of Muslims to speak with  
authority on the conflict, and of those who are seen as too politically correct to 
admit that the problem is Islam. 
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Political Agency discourse: The volatility of violence 
The political agency view casts Boko Haram-related violence as part of the 
state’s continuous efforts to maintain order against the forces of chaos and dis-
order. The state’s purpose is to provide order, and this is threatened by the exist-
ence of violence, which is apt to spread by contagion. The language used sug-
gests a metaphor of violence as a liquid seeping through gaps in the state’s pro-
tection. The metaphor helps construct a binary between soft, chaotic, non-state 
violence and the hard control of the state. Like water, violence is fluid and evades 
control: it “spreads” (Idris et al. 2009), militants “proliferate”, there are “upsurg-
es” (The Guardian 2009b) and “outbreaks” of violence (The Guardian 2009f). In 
response to the unpredictable fluid movements of chaos, the police must “contain 
and repel” the threat (Abdulfattah 2009a). Any lack of control is characterised as 
loose, lax or volatile. Reports refer to poor policing as “exposing the country to 
danger”, which reinforces the idea of danger as softness or an opening (The 
Guardian 2009e).  
The political agency view presents violence by non-state actors as especially 
dangerous. Boko Haram’s attacks are described in literal, evocative terms, focus-
sing on the physical acts of violence: villages are “stormed” and “razed”. 
“[A]nother civilian was burnt to ashes” as Boko Haram “used sharp knives and 
inflicted serious injuries on the necks and body parts of seven other police offic-
ers” (Idris et al. 2009).  
In direct contrast to the visually evocative descriptions of Boko Haram, police 
are presented as rule-driven. The acts of state violence are described in orderly 
terms, and the police’s physical actions are almost never mentioned. Instead, they 
are described as if in a constitutional document. They submit “comprehensive 
reports” (The Nation 2009a), continue “heavy bombardments” and “successfully 
crushed the uprising” (The Guardian 2009d). Furthermore, police officers are the 
frontline of the fight against violence, because they are the guardians of the forc-
es of order (Idris & Haroun 2009). 
In certain situations, however, the police or the government are to blame for 
failing to exert enough control. The state should not show signs of weakness – 
for example, indecision, unwillingness to be violent, or mercy – because these 
are as bad as the violence itself. The idea that violence is the result of weakness 
is echoed in the wider literature about terrorism. Forrest & Giroux (2011: 12) use 
terms which denote softness or opening to describe the risks posed by terrorists: 
for instance, terrorists might find “sanctuary”, “operational freedom” or a “safe-
haven”. They describe a lack of government control as government “softness” 
(ibid.). Soft openings are bad because danger could penetrate the gaps, like water 
leaks through holes or weak points in fabric. This excludes discourses which fo-
cus on the causes or justifications for non-state violence.  
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For politicians, the solution is to impose more order. The plans proposed by a 
group of northern governors involve increasing government control in general. 
They “resolved to monitor the activities of all religious groups to forestall recur-
rence of unrest” (sic), and traditional rulers will be “empowered to enforce rele-
vant laws that guide and regulate the establishment and activities of religious 
groups or sects” (The Guardian 2009f). All the verbs are all about control: re-
solve, monitor, forestall, empower, enforce, guide, regulate. The state should be 
synonymous with control and order; thus, the response to violence is to extend 
the control of the state. In the literature on terrorism, we can see similar concep-
tions of violence as the result of the state’s failure to be strong and provide order. 
Forrest & Giroux (2011: 12-13) write that terrorism could be addressed by help-
ing African militaries and police services to “strengthen” themselves or encour-
aging “non-state actors ... [to] undertake local policing duties”. 
This discourse serves the interests of the police, because it marginalises mem-
bers of Boko Haram as “dangerous lunatics” and “religious fanatics”, who are 
“awfully superstitious”, and justifies police killings of suspects. BBC News, The 
Nation, Al Jazeera and ThisDay also reproduce this discourse. 
 
Religious Agency discourse: deviance and order within Islam 
The view put forward by some of the northern Islamic establishment is that the 
Boko Haram crisis is a religious issue, but one caused by an Islamic agent whose 
views and behaviour are an aberration, not the norm. The Arewa Consultative 
Forum and editorials in the Daily Trust newspaper present this view (Ebije 
2009). It emphasises the benign nature of Islam in the North and focuses on the 
ways in which individuals such as Yusuf have manipulated normal Muslims to 
make them act in anomalous ways. Muslim leaders engage in a complex process 
of including and excluding Boko Haram from wider Islam. Mohammad Haruna 
writes in a Daily Trust editorial: “Billions of others, including his fellow Mus-
lims, would equally disagree [with Mohammed Yusuf]”. The idea of “fellow 
Muslims” who are in disagreement reflects this tension (Haruna 2009). On the 
one hand, they do not want Islam to be associated with violence, so they con-
demn Boko Haram as “un-Islamic” (Daily Trust 2009h). On the other hand, they 
want to resist the socio-economic view which labels religion as unimportant, a 
superficial symptom of underlying deprivation.  
The Religious Agency discourse resolves this tension by saying Boko Haram 
is a religious problem which therefore needs a religious solution (Abubakar 
2009; Ebije 2009; The Guardian 2009a). Contrary to the Socio-Economic dis-
course, religion is not epiphenomenal. The direct causes of violence are incorrect 
teachings and a lack of moral order. This empowers Islamic leaders as experts, 
who can solve the problem of bad religious teaching through producing CDs with 
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authoritative preaching (Daily Trust 2009a) or religious radio programmes that 
“debunk the myths of Yusuf’s teaching” (Daily Trust 2009b). The Daily Trust 
newspaper devotes large sections of news reports to quoting Islamic leaders’ 
condemnations of the violence (Daily Trust 2009a). This sets up an opposition 
between a minority and the majority of Nigerian Muslims. Boko Haram is mar-
ginalised through the description of weird beliefs held by the group, which dis-
tinguish it from normal Islam. The Daily Trust notes that schools linked with 
Boko Haram taught children not to eat Maggi – a ubiquitous food brand – or 
wash with soap (Fidelis 2009).  
Whereas the religious structural view presents the difference between extrem-
ists and moderates as a matter of degree, the religious agency view presents ex-
tremism as an aberration. Rather than Boko Haram being an “eruption” of under-
lying extremism, Yusuf’s ideas are portrayed as externally imposed, like a sick-
ness, a delirium or a spell (Idris 2009). Boko Haram members are “misled” (La-
lo, Agbese & Muhammed 2009) and “ill-informed, perhaps brainwashed” by 
Yusuf (Daily Trust 2009f), and “innocent children ... were unconsciously initiat-
ed into the sect” (Daily Trust 2009c). This discourse emphasises Muslim victim-
hood both in terms of the members of Boko Haram who “lost their lives” and the 
“bereaved” families they left behind without breadwinners (Gusau & Bashir 
2009; Idris 2009). 
The state, in its primary role as the upholder of moral order, should reaffirm 
and strengthen the proper forms of Islam, supporting mainstream Islam to over-
come its misguided deviant fringes. This discourse is ambivalent towards the cur-
rent government, at times blaming the police for anti-Muslim violence and, at 
others, seeking to harness the power of the state to license and control religious 
activities (Kwaru, Salkida & Idris 2009). 
Tensions, metaphors and hidden assumptions 
Violence does not speak for itself; violence must go through a process of inter-
pretation where it is turned into an event, with a cause and a context. The above 
analysis demonstrates that in the case of the Boko Haram uprising in 2009, there 
is dissensus over the meaning of violence. Where are the points of tension in the 
meta-conflict? How do the various discourses competing for dominance attempt 
to exclude and marginalise rival discourses? In this brief discussion section, I 
highlight how these tensions play out in practice, using the example of a specific 
discursive interaction between the Socio-Economic discourse as reproduced by 
Hilary Clinton and the Political Agency discourse as reproduced by the then 
President Umar Yar’Adua. Finally, I analyse two instances where metaphors are 
used to mask questions of causation and naturalise certain simplified ways of 
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seeing the world. Such analysis is by no means exhaustive but illustrative of the 
ways in which discourse embeds certain assumptions.  
 
Shared ground and areas of tension 
In general it is worth noting that the political agency view is most prevalent, find-
ing widespread support among the Nigerian press and Yar’Adua. Internationally, 
the socio-economic view is most popular, whilst the religious structural view is 
held by a minority of foreign commentators and some Christian organisations in 
Nigeria. The religious agency view is the least prevalent, with support confined 
to Muslim commentators in the North. The four discourses at times overlap. In 
particular, all the divergent discourses are tinged with the political agency view, 
which focuses on the state maintaining control over the forces of chaos. Moreo-
ver, the first three are statist. They all present the state as the key to both the 
problem and the solution, whilst advancing competing views of the appropriate 
role of the state. The final view presents the state as an auxiliary actor in the solu-
tion, fulfilling only a supporting role to the northern Islamic establishment, 
whose role is to uphold the moral order.  
Boyd says some resolution of the meta-conflict is necessary, and Horowitz ar-
gues that dissensus in the meta-conflict “increases the difficulty of finding ways 
for the parties to the conflict to seek accommodation and inclusion rather than 
hegemony and exclusion” (Horowitz 1991: 21; Boyd 1992). Indeed, the four 
conceptions of the state are not necessarily incompatible; there is a degree of 
shared ground where dialogue can happen. There could be a state that provides 
development and order, is secular, and ensures the upholding of multiple 
schemes of moral authority. But this is a tall order for a state which has low ca-
pacity, resources, and legitimacy. The different conceptions pull in different di-
rections, and tradeoffs will require prioritisation of certain functions of the state 
over others. For instance, a discourse which emphasises the inevitability of con-
flict will counsel a different course of action from discourses which identify spe-
cific grievances as the cause of conflict. Where discourses pull in opposite direc-
tions, many of the available options will be not only undesirable but illegitimate 
for key sections of society. For example, the possibility of strengthening Muslim 
leadership in the North as a way of safeguarding against deviant forms of Islam 
would be a solution on the religious agency view, but for the religious structural 
view it would threaten the key secular role of the state.  
A key example of these conflicting conceptions of the state is in the tension 
between the Socio-Economic discourse and the Political Agency discourse. Both 
present the state as a solution to violence, but their conceptions of the state differ. 
For the commentators in Foreign Policy and in the United States government, the 
state’s primary offering is development; for many Nigerian politicians, it is order 
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and control. Hilary Clinton visited Nigeria as American Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs two weeks after the violence. Her comments emphasised con-
flict’s socio-economic causes: 
The most immediate source of the disconnect between Nigeria’s wealth and its poverty is a 
failure of governance at the federal, state and local levels ... Lack of transparency and ac-
countability has eroded the legitimacy of the government and contributed to the rise of 
groups that embrace violence and reject the authority of the state. (The Nation 2009b)  
At first glance, the then President Yar’Adua agreed with Clinton’s analysis, 
saying that he “promised the United States that his administration would not fal-
ter in the war against corruption” (The Nation 2009c). However, Clinton’s con-
ception of the state as provider of development is met with a conception of the 
state as the provider of order. The president’s conception is based around im-
proving the state’s strength and control – for instance, winning the “war against 
corruption” and not “falter[ing]” (Abdulfattah 2009b). 
The Political Agency discourse, which portrays non-state violence as chaotic 
and unpredictable, contrasts with the Socio-Economic discourse, in which Boko 
Haram is portrayed as predictable and rational. Herskovits says that the violence 
“did not surprise the people of Maiduguri or anyone else in Nigeria”. She sug-
gests that Boko Haram’s anti-state beliefs are widely held: “even established 
leaders of Islam in the north ... are aware of how government has failed Nigeria’s 
young” (Herskovits 2009). More broadly, the tension between the socio-
economic and political agency views can further be seen in the discussion of am-
nesty for Boko Haram. For the former it is a rational response to violence which 
expresses political grievances, but for the latter it represents weakness and per-
missiveness, going against the core purpose of the state. Under stress, the small 
area of overlap between the conceptions – for instance, the shared importance of 
the rule of law for the political agency and socio-economic views – will disap-
pear as different actors cling to the core elements of their worldviews. 
The discourses differ in how far they treat the police as an authoritative source 
of knowledge. Newspapers that reproduce the Political Agency discourse, like 
The Nation, ThisDay and The Guardian, frequently quote police spokesmen un-
critically. In contrast, the Daily Trust articles, representing the Religious Agency 
discourse, undermine the police as authoritative sources of knowledge by contra-
dictory reports – for example, when paraded suspects protest their innocence 
(Daily Trust 2009d; Daily Trust 2009e; Daily Trust 2009g; Idris et al. 2009). 
For both the Socio-Economic discourse and the Religious Structural discourse, 
the focus is on general, longstanding structural causes of violence. This allows 
commentators to explain the violence with little reference to local context and 
facts on the ground. Whilst the religious agency view puts local actors in a posi-
tion of expertise – because they know the specifics of Boko Haram’s teaching – 
 Discourse analysis of the Boko Haram uprising, July 2009 127 
 
structural views empower international commentators who are able to ‘stand 
back’ from the conflict and look to the wider, supposedly deeper, causes, whether 
socio-economic or religious. 
 
Objectification of violence and social groups 
The discourses about Boko Haram exemplify how metaphors are used to think 
about different non-physical aspects of our experience in the same ways that we 
can think about physical objects and substances (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). Meta-
phors can obscure empirical questions about the cause of violence, by replacing 
causes with inherent causal properties of the metaphorical objects they create. 
For example, the Political Agency discourse presents the metaphor of violence as 
a fluid. In describing violence as if it is a disembodied phenomenon that can 
spread like water through a country, it becomes un-linked from its human agents. 
The fight against violence stops being a fight against other human beings, and the 
human cost of retaliation is sidelined. Such discourse naturalises state violence, 
making it comparatively invisible. 
Just as violence can be discursively constructed into a physical object like wa-
ter, social groups can be objectified into a single entity. The Religious Structural 
discourse objectifies social groups into homogenous categories of ‘northern Mus-
lims’ in Nigeria, and ‘Muslims’ in general across the world. Therefore, the ex-
planation offered for the violence relies on the assumed violent characteristics of 
‘northern Muslims’, masking the need to explain how frustration among that 
group leads to conflict. Within this metaphorical conceptualisation, Muslims re-
act violently because they are the sort of thing that reacts violently. In seeking to 
simplify and explain the world, we must be cautious not to allow analytic catego-
ries to slip into being treated as “really existing” physical categories (Eltringham 
2004). 
Whilst the religious structural view objectifies all Muslims into a monolithic 
entity, the religious agency view highlights the individual agency of Muslims and 
the plurality of beliefs. For instance, the Daily Trust reports on ordinary people 
who tried to convince their relatives not to join Boko Haram. When Mohammad 
Yusuf was invited to Dumbulwa to preach, the local population is presented as 
going out of their way to prevent his visit, including climbing trees to remove the 
sound system (Idris 2009). Disaggregating the category of ‘Muslims’ allows for a 
more nuanced ascription of motivations and interests to various individuals and 
communities who are affected by the conflict in different ways. 
Conclusion 
It is wrong to say that there are two conflicts in Nigeria, the conflict and the me-
ta-conflict, because only the first is bounded by location. The second extends 
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beyond the state’s borders to encompass all those who contribute to the circula-
tion of discourses which deal with the Boko Haram uprising. The media will in-
evitably use different frameworks or interpretive lenses for making sense of 
events in Nigeria and the rest of the world; neutral reporting is not an option. 
This article sets out the beginnings of a framework whereby commentators can 
tease out the underlying assumptions of different ways of telling the story of 
Boko Haram. There is no objective way of ranking the views, because they rely 
equally on material facts, normative beliefs, and subconscious assumptions about 
social realities. Journalists should be aware of the power hierarchies they are 
supporting when they subconsciously use certain metaphors to describe and ex-
plain the conflict, not just in editorials and analysis pieces but in ‘factual’ news 
reports. Rather than striving for our work to be neutral in its effects, we should 
seek to participate in the meta-conflict responsibly.  
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Abstract 
Based on the case of Boko Haram, or Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal 
Jihad (“People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and 
Jihad”) to give it its real name, this chapter introduces a general discussion on 
the relationship between Islam and politics in Nigeria. Unlike Hamas in Pales-
tine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, or the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, Boko Haram is 
neither a political party nor a charity network. It is political because it contests 
Western values, challenges the secularity of the Nigerian state, and reveals the 
corruption of a “democrazy” that relies on a predatory ruling elite, the so-called 
“godfathers”. But Boko Haram also remains a sect, now engaged in terrorist 
violence. From Mohammed Yusuf to Abubakar Shekau, its leaders have never 
actually proposed a political programme to reform and govern Nigeria accord-
ing to Shariah. In this regard, Boko Haram raises an important question: why 
has Nigeria never had a religious political party, either Islamic or Christian? 
Federalism and the alleged ‘neutrality’ of military regimes do not explain eve-
rything. Compared with the situation in Northern Sudan, the structure and divi-
sion of Islam also help us to understand why Nigerian Muslims have never 
succeeded in setting up a political platform to contest elections with a religious 
programme, and why violence became an alternative channel for reform. 
Introduction 
The Western media and many Nigerians see the terrorist attacks of Boko Haram 
as part of a wider global religious war between Muslims and Christians. The New 
York Times, for instance, claims that “the radical Islamist group … has struck 
mostly at Christians and burned churches” (Worth 2012). As for the Christian 
Association of Nigeria (CAN), it insists on the possibility of a religious war, and 
it has found fault with President Goodluck Jonathan’s statement that Boko Ha-
ram killed more Muslims than Christians (Akowe 2013). However, the first and 
main targets of the radical Islamist organisation were indeed the security forces 
and ‘bad’ Muslims, not Christian communities. The problem is that passions and 
a large variety of opinions confuse the analysis of the objectives and the evolu-
tion of an indigenous sect turned terror group. Depending on positions, Boko Ha-
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ram is thus considered a political uprising, a religious organisation, a social 
movement, or a purely criminal affair. 
As is to be expected, the official narratives of Nigerian security forces tend to 
reduce the radical Islamist group to a gang of armed robbers, devoid of any polit-
ical or social leaning. The founder of Boko Haram, the late Mohammed Yusuf, is 
himself described as an opportunist and a religious entrepreneur who built a mas-
sive audience of followers and attracted donations to become influential and ob-
tain material rewards. Many Nigerian politicians from the South also deny that 
the sect is a freedom-fighting movement cast in the mould of the MEND (Move-
ment for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) in Ijawland, the OPC (Oodua Peoples 
Congress) in Yorubaland, or the MASSOB (Movement for the Actualization of 
the Sovereign State of Biafra) in Igboland. Actually, Boko Haram is not ethnic 
based, even if its main stronghold remains in Borno. Moreover, it developed in a 
remote region, far from the resources of the oil-producing areas that fund most of 
the budget of the federal state. Hence, it does not have the same financial lever-
age to negotiate an amnesty or a political agreement with the central government. 
Last but not least, its militants are often said to be able to commit suicide attacks 
because they are poor people who have nothing to lose … and to gain, unlike 
MEND fighters who struggled for their share of the ‘national cake’. 
However, religious authorities have different views on Boko Haram. On the 
one hand, some Islamic scholars simply deny that the followers of Mohammed 
Yusuf are Muslims. The nickname Boko Haram is quite useful in this regard, 
since it turns “the radical group into an exotic eccentricity and hides its embar-
rassing connection to the leadership of well-established Salafi organization”, the 
Izala (Brigaglia 2012: 38). On the other hand, many evangelicals insist on the 
role of religion and Quranic schools in breeding violence. While pressing the US 
to declare the sect a foreign terrorist organisation, the President of CAN, Pastor 
Ayo Oritsejafor, argues for instance that the movement of Mohammed Yusuf is 
neither a political nor a social one. To him, Boko Haram is first and foremost an 
extremist group “fuelled by a religious fundamentalist ideology”. He acknowl-
edges that the sect indoctrinated the poor and was manipulated by politicians. But 
he claims that it was not driven by misery and compares Mohammed Yusuf to 
Osama bin Laden, who came from a very rich family.1 
By contrast, I argue that Boko Haram is basically an indigenous uprising with 
a religious ideology, a political meaning, and some social support locally, unlike 
transnational professional terrorist groups that can strike anywhere in the world. 
Obviously, the sect is not the armed branch of a party. It does not have a political 
program as such, and its members did not attempt to contest elections. On the 
contrary, the followers of Mohammed Yusuf retreated from the state to dream of 
                                                            
1  Interview by Eriye, Festus (30 Sept. 2012), “The trouble with Nigeria”, The Nation, 24, 25, 50. 
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a Shariah-based caliphate. Yet I consider that they form an embryonic political 
group because of their targets, their rejection of Western values, their contesta-
tion of a secular post-colonial state, their manipulation by politicians, the legiti-
macy they built during the repression, and the fear they provoke in Borno and all 
over Nigeria. To facilitate the reading of this chapter, I use the name Boko Ha-
ram rather than Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (“People Com-
mitted to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”), the real name 
of the organisation. I qualify the group as a sect because of its distinctive reli-
gious beliefs, its deviance from mainstream Islam, its intolerance, its claim to 
possess unique access to the truth, the selection of its members, their fanatic in-
doctrination, and the fascination exerted by their former guru, Mohammed 
Yusuf. I also describe Boko Haram as a movement because of its social basis. 
And I call ‘terrorist’ the faction which began to plant bombs and resort to suicide 
attacks after the killing of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. My position does not 
mean that I support the labelling of the whole movement as a foreign terrorist 
organisation, precisely because of its grassroots and its genesis. 
A political uprising: From insurgency to terrorism 
Since the first recorded act of violence committed by the so-called ‘Taliban’ in 
November 2003, Boko Haram has actually struck against political targets: police 
stations which were sometimes the only effective presence of the state in remote 
villages; prisons which were attacked to release militants; schools that symbol-
ised Western education and the colonisation of the mind; mosques and Muslim 
scholars who contested the moral authority of the deviant sect; politicians and 
godfathers who were fraudulently elected and who were accused of failing to 
implement properly Islamic Law, etc. After the assault of the army and the extra-
judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri in July 2009, the group then 
started to operate outside of Borno and Yobe, hitting churches in Jos in Decem-
ber 2010 and United Nations offices in Abuja in August 2011. At the time of 
completing this chapter in September 2013, it was also speculated that Boko Ha-
ram aimed to further destabilise Nigeria by going to the South to attack strategic 
targets such as bridges, power plants, the radar facilities of international airports, 
and radio and television transmitters. If it did not yet have the capacity to do so, 
this did not mean that it was not engaged in a full war against the government. 
Meanwhile, the extension of the targets of Boko Haram to Christian communi-
ties has testified to the radicalisation and professionalisation of the sect. Indeed, 
this shift makes more sense for a terrorist group which seeks an international au-
dience. In the Western media, first, it pays more to attack Christians rather than 
Muslims – hence a better chance to publicise the local struggle of an Islamist 
sect. Moreover, Boko Haram can now claim to be part of a global holy war (ji-
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had) when it pretends to defend Muslims against Christian aggressors in Kaduna 
or Plateau States – and hence the possibility of external support from organisa-
tions based in Arab countries. Also, it is sometimes suggested that attacking 
Christians is a way to force Nigerian Muslims to take sides. In this regard, it is 
important to understand the implications of the rupture of July 2009, when the 
remnants of the group had to run away from Maiduguri and, once in exile, faced 
a higher probability of getting directly in touch with transnational jihadist move-
ments that were clearly engaged against the Jews and the “Crusaders”. 
Before then, Boko Haram exclusively targeted the security forces and Mus-
lims who did not strictly follow Shariah rules. Initially inspired by the Salafi doc-
trine of the Izala movement, Mohammed Yusuf was always very vocal against 
the African “perversion” of Islamic practices by the Sufi brotherhoods (Loimeier 
2012; Pérouse de Montclos 2012: 7). His attacks focused on the Tijaniyya, who 
were more popular than the Qadiriyya.2 Mohammed Yusuf also condemned the 
corruption of traditional elders and emirs, even if he continued to pay respect to 
Usman dan Fodio and the jihad of 1804, which was linked to the Qadiriyya.3 And 
he eventually fought against the Izala too, a movement which rebuked the teach-
ings of the scholars (Gardawa Mallams) of the traditional Sufi brotherhoods, yet 
did not oppose violently Western education and the secularity of the Nigerian 
state.4 
At that time, the only Christians targeted by Boko Haram were not communi-
ties but a few individuals who were killed because they informed the security 
forces, cursed Mohammed Yusuf, or infringed the Islamic ban on alcohol.5 On 24 
December 2003, the coordinated attacks of the Taliban faction against police sta-
tions in Yobe happened on Christmas Eve. But this symbolic date might have 
been chosen because the holiday period facilitated the operation. It had nothing 
to do with the Christian celebration as such. The fact that Christian communities 
in Borno are not very visible also played a role, for it was more difficult to be-
siege them. First, they are very scattered, unlike in Kano and Kaduna, where they 
usually live together in specific areas. Secondly, they are mainly made up of in-
digenous people who are more integrated in local communities than migrants 
from the South in north-western Nigeria. Thirdly, these native Christians are ra-
                                                            
2  According to surveys, 19 per cent of Nigerian Muslims belong to the former, compared with 9 per 
cent for the latter, while the majority (56 per cent) do not identify with any Sufi order (Lugo et al. 
2010: 147, 158, 315-317) 
3  Almost all Islamist movements in Nigeria praise the historical figure of Usman dan Fodio. In this 
regard, it will be interesting to see if the breakaway faction of Boko Haram, Ansaru, will also refer to 
Shaikh Said bin Hayat, the great-grandson of Usman dan Fodio and the Mahdist leader of the Ansar 
community of Dumbulwa in Fika emirate in Borno. Said bin Hayat is said to have been the longest 
serving political prisoner of the British Empire, from his arrest in 1924 until his late release in 1959. 
4  Actually, the Izala rather aimed to adapt and reform Islamic education to face the technical challenges 
of the modern world. 
5  Various interviews in Maiduguri and Kano, October 2011; database nigeriawatch.org 
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ther recent. As early as 1711, the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the 
Faith attempted to establish a Christian mission in Borno, but to no avail as the 
expedition eventually ended in Katsina. When the Sokoto Caliphate fell in 1903, 
the British then banned Christian missions and schools in the North. Thus, in 
Borno, most churches developed after Independence. 
Of course, this relative ‘invisibility’ does not mean that Christian natives or 
migrants were spared from violence. The CAN claims that in February 2006, an-
ger over the publication in Denmark of controversial cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammed sparked riots by mobs of Muslims in Maiduguri, leaving about fifty 
Christians dead and many churches burnt. During the five days of violence in 
July 2009, it is also alleged that Boko Haram members killed 37 Christians, in-
cluding three pastors, and torched or partially destroyed 29 churches in Borno 
State. However, these two events require clarification. In July 2009, Christians 
were not the exclusive targets of a more general fighting between Boko Haram 
and the security forces. And in February 2006, the press did not report any in-
volvement of the sect; on the contrary, the assailants were assumed to be Hausa-
Fulani who came from Kano, Katsina, and Sokoto because the indigenous Kanuri 
and Shuwa Muslims were too soft on the issue of Shariah (CSW 2006: 9). Ac-
cording to local observers, the protest against the Danish cartoons was actually 
manipulated by politicians to express discontentment against President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, a Christian who was sidelining his Muslim Vice President, Abubakar 
Atiku, in an attempt to run for a third term in office.6 
As far as we know, it is in December 2010 that, for the first time, Boko Haram 
really planned and organised the deadly bombing of churches in Jos and Mai-
duguri. The repression certainly contributed to this evolution. Mohammed Yusuf 
had not advocated the slaying of Christians, neither in his book nor in his ser-
mons left on record (Yusuf 2005). It was after his extrajudicial killing that the 
remaining commanders of the sect, who wanted revenge, drew closer to the glob-
al jihadist narrative against “Crusaders”. The role of Boko Haram is still disputed 
in some of the bombings of churches. Mohammed Yusuf’s successor, Abubakar 
Shekau, did not claim or deny any of them in his video releases. Although the 
sect attempted to exploit communal tensions in the Middle Belt, there is no con-
clusive evidence that it was responsible for all the attacks it claimed responsibil-
ity for, especially against Christians in Jos (ICG 2012: 15). On the contrary, the 
‘original’ Boko Haram’s focus on Muslim targets caused the split off of Abuba-
kar Adam Kambar and a dissident group, Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis 
Sudan (The Supporters for the Aid of Muslims in Black Africa), which emerged 
in 2012 to kidnap expatriates (see Annexes 1 and 2). From a doctrinal point of 
                                                            
6  Agang, Sunday, “Why the Cartoon Protest turned Lethal in Northern Nigeria”.  
http://www.gamji.com/article5000/NEWS5671.htm (Accessed 22 November 2012). 
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view, the leader of the new organisation, Abu Usamata “al-Ansari”, disagreed 
with Abubakar Shekau because he considered that the ‘real’ enemies of Islam 
were essentially Westerners. As for the faction of Khalid al-Barnawi “Abu Haf-
sat”, it regarded deadly attacks against innocent Muslims as a misinterpretation 
of Islam. It did not oppose talks with the government and eventually clashed with 
Abubakar Shekau, who accused it of treachery and organised the killing of its 
spiritual leader, Awwal Gombe, in 2012.7 The Christian issue has thus been a 
source of dissent between the three leaders who took up the baton of Mohammed 
Yusuf and who have been designated by the US as global terrorists: Abubakar 
Adam Kambar, Abubakar Shekau, and Khalid al-Barnawi.8 
In this regard, there are two ways – global and local – to understand the exten-
sion of the targets of Boko Haram. The first is to analyse this evolution as a stra-
tegic move to destabilise a government led by a Christian president, Goodluck 
Jonathan. Such a development is usually seen as going together with the interna-
tionalisation of the sect, its alleged involvement in northern Mali, and possible 
links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). A strategic alliance with 
Saudi Salafi groups actually remains doubtful because the doctrine of Moham-
med Yusuf does not fit the Wahhabi model. One should remember that Boko Ha-
ram is itself a dissident group that broke away from the Izala, the main Salafi 
movement in Nigeria. In Abuja, courts could never prove that Mohammed Yusuf 
received funding from Saudi extremists after his two hajj trips to Mecca. Like-
wise, the Nigerian State Security Service (SSS) alleged in 2006 that Boko Haram 
had sent some children to an Al-Qaeda training camp in Mauritania and to some 
mujahideen fighters in the Republic of Niger. Yet the Kano businessman they 
arrested in connection with this, Mallam Muhammad Ashafa, was later released 
because no evidence could be laid against him regarding funding from Al-Qaeda 
Tabliqh Headquarters in Lahore, Pakistan. In 2007, again, an Abuja High Court 
had to drop charges against the proprietor of the Daily Trust newspapers’ group, 
Mallam Muhammad Bello Ilyas Damagun, who had been accused of receiving 
funds from Al-Qaeda to train terrorists abroad and support the Taliban branch of 
Boko Haram. 
                                                            
7  Africa Confidential, various issues, 2012 and 2013. 
8  Abubakar Adam Kambar is said to have been killed by the Nigerian security forces during a raid on 
his hideout in Kano in mid-August 2012. As for Khalid al-Barnawi, he allegedly got closer to AQIM 
and was to supply funds to both Ansaru and Boko Haram. According to sources that could not be 
cross-checked, Abubakar Shekau appointed as his deputy a disciple of Ansaru and Khalid al-Barnawi, 
Babagana ‘Assalafi’, when the French launched their military operation in northern Mali in January 
2013. The Nigerian army eventually claimed that Abubakar Shekau was wounded in a gunfight and 
died later on in Cameroon in August 2013. As for Ansaru, it followed the model of Al-Qaeda by kid-
napping and killing expatriates, and it was proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the British Home 
Office in November 2012. 
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In 2012, the fact that some Nigerians were said to have fought with AQIM in 
Timbuktu did not prove either that they were sent by Abubakar Shekau in order 
to extend and coordinate various attacks in the region.9 In northern Mali, evi-
dence of their nationality and their affiliation to Boko Haram remained weak. 
From a purely tactical point of view, it is very likely that the sect cooperated with 
foreign jihadist groups to train fighters and get supplies of weapons. In 2009, just 
after the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the acting leader of Boko Haram, Mallam 
Sani Umaru, was even reported to have signed a statement supporting Osama bin 
Laden to “carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islam-
ised”.10 But this expression of solidarity did not mean that his successor, Abuba-
kar Shekau, was to destabilise Nigeria under the supervision of Al-Qaeda. On the 
contrary, the extortion of local businessmen and the multiplication of armed rob-
beries since 2011 tended to show that he had to continue relying on domestic 
funding. Moreover, Boko Haram was international from the beginning, since it 
operated from a region with porous borders.11 At the end of the 1990s, Moham-
med Yusuf first used the regional networks of Izala to extend his influence out-
side of Borno and his home state Yobe. This took him and his supporters towards 
neighbouring countries like Chad and the Republic of Niger, where the Nigerian 
Izala had begun to preach in the mid-1980s, launching their own organisation, 
Adini-Islam, in Niamey in 1993 (Zakari 2007). After Mohammed Yusuf broke 
his relationship with the Izala, his supporters still used neighbouring countries as 
rear bases, for instance in the region of Diffa in Niger and in the Mandara Moun-
tains of Cameroon around 2003-06. 
Terrorism and fear 
Thus, the possibility of an operational connection with AQIM does not explain 
properly the spatial extension and the strategic move of Boko Haram against 
Christian communities to destabilise the Nigerian government. The international-
isation theory is more relevant when it refers to models of terrorism, rather than 
                                                            
9  Relying on a single secret American source, journalist Serge Daniel claims that Boko Haram received 
2 million euros (probably ransom money) and sent twenty men to be trained by Al-Qaeda after signing 
a “pact” in June 2010 (2012: 204-6). US Representatives Michael McCaul et al. do not provide any 
further evidence in this regard, as they quote press reports of journalists who were not even in Mali. 
They claim that Boko Haram is funded by AQIM to recommend that it should be designated a foreign 
terrorist organisation. But they also admit that, to be able to make bombs, the sect had to steal com-
mercial explosives and detonators used in quarries and mines within Nigeria (2013: 18). 
10  http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/08/boko-haram-ressurects-declares-total-jihad/# 
11  The sect also attracted curiosity. Before 2008, for instance, Chadian ministers of Finance and Trans-
ports, Abbas Mahamat Tolli and Abdelkerim Souleyman Terio, were said to attend Friday prayers at 
the Boko Haram mosque in Maiduguri and allegedly gave alms to Mohammed Yusuf. According to 
rumours that could not be confirmed, this connection eventually became a diplomatic case because 
Abbas Mahamat Tolli was a nephew of President Idriss Deby and Abuja pressed the Chadian govern-
ment to dismiss him. 
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religious doctrines. As early as 2003, the first mujahideen fighters of Boko Ha-
ram called themselves “Taliban” even if they had no operational link with Af-
ghanistan. Since then, some of them have made references to other jihadist battle-
fronts like Somalia. Yet the main change was, in 2011, to resort to suicide attacks 
after the model of Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. This is indeed a real 
novelty in Nigeria, a country where non-Muslim groups also used terrorist tech-
niques and bombs against the military junta in the 1990s, but no suicide attacks. 
As such, the international dimension of Boko Haram is not a new phenomenon if 
we look at the history of Islamic protest in northern Nigeria. All the main Sufi 
brotherhoods had a foreign origin, while the Izala followed the model of Saudi 
Arabia, the yan schi’a of Ibrahim el-Zakzaky looked at Iran, and the leader of the 
Maitatsine, Muhammad Marwa, hailed from Cameroon. From a doctrinal point 
of view, it would also be spurious to claim that Mohammed Yusuf was more rad-
ical than other forms of Islamic protest in northern Nigeria, from Mahdism to 
Quranic integralism.12 His rejection of Western modernity, for instance, was 
much more accommodating than the position of Muhammad Marwa, who for-
bade his followers even to ride a bicycle. Likewise, the deadly impact of Boko 
Haram has never reached the proportions of the Maitatsine insurgency in Kano, 
which resulted in the killing of more than 4,000 people in just 11 days in Decem-
ber 1980 (Hiskett 1987; Isichei 1987). 
Definitely, the real novelty of the sect in Nigeria is to resort to suicide attacks 
and terrorist techniques that follow (but presumably do not obey) a global ji-
hadist model. In this logic, targeting Christian communities makes sense because 
it creates panic and challenges the secularity of the state, especially regarding 
freedom of religion.13 To get a national audience despite being based in the pe-
riphery of Nigeria, Boko Haram plays with the fears of southerners regarding 
forced conversion, the Shariah, and the jihad of Usman dan Fodio in the nine-
teenth century. This is rather easy in a society which often perceives itself as be-
ing divided between a Muslim North and a Christian South. According to surveys 
conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa by the Pew Research Center, for instance, Ni-
geria is the country where a majority of people (58 per cent) see conflict between 
religious groups as a very important problem. Individually, however, respondents 
do not feel personally threatened by the other religion of the Book: only one out 
of five said that Muslims were hostile towards Christians, or vice-versa (Lugo et 
al. 2010: 43-44). But these perceptions vary widely across the country. Surveys 
conducted in 2001 and 2007 showed that the fear of Islam was stronger in re-
gions where Muslims were a minority. A majority of respondents in non-Shariah 
                                                            
12  Amongst many academic works on the issue, see for instance Christelow (1985). 
13  In Nigeria, secularity does not mean that the state is separate from religion, but that it is neutral in a 
multi-religious society. 
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states believed that the implementation of Islamic Law would increase ethnic, 
religious, and political conflicts. Yet there was a minority that thought so in Sha-
riah states (Kirwin 2009). 
In this context, Boko Haram fits quite well the terrorist model of insurgents 
who aim to create panic in order to destabilise the state. Since this chapter is 
written from a Western perspective, however, it is important not to overempha-
sise the rationality and the global logic of a sect which often targets outsiders to 
retaliate against attacks on its members. For instance, it is difficult to understand 
why the ‘original’ Boko Haram did not try harder to trigger a mass exodus of 
Christians from the North and revenge killings in the South. To provoke ethnic-
cleansing and a religious all-out war, it would definitely make sense to focus at-
tacks on Christian migrants in the North, instead of natives. In the past, such tar-
gets have caused retaliation that led to the Biafra secession in 1967 and riots in 
Aba and Onitsha in 2000. But today, the self-defence system of Igbo migrants in 
the ghettos of cities like Kano has developed so much that it helps to prevent Is-
lamist attacks. It is also suggested that Boko Haram does not want to provoke 
retaliation that would drive large numbers of Muslim northerners out of the 
South, where they have settled to earn a living. The sect prefers to organise grad-
ual and sporadic attacks on churches to intimidate and pressure the government 
to negotiate.14 
Parallel to the internationalisation theory, local dynamics also explain the rad-
icalisation of the group and the extension of its targets to Christian communities 
– the so-called Nassarawa in Hausa – that symbolise the intrusion of foreign 
powers. Indeed, the rejection of Western values – at least those which are seen as 
incompatible with Islam – is coherent with the demand for full Shariah and the 
utopian creation of a caliphate in Nigeria. Even if the followers of Mohammed 
Yusuf prefer to be called Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad, their 
nickname Boko Haram is quite telling when it is understood as a warning against 
the colonisation of the mind through ‘bad, forbidden books’. The word boko re-
fers both to deception and sorcery (boka) in Hausa, and possibly to book in Eng-
lish.15 Today, Nigerian Islamic scholars are often trained in modern schools (see 
Annex 3). But in the past, many shunned all forms of Western education and its 
certificates based on false evidence (shahadatul zur). The words amaryar boko, 
for instance, refer to a fake bride in Hausa marriage customs, and apparently it 
was used by the Muslim ruling elite when the British introduced their system of 
education, as only Quranic teachings were regarded as true (Ayuba 2010: 263).16 
                                                            
14  I wish to thank Johannes Harnischfeger for this suggestion. 
15  For an etymological analysis that contests links to the English word book, see Newman (2013). 
16  For a reference to old anti-Western education songs in Hausa in Jos, see also Abdulkareem, Moham-
med Babangida (2010), The paradox of Boko Haram, Kaduna, Moving Image Ltd., 50-51. 
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More generally, Western education is accused of having failed to develop the 
North. This critique is not specific to Boko Haram and expresses a long-standing 
opposition between tradition and modernity.17 To put this in perspective, it is 
worth quoting the views of Usman Muhammad Bugaje (1997: 85), a political 
activist from a secular party, the Action Congress. He indeed raises the question:  
Has this western system of education made (Nigeria) any happier place to live in? The great-
est promise of the imperial system of education, fully secured in its secular niche, has been 
material development. We must now ask, has it delivered; what with the crushing weight of 
corruption, inefficiency, poverty, disease and hunger on our frail shoulders? How much hope 
can we nurse today? Can the scholars of this western system of education deliver us from the 
prevailing tyranny and injustice that has today become our lot in the same way Muslim 
scholars and the Jihad leaders of the early 19th century delivered their society from the tyran-
ny of the Hausa rulers? 
To try to get an answer from the point of view of Boko Haram, a quick analy-
sis of the doctrine of Mohammed Yusuf is necessary here. The rejection of West-
ern modernity by his followers is often seen as an expression of their backward-
ness and lack of education. Mohammed Yusuf himself is described as a lunatic 
guru, amongst other things because he contested the Copernican Revolution and 
the assumption that the Earth revolved around the Sun in a system of planets 
named after pagan Roman gods: Saturn, Mercury, Venus, Jupiter, Pluto, Nep-
tune, Uranus and Mars. Yet the founder of Boko Haram did not reject all modern 
technologies. Unlike Muhammad Marwa, for instance, Mohammed Yusuf drove 
cars, used mobile telephones, had computers, and did not ban them for his fol-
lowers. Moreover, his condemnation of Western values was rooted in local Mus-
lim complaints against the colonisation of the mind through education. The tar-
geting of modern medicine, for instance, echoed the rejection of polio vaccina-
tion by some ulama who feared a US conspiracy to sterilise Muslims after the 
death of several children in Kano due to unfortunate pharmaceutical tests by the 
American company Pfizer. This context gives more sense to the ‘irrational’ Boko 
Haram burglary and murder of a pharmacist in February 2011, the bombing of a 
medical store in June 2011 (both in Maiduguri), the assassination of three North 
Korean doctors in February 2013 (in Potiskum), and the killing of ten polio im-
munisation workers (in Kano), also in February 2013. David Cook (2011: 20) 
even sees the suicide attack against UN offices in Abuja in August 2011 as a 
form of protest against the World Health Organization. 
A thorough analysis of the doctrine of Mohammed Yusuf offers a radical reli-
gious reading of the travails of Nigerian politics in this regard. Obviously, the 
fight against the corruption of traditional chiefs and governors does not mean that 
                                                            
17  As Murray Last wrote (2005: 79), it is not sure in this regard that the Western education system would 
have been more acceptable for the conservative Sokoto Caliphate, had the British not colonised north-
ern Nigeria. 
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Boko Haram was to become a kind of ‘armed branch’ of Transparency Interna-
tional! In his speeches, Mohammed Yusuf did not explicitly condemn the bad 
governance and the electoral fraud of the ruling class. In fact, we do not even 
really know if Nigerian Muslims reject modern corruption and if they consider 
Islam to be the best way to reform the moral economy. To the rural talakawa 
masses in Hausaland, for instance, colonisation and British taxes were seen as 
just a continuation of the oppressive exploitation of the Sokoto Sarakuna aristoc-
racy, with another name and a new legal framework (Pierce 2006). But clearly, 
the Boko Haram dream of a ‘pure’ Islamic society and the blank refusal to be 
governed by a non-Muslim government reflected strong disillusion with post-
colonial Nigeria, party politics, and the failure of the so-called “democrazy” 
since the return to a civilian regime in 1999. Unlike other Salafi groups that also 
wanted to establish a caliphate, Mohammed Yusuf did not accept the modern rule 
of a secular state as a temporary necessity. Consequently, he forbade his follow-
ers to accept employment in the government, especially in the areas of judiciary 
and law enforcement (more than in social services), and he did not recognise the 
authority of the present Sultan of Sokoto, a former military man (Anonymous 
2012: 126). 
An ambiguous relationship to the state 
In this logic, the demand for full Shariah, social justice, and Islamic purity could 
not be seen as compatible with a parliamentary regime in a plural society. Inter-
estingly enough, other radical groups like the yan schi’a of Ibrahim el-Zakzaky 
came to the same conclusion, but without advocating armed struggle.18 The main 
argument was that a secular government could not properly apply Islamic Law. 
The doctrinal and divine foundation of Shariah could not be placed under the su-
premacy of a constitution written by men. The basis for a ‘secular’ rule of law 
was weak indeed. Even in the South some scholars challenged the legality of the 
Nigerian Constitution because it was promulgated by a military decree in 1999. 
But the extension of Islamic Law by some northern governors clearly compro-
mised the secular neutrality of the state, especially with regard to the condemna-
tion of apostasy, which contradicted freedom of religion. In addition, the severity 
of Shariah punishments could not be reconciled with the proscription of cruel and 
inhuman treatment by various international human rights conventions to which 
Nigeria was signatory. 
                                                            
18  In Katsina, for instance, the so-called yan schi’a taught students to disregard the national anthem and 
the flag because they eroded the faith of Muslims in Islam. They also encouraged them to ignore the 
school’s time-table when it coincided with the five daily prayers. And they did not recognise the laws 
of Nigeria that did not conform with the Quran (Sulaiman 1997). 
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Contradictions were quite obvious. Shariah, first, was discriminatory because 
citizens were no longer equal before the law. At Independence, specific punish-
ments for Muslims had generated little controversy since offences like adultery 
or the consumption of alcohol already existed in the Northern Nigerian Penal 
Code. But discrimination became more visible after 1999, when Shariah-com-
pliant states extended the domain of Islamic Law and imposed a stricter penal 
regime on Muslims. For instance, a Muslim culprit who stole a bicycle would 
face amputation while his non-Muslim co-offender would be sentenced only to 
prison. Likewise, a Christian adulterer would not answer to any criminal charge, 
while a Muslim could be sentenced to death by stoning (Iwobi 2004: 149). From 
a political point of view, such discrimination dismissed the argument of con-
servative religious scholars, for whom the more rigorous penal regime sanctioned 
by Shariah would be regarded by devout Muslims as a benefit. 
After the end of the military regime in 1999, the extension of Islamic Law def-
initely exacerbated the most visible contradictions of the Nigerian parliamentary 
system. In the North, for instance, Shariah was officially to be implemented by 
the corrupt and ineffective police force of a unitary federal government that for-
bade the creation of specific religious and regional militias like the Hisbah in 
Kano. The various interpretations and the uneven application of Islamic Law 
raised another problem, with different legal frameworks from one northern state 
to another (Ostien 2007; Naniya 2002). In addition, some of the governors who 
claimed to have banned alcohol did not refuse the haram (forbidden) money of 
their monthly federal allocation, which was partly funded by taxes on alcohol 
levied in the South. Up to now, this contradiction has not been resolved.19 
An important issue after 1999 was actually to know whether it was the role of 
the state to extend, promote, and implement Shariah. Some Islamic scholars 
thought so and accepted playing the ‘democratic’ game by lobbying political par-
ties and cooperating with the government. Indeed, many Nigerian Muslims con-
sidered that “an Islamic law system helps legitimize the state” (Laremont 2011: 
xx). But others did not agree. This does not mean that they followed the radical 
reasoning of Mohammed Yusuf. On the contrary, moderate and quietist Muslims 
thought that religion should not interfere with secular politics because it belonged 
to the private sphere. Historically, they argued, Shariah was not developed by 
states but by the population growth of the ummah, the necessity to formalise Is-
lamic Law, and the expansion of the business of traders who needed universal 
                                                            
19  In The Nation dated 10 April 2007, for instance, Akintola Benson, a Senior Special Assistant to the 
(Muslim) Governor of Lagos State, Babatunde Fashola, was calling for federal compensation because 
alcohol consumption represented a major share of the local revenue of Value Added Tax (VAT), yet 
funded northern regions. 
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standards to sign contracts and circumvent the variations of local rules.20 Other 
scholars added that it was not possible to call for the political authorities to apply 
a uniform and codified version of Shariah, which had always coexisted with na-
tive customs and whose versions had been disputed by several legal schools since 
the eight century. Using the Quran as the principal, or even the only, source of 
Shariah, as some Boko Haram members advocated, was not sustainable either. 
The text contains few explicit rules. Out of 6,235 verses, between 350 and 500 
are said to be relevant from a legal point of view. Yet even these verses deal 
mainly with rituals, devotional issues, marriage, and trade. In the whole Quran, 
only thirty verses are really concerned with crime, prescribing specific punish-
ments for the famous five hudud infractions: theft, drunkenness, fornication, def-
amation, and highway robbery (Hallaq 1997: 12; Vikør 2005: 32-37). 
In other words, Boko Haram was not alone in rejecting the possibility of a 
secular state to apply Shariah. The difference is that Mohammed Yusuf did so 
with fiery arguments that precipitated violence yet did not solve ideological con-
tradictions. Indeed, Shariah has historically been a moral and an ethical power, 
rather than a blueprint for government organisation. Thus, the sole demand for 
full Shariah, which was the main objective of Mohammed Yusuf, did not help in 
understanding the political meaning of his actions. Undoubtedly, Boko Haram 
has had an ambiguous and puzzling relationship to the Nigerian state. Scholars 
do not agree in this regard. Muhammad Sani Imam and Muhammad Kyari (2011: 
29), for instance, argue that by calling for isolation from the government and the 
city, Boko Haram wanted to abrogate the state, which was regarded as satanic 
and off-limits (taghut). Meanwhile, Andrew Walker (2012: 9) claims that Mo-
hammed Yusuf wanted to set up a parallel political organisation in order to, ulti-
mately, “replace the actual state”. Hence he had a cabinet, a Supreme Council 
(Shura), specialised departments (Lagina), and various emirs posted according to 
the Nigerian administrative territorial units of local government areas. According 
to Micha’el Tanchum (2012: 79), this “alternative society” eventually formed a 
“miniature state within the state”.21 
From a political and ideological point of view, Boko Haram reveals many in-
consistencies in this regard. As we have seen, Mohammed Yusuf and his follow-
ers did not hesitate to use modern technology imported from the West to carry on 
their struggle. In the same vein, they condemned entertainment, including cine-
ma, but they broadcast videotaped sermons; before 2009, Mohammed Yusuf was 
even allowed to preach on the Borno television station. His Izala arch-rival Jafar 
                                                            
20  See for instance the position of An-Na‘im (2005: 333). The famous historian Marshall Hodgson also 
reminds us that if Shariah was born in the Arab garrison-town, it was mainly applied by merchants 
and travellers, rather than peasants (1974 vol. 1: 319-347, vol. 2: 122). 
21  See also Onapajo, Hakeem & Ufo Okeke Uzodike (2012), “Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria”, Afri-
can Security Review 21(3): 28. 
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Adam also noticed that the founder of the sect used a passport from the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria – the secular government Yusuf supposedly abhorred – to 
obtain the visa necessary to perform the holy pilgrimage to Saudi (Anonymous 
2012: 138). Following the logic of Muhammad Marwa, Mohammed Yusuf 
should have refused to travel on roads constructed by the state with revenues 
from usury and taxes collected from alcohol manufacturers. Today, Boko Haram 
members are also incoherent. On the one hand, they condemn secular justice. On 
the other, they ask the government to punish the people responsible for the exe-
cution of Mohammed Yusuf and his unarmed followers. Likewise, they justify 
bank robberies because banks charge usury and are owned by big men who si-
phon public funds. Yet they steal and use haram money. 
A politicisation by reciprocal manipulation 
Do such inconsistencies mean that Boko Haram is not a political uprising, but 
just the irrational revolt of uneducated and lunatic young fanatics from the poor-
est sections of the society, especially Quranic students? I do not think so, because 
of the way the sect has encountered the Nigerian state, which politicised the 
group through manipulation and repression. Of course, I would agree that politi-
cal targets and religious grievances do not make up a political programme, no 
more than they make up a guerrilla movement. Bank robberies and retaliations on 
both sides have confused the political meaning of the attacks of Boko Haram. 
Many politicians, Muslim leaders, and traditional chiefs were assassinated by the 
sect to avenge the killing of its members rather than to implement a comprehen-
sive strategy to destabilise the Nigerian state. Likewise, the security forces often 
went on the rampage to retaliate against the slaying of soldiers or policemen, 
without any counter-insurgency planning to win the hearts and minds of the peo-
ple. This is precisely what killed Mohammed Yusuf. 
But the sect has also played with local politics. In its love – hate relationship 
with the Nigerian state it both manipulated, and was manipulated by, its political 
sponsors. In Borno, it is on record that Governor Ali Modu Sheriff used Boko 
Haram to win the elections of 2003; in exchange, followers of Mohammed Yusuf 
were rewarded: Alhaji Buji Foi was promoted to Minister of Religious Affairs, 
and Abubakar Adam Kambar was released from jail, where he had been held for 
armed robbery. In fact, such kinds of ‘deals’ were not specific to the sect. Else-
where in the North after the end of the military regime in 1999, politicians also 
played with Islamic issues to get elected. Thus, in 2001, the leader of the opposi-
tion and the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), Muhammad Buhari, was report-
ed to have called for the introduction of ‘total’ Shariah across the country.22 
                                                            
22  http://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/Calls-for-total-Sharia-in-Nigeria-20010827 
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Nicknamed Abacha People’s Party after the former military dictator, who was a 
Kanuri from Borno, Buhari’s group was strongest in the North, especially in 
Zamfara where Governor Ahmad Sani Yerima was the first to extend Islamic 
Law after 1999. Yet the ANPP was not the only party to advocate Shariah. 
Northern governors of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), in power in 
Abuja, were quick to follow suit. 
In this regard, Boko Haram exposed the misbehaviour of politicians who did 
not hesitate to manipulate Islam and hire private militia to kill their opponents. 
The sect certainly benefited from the lack of legitimacy of fraudulently elected 
leaders. Conversely, it contributed to delegitimise a mafia-like parliamentary re-
gime that did not follow Islamic principles of government. More than poverty, 
bad governance in Borno helped Mohammed Yusuf to become popular and polit-
icise his struggle.23 The difference with the neighbouring Republic of Niger is 
quite striking. To William Miles (2003), who studied Hausaland on both sides of 
the border, radical Islamists actually developed more in Nigeria because of bad 
governance. By all standards, the Republic of Niger is much poorer, yet it is bet-
ter managed and hence has a lower sense of alienation and social injustice. Such 
variations result not only from the French and British colonial legacies of direct 
or indirect rule. In the Republic of Niger after Independence, local politicians did 
not try to set up private armies with traditional watchmen, the so-called yan sin-
tiri, a Hausa word derived from the English ‘sentry’. Likewise, the yan daba, 
who hailed from the Vanguard youth movement of the Nigerian Northern Ele-
ments Progressive Union (NEPU) in Kano at Independence in 1960, did not 
transform into a political militia when they formed neighbourhood watches for 
self-defence in Niamey in the 1990s (Göpfert 2012). 
By contrast, Boko Haram got involved in dirty politics as soon as Mohammed 
Yusuf became popular and was potentially able to bring votes to the governor of 
Borno. Today, it is quite unlikely that local officials still attempt to manipulate 
the remnants of the sect to win elections or destabilise opponents – a very risky 
operation. But Boko Haram has generated all sorts of conspiracy theories that 
have further contributed to delegitimise the parliamentary basis of a secular gov-
ernment. The press, the blogosphere, and street conversations speculate on who 
benefits from the insurgency. In the North, some believe that Boko Haram was 
first and foremost a plot by the PDP to destabilise the opposition. They argue that 
violence mainly affected ANPP states like Borno and Yobe, whereas in neigh-
bouring Bauchi, Governor Isa Yuguda, who changed allegiance to the PDP in 
2009, is suspected of having harboured members of the sect to avoid being at-
                                                            
23  For an alternative perspective, claiming that youth unemployment is the main driver behind Boko 
Haram, see Meagher (2013). For an opposite view, showing that poverty is not limited to Borno and is 
even more or as severe in Sokoto and other Shariah-compliant states where Boko Haram is not very 
active, see Pérouse de Montclos (2012). 
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tacked by them. Many Muslims from the North also claim that curfews and the 
war on terrorism prevented the opposition and Muhammad Buhari from cam-
paigning in 2011 and that it will help the PDP to rig the next elections in 2015.24 
Interestingly enough, such speculations mirror the opposite views of southern 
Christians, who think that Boko Haram is a Muslim conspiracy to destabilise 
President Goodluck Jonathan, or “a Frankenstein monster created by some elite 
of the North” (Okpaga et al. 2012: 85). 
A politicisation by repression 
In any case, all these theories exacerbate the North-South divide and expose the 
fragility of a weak state, which is precisely the objective of terrorists. In the same 
vein, the resilience of the sect challenges the capacity of the government to main-
tain law and order. Again, the repression of July 2009 was a major rupture. First, 
it showed the shortcomings of a military response, which triggered a terrorist re-
action and failed to win the hearts and minds of the locals. Emeka Okereke 
(2012: 186), a Research Fellow at the National Defence College, thus acknowl-
edged that  
contrary to the expectation that the destruction of Boko Haram headquarters in Borno State 
and the killing of its leaders could eradicate the threat of religious extremism in Nigeria, the 
sect transformed itself from a loose network of artisans, school dropouts and unemployed 
youths to an organised network of intellectuals and strategists, with strong national and in-
ternational connections. 
In addition, the brutality of the security forces and the massacre of innocent 
civilians led some people to believe that the Islamist organisation was a re-
sistance group against occupying troops. 
The police, which were the first target of Boko Haram from November 2003, 
are quite telling in this regard. All over Nigeria, they have a terrible reputation of 
being abusive, brutal, corrupt, and completely inefficient. In the North-East, they 
were involved in various human rights violations. In March 2005, for instance, 
they arrested six boys in different locations of Borno, charged them with armed 
robbery, and summarily executed them in the Ibrahim Taiwo Police Station in 
Maiduguri (Odinkalu 2010: 58). In other words, the population did not trust the 
Nigerian police even before the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf. Boko 
Haram probably benefited from this suspicion, as it raised sympathy for Islamic 
justice against governmental repression. Indeed, the massacre of hundreds of un-
armed, innocent believers in July 2009 came as a reminder of how brutal post-
colonial forces could be. Such traumatic events were sometimes interpreted as a 
proof of the necessity for Muslims to defend themselves against an aggression 
                                                            
24  See for instance the stories carried in the Kaduna-based newspaper Desert Herald. 
 Boko Haram and politics 151 
 
led by officers who included Christian southerners in their ranks.25 As a matter of 
fact, many policemen do not speak local languages because a national policy re-
quires them to be posted outside of their native region. Moreover, Maiduguri 
does not accommodate the police headquarters of the zonal command of Borno 
and Yobe, which is in Bauchi. In July 2009, most of reinforcements sent to quell 
the Boko Haram rebellion were outsiders. 
Of course, a sense of alienation and compassion for the victims of the repres-
sion do not mean that, all of a sudden, the youth felt an urge to join the sect or 
that the masses adhered to the extremist doctrine of Mohammed Yusuf. To be 
protected, for instance, local businessmen are sometimes forced to pay a tribute 
to the group, yet they have no sympathy with its ideology. However, coercion is 
not the only reason for refusing to fight against the ‘terrorists’. Because of ethnic 
affinities, Boko Haram members certainly found it easier to hide amongst the 
population in Maiduguri rather than in Kano, where they were seen as foreigners. 
In Borno, the locals avoided informing the security forces against their brothers 
and sisters, even if they were as much afraid of the terrorists. This omertà also 
reflected poor social control by traditional elders. Appointed by Governor Ali 
Modu Sheriff in March 2009, the new Shehu of Borno, Umar Garbai Abba 
Kyari, lacked legitimacy and never publicly condemned the atrocities committed 
by the army. As a result, he did not enjoy the popularity of the emirs of Kano or 
Zaria, two old Hausa cities where the population still cooperated with the securi-
ty forces. 
Although not a mass movement, Boko Haram has thus a social basis which 
has not been eliminated by the repression. Such support does not seem to have 
been impacted by a growing disillusionment regarding the capacity of Islamic 
Law to bring social justice and reform the government. The popularity of the 
demand for Shariah is certainly difficult to assess. It depends much on people’s 
expectations. In Kano, for instance, members of the Hisbah militia see Islamic 
Law as the democracy of majority rules in a Muslim environment, while mem-
bers of yan daba urban gangs emphasise the need for social justice and individual 
human rights through Shariah (Casey 2008: 81). Perceptions also vary according 
to education, ranks, status, regional origin, and, of course, religious creed. As we 
do not have data on the feelings of Muslims in Borno, it would be hazardous to 
speculate on a link between the demand for Shariah and the popularity of Boko 
Haram. 
According to opinion polls conducted in 2001 and 2007, we know that the 
support for Islamic Law has not waned at the national level (Kirwin 2009). 
                                                            
25  In Kano, for instance, the Nigeria Police is seen as an occupation force, yet with less suspicion, and 40 
per cent of its officers are allegedly Christians, even if Northerners dominate senior ranks (Hills 2012: 
52). 
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Movements that advocate Shariah are still vibrant. Surveys show that 56 per cent 
of Nigerian Muslims do not belong to Sufi orders, which are known for their 
willingness to accommodate local traditions and their softer views on the applica-
tion of Islamic Law. Amongst this majority, 11 per cent identify with the Shia, 14 
per cent with the Tabligh, 11 per cent with the Salafi, and 14 per cent with the 
Wahhabi movements (Lugo et al. 2010: 147, 158, 315-317). Likewise, 35 per 
cent of the ulama in northern Nigeria are said to be Izala, as against 24 per cent 
for the Tijaniyya, less than 8 per cent for the Qadiriyya, and almost 28 per cent 
with no affiliation (Jega 2005: 97). But the alleged predominance of Salafi schol-
ars does not mean that believers would accept a religious radicalisation. Accord-
ing to the same surveys, many Nigerian Muslims who want Shariah to become 
the official law of their land also support democracy and freedom of religion. In 
fact, only a minority of them advocate the death penalty for renegades who leave 
Islam, stoning for women who commit adultery, or cutting off hands for thieves – 
a much lower percentage than in many other African countries.26 
Political parties and Islam in Nigeria 
In other words, the radical form of Shariah that Boko Haram wants to impose 
does not correspond at all to the demand of a very large majority of Nigerian 
Muslims. By the same token, the sect appears to be extremely marginal. Despite 
some backing in Borno and a high terrorist profile in the media, it does not have 
the support of the masses that other reformist Islamic movements can claim in 
Egypt or Tunisia. Boko Haram used religious references to legitimise political 
grievances as a moral right. But it would not and could not transform into a party. 
Unlike the Izala, for instance, it never maintained that elections were more im-
portant than daily prayers or the pilgrimage to Mecca.27 On the contrary, it con-
tributed much to dividing further the Muslim community and the political North, 
a region which has not had a clear leader since the times of Ahmadu Bello at In-
dependence. 
The story of Boko Haram thus leaves room for a more general discussion on 
the politicisation of Islam and the Islamisation of politics. Despite the assump-
tions of the theory of a clash of civilisations between Muslims and Christians, 
Nigeria did not develop religious parties as such, either Islamic or Christian 
Democrat. In this regard, the most populated country of the continent is quite 
different from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and 
South Africa, which have all experienced the formation of Islamic parties, with 
                                                            
26  Interestingly enough, the same proportion of Christians (70 per cent) also favour making the Bible the 
official law of their country (Lugo et al. 2010: 11, 50, 288, 291-293). 
27  At the time, the Izala leader Abubakar Gumi campaigned for the re-election of President Shehu Sha-
gari and was reported to have made this statement in the New Nigerian of 3 April 1983. 
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or without people’s support and legal recognition. In Nigeria, the only exception 
was probably the Lagos-based United Muslim Party from 1953 to 1966. This 
very local organisation had no national audience and aimed only at protecting the 
interests of an urban minority group. At Independence, however, the two main 
political parties in the North were clearly linked with religious movements: the 
conservative NPC (Northern People’s Congress) with the Qadiriyya and the aris-
tocracy (Sarakuna) of the Sokoto Caliphate; the progressive NEPU (Northern El-
ements Progressive Union) with the Tijaniyya and the commoners (talakawa) of 
Kano. But their experience was short-lived. While NEPU remained in the opposi-
tion, the leaders of the NPC were killed during the first coup of 1966, and both 
parties disappeared during the military regimes that followed (Paden 1973; Dud-
ley 1968). 
The Second Republic (1979-1983) was more confusing in this regard. If 
NEPU was reformed under the aegis of the PRP (People’s Redemption Party), 
which maintained links with the Tijaniyya, the NPN (National Party of Nigeria) 
in power had no clear allegiance and received support from the aristocracy of 
Sokoto as well as the spiritual leader of Izala, Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, who was 
very close to President Shehu Shagari. In their formative period before their legal 
registration and the return to civilian rule in 1979, the Izala were on the verge of 
developing a political platform. Hence their different names referred either to an 
Association (Kungiyar) or a Congress (Jamiyyar), as in Kaduna with the “Party 
for the Propagation of Islam” (Jamiyyar Ada Addinin Musulunci) (Yandaki 1997: 
48). But in the end, the Izala did not transform into a political platform to contest 
elections. 
Since then, the voting patterns of Nigerian northern Muslims have not con-
firmed the existence of Islamic parties in disguise, even with the ANPP. The zon-
ing system, which is supposed to protect the federal character of the country, also 
did not reflect a rigid religious divide between a ‘Muslim North’ and a ‘Christian 
South’. During the presidential elections of 1993, for instance, the two candi-
dates, Moshood Abiola and Bashir Tofa, were Muslims and the former was a Yo-
ruba who won in the South. In 2011, again, Nuhu Ribadu and his running mate 
Fola Adeola, who contested the presidential elections for the ACN (Action Con-
gress of Nigeria: the opposition), were both Muslims; yet their party did win a 
substantial number of votes among Christians in south-western states, and very 
few in the so-called ‘Muslim North’. 
A comparison with Sudan is interesting in this regard (see Annex 4). Unlike 
Nigeria, local Islamic scholars have not only run governments or participated in 
elections, but also created and controlled political parties in a hereditary sys-
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tem.28 At Independence, for instance, the Mahdi family led both the Umma Party 
and the Ansar brotherhood. Likewise, the Mirghani led both the People’s Demo-
cratic Party and the Khatmiyya. Banned by the military coup of 25 May 1969, 
they later on had to go into exile when the ‘socialist’ junta of Colonel Jaafar Mu-
hammad Nimeiri promoted smaller Sufi brotherhoods and killed thousands of 
Ansar supporters of the Umma Party. However, they came back to power after 
the dismissal of the dictator on 6 April 1985, and they are still politically active 
today. As for the Islamist coup of 30 June 1989, it was very much an offshoot of 
the Muslim Brothers of Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi. 
In the same vein, the use of Islam as the official law of the state has been much 
more institutionalised in Sudan. By a decree of 9 September 1983, Jaafar Mu-
hammad Nimeiri first imposed Shariah throughout the country, even in the South 
where Muslims were a minority and where this decision contributed to precipitat-
ing a second civil war under the aegis of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. 
After the fall of the dictatorship, the National Islamic Front then refused to en-
dorse a peace agreement signed on 16 November 1988, precisely because the 
government had accepted repealing Islamic Law to satisfy the demands of south-
erners. Despite an informal approval by the Parliament to suspend Shariah on 3 
April 1989, the military coup of General Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir did put 
an end to the negotiation and abrogated the constitution, dissolving political par-
ties, banning trade unions, and closing newspapers. A state of emergency was 
declared and, on 5 February 1991, a decree re-established Islam as the only offi-
cial law in Sudan. Adopted by 96 per cent of the voters at a referendum organised 
on 30 June 1998, the new constitution was extremely strict in this regard, since 
its Articles 7 and 10 proclaimed jihad, defence of the country, and payment of 
zakat as a compulsory duty for all, including non-Muslims. 
Conclusion 
No such thing ever happened in Nigeria, where the secular British Common Law 
still prevails, even in the North. Since 1999, Shariah courts are not permitted to 
try Christians without their consent and they usually settle conflicts only between 
Muslims. In other words, Nigeria experienced a politicisation of Islam but not the 
extensive Islamisation of politics that affected countries like Sudan. A better bal-
ance of power certainly explains this. Nigeria’s South is much more developed 
than the North, whereas in Sudan, the North is much more developed than the 
South. Unlike Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, moreover, the military regimes in 
power in Lagos and Abuja did not attempt to use Islam as their primary source of 
                                                            
28  See for instance Fluehr-Lobban (1987); Hunwick (1992); Pérouse de Montclos (2003); Warburg 
(2003). 
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legitimacy. On the contrary, they always justified their coups and the suspension 
of the constitution by the necessity to ban ethnic or religious parties to restore 
law and order. 
The federal and secular structure of the Nigerian state, however, does not fully 
explain why Muslims have never succeeded in setting up a political platform to 
contest elections with a religious programme. Notwithstanding the Yoruba Mus-
lims in the South, this characteristic has also much to do with the internal divi-
sions of Islam in the North. In this regard, Boko Haram should be understood as 
another disruptive factor within the ummah, much more than the trigger of a civil 
war and a civilisational clash between the so-called ‘Muslim North’ and ‘Chris-
tian South’. Many analysts like to speculate on the collapse of the Nigerian state. 
But Boko Haram also reveals the failure of the Muslim community to unify, de-
velop, and organise a common response to modernity. In reality, the sect of Mo-
hammed Yusuf is a challenge to both the Nigerian state and Islam. 
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Abstract 
Over the last three years, Boko Haram has evolved from a sect that waged 
poorly planned hit-and-run attacks on state security establishments to one that 
increasingly mounts audacious attacks on diverse military and civilian targets. 
To reduce its operational capability, the Nigerian government has adopted sev-
eral counter-insurgency measures. Notwithstanding the government efforts, the 
sect has continued to mount deadly (sometimes suicide) attacks in northern Ni-
geria with the potential to penetrate into the southern region. Why is the 
movement proving increasingly difficult for the Nigerian government to root 
out? This is the central concern of this chapter. The chapter therefore examines 
the threat posed by Boko Haram, arguing that its growing audacity and resili-
ency can better be understood within the context of the transnational flow of 
the global Salafi Jihadist ideology. Salafi jihadism focuses on the use of vio-
lence to purge Islam of outside influences and strives for a return to the Islam 
practised by the “pious ancestors”, that is Mohammed and the early Islamic 
community. The transnational flow of this fringe and violent ideology is em-
boldening Boko Haram, and it poses significant threats to sub-regional and  
national security. To effectively counter the threat posed by Boko Haram, there 
is a need for a robust combination of the use of force and political dexterity. 
This will require, among other measures, a political strategy that builds gov-
ernment legitimacy and effectiveness in delivering public goods to citizens, 
strengthening support for moderate Islam, and implementing a robust pro-
gramme on countering ideological support for extremism and terrorism. 
Introduction 
The violent activities of the extremist Islamic sect, Boko Haram, have made Ni-
geria a country of serious security concern for the international community and a 
subject of research interest for scholars focusing on terrorism and violent extrem-
ism. Although the sect incubated in northern Nigeria from the mid-1990s, very 
little academic and security attention was paid to it until July 2009, when it en-
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gaged state security forces in a major uprising in five states in northern Nigeria. 
The revolt ended when its charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was finally 
captured and later brutally murdered by the police.  
The events that occurred in 2009 are important for understanding the current 
phase of Boko Haram, particularly the cause of its grievance against the Nigerian 
government. The group felt that the killing of Yusuf in police custody was unjust 
and extrajudicial, and vied to avenge the death of their leader and other members 
who perished in police shooting during the 2009 uprising. To this end, over the 
past few years, the group’s tactics have evolved from poorly planned open con-
frontations with state security forces to increasing use of improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs), targeted assassinations, ambushes, drive-by shootings, and sui-
cide bombings (Onuoha 2012a). 
In order to reduce its operational capability, the Nigerian government has 
adopted militarised counter-insurgency operations, which include legislative, 
prosecutorial, security, and bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Notwithstanding 
the government efforts, the sect has continued to mount attacks in northern Nige-
ria. Why is the group proving increasingly difficult for the Nigerian government 
to root out? This is the central concern of this chapter. In this light, the chapter is 
organised in seven parts. Following this introduction, the next section addresses 
the philosophy, organisation, and sources of funding for the sect. The third sec-
tion discusses the evolution of the sect, while the fourth examines its operational 
tactics. The fifth part highlights government responses to the Boko Haram threat, 
and the sixth interrogates the transnational flow of Salafi Jihadist ideology and 
alliances that sustain the sect in spite of government repressive measures. The 
chapter ends with a conclusion. 
Understanding Boko Haram  
The most common account of the origin of Boko Haram offered by local and for-
eign media traces it to 2002, when a charismatic preacher, Mohammed Yusuf, 
became the leader of the group. To the intelligence community in Nigeria, how-
ever, its true historical root harks back to 1995, when Abubakar Lawan estab-
lished the Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra or Shabaab group (Muslim Youth  
Organisation) in Maiduguri, Borno State (Taiwo & Olugbode 2009; Adisa 2012). 
The group flourished as a non-violent movement until 2002, when Mohammed 
Yusuf assumed leadership of the sect. Over time, the group has metamorphosed 
under various names, such as the Yusufiyya sect, Nigerian Taliban, and lately as 
Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad. 
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Philosophy and ideology 
The sect considers “western influence on Islamic society as the basis of the reli-
gion’s weakness” (Sani 2011: 26). It opposes secular government, conventional 
banking, taxation, jurisprudence, and in particular Western education, which it 
believes is not founded on moral teachings. This explains why the sect is popu-
larly known as Boko Haram (literally, “Western education is forbidden”). The 
term Boko Haram is derived from a combination of the Hausa word boko, mean-
ing “book”, and the Arabic word haram, meaning “forbidden”. However, a 
statement released in August 2009 by a self-identified interim leader of the sect, 
Mallam Sanni Umaru, rejected the media description of it as Boko Haram: 
Boko Haram does not in any way mean “Western Education is a forbidden” as the infidel 
media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means “Western Civilisation” is forbid-
den. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal 
education coming from the West … which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the 
supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is broader, it includes education but 
not determined by Western Education. (Vanguard 2009) 
The sect instead prefers to be addressed as the Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lid-
da’awati wal Jihad, meaning a “People Committed to the Propagation of the 
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”. Its ideology is rooted in Salafi Jihadism and its 
actions are driven by Takfirism. Salafism seeks to purge Islam of outside influ-
ences and strives for a return to the Islam practised by the “pious ancestors”, that 
is Mohammed and the early Islamic community (European Commission’s Expert 
Group on Violent Radicalisation 2008). It stresses adherence to a rigorist inter-
pretation of the Quran and the Hadith and aims at reforming the personal behav-
iour of every Muslim. It also involves the duty to advise other believers to 
change their way of life in the same sense. Only “one specific interpretation of 
Salafism focuses on the use of violence to bring about such radical change and is 
commonly known as Salafist Jihadism” (European Commission’s Expert Group 
on Violent Radicalisation 2008: 6). Adding to the Salafi Jihadist strain is Tak-
firism. At the core of Takfirism is the Arabic word takfir – pronouncing an action 
or an individual un-Islamic (Mneimneh 2009). As noted by Shahzad (2007), Tak-
firism classifies all non-practising Muslims as kafirs (infidels) and calls upon its 
adherents to abandon existing Muslim societies, settle in isolated communities, 
and fight all Muslim infidels.  
Likewise, Boko Haram adherents are motivated by the conviction that the Ni-
gerian state is a cesspit of social vices, and thus:  
the best thing for a devout Muslim to do was to ‘migrate’ from the morally bankrupt society 
to a secluded place and establish an ideal Islamic society devoid of political corruption and 
moral deprivation. (Akanji 2009: 60) 
For the sect, all those who do not subscribe to its strict interpretation of Islam 
are regarded as kuffar (disbelievers; those who deny the truth) or fasiqun (wrong-
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doers), making such individuals and groups legitimate targets of attack by its 
members. Its mission is to overthrow the secular Nigerian state and impose its 
own interpretation of Islamic Shariah law in the country. It is reported that mem-
bers wore long beards and red or black headscarves and shunned certain modern 
(purportedly Western) goods, such as wristwatches and safety helmets (Ajani 
2011; Jimos 2011). The irony, however, is that they do not abhor or refuse to use 
Western products such as motorcycles, cars, cellular phones, AK-47 guns, and 
other innovations that have aided their violent operations. 
 
Leadership, organisation, and membership 
Before his death in July 2009, Mohammed Yusuf was the spiritual leader as well 
as commander-in-chief (amir ul-aam) of the group. Under his leadership, an ex-
ecutive cabinet and a Shura (decision-making) Council was instituted to oversee 
the affairs of the group. Yusuf was then assisted by two deputies (na’ib amir ul-
aam I and II). Each state where they existed had its own amir (commander/ lead-
er), and each local government area where they operated also had an amir. The 
group appointed amirs in various locations across the area, including in the 
Kanuri regions of Niger and Chad, to oversee local activities. They also organ-
ised themselves according to various roles, such as soldiers and police (Da’wah 
Coordination Council of Nigeria 2009: 14). In its early stage, the sect was en-
trenched in Borno, Yobe, Katsina, and Bauchi states. Over time it has recruited 
more followers and established operating cells in almost all northern states, pos-
sibly nursing the intention to spread further south. 
In the aftermath of Yusuf’s death, one of his deputies, Abubakar Shekau, be-
came the new spiritual leader of the sect. Abubakar Shekau inherited, if not mod-
ified, the organisational structure. Under Shekau, the sect maintains a loose 
command-and-control structure, which allows it to operate autonomously (Figure 
7.1). Boko Haram now operates in cells and units that are interlinked; but gener-
ally, the cells take directives from one commander (Alli 2011). The Shura Coun-
cil is Boko Haram’s apex council and highest decision-making organ, and all 
cells of the organisation are represented in the council (Marama 2013: 5). Cur-
rently, Shekau heads the Shura Consultative Council, which has authorised the 
more coordinated and sophisticated attacks by various cells of the sect since the 
July 2009 revolt. 
Boko Haram members come from diverse backgrounds: disaffected youths, 
unemployed graduates, former almajirai, and wealthy persons, mostly but not 
limited to northern Nigeria. It also draws members from beyond Nigeria: from 
Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Sudan. Former almajirai (sing. almajiri) form a 
significant part of its foot soldiers. The term almajirai here refers to youths and 
sometimes children who, in pursuit of higher knowledge and Islamic purity, 
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leave their homes and take up residency with a senior or elderly Islamic scholar. 
It is a popular and ancient Islamic practice whereby children are sent to live and 
study under renowned Islamic teachers in cities in northern Nigeria, such as Ka-
duna, Kano, Maiduguri, and Zaria (West Africa Insight 2010: 7). Sometimes this 
is voluntary, but in most cases children are forced into becoming almajirai by 
abject poverty or orphanhood. A study conducted by the Ministerial Committee 
on Almajiri Education in 2010 revealed that “there are 9.5 million Almajiris in 
Nigeria” (Ibrahim 2010: 11). Over 70 per cent of these almajirai are concentrated 
in northern Nigeria and they live and study in appalling social and economic 
conditions. 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Hypothetical organisational structure of Boko Haram under Abubakar 
Shekau 
 
Source: Onuoha (2012b: 3) 
 
 
The practice of almajirci (living as almajirai) has been a contentious phenom-
enon which has generated different interpretations of its possible connections to 
insecurity in northern Nigeria. The almajirai have been rightly or wrongly asso-
ciated with Islamic radicalisation, militancy, and the periodic religious riots that 
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have blighted many northern Nigerian cities. The current menace of Boko Haram 
violence in northern Nigeria has accentuated the concern. While some writers 
have questioned the unfounded stigmatisation of this religious practice of acquir-
ing education (Hoechner 2013), others have raised serious concern over its vul-
nerability to exploitation by extremist groups. In this regard, four important fea-
tures of the almajirci system that make it ideal for exploitation by terrorists or 
extremist ideologues have been identified:  
First, it involves children being relocated or separated from their family and friends to the 
guardianship of Mallams in towns. Second, it is restricted almost exclusively to boys. Third, 
the curriculum of the schools is concerned primarily with teaching the sixty chapters of the 
Koran by rote memorization. Fourth, each school serves 25 to 500, from the ages 6 to 25. 
These schools are largely autonomous from government oversight. (Awofeso, Ritchie & De-
geling 2003: 314)  
The almajirai are often cramped into shacks or makeshift homes and have lit-
tle or no food or drinking water, forcing them to roam the streets begging for 
alms. Given their social and religious status, they are extremely vulnerable to 
religious extremism and financial influences.  
Besides almajirai, the sect also has some well-educated, wealthy, and influen-
tial people as members. For instance, Alhaji Buji Foi (an ex-commissioner in 
Borno State), Kadiru Atiku (a former university lecturer), and Bunu Wakil (a 
very rich Borno-based contractor) are known to be members of the sect (Mukairu 
& Muhammad 2009; Idris 2011a; Sani 2011). The exact strength of its member-
ship is not known, although an analyst gave an outrageous figure of “about 1.5 
million followers” (Adele 2011: 64). There is no evidence that suggests that 
Boko Haram has such a huge number of fighters. At best, its militants will be in 
the region of a couple of thousand. Its method of recruitment is largely through 
indoctrination. It has also recruited among the escapees of prison jail breaks it 
has mounted in the past, in addition to using the Internet for the propagation of 
its extremist ideologies.  
 
Sources of funds  
Like other terrorist groups, Boko Haram sustains its operations through diverse 
sources of funding. However, four major financing streams stand out: member-
ship dues, donations, external funding, and bank robberies. The payment of 
membership dues was initially the basic source of funding for the sect. Before 
Mohammed Yusuf was killed, members had to pay a daily levy of 100 naira to 
their leader. The known members then were predominantly peasant farmers, 
traders, road-side car washers, and commercial motorcycle riders or okadas. 
Some of the okadas were believed to be owned by Yusuf himself, who collected 
daily returns from them. But since the death of Yusuf, the activities of the sect 
have become more secretive, making it difficult for researchers to investigate the 
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kinds of economic activities they are engaged in to generate funds and whether 
members still pay dues, as well as the significance of such dues to the group’s 
sustainability. 
Donations from businessmen, politicians, government officials, and other in-
dividuals and organisations within Nigeria have been another source of funding 
for the sect. On 5 January 2011, for instance, the Nigerian police celebrated what 
it described as a “landmark” achievement, when security operatives arrested 
Alhaji Bunu Wakil and 91 other persons. Alhaji Bunu Wakil, who is a contractor 
and an indigene of Borno State, was alleged to be a major financier of the Islamic 
sect (Idris 2011a). Also, on 21 November 2011, state security operatives arrested 
a serving senator representing Borno South Senatorial District, Mohammed Ali 
Ndume, who was subsequently arraigned before an Abuja High Court for ties 
with and sponsorship of Boko Haram (Abonyi 2011). Senator Ali Ndume is cur-
rently being tried under the provisions of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011, and 
if convicted will serve a prison term of not more than twenty years. 
The sect is also alleged to receive financial assistance from foreign terrorist 
networks. In 2007, for instance, Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Ilyas 
Damagun were tried for terrorism-related offences. Mohammed Damagun, the 
proprietor of the Daily Trust newspapers’ group, was arraigned before the Abuja 
High Court on three charges: namely, belonging to the Nigerian Taliban; receiv-
ing a total of 300,000 USD from Al-Qaeda to recruit and train Nigerians in Mau-
ritania for terrorism; and aiding terrorists in Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf was ar-
raigned on five charges, which included receiving monies from Al-Qaeda opera-
tives in Pakistan to recruit terrorists to attack the residences of foreigners, espe-
cially Americans, living in Nigeria (Onuoha 2012c). However, the charges 
against Mohammed Bello Ilyas Damagun were later dropped by the court.  
In an interview in January 2012, a self-identified spokesman for Boko Haram, 
Abul Qaqa, informed the Guardian newspaper that they are spiritual followers of 
Al-Qaeda and the late Osama bin Laden, and that their leader Mohammed Abu-
bakar Shekau had met Al-Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia in August 2011 and was 
able to obtain from Al-Qaeda whatever financial and technical support they 
needed (Mark 2012). It is very difficult to ascertain the veracity of the claims by 
Abul Qaqa. This could be one of the propaganda tools Boko Haram wants to use 
to attract more attention or even scare the West. Although the issue of external 
financial assistance to Boko Haram remains uncertain, US Homeland Security 
Department officials contend that “groups like Boko Haram are being influenced 
and financed by extremist foreign religious leaders and groups” (Offor, Ogbon-
nikan & Okoro 2011).1 Evidence in this regard emerged recently during the trial 
at the Federal High Court in Abuja of Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar, alias “Kab-
                                                            
1  http://allafrica.com/stories/201101070435.html 
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iru Sokoto”, who masterminded the 2011 Christmas Day bombing of a church in 
Madalla, Niger State. A prosecution witness informed the court “that Sokoto in-
cluded in his statement details of funding received by the insurgents from an Is-
lamic group, Musilimi Yaa'maa, based in Algeria and how the funds led to the 
fragmentation of Boko Haram, following disagreements over the sharing of the 
money” (Soniyi, Bello & Akinsuyi 2013: 7). 
Of late, Boko Haram has relied largely on criminality, such as directly raiding 
banks or supporting robbery gangs to raid banks, to finance its operations. A 
member of a robbery gang arrested by the police in 2011, Sheriff Shettima, con-
fessed that his gang was responsible for some robbery operations in Borno State 
to raise funds for Boko Haram. He claimed that his gang raided the Damboa 
branch of First Bank Nigeria Plc on 12 October 2011, during which a policeman 
was killed and 21 million naira stolen (Bwala 2011). It is noteworthy that of 
about 100 bank branches in Nigeria attacked by armed robbers and Boko Haram 
in 2011, “over 30 of the raids were attributed to Boko Haram” (ThisDay 2011: 
6). In this regard, Boko Haram militants subscribe to the principle of Fa’i, the 
religious arguments used by extremists to justify the robbing of banks and jewel-
lery shops to finance their jihadist operations. Indeed, some arrested Boko Haram 
members have been arraigned for bank robbery in Nigeria.  
Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar has also confirmed that the sect raises money 
for its operations through bank robbery. The loot is usually shared among five 
groups: the less privileged, widows of those that have died in the jihad, zakat, 
those that brought in the money, and the leadership (for use in prosecuting the 
jihad) (Alli 2012). As security agencies tighten the noose on its known funding 
streams, the sect may turn to other criminal activities, such as car theft, kidnap-
ping, pipeline vandalism, illicit trafficking in arms and narcotics, and offering 
protection rackets for criminal networks to raise funds (Okereke & Omughelli 
2012).  
The evolution and incarnation of Boko Haram 
Although the movement had been incubating in north-eastern Nigeria since 1995, 
its transformation into an armed violent group can be traced to events leading up 
to the 2003 general elections in Nigeria. Shortly after the original founder of the 
sect, Abubakar Lawan, left for further studies in Saudi Arabia, a committee of 
clerics appointed Mohammad Yusuf as their leader in 2002. Afterwards, Moham-
mad Yusuf ousted the clerics who appointed him on allegations of their corrup-
tion and failure to properly interpret the teaching of the Quran. In its early years, 
the group under Yusuf’s spiritual leadership and command:  
strove for self-exclusion of its members from the mainstream corrupt society by living in  
areas outside or far away from society in order to intellectualise and radicalise the revolu-
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tionary process that would ultimately lead to violent overthrow of the Nigerian state. (Isa 
2010: 333)  
Yusuf’s preaching attracted unemployed youths from Yobe and Borno states, and 
even from neighbouring countries such as Niger and Chad. It was around this 
time that the group became known as the Yusufiyya movement. 
As the followership expanded, the group became very attractive to politicians 
in the build-up to the 2003 general elections (Monguno 2013). On the eve of the 
2003 general elections, politicians who sought to outsmart their opponents in the 
north-eastern states used several youth groups and militias established or funded 
by them as political thugs. Ahead of the polls, youths belonging to the Yusufiyya 
movement, as well as others operating under titles such as Yan Kalare in Gombe 
and Sara Suka in Bauchi, were armed with sophisticated weapons by political 
leaders contesting gubernatorial elections in Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, and Yobe 
states (Ohia 2009; Idris & Adebayo 2012; Patrick 2013). In Yobe State, for in-
stance, the Yusufiyya movement was invited to the state: 
during the build-up to the 2003 elections in the wake of Sharia implementation in some 
northern states. But due to the fact that the election never took the shape that those that  
invited them thought it would, the then state government subsequently gave (the group) the 
ultimatum to immediately quit. (Ohia 2009: 3) 
In Borno State, however, it was reported that Ali Modu Sheriff employed the 
services of young men belonging to the ECOMOG and Yusufiyya movement dur-
ing the 2003 election to snatch Borno State from then Governor Mala Kachalla. 
According to Monguno (2013), “Ali Modu Sheriff promised the group strict im-
plementation of Shari’ah, 50 million naira reward, 50 motorcycles and the office 
of the Commissioner for Religious Affairs in exchange for their support”. The 
group then provided Sheriff with the name of Alhaji Buji Foi as their candidate 
for the position of the Commissioner for Islamic Affairs. After becoming gover-
nor, Sheriff created a Ministry of Religious Affairs and appointed Alhaji Buji 
Foi, Yusufiyya’s national secretary, as its first commissioner (Idris & Adebayo 
2012). 
Shortly after the election, there was a breakdown in the relationship between 
Governor Sheriff and the Mohammed Yusuf-led group over issues of strict im-
plementation of the Shariah, although there could have been other personal rea-
sons behind their parting company. Consequently, Mohammed Yusuf pressured 
Alhaji Buji Foi to resign from Sheriff’s cabinet along with most of the other staff 
brought by Foi to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. At this point, Sheriff used 
rival group ECOMOG to confront the Yusufiyya movement. As the relationship 
deteriorated, Mohammed Yusuf became more vocal and belligerent in his 
preaching against the government (Monguno 2013). 
The practice of arming youths, mainly unemployed, for electoral violence and 
subsequently dumping them after elections is a well-established electioneering 
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habit of most Nigerian politicians. In this connection, Ojo (2013) has rightly not-
ed that south-eastern politicians used Bakassi Boys and members of the Move-
ment for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and 
South-South politicians used the Egbesu Boys as well as members of the Move-
ment for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), to deal with their politi-
cal opponents. The political elite in the South-West used different factions of the 
Oodua Peoples Congress (remnants of the old Agbekoya Movement) and mem-
bers of the Road Transport Workers Union, as well as street urchins known as 
‘Area Boys’, to deal with their perceived political opponents. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that to influence or win elections: 
Northern politicians used various groups such as Yan Sara-Suka in Bauchi, Yan Kalare in 
Gombe, Yan Daba and Yan daukan amarya in Kano and ECOMOG in Borno and Yobe 
states. In Adamawa State, the political thugs are known as Damagun Boys and Shinko Boys. 
In Taraba State, they are called Bani Israila. (Ojo 2013: 25)  
As is typical of Nigerian politicians, the northern youths and militia that were 
armed by politicians during the 2003 elections were eventually discarded by their 
sponsors after the election since they could not continue funding them. With no 
visible means of legitimate livelihood and frustrated over their fate in the after-
math of the elections, some of these disillusioned youth and militias in northern 
Nigeria became very susceptible to the radical brand of Islam preached at the 
time by Mohammed Yusuf (Patrick 2013).  
Mohammed Yusuf’s mosque complex, the Ibn Taimiyya Masjid, named after 
the medieval Islamic scholar who virulently condemned Shia, Sufis, and the rul-
ing Sunni elite, was both a staging post for his virulent attack on government and 
a headquarters for his movement. By “naming his mosque after one of the Islam-
ic scholars most often cited by Salafi jihadists, Yusuf signalled his hostility to the 
ruling Muslim elite as well as to traditional Nigerian Islam” (Tanchum 2012: 79). 
He ratcheted up his strident call for jihad to restore what he considered the pris-
tine Islam of the early Islamic community as well as began the construction of an 
alternative society. The group also managed farmland and engaged in  
micro-financing, and Yusuf functioned as chief adjudicator of this miniature 
state-within-a-state (Tanchum 2012).  
Yusuf subsequently redefined the doctrine of the sect around an ideology that 
abhors Western education and the tenets of Western science. He centred his as-
persion and criticisms on the failures and corrupt attitudes of yan boko (modern 
elites trained at secular schools) who have acquired Western education and are 
currently in positions of power. In the sect’s view, “the system represented by the 
yan boko is unjust, secular and has no divine origin. It is therefore unIslamic, 
which in turn accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness” (Isa 2010: 332).  
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Subsequently, the movement first took up arms against the state establishment 
when, on 24 December 2003, it attacked police stations and public buildings in 
the towns of Geiam and Kanama, Yobe State. Members occupied the two build-
ings for several days, hoisting the flag of Afghanistan’s Taliban movement over 
the camps. A joint “operation of soldiers and police dislodged the group after 
killing 18 and arresting dozens of its members” (Suleiman 2007: 25). On 31 De-
cember 2003 the group left the village and dispersed into other northern states 
after inscribing the word “Taliban” on a captured vehicle (Morgan 2009). In 
2004 it established a “base called ‘Afghanistan’ in Kanama village in northern 
Yobe State, on the border with the Republic of Niger” (Awofadeji 2009: 8). With 
these developments, the sect became known as the Nigerian Taliban, which was 
used in a derogatory sense by local people who despised the ideology and teach-
ings of the sect.  
Yusuf’s radical ideology, however, generated friction between himself and 
other moderate northern-based Islamic scholars like the late Ja‘far Mahmud Ad-
am, Sheik Abba Aji, and Yahaya Jingir. In particular, bitter theological disputes 
characterised the confrontation between Ja‘far Mahmud Adam and Mohammed 
Yusuf between 2004 and 2007 (the year of Ja‘far Mahmud Adam’s death). Ja‘far 
Adam criticised Mohammed Yusuf’s theological positions as “ignorant” and 
“stupid” and as dangerous for the political ambitions of Muslims in Nigeria. Con-
trary to Yusuf’s position, Ja‘far Adam advocated the importance of Western and 
secular education for Muslims, noting that “only the conscious adoption of West-
ern and secular boko education would eventually enable Muslims to effectively 
fight the Western enemy” (Loimeier 2012: 149).  
The dispute notwithstanding, Yusuf’s charismatic skills endeared him to many 
young Muslims in northern Nigeria. Although Yusuf preached a simple, ascetic 
form of life for his followers, he enjoyed Western luxuries, including a Mercedes 
and imported delicacies (Onuoha 2012d: 27). The activities of his group became 
more worrisome from 2004 when students, especially in tertiary institutions in 
Borno and Yobe states, who constituted the sect’s members, withdrew from 
school, tore up their certificates, and joined the group. By disassociating from 
society at large, members became more indoctrinated by the ideologues, who 
inculcated in them anti-secular ideologies. On 21 September 2004 members at-
tacked Bama and Gworza police stations in Borno State, killing several police-
men and stealing arms and ammunition. It maintained intermittent hit-and-run 
attacks on security posts in some parts of Borno and Yobe states until the famous 
July 2009 anti-government uprising. 
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The root cause of the July 2009 revolt can be traced to the fatal shooting of 
members of the sect on 11 June 2009 by men of Operation Flush.2 Some mem-
bers of the sect, riding on motorbikes on their way to a cemetery to bury four of 
their members that had died in a motor accident, were intercepted by a patrol 
team of Operation Flush. The affected members were temporarily detained for 
not wearing crash helmets as stipulated in the state traffic law. Other sect mem-
bers were infuriated with the interception, which they interpreted as a provo-
cation, given that they were in a funeral procession. The resultant altercation  
between the sect members and security forces led to the shooting of some of their 
members by men of Operation Flush. Reacting to this event, Mohammed Yusuf, 
though absent at the time: 
made a pronouncement through his well circulated Friday sermon in Maiduguri to retaliate 
the shooting of his men, boasting that his group would be prepared to confront all security 
agencies in the State as well as government which he described as the enemies of Islam. 
(Sani 2011: 29) 
The security operatives later received a tip-off that the sect was planning to 
strike from their base in Dutsen Tanshi in Bauchi State. When “security opera-
tives stormed the place, nine members of the group were arrested while items 
used in local production of bombs were recovered” (Ohia 2009: 6). In retaliation, 
the members attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi police station on 26 July. 
This attack was the curtain raiser for a wave of unrest that manifested in Bauchi, 
Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe states. The revolt ended on 30 July 2009, when 
their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was finally captured in a goat pen in his resi-
dence in Maiduguri. After a few hours in police custody, Yusuf was murdered 
extrajudicially by the police, although police officials claimed that he was killed 
while trying to escape. Over 800 persons, mainly sect members, were killed dur-
ing the revolt, and hundreds of its members were arrested and detained for formal 
trial (Adesoji 2010; Sampson 2013). The way the 2009 revolt was repressed by 
the Nigerian state proved to be a critical factor in the deadly escalation of Boko 
Haram’s violent attacks.  
Operational tactics of Boko Haram 
Following the death of Yusuf and the mass killings and arrest of many of its 
members, the sect retreated and re-strategised in two ways. First was the adop-
tion of Yusuf’s hard-line top deputy, Abubakar Shekau, alias “Darul Tawheed”, 
as the sect’s new spiritual leader. Second was the redefinition of its tactics, which 
involved perfecting its traditional hit-and-run attacks and adding new flexible 
violent tactics. As the sect retreated and regrouped, the new leadership began 
                                                            
2  Operation Flush was a Borno State-owned security outfit established to combat armed banditry in the 
state. 
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mobilising, recruiting, and radicalising members using martyrdom videos of the 
July 2009 revolt. They issued several radical messages in leaflets and audio and 
video tapes to the media, stating an intention to wage war on secular authorities 
and “enemies”, as well as claiming responsibilities for deadly attacks. The sect 
has continued to perpetrate acts of violence against diverse targets, such as state 
security personnel, community and religious leaders, politicians, worship centres 
(churches and mosques), the United Nations building in Abuja, telecommunica-
tion facilities, and media houses. 
Exact casualty figures of attacks since the July 2009 anti-government uprising 
are hard to come by. Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika 
claimed in November 2012 that the Islamic sect had killed no fewer than 3,000 
people since it began its terror campaign (Iroegbu, Adedapo & Shittu 2012). This 
figure is not inclusive of those allegedly killed by security forces while fighting 
the sect. Innocent people, including women and children, have been killed as a 
result of these attacks. There are other inestimable costs to the nation due to these 
attacks, such as discouraging local and foreign investments, disruption of social 
and academic activities, destruction of property, and internal displacement of 
persons. Their activities have equally undermined religious harmony. For in-
stance, suicide bombing attacks on churches by the sect have precipitated reprisal 
attacks on Muslims by Christian youths in Kaduna and Plateau states (Akogun et 
al. 2012; Alechenu, Chiedozie & Onwuamanam 2012; Wooden 2012). Other con-
sequences include the fracturing of family structures (creating widows, widow-
ers, and orphans) and damage to the country’s image.  
These attacks have occurred mainly in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno 
State. However, several such attacks for which the group has claimed responsi-
bility have occurred in Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, 
Niger, Plateau, and Yobe states, and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (Figure 
7.2). Although the sect has concentrated its attacks mainly in northern Nigeria, it 
is speculated that it may extend its attacks to the Christian-dominated South as 
security agencies firm up counter-insurgency operations in the northern states 
(Onuoha 2012b: 9). Tactics such as targeted assassination, drive-by-shooting, use 
of IEDs, and suicide bombing have been used in the campaign of terror. 
The choice of any of the above-mentioned tactics usually depends on the con-
text, chosen target, and objective to be accomplished. The tactic of open armed 
confrontation is a key operational tactic Boko Haram has perfected since the July 
2009 revolt. This is a modification of its traditional tactics of hit-and-run, which 
require appreciable numbers (10-60) of selected operatives engaging security 
forces in gun battles. The new method involves deploying large number of mem-
bers to mount surprise attacks on security establishments (stations, barracks, or  
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Figure 7.2 Locations of Boko Haram’s attacks and suicide bombings in Nigeria 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
prisons) or ‘soft’ civilian targets (markets and churches), where there is usually a 
large number of forces or people who can overpower its operatives if it adopts 
any other means. 
Targeted assassination is another Boko Haram tactic. It is adopted when the 
sect is after a person(s) listed as an “enemy”. The usual mode entails the assigned 
operatives trailing the target to a place where the individual is most vulnerable to 
being successfully killed. Boko Haram members usually use cars or motorbikes 
in going after such targets and shoot at a very close range (usually at the head, 
chest, or abdomen) to ensure that the chances of the victim surviving are very 
slim. In this way, Boko Haram has been able to kill several civilians, politicians, 
religious leaders, security agents, and community leaders that were outspoken 
against its ideology and activities. A notable example was the killing of engineer 
Modu Fannami Gubio, the governorship candidate of All Nigerians Peoples Party 
(ANPP) in Borno State for the April 2011 general elections. On 28 January 2011, 
Gubio, a cousin of then incumbent Governor of Borno State Ali Modu Sheriff, 
172 Onuoha  
 
was killed along with Sheriff’s younger brother and six others in his residence in 
Maiduguri by Boko Haram operatives (Idris 2011b).  
Drive-by-shooting is a method that is very similar to targeted assassination in 
that some of the targets killed in the past have been executed through a process 
that involves operatives riding on a motorbike. It became a common tactic after 
the July 2009 revolt, and by mid-October 2010 no fewer than 21 people, includ-
ing a top politician, had been killed by suspected members of the sect riding on a 
motorbike (The Nation 2010). One possible reason for adopting drive-by-
shooting is to kill targets that have proven very difficult to track down to a spot 
where execution will be easy. It is a flexible method often adopted when operat-
ing in a built-up area or to kill target(s) that operate largely in the city centre. The 
convenience of this method is that the target can be shot at a very close range and 
the killers can easily manoeuvre their way out of the city without being appre-
hended by security agents. 
The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is another tactic that gained 
prominence after the July 2009 revolt. Such IEDs are configured in ways such 
that they can be detonated when thrown or can be set off through a timer or a re-
mote control. Usually, the sect selects a particular place to plant the IED where it 
will have maximum effect upon explosion. They have been planted along roads, 
bridges, and rail lines, or deposited in bags or containers that are left behind in 
public places, including churches, drinking establishments, lecture halls, car 
parks, and bus stops. The size of the IEDs has ranged from small contraptions 
stuffed into used drink cans, to large containers such as drums fitted into the boot 
of a car if the intent is to mount a suicide attack.  
The US Joint IED Defeat Organization revealed that Nigeria witnessed a near-
ly fourfold jump in the number of IED attacks in 2011. Nigeria saw 196 bomb 
incidents in 2011, compared with 52 incidents in 2010 (Straziuso 2012). The op-
erational sophistication Boko Haram has attained in constructing IEDs is one of 
the main reasons why security experts believe it is receiving enhanced foreign 
support in the area of training and acquisition of explosives, possibly from 
AQIM. The IEDs are usually constructed using powerful explosive substances, 
such as trinitrotoluene (TNT), pentaerythritol (PETN), and ammonia (fertilisers). 
The use of IEDs is one of the greatest challenges the security forces are confront-
ing in regard to the sect.  
Particularly worrisome among the new tactics of Boko Haram is the adoption 
of suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism refers to a form of extremely committed 
violence, carried out by someone who is intent on or deceived into taking his or 
her own life alongside killing or destroying the chosen target, in furtherance of a 
political, religious, or ideological goal. Seen in this light, the terrorist is fully 
aware that if he or she does not die, the planned attack will not be implemented. 
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Thus the perpetrator’s ensured death is a precondition for the success of the mis-
sion (Ganor 2001; Gunaranta 2002; O’Connor 2011). The method of suicide ter-
rorism adopted by the sect is suicide bombing, which refers to any politically or 
ideologically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual(s) 
who actively and purposely causes his or her own death through blowing himself 
or herself up along with the chosen target. 
Boko Haram is adept in mounting suicide bombing. At the time of writing, it 
has relied mainly on vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), twice 
on body-borne improvised explosive devices (BBIED), and once each on a  
motorcycle-borne improvised explosive device (MBIED) and a tricycle (popular-
ly known as Keke NAPEP)3-borne improvised explosive device (TBIED). Table 
7.1 provides one example each of the suicide bombing modes. 
It has been noted that “between June 2011 and November 2012, the sect has 
staged at least 29 suicide attacks in northern Nigeria, with Borno State witnessing 
the highest number of attacks” (Onuoha 2012b: 7). Other acts of suicide bombing 
have been staged since then in northern Nigeria. While quite a number of these 
suicide attacks failed woefully, some were partially successful, and the majority 
have been largely successful when assessed on the basis of the number of lives 
lost, property damaged, and the international visibility they earned the sect. Its 
diverse targets of suicide attacks included security establishments (stations and 
barracks), international organisations, churches, mosques, telecom offices, and 
media houses. It is believed that some of the cars used in the suicide bombings 
were stolen. 
Four factors could account for the adoption of suicide terrorism by the sect: 
the emergence of a more radical and hard-line leadership of the sect in the after-
math of the July 2009 revolt; the increased counter-insurgency measures put in 
place by the government to curtail its traditional tactics of open armed confronta-
tion or placement of IEDs; improved funding from various sources within and 
outside Nigeria; and, more importantly, the sect’s bond with foreign terror 
groups, leading to increased fanatic indoctrination of its members by experienced 
ideologues skilled in evoking visions of martyrdom to radicalise recruits.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3  Keke NAPEP refers to the motorised tricycle (tuk tuk) used for commercial transportation in cities 
across Nigeria. It was introduced in 2000, when President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration, 
through the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), partnered with the Autobahn Tech-
niques Limited (trademark owners of the name KEKE NAPEP) to roll out the tricycle project as an in-
tervention tool for job creation and poverty alleviation.  
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Table 7.1 Samples of suicide bombing modes mounted by Boko Haram  
(June 2011–November 2012) 
Date Attacker Mode Target(s)  Effects 
26 August 
2011 
Mohammed 
Abul Barra 
(27 years old) 
VBIED 
(Honda Ac-
cord car) 
UN House, Fed-
eral Capital Ter-
ritory, Abuja.  
The explosion killed 24 
persons and injured over 
100 others. The building 
houses over 400 staff of 
26 UN humanitarian and 
development agencies. It 
was the sect’s first attack 
on an international  
organisation. 
 
30 April 
2012 
Names not 
disclosed or 
reported 
Motorcycle-
borne 
(MBIED) 
The convoy of 
Taraba State 
Police Commis-
sioner, Jalingo, 
Taraba State 
Three suicide bombers 
riding motorbikes 
rammed into the convoy 
of the Police Commis-
sioner, killing at least 11 
people. 
 
3 August 
2012 
Name not 
disclosed or 
reported 
A suicide 
bomber 
packed his 
body with 
explosives 
(BBIED) 
The Emir of Fika 
Alhaji Moham-
med Abali Ibn 
Muhammadu 
Idrissa, at Poti-
skum mosque, 
Yobe State 
 
Six people including 
three civilians, the emir’s 
police orderly, and two 
other policemen sus-
tained various degrees of 
injuries; the suicide 
bomber died in the  
incident. 
 
16 August 
2012 
Name not 
disclosed or 
reported 
Tricycle, pop-
ularly known 
as Keke 
NAPEP 
(TBIED) 
A patrol vehicle 
of the JTF in 
Custom area of 
Maiduguri 
The suicide bomber on a 
bomb-laden tricycle 
missed his target and 
rode into a moving  
Mercedes Benz car. The 
blast killed the suicide 
bomber and a civilian, 
while two other people, 
including a soldier, sus-
tained injuries.  
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Government responses to the Boko Haram threat4 
To reduce the operational capability of the sect, the Nigerian government has 
adopted several measures, including prosecution of arrested members, deploy-
ment of special security forces, temporary closure of parts of borders in northern 
Nigeria, deportation of illegal immigrants, capacity building of security forces on 
counter-terrorism (CoT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, installation 
of surveillance equipment, and collaboration with foreign partners. 
The ramping up of violent attacks by the sect in the aftermath of the July 2009 
revolt played a critical role in the enactment of Nigeria’s first anti-terrorism leg-
islation, the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011. An important external factor 
that also contributed in this regard was the pressure from the US on the Nigerian 
government to expedite actions towards adopting comprehensive anti-terrorism 
legislation in the aftermath of the failed Christmas Day bombing of a US airliner 
by a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (Sampson & Onuoha 2011). The 
young Abdulmutallab, who had been trained in Yemen by Al-Qaeda, attempted 
to detonate an explosive device hidden in his underwear while on board North-
west Airlines Flight 253 en route to Detroit’s Metropolitan Airport on 25 De-
cember 2009.  
The establishment on 12 June 2011 of a Joint Military Task Force known as 
“Operation Restore Order” (JTORO) with headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno 
State, to counter the sect’s growing terrorist potentials is a prominent dimension 
of the government response to the Boko Haram threat. The deployment of the 
JTORO has been partly successful, especially the use of military patrol vehicles 
equipped to detect hidden bombs and other weapons within a radius of 50 meters. 
The special security forces have also registered successes in terms of arrest and 
killing of Boko Haram operational commanders and strategists. 
Notwithstanding the successes of the special security forces in northern Nige-
ria, their deployment has received criticism for harsh tactics that have injured 
civilians and damaged property. The approach taken by the security forces has 
led to unprecedented use of road blocks, cordon-and-search, and total blockade 
of some roads (especially those close to security establishments), often generat-
ing long traffic jams. Particularly worrisome is the accusation of unlawful kill-
ings, dragnet arrests, detention, intimidation, and extortion by the security forces. 
These real or alleged excesses undermine public support, especially in the area of 
providing tip-offs on Boko Haram members or hideouts. Sampson (2013: 17) has 
noted: 
                                                            
4   This section benefited from Onuoha, F.C. (forthcoming), “Assessing the Implications of Counter 
Boko Haram Operations by the Nigerian Government”, commissioned by the Institute of Security 
Studies, South Africa. 
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[As] a result of these human rights abuses, the JTF has been severely criticised by a section 
of the Nigerian public over its violent counter-terrorism operations. Its use of disproportion-
ate force has forced people, otherwise critical of the sect’s activities, to renege on their earli-
er endorsement of military deployment.  
Therefore, if the security forces are to be successful in the future, they must strike 
the proper balance of winning the hearts and minds of local people by offering 
security and using the ‘stick’ to weaken Boko Haram’s operational capacity 
through arrests and prosecution. 
Given the discovery that Boko Haram moves weapons and fighters in and out 
of Nigeria through Nigeria’s porous international borders in the north, the federal 
government began an aggressive crackdown on illegal immigrants, repatriating 
around 11,000 foreigners as at 28 February 2012 (Vanguard 2012). Related to 
this was the decision to close part of Nigeria’s northern borders and the estab-
lishment of two new defence intelligence missions in Niger and Mali in February 
2012 to ensure better monitoring of the security situation in the Sahara–Sahel 
region. The Nigerian government has also scaled up training in counter-terrorism 
(CoT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) operations for state security forces in re-
sponse to the growing audacity of the sect (Omonobi 2012). Training in special 
reconnaissance, close-quarters combat, urban warfare, amphibious operation, 
information operation and management, tactical communication, civil-military 
relations, and forensic analysis have equally been expanded in the training cur-
ricula of the armed forces and other security agencies (Musa 2012). This inter-
vention is also supported by the acquisition and installation of technical and sur-
veillance equipment, such as closed-circuit televisions, identification equipment 
for post-bomb blast investigation, and military patrol vehicles equipped to detect 
hidden explosives and other weapons. 
The government has also embraced collaborative engagements with foreign 
states and international organisations to increase Nigeria’s capacity to combat the 
Boko Haram threat. These include collaborations with organisations such as the 
UN, the EU, and the International Civil Aviation Organisation, as well as states 
like the US, France, South Korea, and Israel, geared towards ensuring that terror-
ist organisations do not establish strong footholds in Nigeria. For example, Nige-
ria established a collaborative framework with the UN known as the ‘Integrated 
Assistance on Counter-Terrorism’ (I-ACT), under the aegis of the UN Counter-
Terrorism Implementation Task Force. Although details of these collaborative 
efforts are not made public, they cover areas such as intelligence sharing, capaci-
ty building of security forces, and equipment support programmes. 
In spite of the various measures adopted by the Nigerian government to reduce 
the sect’s capability, Boko Haram continues to demonstrate resilience and modi-
fy its modus operandi. Since 2010, the sect has evolved into a more flexible, dy-
namic, and decentralised organisation, capable of changing and combining tactics 
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as well as expanding or re-ordering target selection. This situation has prompted 
debates concerning Boko Haram’s ability to remain a potent force despite the 
losses it incurs from state security forces. 
Boko Haram and the transnational Salafi Jihadist threat  
A fruitful way to understand Boko Haram’s ability to continue to mount auda-
cious attacks is to view it within the context of the transnational flow of ideologi-
cal influence from global Salafi Jihadist Islamism. The term ‘Islamism’ means 
different things to different people. A more precise and analytically useful defini-
tion of Islamism describes it thus:  
a form of instrumentalisation of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue 
political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagin-
ing a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed 
from the Islamic tradition. (Denoeux 2002: 61)  
Certainly, Islamism is politically heterogeneous, in the sense that different Is-
lamist movements specialise in qualitatively different political activities depend-
ing on the context that underpins their emergence (Hegghammer 2009). Some 
oppose local regimes by non-violent means (radical Islamist); others try to topple 
regimes with terrorist tactics (jihadi Islamist); and still others wage armed re-
sistance against occupation by non-Muslim powers (expellist Islamist). 
Boko Haram belongs to the Salafi Jihadist Islamist stock, and it seeks to topple 
the secular Nigerian state. The sect’s ideology and operational tactics derive from 
the global Salafist Islamic ideology, which seeks the imposition of its own inter-
pretation of Islamic Law and a safe haven for jihadists. The Salafiyya movement 
identifies the problems of the contemporary world with deviation from the cor-
rect path delineated in the holy scriptures. Therefore, Salafis describe their activi-
ties as a struggle against innovations and shirk, or heresy (Rasheed 2012). Salafi 
adherents insist on the right of believers to interpret the fundamental texts for 
themselves through independent reasoning. There is often an analytical distinc-
tion between the Salafiyya ‘ilmiyya, or “scholarly Salafis”, and the Salafiyya ji-
hadiyya, or “fighting Salafis”. “Many Salafis are quite radical in their calls for a 
return to an authentic original form of Muslim practice without being at all ori-
ented toward political activity, whether peaceful or violent” (European Commis-
sion's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation 2008: 6). However, Salafi Ji-
hadism, as noted earlier, focuses on the use of violence to bring about such radi-
cal change. It refers to the merging of a Salafi outlook and a jihadi call to vio-
lence. In other words: 
Salafi jihadi groups are motivated by a mix of religious and political objectives: they  
embrace a strict, literal interpretation of Islam, and combine it with an emphasis on jihad, 
understood here as holy war. They view jihad as the primary instrument through which their 
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Salafi desire to ‘return’ to the original message of Islam will become reality. Unlike radical 
Islamists, they approach jihad as a global struggle that knows no borders, and that focuses on 
combating the West, in general, and the United States, in particular. They form an amor-
phous, transnational movement, and disseminate an ideology that is fundamentally hostile to 
modernity, to the secular, democratic nation-state, to the logic of globalization, and to peace-
ful coexistence of different cultures and religions. (Denoeux & Carter 2009: 86) 
In this light, Boko Haram’s Salafi Jihadist inclination became evident in the 
aftermath of the July 2009 revolt. In March 2010, for instance, Boko Haram  
declared that it was “joining Al-Qaeda to avenge the murder of some of its mem-
bers and leaders in a series of explosions across Nigeria” (The Jihadi Websites 
Monitoring Group 2010: 14). In an interview with Al Jazeera television on 14 
June 2010, the AQIM leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, also known as Abu Musab 
Abdel Wadoud, confirmed that his group has been talking to Boko Haram and 
intends to supply it with weapons to “defend Muslims in Nigeria and stop the 
advance of a minority of Crusaders”. He further noted that Al-Qaeda has an in-
terest in Sub-Saharan Africa for “its strategic depth that would give it a bigger 
scope for manoeuvres” (Stratfor 2010). 
Some analysts then dismissed AQIM’s intent to bond with Boko Haram as 
mere wishful thinking or rhetoric. It was argued instead that “issuing statements 
claiming an alliance is easier than actually creating a meaningful accord and sev-
eral factors complicate AQIM’s intent to move into Nigeria” (ibid.). Indeed, there 
is clearly a distinction to be made not only between affiliation and solidarity, but 
also between tactics (common training and supply of weapons) and strategy (co-
ordination of attacks under a central command). Notwithstanding, such a dis-
missive assessment downplayed the fact that both the AQIM and Boko Haram 
belong to the Salafi Jihadist ideological stock. Moreover, it overlooked the fact 
that global Al-Qaeda had attempted to draw localised conflicts (for instance, in 
Southeast Asia) into an evolving but loose network of transnational jihadism and 
may be bent on doing so in Nigeria. As Vidino, Pantucci and Kohlmann (2010: 
224) have rightly observed: 
Al-Qaeda and, more generally, the global jihadist movement, have repeatedly attempted to 
hijack conflicts that were largely nationalistic (local) in nature and turn them, both rhetori-
cally and operationally, into battlefields of what they perceive to be a millenarian and global 
conflict between Islam and the world of infidelity. Local actors might maintain some of their 
parochial agendas, but by putting themselves under the banner of the global jihadist move-
ment they benefit from outside support in terms of funding, recruits, propaganda, and mili-
tary expertise. The global jihadist movement also benefits, as it can expand its influence and 
add credibility to its narrative that Islam is under attack from non-Muslims. 
Evidently, Boko Haram began in 2010 to recast its grievances within the nar-
rative framework of global jihad and employ rhetoric common to Salafi Jihadist 
groups around the world: that Islam is under attack by infidels in Nigeria. Given 
Nigeria’s recent history of religious tension between Muslims and Christians, 
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especially in northern Nigeria and the Middle Belt region, this was part of a strat-
egy of whipping up religious sentiments to draw sympathy from impressionable 
Muslim youths to its cause. In February 2011, Boko Haram in a message sent to 
the media declared: “We are carrying out these attacks in order to propagate the 
name of Allah and to liberate ourselves and our religion from the hands of infi-
dels and the Nigerian government” (Mshelizza 2011).  
Earlier, in a published manifesto in July 2010, Abubakar Shekau linked the ji-
had being fought by Boko Haram with jihadist efforts globally, especially that of 
“the soldiers of Allah in the Islamic State of Iraq” (Pham 2012: 4). Shekau ex-
pressed solidarity with Al-Qaeda and threatened the US: “Do not think jihad is 
over. Rather jihad has just begun”, he enthused (Pham 2012: 4). He also threat-
ened attacks not only against the Nigerian state, but against “outposts of Western 
culture”. This propaganda is archetypical of Al-Qaeda’s global Islamist rhetoric 
of Islam being under attack by infidels. The ideological rhetoric signposts that 
Boko Haram aspires to share features of, and ties with, Al-Qaeda’s Salafi Jihadist 
orientation, while at the same time retaining its own distinctive local organisa-
tion, character, and practice in Nigeria.  
Given the brutal character of the Nigerian state, Boko Haram ideologues were 
convinced that the sect is largely impotent and must do the extraordinary to be 
able to liberate their religion from the hands of infidels in reference to the Nigeri-
an state. As Ayoob has rightly noted:  
When and where the sense of impotence becomes very acute, it provides extremist elements 
with the opportunity to exploit the prevailing climate of despair to undertake terrorist activi-
ties. Extremist groups that arrogate to themselves the right to speak in the name of ‘Islam’ 
justify terrorism as the … only strategy that can wrest the initiative from the hands of west-
ern powers and those perceived to be their surrogates in the Muslim world. (Ayoob 2005: 
960) 
The sense of impotence drove Boko Haram ideologues to establish links with 
like-minded Salafi Jihadist groups in Africa – in particular AQIM and Al-
Shabaab – in furtherance of its ideological goal of Islamisation of northern Nige-
ria. To this end, many of their members fled to North Africa to training with Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the aftermath of the July 2009 revolt. The 
“Boko Haram men in the AQIM camp chose Abubakar Adam Kambar, as their 
leader” (Africa Confidential 2013: 5). During training with AQIM, Boko Haram 
members mastered the skills of bomb making:  
Boko Haram militants also attended Al Shabaab-owned training camps in Somalia. Members 
were taught how to construct and detonate improvised explosive devices, as well as employ 
the use of suicide bombers, which until participating in the training camps, Boko Haram did 
not engage such practices. (Connell 2012: 89)  
In a statement released on 15 June 2011, Boko Haram boasted of its ties to the 
Somali-based terror group, Al-Shabaab:  
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We want to make it known that our Jihadists [warriors] have arrived [in] Nigeria from Soma-
lia where they got serious training on warfare from our brethren (Al-Shabaab) who made the 
country of Somalia ungovernable. We want to assure all security agencies that we would 
frustrate their efforts. By the grace of God, despite the armored carriers that they are boasting 
of, they cannot match the training we acquired in Somalia. (Safeafricagroup.com 2011)  
The alignment and solidarity with AQIM and Al-Shabaab speaks for itself as a 
true shift of radical ideological expansion (Connell 2012). Having acquired the 
tactical and ideological tools, the sect began attacking targets it considers as infi-
dels and surrogates: Christians, moderate Muslims, and secular (local and inter-
national) institutions in Nigeria. The suicide attack on a police headquarters on 
16 June 2011 was a blatant signal of the training Boko Haram boasted it has ac-
quired from established transnational jihadist movements in Africa. More than 
anything else, the 26 August 2011 suicide bombing of the UN building in Abuja 
was devastating evidence that the group aims to internationalise its acts of terror, 
in furtherance of the global jihadist agenda. In the aftermath of the UN bombing, 
a self-identified spokesman for Boko Haram claimed that they attacked the UN 
building because: 
all over the world, the UN is a global partner in the oppression of believers. We are at war 
against infidels. In Nigeria, the federal government tries to perpetuate the agenda of the 
United Nations. (Bashir 2011) 
In another interview, Abu Qada disclosed Boko Haram’s emerging ties to Al-
Qaeda:  
Our relationship with Al Qaida is very strong. In fact, our leader [Shekau] and his team were 
in Mecca for the lesser Hajj to consolidate on that relationship. And we carried out the attack 
on the UN building when he was about to go into a meeting with Al Qaida leadership in or-
der to strengthen our negotiation position. (Salkida 2011: 42) 
The UN bombing brought to the world’s attention the growing danger Boko 
Haram poses to regional and international security. Prior to the UN bombing, 
there was very little awareness of, or attention paid to, the ideology driving the 
sect. In particular, there existed a collective security nescience concerning the 
growing ideological links between Boko Haram and other transnational Salafi 
Jihadist networks in Africa. Unlike earlier years when the debate was whether 
Boko Haram had links to other Salafi Jihadist movements, the current concern is 
on the extent of established ties and the consequences for national and regional 
security in Africa. The intelligence community has confirmed that Africa’s top 
three Salafi Jihadist movements – Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Boko Haram – are 
sharing funds, training, and explosive materials, which could possibly lead to the 
emergence of an ‘extremist triangle’ in Africa (Shaughnessy 2012). The US AF-
RICOM Commander, Gen Carter Ham, captured the threat thus: 
What really concerns me are the indications that the three organizations are seeking to coor-
dinate and synchronize their efforts, in other words to establish a cooperative effort amongst 
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the three most violent organizations. And I think that’s a problem for America and for Afri-
can security in general. (US Africa Command 2012)5  
Given that Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and Boko Haram subscribe to Salafi Jihadist 
ideology, it was possible for them to collaborate on certain areas of mutual inter-
est such as training and weapons, while maintaining their distinctive local speci-
ficity and character shaped by the domestic environments in which they are oper-
ating. Recent developments in Mali confirm such connections. Mali slipped into 
instability after a coup led by Captain Amadou Sanogo overthrew President Am-
adou Toumani Touré on 22 March 2012. The coup created a power vacuum that 
enabled Tuareg rebels in the North, backed by a patchwork of Islamist forces – 
Ansar Dine, AQIM, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MU-
JWA) – to take control of nearly two-thirds of the country. These groups, particu-
larly AQIM and Ansar Dine, belong to the Salafi Jihadist stock.  
Beginning from 11 January 2013, France deployed her forces in “Operation 
Serval” to stop the advance of Islamist groups who were intent on invading Bam-
ako. French Mirage and Rafale fighter jets mounted air strikes across a wide belt 
of Islamist strongholds, from Gao and Kidal in the North-East, near the border 
with Algeria, to the western town of Lere, close to Mauritania. French air and 
ground assaults on rebel strongholds have enabled French and Malian forces to 
retake Konna, Douentza, Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal, with hopes of capturing 
more territories from the Islamists. Nigerian troops, in addition to other African 
forces, have joined French forces to roll back the Islamist occupation of northern 
Mali (Onuoha & Thurston 2013). 
Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, as well as Chief of Army Staff Lt-Gen 
Azubuike Ihejirika, have alleged that Boko Haram received training in Mali, 
making it imperative for Nigerian troops to join the international campaign to 
free northern Mali from Islamist militants. Some media reports carried further 
allegations: 
Hundreds of Boko Haram members stayed at training camps with Malian militants for 
months in Timbuktu, learning to fix Kalashnikovs and launch shoulder-fired weapons … The 
Boko Haram members trained for about 10 months at what is now a bombed-out customs-
police building on Timbuktu’s desert fringe, intermingling with a local al Qaeda offshoot 
called Ansar Dine ... About 50 Boko Haram militants lived and trained at the customs build-
ing, and 50 more lived in an annex across a giant sandy lot, while others took up in other 
abandoned government buildings. (Pindiga 2013: 1) 
Although concerns may be raised on the credibility of these latest allegations, 
they should be read against the backdrop of revelations that many Boko Haram 
members fled to North Africa after the July 2009 revolt to receive training in 
AQIM’s camp (Africa Confidential 2013: 5). This evolving situation poses seri-
ous dangers to security in the Sahara–Sahel region, given possible fusion of 
                                                            
5  http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=8039&lang=0 
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movements that have strongholds or footprints in the region and share in the 
Salafi Jihadist ideology. In Niger, for instance, its southern part is dominated by 
the Hausa-speaking Izala-Salafi group, while its northern region, bordering Alge-
ria and Libya, is dominated by the Tabligh Tuaregs. In Chad also, the Ansar al 
Sunna is an influential Salafi group which gets huge funding from donors in Su-
dan and Saudi Arabia (Rasheed 2012). As a result, the Sahara–Sahel region of-
fers not only a potential safe haven and training ground for Salafi Jihadists, but 
also large ungoverned spaces for them to generate funds for their terrorist activi-
ties through complex shades of criminal activities such as kidnapping, drug traf-
ficking, and arms smuggling. Worse still, the existence of porous borders and 
ineffective national security forces facilitates the ease of movement of jihadists 
across borders and the exchange of ideas, resources, and training centres. As Ni-
geria is surrounded by intrusive Salafi movements or influences, Boko Haram is 
gaining support from some Al-Qaeda-linked Salafist groups in the form of train-
ing, weapons, and ideological radicalisation of impressionable youths in northern 
Nigeria.  
The tipping point in the radicalisation of Boko Haram has been traced to the 
extrajudicial killing of its charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf, as well as the 
gruesome murder of some arrested members in the aftermath of the July 2009 
revolt. However, this factor rode on a groundswell of dissatisfaction, especially 
among Muslim youths in northern Nigeria, over governance failure on the part of 
the secular Nigerian state. Although political leaders from northern Nigeria dom-
inated positions of leadership, such as presidents and heads of state, before the 
return to democracy in 1999 they did little or nothing to address the pervasive 
poverty and unemployment afflicting the northern region.  
The frustrations created by poverty and unemployment played a critical role in 
making some youth fall victim to the appeals of violent, extremist ideologies. As 
rightly argued by Isa (2010: 333), the “movement used the term Boko Haram to 
mobilise and radicalise unemployed, unskilled and poverty-stricken youths to 
join its cause (and) dislodge the secular, boko-controlled state in Nigeria”. The 
solution in the sect’s view, therefore, is to overthrow the secular Nigerian state 
and introduce strict application of Shariah Law as a moral societal cleanser to 
effectuate the creation of an Islamic state devoid of corruption.  
Boko Haram’s Takfirist approach of cleansing the secular Nigerian state of in-
fidels, however, has contributed in part to the emergence of a splinter group 
known as the Jama’atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (abbreviated as 
Ansaru), which translates roughly as “The Supporters of Muslims in the Land of 
the Blacks”. Arguably, ideological and personal differences between top leaders 
of Boko Haram contributed to the breaking away of Ansaru. At the root of the 
ideological differences is the issue of Takfirism. The Ansaru offshoot is believed 
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to have sprouted from Boko Haram in January 2012, following the 20 January 
2012 Boko Haram attack in the city of Kano that resulted in the death of at least 
180 people, mostly Muslims. The group’s existence, however, became more 
widely known from 2 June 2012, when its self-identified leader, Abu Usmatul al-
Ansari, released a video proclaiming the creation of the sect and outlining its 
ideological stand (Onuoha 2013). 
Security agents suspect that the name ‘Abu Usamatul Ansari’ is a pseudonym 
for Khalid al-Barnawi, who is believed to be heading the group. As an erstwhile 
leader of Boko Haram, he is believed to have trained with AQIM in Algeria in 
the mid-2000s and led several AQIM-inspired kidnapping operations in Niger. It 
will be recalled that Khalid al-Barnawi was among the three leaders of Boko Ha-
ram designated as ‘global terrorists’ by the US State Department on 21 June 
2012. The other two were Abubakar Shekau, the current spiritual leader of Boko 
Haram, and Abubakar Adam Kambar, who was later killed by Nigerian security 
forces during a raid on his hideout in Kano on 15 August 2012 (Africa Confiden-
tial 2013). 
Ansaru has become famous following a string of kidnappings of expatriates it 
has pulled off. Unlike the Shekau-led Boko Haram, which considers non-
members as kuffar or fasiqun, making such individuals or groups legitimate tar-
gets of attack, Ansaru considers anybody that has accepted the khalimatush sha-
hada (belief in one God and the Prophet Mohammed as the Messenger of Allah) 
as a Muslim who should not be killed, unless the person has committed an act 
that is punishable by death as stated in the Quran. In view of this, “Ansaru de-
tests Boko Haram’s style of operations which it regards as inhuman to the Mus-
lim Ummah. It claims that Islam forbids killing of innocent Muslims” (Mamu 
2012). This philosophical position, however, flies in the face of reality given the 
way some innocent foreigners abducted by the sect have been killed. For in-
stance, on 9 March 2013, Ansaru released a communiqué and video claiming that 
it had killed the seven foreign hostages abducted from a Lebanese construction 
company, Setraco, in Jamaare, Bauchi State, on 17 February 2013. Ansaru justi-
fied the killing of the hostages after British warplanes were reported to have been 
seen in the northern Nigeria city of Bauchi by local journalists, possibly on a res-
cue mission. In keeping with its philosophical standpoint, it is possible for the 
group to claim that it acted in ‘self-defence’.  
The kidnapping and murder of the seven expatriates by the group remains the 
largest of its kind since the outbreak of terrorist violence in northern Nigeria. Be-
fore the February 2013 kidnapping, Ansaru was linked to the May 2011 kidnap-
ping of Christopher McManus (a Briton) and Franco Lamolinara (an Italian) 
from their home in Kebbi State. They were held for months, before their captors 
killed them in March 2012 during a failed rescue mission by Nigerian security 
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forces and British special forces in Sokoto. Given its ideological and operational 
outlook, as well as the known history of its suspected leader, Khalid al-Barnawi, 
analysts believe that Ansaru is strongly connected to AQIM (Bay & Tack 2013; 
Zenn 2013). 
In terms of personal differences underling Ansaru’s emergence, it is alleged 
that: 
one of the disputes between Al Barnawi and Shekau came over 40 million naira (US$ 
250,000), which Al Barnawi donated to Boko Haram when he returned to Nigeria in early 
2011. It was his share of an AQIM ransom. (Africa Confidential 2013: 5) 
The ransom caused fierce disagreements within Boko Haram, with Shekau  
reluctant to give al-Barnawi any say in how the money should be spent. This  
offered al-Barnawi a reason to create a parallel group to burnish his own ideolog-
ical interpretation of the jihadist struggle. In spite of their ideological and person-
al differences, it seems that the two have lately been growing closer, given the 
crackdown by Nigerian security forces against their members and the Franco–
African onslaught against Islamists forces such as AQIM in northern Mali that 
have aided them in the past with financial and training assistance. Faced with 
similar challenges, it is possible that Boko Haram and Ansaru will tend to coop-
erate rather than compete with each other. As speculated by Zenn (2013: 8), 
“they may also collaborate on refining their tactics as well as expanding their 
areas of operations to locate new targets and eliminate Western and Christian 
influence from Nigeria and the region”. 
In this context, Boko Haram still poses a serious threat to security and stability 
in Nigeria, given the possible consequences of any successful large-scale attack 
in southern Nigeria. Although some analysts view this situation as a high-impact 
but low probability risk (de Pontet & Sparks 2013), several factors can serve as  
enablers rather than limiters for Boko Haram’s penetration of the south-western 
zone. First, the substantial number of Muslim adherents in the zone offers Boko 
Haram broad room for incremental penetration. Second, and as a corollary to the 
above, the cosmopolitan nature of strategic economic cities such as Lagos, where 
substantial Hausa-speaking northerners tend to settle in particular communities, 
is another leverage for manoeuvre without being easily detected or suspected. 
Third, inchoate ideological rivalry between Islamic sects in the zone could be 
exploited to recruit impressionable youth into the Boko Haram fold. And fourth, 
the presence of strategic targets – embassies, oil tank farms, maritime assets, and 
international markets – could be so attractive that Boko Haram could partner 
with criminal or radical groups (such as Ansaru) to mount attacks. If successfully 
planned and executed:  
[such an] attack in southern Nigeria would also render a psychological victory for Boko Ha-
ram because it would show that the group could strike anywhere in the country and that La-
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gos, Nigeria’s economic hub and Africa’s most populous city, is in Boko Haram’s targeting 
range. (Zenn 2012: 10) 
It is safe to expect that such attacks are more probable in the form of planted IED 
or suicide bombing attacks than coordinated gunfights with security forces. 
As hinted earlier, Boko Haram could also attempt to exploit incipient Islamo-
ideological contestation between Sufi traditionalists and emerging Wahhabi 
Salafi adherents in the south-western zone to deepen its recruitment and radicali-
sation drives or establish a footprint in the zone. In recent times, Sufi traditional-
ists are being challenged by the emerging Wahhabi Salafis for the control of 
mosques across Yorubaland in the south-west zone (Rasheed 2012). The contest 
between the groups in the region is already evident in the struggles in mosques 
over how an imam or prayer leader should be chosen. Control over the mosques 
is critical in this respect, because the successful group stands in good stead to 
propagate its ideology in the region. 
Even though Salafi Jihadism has not manifested in overt violence in any area 
of southern Nigeria, intelligence reports show that the penetration of the ideology 
is gradually manifesting across the South-West and Middle Belt zones (Rasheed 
2012). Already, there have been cases of clashes between Islamic sects in the 
South-West, as was the case between the Izala sect and Tijaniyya/Adriya group 
in the Sabo area of Ibadan, Oyo State. On 22 August 2010, disagreement on 
some Islamic doctrines saw the two groups using the public address systems to 
launch verbal attacks on each other. In the ensuing violent clashes, no fewer than 
13 people were seriously injured and property, including buildings, three 
mosques, and four vehicles, was vandalised before policemen brought the situa-
tion under control (Adesuyi 2010: 6). As these confrontations unfurl over an en-
vironment of economic marginality, political exclusion, and social destitution, a 
potentially fertile ground for radicalisation and recruitment in the south-west 
zone is being created for Salafi Jihadist groups such as Boko Haram. The arrest 
of a top Boko Haram leader in Kano, who is believed to be a native of Ogbomo-
so, Oyo State (Salihu 2012), suggests that the sect can use such members as con-
duits to establish footprints in the South-West, where some young men are be-
coming very impatient with the secular Nigerian state over governance failure. 
Also, on 21 March 2013, security forces raided a hideout in Ijora, Lagos State, 
where some suspected Boko Haram members were arrested, and bombs, AK-47 
rifles, cartridges, and daggers were recovered (Utebor & Akinkuotu 2013). Any 
evidence that proves that the suspects are indeed Boko Haram members would 
confirm its potential expansion into the south-west zone. Given that in 2009 
Boko Haram had threatened to attack cities such as Lagos in southern Nigeria 
(Vanguard 2009; Olupohunda 2013), its potential foray into southern Nigeria 
remains a major concern for the security agencies. 
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Conclusion  
Although the Nigerian government has repeatedly promised to hold talks with 
Boko Haram if its leaders come forth, its kinetic response in the form of use of 
military force has recorded modest successes such as the arrest and killing of 
some of the sect’s members, strategists, and commanders. In spite of the gov-
ernment onslaught, Boko Haram has remained resilient, tapping strength from 
Salafi Jihadist ideology to further recruit and radicalise young impressionable 
minds and stage dramatic acts of terror in northern Nigeria. Evidently, Boko Ha-
ram is a manifestation of a fringe and violent ideology that underpinned many 
religious uprisings in the North in the past several decades, such as the 
Maitatsine revolt in the 1980s (Okanya 1995; Danjibo 2010). The problem is that 
even when the manifestation is destroyed, the ideology remains, leading to fears 
that in the future the ideology may sprout another manifestation with even more 
violent orientation (Rasheed 2012). 
Therefore, a more sustainable approach to addressing the challenge in Nigeria 
is to deal with the underlying ideology of the sect as well as the formative envi-
ronment that enables such ideology to flourish. As one scholar has rightly noted, 
the underlying ideology of Boko Haram:  
is framed around issues that appeal to the people’s grievances; hence, the environmental con-
text is very critical to understanding what generates and sustains the grievances that are ex-
pressed through terrorists’ tactics. (Sampson 2013: 22)  
Defeating or countering such ideology could be achieved through the initiation 
of robust political, economic, and religious reforms. Political reforms would tar-
get strengthening governance processes and institutions to ensure transparency, 
accountability, and responsiveness in ways that increase the legitimacy of gov-
ernment at all levels in Nigeria. Economic reforms entail rolling out robust inter-
ventions that will drastically reduce the level of poverty, unemployment, and so-
cial destitution in northern Nigeria, which extremist ideologues have exploited in 
their recruitment and radicalisation drives. The religious aspect requires deliver-
ing a national project on countering ideological support for extremism and terror-
ism by the government, focusing on monitoring religious sermons, supporting 
moderate Islamic scholars to deliver enlightenment programmes, scrutinising 
foreign funding of religious undertakings, and encouraging the teaching of com-
parative religion in Nigerian schools – primary, secondary, and tertiary. If con-
certed efforts are not made to defeat the ideology behind the Boko Haram men-
ace, the tendency for a different violent sect to emerge in the future is most prob-
able, even if the Nigerian state succeeds in winning the fight against Boko Ha-
ram. 
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Abstract 
This chapter examines the interplay between insurgency and counter-insurgen-
cy elements within north-eastern Nigeria. We scrutinise the effectiveness of se-
curity force operations in increasing population security and managing or miti-
gating violence caused by the violent and extremist Islamist organisation Boko 
Haram. Key to the chapter is determining whether Nigerian security force op-
erations have either helped or exacerbated problems associated with Islamist 
violence in the north of the country. To do so we have compiled data on both 
security force and militant fatalities since the outbreak of the violence and in-
cluded historical case studies for comparison. Ultimately, this chapter will call 
into question whether Nigerian strategies for dealing with the problem are 
practicable and appropriate.  
Introduction 
Boko Haram, a self-styled Islamist movement, whose name has commonly been 
translated as “Western education is forbidden” and which has been ranked as a 
terrorist organisation by a host of governments across the world, has been en-
gaged in a costly – both in terms of lives and property – insurgency/counter-
insurgency battle with Nigeria’s military and law enforcement elements, collec-
tively operating under the Joint Task Force (hereafter JTF) framework. Boko Ha-
ram, which has its origins in and maintains its current stronghold in Nigeria’s 
north-eastern provinces (Borno and Yobe), has increasingly utilised indiscrimi-
nate violence in pursuit of a radical social reform agenda, while the JTF have 
responded with heavy-handed tactics to quash the movement. The battle thus far 
from the side of Boko Haram has largely consisted of small-scale insurgent hit-
and-run attacks on a range of government and civilian targets, followed by large-
scale retaliatory military deployments from the state security forces, widespread 
urban lockdowns, door-to-door searches, and haphazard large-scale arrests. This 
dynamic has left much of the population of the north of Nigeria caught between 
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Boko Haram brutality and JTF excesses of authority. The inability of the Nigeri-
an military and the police elements of the JTF to effectively conduct more even-
handed counter-insurgency operations in urban environments has created a situa-
tion where the constant ebb and flow of insurgent gains and systemic human 
rights abuses on the part of both insurgents and security forces make any substan-
tial security improvements fleeting.  
Security, as Okunola (2013: 4) argues, is an imperative for Nigeria, as is the 
case for any society, and is one of the major needs of a population, particularly 
following physiological needs. Security allows for individuals to grow, engage in 
lawful and productive activities, and produce meaningful development in Nigeri-
an society. As such, a primary duty of the Nigerian state is the provision of secu-
rity to its citizens (ibid.).1 Given this assertion, this chapter examines the Nigeri-
an context by drawing upon elements of Hobbesian theory – that is, from the hy-
pothesis that in the absence of strong central governance, where there is a mutu-
ally accepted covenant of trust between the government and the governed, situa-
tions emerge where there is a “war of all against all” (Hobbes 1988: 15). Moreo-
ver, key to the analysis of a state’s struggle for security and stability is the point 
at which the actions of the state become part of the problem rather than the solu-
tion. In other words, when does the actor whose role it is to provide security, and 
often in the name of security implementation, become yet another element of in-
security in a seemingly never-ending cycle of violence (ibid.)? Whilst the context 
in Nigeria is not quite as stark as this, the emergence and continued activities of 
Boko Haram and its splinter groups, as well as generally high levels of violence 
across the country, suggest a fundamental breakdown in this covenant. At the 
same time, an overly violent central government or security force also has its part 
to play in perpetuating cycles of increasing violence and insecurity. 
This chapter is a case study focused on the incidence of violence between the 
security services and the militant groups directly engaged in violence within Ni-
geria, namely Boko Haram and Ansaru. The chapter further touches upon exam-
ples of insurgency/counter-insurgency operations from other international con-
flicts as a means of contextualising our arguments. As such, the analysis will not 
substantively engage in larger issues of fatalities or patterns of violence suffered 
by either intended or unintended civilian or other government casualties (espe-
cially since clear designations are particularly difficult to definitively ascribe in 
Nigeria). Here we analyse the role of Nigeria’s security forces as the primary 
proponents of state-sanctioned violence, to examine its attempts to (re)assert con-
trol over the state. How the Nigerian security forces respond to challenges to 
their central authority, both from internal non-state actors and other globalising 
influences, as well as how they exercise their desired monopoly over the practice 
                                                            
1  See Section 14 (b) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution 
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of violence, represent the primary factors of analysis. As such, the central  
hypothesis is that the Nigerian security forces’ ability or inability to exercise the 
required discretion in their use of violence determines the probability of success-
fully creating an atmosphere from which security and stability can emerge. If one 
accepts that a state of insecurity creates the opportunity for direct challenges to 
state legitimacy to arise and that overly repressive security tactics exacerbate the 
problem, then there is a need to determine whether the actions of the Nigerian 
state are resolving internal security issues or creating a growing sense of insecuri-
ty. 
What this chapter argues is that the JTF response to Boko Haram and Ansaru 
has provided a platform from which these groups became successful in framing 
and re-framing longstanding local grievances in an organisationally advantageous 
way. This becomes evident in the fact that Boko Haram has been able to expand 
its support outside its original home base in the North-East. Further, we propose 
that this societal dynamic (namely the propensity to perceived grievances in the 
North-East) has been intensified by JTF operations in recent years, even though 
there has been no single linear trend to the changes over time. The chapter exam-
ines the back-and-forth battle between Boko Haram and the JTF, as well as its 
consequences. 
In order to analyse the factors associated with security or insecurity, one needs 
to first establish reasonably reliable datasets from which to draw figures for 
comparison. In addition, one needs comparable historical case studies which pro-
vide a baseline for what can be considered effective or ineffective uses of state-
sanctioned violence in response to direct challenges to authority. Moreover, reli-
able datasets provide the totals from which to identify broader trends and develop 
determinations for red-line points at which the rates of state-sanctioned violence 
begin to have adverse effects. In the case of Nigeria, data constitutes both the 
greatest requirement and the greatest impediment to empirical research, owing to 
poor data collection and management practices at all levels of government. As 
such, non-traditional methods of data selection and collection play significant 
roles in study and analysis. This type of research encountered two primary and 
significant obstacles. First, acquiring enough online media sources to reconstruct 
nearly a decade’s worth of events with a reasonable amount of reliability proved 
extremely difficult and labour-intensive. Second, the politically charged atmos-
phere surrounding Boko Haram-related events made discerning between fact and 
propaganda immensely difficult and nearly impossible.  
Using data collected from Nigerian online media sources, as well as from 
globally recognised news agencies such as the BBC, Reuters, AP, and AFP, we 
examine the details of events, fatalities, and evolutions within the militant insur-
gency in Nigeria to identify trends. For the Nigerian media sources we relied on 
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all major reputable outlets but focused more on northern and central Nigerian-
based media sources like Leadership, Blueprint, Daily Trust, and smaller outlets 
like the Desert Herald for linguistic and cultural reasons. Major southern-based 
sources like Punch and Vanguard were also used, but due to the heavily politi-
cised nature of Boko Haram reporting, especially in terms of North–South divi-
sions, this was an issue for which we attempted to account. Alternatively, This-
Day newspaper, which typically has the best access to the military elite, is a good 
example of a media outlet intimately tied, almost too much so, into the political 
and military elite and therefore their reporting on certain events must be under-
stood through that prism. Additionally, certain details, whether entirely accurate 
or not, once printed in one media outlet quickly become reproduced in others, 
creating a echo chamber effect that is easily mistaken for confirmation. For this 
reason, we chose to omit source like Osun Defender and other such outlets which 
reproduce news instead of creating original content.   
While this system is not the ideal source of empirical data, it is the most readi-
ly available in a country with noted deficiencies in transparency of reporting and 
record keeping. As such, best-faith efforts to cross-verify all reported data to en-
sure a reasonable level of consistency and accuracy have been made. Based on 
fatality totals reported by the JTF, we analyse the efficacy of JTF operations 
based on the numbers of suspected insurgents killed and how those killings af-
fected Boko Haram’s operations and organisational trajectory. The chapter fur-
ther draws upon accounts and reported fatalities in other conflicts, as a means to 
determine the role security forces played in both the evolution of insurgencies 
and the creation of environments within which insurgencies continue to thrive. 
The total fatalities additionally allow us to further examine the overall transpar-
ency of JTF operations and scrutinize the attribution of insurgent status to vic-
tims of JTF operations. 
This analysis will focus exclusively on the interplay between the security forc-
es and the insurgents. The reason for this is the inherent difficulty in accurately 
assessing ultimate responsibility for fatalities in situations where victims are 
killed in an exchange of crossfire. Furthermore, we will rely only on estimates of 
‘militant’ fatalities collected by the authors, as part of an ongoing wider research 
study into conflict in West Africa. First, while there have been various reports on 
the alleged numbers of corpses stacked outside police facilities during the violent 
crackdowns in north-eastern Nigeria, there is no definitive evidence that the bod-
ies were all militants. Despite this, some agencies have listed militant fatalities as 
the sum of corpses reportedly counted outside these police stations. Such num-
bers, while not impossible, are nonetheless largely improbable in sheer scale, 
based on comparative data we have from other such incidents both in Nigeria and 
around the world on numbers of ‘active militant’ fatalities in combat over a simi-
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lar period of time. Second, ascertaining which corpses were ‘actively’ engaged in 
armed militancy is virtually impossible in a scenario where corpses are almost 
certainly not divided accurately into combatants and non-combatants. As such, 
while our estimates on militant and security force fatalities are lower than those 
released by the Nigerian government (Human Rights Watch 2010), we feel that 
they are reliable estimates for actual militant fatalities.  
Beginning with the 2003 clashes in Yobe State and moving forward into the 
current operations under the rubric of “Operation Restore Order”, we analyse 
both the JTF claims of militant killings and the reported loss of JTF members. In 
establishing solid estimates and comparing the data, we can scrutinise the figures 
for alleged Boko Haram members and reported JTF casualties and determine pat-
terns of lethality associated with both insurgent operations and Nigerian state 
responses. The sum of alleged militant killings provides the basis for comparison 
with other such insurgencies in other parts of the world. Analysis of both Boko 
Haram and JTF fatalities, independent of the civilian casualties, will provide the 
opportunity to examine the internal dynamics of the struggle between Boko Ha-
ram and the JTF. This analysis will provide a level perspective and scale to the 
insurgency and present the data from multiple perspectives. 
The chapter develops an understanding of where the JTF are in their attempts 
to dismantle Boko Haram and address the overall security situation that has aris-
en from the violence. Key analyses will focus on issues of proportionally appro-
priate violence, addressing underlying security factors, and decreasing federal 
legitimacy amongst affected populations. By determining the status of these fac-
tors one will be better able to ascertain how effective the JTF operations have 
been thus far and potentially determine where the operations have succeeded and 
failed to achieve their overall goals. Through this analysis we hope to highlight 
how and why the Boko Haram movement has both gained and lost support and 
legitimacy in the North-East, from its inception to its current manifestation. Fi-
nally, we develop a critical assessment of how the JTF has thus far engaged the 
threat to the Nigerian state. 
Insurgents or terrorists? 
Given the dramatic contextual shifts following the September 2001 attacks on the 
US, as well as subsequent terrorist attacks in Spain (2004) and the UK (2007), 
much non-state violent activity has come to be viewed through the securitised 
lens of the ‘war on terror’. Groups and individuals that would once have been 
seen as guerrillas, insurgents, or revolutionaries have come to be defined as ‘ter-
rorist’ (Smith 2008). Whilst there are a number of overlaps between the defini-
tions, it is important to highlight some of the differences as well as move away 
from crude labelling of groups as merely terrorist, a labelling that has often 
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served a strategic function to increase counter-terrorism aid to certain govern-
ments from Washington (Smith 2008; Colombant 2012).  
During the last few decades, religious and ethnic activists have been by far the 
most frequent non-governmental strategists of terror. Often they have called for 
autonomy; at times they have sought control of existing governments; but in-
creasingly, they have struck directly at their religious and ethnic rivals (Tilly 
2004: 10). But just because a group utilises terrorist strategies as part of its reper-
toire of actions, does that make it a terrorist organisation? Charles Tilly, in his 
article Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists, asserts that “terror is a (political) strategy, 
not a creed” and thus represents “asymmetrical deployment of threats and vio-
lence against enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle 
routinely operating within some current regime” (ibid. 11). For Tilly, terrorist 
strategies have a crude logic of their own, sending “signals that the target is vul-
nerable, that the perpetrators exist, and that the perpetrators have the capacity to 
strike again”. These signals are often directed at three different audiences: “the 
targets themselves, potential allies of the perpetrators, and third parties that might 
cooperate with one or the other” (ibid. 9). For Tilly, terrorist violence is not an 
end in itself but rather is perpetrated in support of different demands: recognition, 
redress, autonomy, or transfers of power. Hence, for Tilly, terror is a strategy 
aimed at altering or inhibiting the target’s disapproved of behaviour, fortifying 
the perpetrators’ standing with potential allies, and moving third parties toward 
greater cooperation with the perpetrators’ organisation and announced program 
(ibid.). This is certainly part of Boko Haram’s wider repertoire of actions. 
It is clear that Boko Haram utilises terrorist strategies as part of its repertoire 
of actions – however, to define it as simply a terrorist organisation is to fall short 
of an adequate analysis of the group’s wider activities. This chapter argues in-
stead that Boko Haram should be analysed within the wider lens of insurgencies 
and counter-insurgencies. For R. Scott Moore, insurgencies seek fundamental 
change:  
[to] the existing political or social order through the use of sustained violence and political 
disruption. It is a long-term form of warfare in which military actions are carried out by 
guerrilla cells and terrorists, often targeting civilians and infrastructure. (Moore n.d.) 
Importantly, Moore argues that guerrilla attacks and terrorism comprise only 
one element of insurgencies, and sometimes not the primary one. The argument 
is that more important than the violence of insurgency are:  
[its] political, economic, and social components. These are at the heart of the conflict, both 
its causes and its effects. Instead of defeating armies, insurgents slowly chip away at the au-
thority and legitimacy of the ruling government … Thus subversion, social disruption, and 
political action become more important than violence, however spectacular or horrendous. 
(ibid.) 
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Viewing Boko Haram as an insurgency movement allows us, therefore, to not 
only consider the use of strategies of terror by the group, but also wider tactics 
that further help to explain the response elicited from the Nigerian state as well as 
the ensuing cycle of violence. 
An insurgency requires two fundamental elements to ensure its long-term via-
bility as a functioning organisation within a particular operating environment: 
support and fear. Support is required in the sense that an insurgent organisation 
requires a relatively consistent recruitment base and a reliable safe haven from 
which to plan and carry out operations. Support does not require majority por-
tions of a population to be actively engaged but enough to ensure that counter 
measures against the organisation remain relatively difficult. Alternatively, in-
surgent organisations can operate from bordering countries, but increased travel 
distances and required border crossings substantially add to the operational risks 
associated with any action. As such, the support of a local population is a vital 
requirement for the survival of an insurgent movement. It is for this reason that 
maintaining its base of operations in and around Maiduguri is essential to Boko 
Haram’s long-term viability. 
The cycle of escalating violence 
Since the 2003 clashes between followers of firebrand leaders Mohammed Ali 
and Mohammed Yusuf – founders of the extremist albeit still abstruse sect – and 
Nigeria’s security forces, there has been a non-stop cycle of brutal repression and 
violent revenge. The cost in human lives has been estimated at between one and 
three thousand victims, but accounts and specific details vary widely from source 
to source (Campbell 2011; Aghedo & Osumah 2012; Walker 2012; Murdock 
2013; Chouin, Reinert & Apard, this volume). It should be noted that even if the 
high-end estimate of fatalities directly or indirectly attributed to the Boko Haram 
insurgency were accepted at face value, they would still represent a small per-
centage of the overall violent deaths that have occurred in Nigeria over that same 
period of time (Ajaegbu 2012; Ayuk et al. 2012). According to UNODC data, 
Nigeria had 18,422 intentional homicides in 2008, the year after the violently 
contested elections (UNODC 2013). Based on those numbers remaining relative-
ly constant, Boko Haram would constitute approximately 5 per cent of all violent 
deaths in Nigeria since their peak in fatalities in 2009. The question of who fired 
the first shot or what act precipitated a given response in the now nearly decade-
long struggle is less important than the recurring pattern of violence and retalia-
tion that has engulfed the northern region of Nigeria. This is especially true inso-
far as it pertains to examining the efficacy of the efforts to curb violence in north-
eastern Nigeria. A largely underreported and underexamined element of the crisis 
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in the North is the number of fatalities associated with the state response to the 
insecurity associated with the emergence of Boko Haram.  
Since the earliest clashes with Mohammed Ali, one of the original leaders 
along with Mohammed Yusuf, and his followers in Yobe State, there has been a 
cycle of retaliation and retribution that has exacerbated an already fraught situa-
tion. The initial settlement established by Yusuf’s followers, dubbed ‘Afghani-
stan’, appeared to be a largely non-violent albeit simultaneously socially antago-
nistic move, meant to mirror the actions of Islam’s Prophet Mohammed during 
his hijrah (migration) from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD as a means of fleeing 
threats and persecution (Masud 1989). This action, as explained by other ana-
lysts, confirms the scripturally literalist inclination of Yusuf and his followers, a 
characteristic that can lend itself to creating deep social divisions with all other 
forms of religious and political interpretations of what constitutes a morally ac-
ceptable society (Onuoha 2012; Tanchum 2012: 77). According to available re-
porting, while the movement was not opposed to violence in defence of its social 
agenda, the initial clashes appeared to be localised communal violence, an occur-
rence that is widespread across Nigeria. This violence was accompanied by in-
creasingly anti-government rhetoric as well as exclusionary practices on the part 
of the Yusufiyya followers, such as encouraging followers to tear up higher edu-
cation degrees and establishing communal police and judicial systems to openly 
challenge existing state institutions (Onuoha 2012). Nevertheless, the state re-
sponse between 2003 and 2004 to these initial occurrences of violence – which 
according to reports ultimately claimed the lives of a significant number of sect 
members – in comparison with similar forms of criminal deviance and insurrec-
tion elsewhere in Nigeria appeared to be quite disproportionate (Cook 2011; 
Onuoha 2012; Walker 2012). 
The scale of the response has likely been influenced by the direct challenge to 
the legitimacy of the Nigerian federal government’s right to rule over northern 
Muslims, especially Yusuf’s followers. The military response, which was de-
layed following the initial small-scale clashes with police forces (Cook 2011), 
was possibly unavoidable in the long term given Yusuf’s growing number of fol-
lowers and staunch opposition to central government authority. However, the 
scale of this response can and should be scrutinized and further debated. The 
need for proportionality in effectively countering internal instability and uproot-
ing localised insurgencies is a central element of widely accepted counter-
insurgency doctrine (Moore n.d.). The ability of the Nigerian federal government 
to find the necessary balance in its early response to Yusuf and subsequent at-
tempts to deal with a more violently inclined movement can and should be called 
into question. 
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In 2003, when followers of Yusuf assaulted locals near Kanama who chal-
lenged their rights to use fishing waters in lands not owned by the sect, it raised 
concerns with local authorities and eventually led to clashes with local police 
(Walker 2012). Police were then, and still are, largely unable to effectively deal 
with such situations across Nigeria at a local level, owing to a lack of investment, 
training, and capacity, which continues to plague them to this day (Okunola 
2013); therefore, their failure to address the problems in Kanama village should 
have come as no surprise. The destruction of two local police stations and the 
looting of police armouries provided Yusuf’s followers with improved weaponry 
and increased the urgency of the Nigerian security apparatus (Cook 2011; Onuo-
ha 2012). Moreover, it provided the first in an increasing number of public hu-
miliations for local security officials at the hands of determined militants and 
represented a sign of the escalating violence that would come. However, the 
event was not without precedent in Nigeria, where there is little regard for law 
enforcement officers, and numerous armed militias have attacked such institu-
tions (Ikelegbe 2005; Alemika & Chukwuma 2012). In fact, police stations and 
police have routinely been assaulted throughout Nigeria by a number of different 
groups for a variety of reasons (Marenin 1987; Ikelegbe 2005; Udo 2013). 
The one concerning and uniquely distinguishing factor about Yusuf and his 
followers, nevertheless, was the content of their vocal contempt and disregard for 
the legitimacy of the Nigerian state, a contempt which in some regards exceeded 
that of more financially, ethnically, or purely grievance-driven movements. This 
more overtly religious element, especially the social exclusion and public with-
drawal aspects, possibly increased the stakes of the situation in the minds of the 
security officials tasked with resolving the problems in Yobe State (Adesoji 
2011; Marchal 2012). While criminal organisations typically have little, if any, 
respect or regard for the central authority of rule of law, such inclinations do not 
necessarily constitute the primary motivators of membership or collective action 
and do not always supersede the desire for monetary gain or sense of increased 
security (Salaam 2011; Sharkey et al. 2011). Such complexities in motivation 
and intent are likely also to be as present in the membership composition of out-
wardly religious groups like Boko Haram as they are in other criminal organisa-
tions. This is important because it was the overall criminal violence that initially 
prompted the Nigerian authorities to establish Operation Flush units, among oth-
er such operations, throughout the country to deal with near endemic crime rates 
(Joab-Peterside 2007). It was units established and intended for anti-crime opera-
tions, not properly trained or skilled in dealing with militant social movements, 
that first engaged Yusuf and his followers; and it was these units which, in com-
bination with Yusuf, helped to initiate the cycle of violence and retribution that 
has ensnared the North-East. 
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The clashes in and around Kanama village in Yobe State played a significant 
role in the genesis from which the “Nigerian Taliban” movement began its grad-
ual progression to increasingly more violent operational modes (Onuoha 2012; 
Walker 2012). The clash, as previously stated, was possibly inevitable since the 
movement had by this time already taken a position of absolute disregard for the 
legitimacy of the Nigerian state and afforded no respect or regard to security and 
law enforcement elements (Onuoha 2012; Walker 2012). According to various 
estimates, approximately seventy sect members were killed in the raids following 
the police station attacks (Cook 2011; Walker 2012). This number of fatalities, 
which by most accounts amounted to the majority of the sect members in Ka-
nama, in addition to the arrests of others, almost decimated the nascent move-
ment. The killings represented the first in a series of arguably disproportionate 
state responses. 
The incident likely provided Yusuf with clearly visible current actions to sub-
stantiate his previous claims against the Nigerian state and probably aided in the 
recruitment of further disaffected youths to restore and bolster the movement’s 
active membership. Eventually, the movement regrouped and was able to pose an 
even greater threat to the Nigerian state. At this time, Yusuf’s movement had, 
according to some accounts, more than doubled (Cook 2011; Onuoha 2012; 
Walker 2012). Again, as was the case in Yobe State, it was a potentially avoida-
ble violent incident between the JTF and Yusuf’s followers which incited the 
deadly 2009 uprising across several Nigerian states. While details of the encoun-
ter vary depending on sources, what is clear is that sect members participating in 
a funeral procession had an altercation with the JTF in Maiduguri, which eventu-
ally led to several unarmed sect members being shot and dozens of others arrest-
ed (Cook 2011; Walker 2012). Yusuf wasted no time in capitalising upon this 
perceived assault on ‘the faithful’ by the ‘illegitimate’ Nigerian state, fomenting 
anger and a desire for revenge among his followers (Walker 2012). The ensuing 
uprising resulted in several hundred fatalities, of which approximately 200 were 
alleged to have been sect members, according to local media reports on JTF 
statements. In addition, this led to the widely condemned extrajudicial killings 
not only of Mohammed Yusuf but of dozens of other individuals in police custo-
dy, including prominent sect member Alhaji Buji Foi (Cook 2011; Onuoha 2012; 
Walker 2012). 
Following the uprising and violent crackdown, the group once again dispersed, 
into remote areas of Nigeria and into neighbouring countries, until they were able 
to reorganise and again recruit (Onuoha 2012). This encounter ushered in a new 
evolution of the movement, one that embraced the far more violent tendencies of 
its new leader, Abubakar Shekau (Cook 2011; Onuoha 2012; Rodgers 2012). 
Following the 2009 crackdown, the group built on the charismatic anti-establish-
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ment preaching of Yusuf and was transformed into a full-blown insurgency, 
which has trapped the North in a seemingly never-ending cycle of violence and 
retaliation. The group not only changed in its willingness to initiate and instigate 
violence, but it began to adopt tactics and methods more akin to global terrorist 
organisations. This evolution dramatically altered the dynamic of the battle be-
tween the sect and the Nigerian security forces. 
In the time between the 2009 crackdown and the group’s re-emergence, ac-
cording to local media reporting, Boko Haram members engaged in a series of 
targeted assassinations on individuals directly related to the crackdown or those 
suspected of having provided information or support to the crackdown. This se-
ries of violent attacks, largely carried out in areas considered to be sect strong-
holds, would later pale in comparison with the hit-and-run, mass-casualty attacks 
that became commonplace across northern Nigeria and into the Federal Capital 
Territory. In 2011, the group once again resurfaced, this time with Nigeria’s first 
suicide attack – a type of action previously thought to be cultural anathema for 
Nigerians (Lee 2010; Oghre 2012) – on Police Headquarters in Abuja, and it was 
followed by a more daring suicide attack on the UN facility in Abuja (Onuoha 
2012). The tactics employed by the security services, tactics that had previously 
worked in largely quelling the 1980s’ Mahdi insurgency led by Mohammed 
Marwam known as the Maitatsine uprising (Danjibo 2010; Adesoji 2011), had 
served only to further spread the violence and seemingly stiffen the resolve of 
sect members. 
This evolution represented the second time in which attempts by security forc-
es to destroy Boko Haram had negligible or adverse effects. Shekau’s ascension 
to power and the subsequent rapid escalation of persistent and sustained violence 
were largely unexpected in Nigeria (Cook 2011; Onuoha 2012). The failure of 
the Nigerian security and intelligence services to adequately understand and 
properly contextualise the problem Yusuf’s movement presented, coupled with 
the failure to determine the best options for dealing with the security implications 
while ensuring the security and welfare of the citizens, are in part responsible for 
the course of events that followed (Marchal 2012; Kogbara 2013). Moreover, the 
widespread human rights abuses and indiscriminate crackdowns in the North, 
particularly in Borno and Yobe, further alienated an already sceptical north-
eastern population and served to further complicate any attempts to deal with the 
problems posed by Boko Haram (Onuoha 2012; Nossiter 2013). This was made 
clear in a recent Human Rights Watch report, which claimed that “JTF abuses 
have created growing resentment in communities, making community members 
more unlikely to provide information that could help curtail Boko Haram” and 
that “abuses by the JTF have created more distance between the people and the 
government” (Human Rights Watch 2012: 59). This sentiment was echoed in the 
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frustrations, expressed by the JTF, regarding the perceived lack of public support 
in Borno State for Operation Restore Order, designed to ‘protect the people’ 
(Idris 2013; Ugah 2013). 
The latest security force attempt to once and for all dismantle Boko Haram has 
led to the third violent crackdown, primarily focusing on Borno and Yobe states. 
This crackdown led to the alleged killing of an even greater number of Boko Ha-
ram members but has yet to deal the decisive final blow to the organisation (Al 
Jazeera 2013; Nossiter 2013; Umar & Gambrell 2013). The JTF operations have 
included imposing rigid curfews, mass arrests, door-to-door searches, destruction 
of homes, and prolonged detentions and/or interrogations of anyone suspected of 
being associated with Boko Haram. These actions have contributed to the low 
levels of public support for the security forces and have led to public protests in 
Maiduguri as well as condemnation by opposition politicians (Olugbode 2013). 
Moreover, the crackdowns, while not only failing to deal with the insurgency, 
have potentially spurred yet another evolution in the group. This latest evolution 
presents an even more complex and potentially more dangerous problem than 
previously seen. This evolution has split the organisation into multiple loosely 
interconnected groups that now complicate analysis and accurate attribution of 
events (Zenn 2013). Furthermore, the various groups have adopted new tactics, 
in the form of kidnappings for ransom or political statement, which have in-
creased the targets to include expatriate workers, foreign corporations, and re-
gional business infrastructures (Peoples Daily 2013). 
Counterinsurgency and the body count 
The raw data, while not optimal in terms of providing absolute certainty, tells a 
significant story in itself. In the case of the clashes between the JTF and Boko 
Haram, certain patterns emerge which provide a unique perspective. For exam-
ple, the ratio of reported militants killed versus militants arrested in a given year 
shows a potentially significant indication of the willingness of JTF forces to re-
sort to deadly force during counter-insurgency operations. The rate at which 
counter-insurgency operations lead to deaths rather than detentions is an im-
portant variable of analysis. This perspective is especially revealing when con-
trasted with numbers from similar historical case studies of military and paramili-
tary efforts to counter domestic militant groups. According to our compiled sta-
tistics, the approximate number of Boko Haram fatalities from 2007 to 2013, 
largely reported by the JTF, stands at approximately 620, which is admittedly at 
the low end of overall estimates for reasons of methodology. During the same 
period, according to our data, approximately 777 suspected Boko Haram mem-
bers were arrested. Some commentators suggest approximately 1,000 Boko Ha-
ram followers were killed in the 2009 riots alone (Cook 2011; Human Rights 
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Watch 2012; Zenn 2013), but we have thus far been unable to find reputable or 
reasonably verifiable reporting to substantiate such claims. Moreover, such num-
bers, while not impossible, are rather high; for example, the Pakistan military 
claimed to have killed similar numbers of militants during a 2008 offensive in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but those occurred over the course of a 
month-long sustained offensive (AFP 2008). Therefore, reports suggesting that 
those numbers were equalled over the course of an uprising that lasted less than a 
week in north-eastern Nigeria are dubious. 
While reporting agencies have different approaches to calculating total fatali-
ties and casualties during the ongoing Boko Haram conflict, the one consistent 
factor is the reliance to varying degrees on media reporting. As such, the assump-
tion is that certain portions of the data should be somewhat stable across the 
board, based on seemingly consistent sourcing. There are, however, instances of 
significant disparity in reporting within the data that emerged from the 2009 mili-
tant uprising across the several northern states and the ensuing state of emergen-
cy, a fact that is likely the primary cause of discrepancies in fatality totals be-
tween various entities tracking such data. In particular, reports that emerged re-
garding the security forces’ siege of Maiduguri from 27 to 29 July 2009 are espe-
cially problematic because the flow of information from the city was largely sti-
fled. The greatest disparity in fatality numbers emerges in this reporting, with 
estimates upwards of 1,000 fatalities, including from 200 to 700 militants killed 
(Al Jazeera 2009; Mukairu & Muhammad 2009; Telegraph 2009). The actual 
events in Maiduguri are virtually impossible to accurately assess, given the me-
dia blackout and rigid civilian curfew in which non-combatants were forced to 
remain indoors for the majority of the fighting. 
For the purposes of this analysis we clarify our position on two accounts. First, 
given the lack of reliable census data in Nigeria to provide context to reports, we 
accept that the probable range of total fatalities, according to Nigerian media re-
ports, in the 2009 uprising is somewhere between 600 and upwards of 1,000 
(BBC 2009; The Nation 2009). We also accept that the security services are like-
ly responsible for a significant share of that total as well as the militants. Howev-
er, since we do not have reliable comparative data on prior Nigerian military 
raids and equally heavy-handed military crackdowns on organised populist in-
surgencies – for example, the Maitatsine riots – we are less inclined to accept that 
600 to 1,000 ‘militants’ were killed. This position is based on our particular data 
collection methodology to assess the most likely totals of militant and security 
force fatalities, which form the basis for analysis within this piece. We fully 
acknowledge that our data, as with all other datasets, is open to further discussion 
and debate.  
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Accurately assessing fatalities directly attributable to low-intensity conflicts, 
such as that of Boko Haram, while a worthwhile and necessary endeavour, is an 
imperfect science and immensely difficult even with good pre-existing popula-
tion data, which Nigeria does not have; this therefore leaves the range between 
fatality estimates in a given conflict somewhere between the thousands and hun-
dreds of thousands (Murray et al. 2002). As such, variations in estimates from 
reporting agency to reporting agency are to be expected, given the various 
sources of collection. The disparity in reported statistics can be attributed to a 
number of variables, and few estimates can be categorically dismissed as entirely 
inaccurate. Nevertheless, numbers alone say less than the patterns that emerge 
regarding the actions and reactions of both the JTF and Boko Haram in their on-
going struggle. It is here that we wish to draw the focus of our analysis within 
this particular dataset. 
For example, irrespective of the body count or damage inflicted on the militant 
movement, the typical response from the group to any violent crackdowns has 
been a reactionary wave of violent revenge attacks, thus continuing a seemingly 
endless cycle of violence that largely affects surrounding civilian populations. 
According to the collected data, the timing of such retaliatory attacks by Boko 
Haram can range from days to even a year, but they occur without fail. This calls 
into question whether the tactics employed by the security forces are dealing with 
the root problems causing the insurgency and instability in the north-eastern re-
gions of Nigeria. Part of this question directly relates to the impact of civilian 
casualties attributable to security forces in a war among the people – as opposed 
to a strictly military combatant conflict – but we will address this issue only 
briefly. As already stated, this analysis will focus on the numbers of militant and 
security force fatalities and the patterns of militants killed or detained during the 
ongoing conflict, to contextualise the conflict. 
The current JTF strategy neither embraces all-out brutal repression nor does it 
effectively implement a more holistic counter-insurgency model. Instead, the op-
erational strategies are largely reactionary, and tactics like the routine demolition 
of properties of individuals even accused or suspected of tacitly supporting Boko 
Haram militants have placed the civilian population in a virtual no-win situation 
between the violence and destruction of both the militant and the security forces. 
In addition to alienated residents, the operating environment within which the 
security forces are attempting to carry out their counter-insurgency operations is 
made more complex by failures in other national institutions. Weak judicial and 
penal systems in the country, which also suffer from varying degrees of corrup-
tion, have made it so that there is only limited faith that insurgents will be 
properly prosecuted or effectively detained. Moreover, the series of daring prison 
breaks in northern prisons, along with the problems of poor funding and inade-
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quate staffing and equipment, have created a situation where security officials 
and their families can become targets for reprisal, a reality that has played out 
repeatedly in the North. 
In examining the fluctuating scale of violence in the course of the ongoing 
counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism operations (depending upon the particu-
lar agenda and perspective), the trends that emerge in the relationship between 
Boko Haram and the security forces tell a story in themselves. This story corre-
lates directly with the relationship between the citizens in Nigeria and the state 
institutions tasked with providing their “safety and well-being” as outlined in the 
Nigerian Constitution. For comparison, the total numbers of security forces, mili-
tants, and civilians killed in other conflicts are shown in Table 8.1: 
 
 
Table 8.1 Comparison of militants and security forces killed in selected conflicts 
  Militants killed Security forces  Ratio 
  killed  
IRA “Troubles” (35+ years) 350 * 1,100 * 1:3 
FARC (50+ years) 13,197 ** 4,286 ** 4:1 
2nd Chechen War (10 years) 14,113 *** 7,425 *** 2:1 
Boko Haram (6 years) 620 ^ 127 ^ 5:1 
* IRA totals (O’Brien 1999; Thorton et al. 2004; CAIN 2013); ** FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) totals (Cadavid n.d.; Human Rights Watch 2011); *** Chechen totals (Lee n.d.; Dunnigan 
2002; Sapozhnikov 2003; REFRL 2005); ^ Boko Haram totals based on media reporting from January 
2007 through February 2013. 
 
 
This data highlights that the Nigerian security forces are by no means the most 
brutal in terms of total alleged counter-insurgent fatalities; however, the numbers 
are not particularly positive either, especially in terms of the ratio of militant to 
security force deaths, in which Nigeria ranks highest. It must be stated that secu-
rity sector abuses in Nigeria are not isolated to counter-insurgency operations 
against Boko Haram and are responsible for fatalities on an almost daily basis 
throughout the country (Pérouse de Montclos 2011); however, such abuses are 
also common in the Caucasus and in Colombia, which further highlights this par-
ticular comparative data with Nigeria as it pertains to counter-insurgency opera-
tions. These problems occur when trying to resolve a largely law enforcement 
issue with primarily traditional military forces, a lesson learned by all the other 
case studies. There is no clear figure to distinguish the point at which fatalities 
caused by the security forces contribute to a growing sense of insecurity; howev-
er, given the fact that Boko Haram has continued and, at times, expanded  
operations, that point is probably not far off.  
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In addition, if one takes into account the rates at which militants are either 
killed or detained/arrested in a given year in Nigeria from the 2009 uprising to 
date, the data shows some interesting trends (Table 8.2). 
  
 
  Table 8.2 Comparison of arrests with kills* 
  BH militants killed Security forces killed BH militants arrested 
2013 99 4 82 
2012 210 18 197 
2011 20 47 119 
2010 0 5 13 
2009 251 21 373 
  * Totals based on media reporting from January 2009 through February 2013. 
 
 
The arrest/kill data shows that the ratio between arrests and killings begins to 
shift increasingly towards killing over the last 18 months, especially in the last 
year of the conflict. This suggests that there is a possible growing preference 
amongst Nigerian security forces to kill. If the current ratio from the first months 
of 2013 remains consistent through the remainder of the year, it will represent a 
dramatic increase in already repressive tactics. In the end, such a shift will likely 
further distance the ‘protectors’ from the ‘victims’, thereby undermining security 
operations and perpetuating negative perceptions of the security forces by the 
public. This does not have to be the case. The security forces have, in other vio-
lent clashes, conducted themselves in a manner that has resolved the crisis with-
out resorting to heavy-handed tactics (Ezeobi 2013). 
Conclusion 
Based on the regenerative nature of Boko Haram and the splintering of the vio-
lent movement into competing groups, there is nothing to suggest that the Nigeri-
an security forces are in a position to kill their way to stability in the North. Even 
the historically heavy-handed Russian counter-insurgency units operating in the 
Caucasus region have adopted more even-handed tactics, which have led to in-
creased security for local residents (Flintoff 2013). Such realisations have come 
to most successful counter-insurgency operations and are core elements of sound 
strategy to achieve sustained security (Moore n.d.). As such, to return to a rea-
sonable sense of security, a serious shift away from the current reactionary strat-
egies and the heavy-handed tactics currently employed by the Nigerian security 
forces is likely to be the only viable option. The fact that operating environments 
have improved and public support, even in counter-Boko Haram operations, has 
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been greater in areas where the security forces have not so strictly adhered to 
such heavy-handed is evidence to that end (Garba 2012). 
In the relatively short history of security force operations against Boko Haram, 
there have been far too many incidents of inexcusable abuses of state power, 
from extrajudicial killings to indiscriminate retaliatory responses. Such events 
have continued to contribute to the ever-growing sense of insecurity amongst the 
people. The peaks and troughs in overall violence within the Nigerian security 
response speak to the reactionary nature of the strategy. In the war currently be-
ing waged amongst the people, the reactionary strategy being employed by the 
Nigerian security forces must be re-evaluated and altered to better address both 
the causes and results of the ongoing violence. With a more cohesive operational 
focus and tempo, knee-jerk retributions of uncontrolled violence can be better 
controlled. Until such time, the majority of the insecurity burden will continue to 
be shouldered by the public. The public are in no position to bear such a burden, 
and in such an environment there will almost certainly be no substantive security 
gains.  
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Abstract 
This chapter tackles the issue of victims and religion in the Boko Haram crisis 
through a quantitative, critical examination of the deaths it has resulted in 
among Christians and Muslims in the affected states of Nigeria. After a brief 
discussion of the sectarian movement’s changing ideology towards Christians, 
317 Boko Haram-related events, identified in the Nigeria Watch database from 
July 2009-December 2012 data, are analysed to provide the most reliable pos-
sible body count for the period. The study assesses the status – civilian, Boko 
Haram member, JTF member, etc. – and the religious affiliation of all reported 
individuals who died as a result of the conflict. As it proved impossible to de-
termine the religion of more than 60 per cent of the fatalities (mostly civilians), 
available demographic data were used to provide estimates. Despite an obvious 
increase in deadly attacks against Christian civilians, the combined data sug-
gest that approximately two civilian victims out of three were Muslims. This 
challenges the commonplace temptation to understand the crisis in terms of a 
religious confrontation between Muslims and Christians. It suggests that such a 
representation may be fed by an overreporting of Christian victims compared 
with Muslim victims, in both Nigerian newspapers and international reports.  
Introduction  
A small Islamic sect created in the early 2000s by Mohammed Yusuf with a few 
dozen followers in Borno and Yobe states has become, in less than ten years, a 
high-profile terrorist organisation known as Boko Haram, strong enough to chal-
lenge the Nigerian state and threaten the stability of bordering countries such as 
Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The essence and goals of the radical group, as well 
as its methods, targets, and victims, have evolved over time and are not easily 
retraceable. In the Western narrative, the conflict is frequently presented as a  
religious war opposing Islamic extremists to Christian communities. Christian 
killings have indeed been widely reported, in both the Nigerian and international 
media, strengthening the idea that Christian communities are the primary victims 
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of the crisis in terms of fatalities. In 2013, declarations by Nigerian President 
Goodluck Jonathan, however, stressed that Muslims are the most numerous vic-
tims of the ongoing struggle (Daily Trust 2013). The issue is undoubtedly sensi-
tive as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) immediately replied to the 
statement by accusing President Jonathan of “distorting facts”, and recalling “the 
statistics” that “are there for everybody to see how Christians have been massa-
cred by the terrorists” (The Nation 2013a). The debate is not meaningless; it 
gives the conflict a particular definition and chooses to analyse it exclusively in 
terms of religious confrontation. This perspective, which is undoubtedly an im-
portant characteristic of the current crisis, disregards a number of other factors. 
Nevertheless, even when tackling the issue of casualties in terms of religion, a 
major problem remains: statistics are not there. Indeed, data presented to support 
both President Jonathan’s and CAN’s affirmations are nonexistent at worst, and 
rather weak at best.  
In this article, we use the Nigeria Watch database to build a statistical basis for 
a discussion on the religious affiliation of the fatalities in the conflict and the pre-
ferred targets of the radical group. The aim is to empirically examine the identity 
of the victims, through their religion (basically Islam and Christianity) and also 
their status (civilians, Boko Haram members, Nigerian security force members, 
other officials, etc.). The Nigeria Watch database provides material on violent 
deaths in Nigeria from 2006 onward, and our analysis covers the case of the 
Boko Haram crisis from July 2009 to December 2012. Religious affiliation as a 
category has been excluded from public censuses in Nigeria since 1962; but since 
this question is inherently linked to our study, we also tackle the issue of de-
mographics and religion in the Nigerian states where Boko Haram has been ac-
tive. Our results are used to better assess the reality of the ongoing violence and 
debunk some preconceived ideas. 
First, we recall the ideological background of Boko Haram and attempt to 
provide an account of its public stance towards Christians. We then present the 
Nigeria Watch database, the nature of the data used, and the way it was extracted. 
Finally, we propose a step-by-step analysis of these data, leading to estimates of 
the numbers of Muslims and Christians who fell victims to the crisis during the 
period under consideration. 
Ideological background and attitude towards Christians 
Until the beginning of the 2000s, before becoming the spiritual leader of his own 
spiritual community, Mohammed Yusuf was a follower of Sheikh Ja’far Adam, a 
renowned and charismatic Islamic scholar in the Izala movement. The two men 
shared the same Salafi/Wahhabi religious ideal inspired by the Saudi model. The 
Izala doctrine, which appeared in Nigeria in the late-1970s, advocates for the es-
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tablishment of an Islamic society that will correspond to the values and practices 
of the pious ancestors (Salafs) but has never prevented members from being ac-
tive participants in the state system or attending public schools.1 The movement 
is characterised by its active proselytism (dawah), and Yusuf, being an excellent 
preacher, subsequently became a significant Izala figure in Maiduguri (Brigaglia 
2012a). 
From 2003 onwards, Yusuf’s ideology gradually moved away from the Izala 
ideal, radicalised, and developed into a discourse characterised by the systematic 
rejection of all secular aspects of Nigerian society ([Anon.] 2012).2 He built his 
argumentation around the concept of boko (Higazi 2013), a Hausa word that 
brings together the notions of sham, fraud, deceit, and lack of authenticity, but 
also refers to Western education (Newman 2013). According to Yusuf, the feder-
al state of Nigeria represents a boko model in which Muslims cannot participate. 
In his preaching, Yusuf used to repeat that “Boko haram da aïki’n gomenati ha-
ram”, which means that receiving a secular education, as well as working for the 
government, was forbidden for Muslims – hence the nickname Boko Haram giv-
en to the movement by outsiders.3 
Such divergences led to an open conflict with Sheikh Ja’far and Yusuf’s de-
parture from the Izala movement. Secluded in Maiduguri, he was prevented from 
preaching in Izala mosques and was directly attacked in sermons given by his 
former mentor ([Anon.] 2012; Brigaglia 2012a). At about the same time, in 
2002–2003, a group of presumed Yusuf students calling themselves Al Sunna 
Wal Jamma (“Followers of the Prophet’s Teaching) decided to create a distinct 
community near Kanama, a small town of Yobe State, in order to live outside of 
any secular framework. Members of this community were the first to engage in 
violent confrontations with state authorities. The process of Yusuf’s ideological 
escalation is, in a way, consistent with the Izala philosophy, which was born out 
of the contestation of the traditional Muslim elite’s authority. By refusing the 
supremacy of Tijanyyia scholars, the proponents of the Izala doctrine encouraged 
the acquisition of an individual religious knowledge that promotes a direct rela-
                                                            
1  In their sermons, the Izala mallams such as Sheikh Mahmoud Ja’far, Sheikh Abubakar Giro, Sheikh 
Kabiru Gombe, and Sheikh Albani Zaria attach considerable importance to education. The deep social 
and religious reform they advocate for requires the involvement of their followers at every level of the 
state. These speeches, made in Hausa and recorded on DVDs manufactured by small local production 
companies (such as An-Noor Islamic Production, Sawtul-Hikmah, Sautu Rijaalis Sunnah, Darul Islam 
Production), are on sale in street shops and markets all over northern Nigeria.  
2  In support of his argument, Yusuf referred to Abu Zayd, a Saudi Islamic scholar who claimed that 
modern secular education was “totally lacking any Islamic legitimacy”.  
3  From 2005 onwards, the popularity of Mohammed Yusuf began to grow in the Republic of Niger, 
where his sermons recorded on DVDs were widely disseminated. The Nigerien version of his name 
was Mahamadou Issoufou, and he was known for the numerous references to the concept of boko in 
his preaching; thus, people began to call him Mahamadou Issoufou ‘Boko Haram’ (interviews with 
DVDs sellers in Niamey, Maradi and Zinder, 2012–2013). 
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tion with God and facilitates a certain disconnection from Islamic clerics. 
Yusuf’s dissidence also arose from a desire for emancipation from the control of 
Izala’s scholars as he developed a radical discourse in his preaching for the rejec-
tion of the secular state. By stepping outside of the Izala doctrine conveyed by 
the great figures of the movement, Yusuf created his own school of thought. 
Likewise, members of the Kanama community wanted to literally break away 
from the federal secular state and consequently began a new experiment which 
was consistent with the message of Yusuf (Higazi 2013). The radicalisation pro-
cess of the Kanama community may have encouraged Yusuf to further strengthen 
his own rhetoric.4 It is worth noting that Yusuf’s sect began committing violent 
acts against police stations and other symbols of the Nigerian state authority after 
the repression of the Al Sunna Wal Jamma in 2003, although such actions long 
remained sporadic. 
A tipping point was reached in July 2009, after a week-long battle in north-
eastern Nigeria between government forces (both police and army) and members 
of the sect. A series of attacks on police stations by Boko Haram members in 
Bauchi, Borno, and Yobe states – indicating that the group had prepared for an 
armed confrontation with the secular state (even in a rather amateurish way in 
several instances) – was followed by harsh military repression. The uprising re-
sulted in hundreds of casualties and led to the extrajudicial assassination of the 
sect’s leader.5 The first deliberate attacks against Christians were witnessed at 
this time (Amaza 2013). Subsequently, after more than a year of restructuring, 
and seemingly under the subdued leadership of Yusuf’s second-in-command, 
Abubakar Shekau, followers became true activists and diversified their actions in 
a more politically focused way, with improved weaponry, logistics, and organisa-
tion. Large-scale terrorist attacks began in December 2010, systematically target-
ing people – such as Christians – and institutions that had not been strategic tar-
gets for Boko Haram before then.6  
Unlike most terrorist groups, which formulate a discourse and define political 
goals before striking, Boko Haram’s ideology seems to have developed gradually 
                                                            
4  Although most of them are thought to be former students of Mohammed Yusuf, the nature of the rela-
tion between members of the Kanama community and the Boko Haram leader have not been fully 
clarified. It seems, however, that most of the survivors integrated into Yusuf’s group after the gov-
ernment repression in 2004. 
5  Borno in general and Maiduguri in particular were by far the two places most affected in terms of 
casualties. Our breakdown accounts for about 900 victims. However, other estimates propose more 
than a thousand people killed. See Brigaglia (2012a: 35) and Higazi (2013: 4). The latter cites the  
Report of the Administrative Committee of Inquiry into the Boko Haram Insurgency in Borno State. 
Main Report (5 volumes), October 2009. This report has never been made public and records 1,387 
victims. 
6  Including the bomb attack on the UN building in August 2011 and the series of attacks on Christian 
targets at Christmas 2010 and 2011, the coordinated attacks in Kano in January 2012, the bombing of 
ThisDay newspaper headquarters in April 2012, and the destruction of several telecommunication fa-
cilities.  
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alongside its violent actions. The official name of the movement also evolved. 
Originally known as Ahl al-sunna wa’l jama’a ala minhaj al-salaf (Association 
of the People of the Sunnah for the Implementation of the Salafs’ Model), it was 
renamed around 2010 as Jamā‘atu ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da‘wa wa’l-jihād (Associa-
tion of Sunnah People for Proselytisation and Armed Struggle) (Higazi 2013). 
The reference to jihad seems to have appeared after the repression of July 2009 
and anchored the group in a warmongering logic. Despite the ‘Ahl al-Sunna’ 
mention, which refers to the Wahhabi school of thought, the new name confirms 
the split from the Izala movement, which never encouraged the use of lethal vio-
lence. If the official name provides interesting information, it is rarely used by 
commentators. The nickname Boko Haram, catchy and easy to remember, is pre-
ferred. Unfortunately, it is also a simplistic ideological shortcut that fits some 
classical stereotypes about Muslims being fanatics opposed to modernity 
(Brigaglia 2012a). Yet, since 2009, the group has shown significant abilities to 
adapt, innovate, and develop sophisticated means of action and propaganda. Over 
the past few years, Boko Haram has become a serious security threat for the Ni-
gerian state, acquired a transnational influence, and redefined itself in the broader 
regional framework by networking with Salafi groups in Mali, Niger, and possi-
bly Algeria and Somalia (Higazi 2013).7 
The evolving and opportunistic nature of Boko Haram’s ideology must be tak-
en into account as we are attempting to clarify the rhetoric of the sect towards 
Christians. When Boko Haram took advantage of inter-community conflicts in 
Plateau and Kaduna states to spread violence in new territories, they essentially 
highjacked the long-standing tensions that had built up more around land access 
than religious issues (ibid.). Also, the rise of a dissident group, Ansaru, which 
has blamed the leaders of Boko Haram for killing Muslims and has introduced 
new practices such as the kidnapping of Westerners, signals the existence of in-
ternal debates and confirms our impression of the group’s rather fuzzy and con-
stantly evolving ideological substance. At the sect’s beginning, it seems there 
was no particular animosity vis-à-vis other religions in Yusuf’s doctrine, while 
Islamic clerics were clearly targeted and many of them assassinated (Brigaglia 
2012b).8 This seems to have changed surreptitiously from 2009. Between 26 July 
and 31 July, approximately twenty churches were destroyed and more than fifty 
Christians killed in Maiduguri. It was also reported that Boko Haram’s members 
                                                            
7  Boko Haram’s connections with Niger Republic are particularly strong, since victims of the repression 
of the Nigerian government in northern Nigeria have been crossing the border. These connections are 
also grounded in very dynamic trans-border trade and kinship-based relationships among groups on 
both sides of the border with shared ethnicity, language, and long-term history. In Niger, groups based 
on a similar ideology are known to have been formed, such as Sake gueme Haram (Hausa: “shaving 
the beard is forbidden”), which appeared in 2007 in the region of Diffa.  
8  The most symbolic assassination was the murder of Sheikh Ja’far, perpetrated in April 2007 at the 
Juma’at Mosque of Kano, when he was leading the morning prayer. 
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forced people to convert to Islam under the threat of death (Amaza 2013). For 
Christians living in Borno State, it was beyond dispute that the uprising was  
religiously motivated. According to a witness of these events, who made public a 
detailed daily account from 23 July to 30 July, the objectives of the sect were 
both “crippling the government and terrorizing Christians in Borno” (ibid.).  
Nevertheless, he was very surprised when Boko Haram began targeting Chris-
tians. On 27 July, he writes:  
news began filtering in that some churches had also been destroyed including the Eklessiyar 
Yan’uwa a Nigeria …, which was the largest indigenous church in Borno State. ‘Impossi-
ble!’ was my first reaction. The sect had assured us that the fight was only against the gov-
ernment. (ibid.) 
In fact, for the first time in the history of the radical group, a somewhat clearer 
anti-Christian rhetoric appeared in the discourse of Yusuf right in the middle of 
the crisis. Asked by the press about Muslim and non-Muslim peaceful co-
existence during the time of the Prophet, he stated that the latter came to a mis-
creant land and gradually turned it into an Islamic state when, on the contrary, 
Borno “was an Islamic state before the colonial masters turned it to a kafir land” 
(Daily Trust 2009).9 So, in Yusuf’s vision, the restoration of an Islamic state in 
north-east Nigeria required the suppression of others religions, especially Chris-
tianity, which is clearly assimilated with colonialism and its avatar, the post-
colonial Nigerian state. The troubled days of July 2009 somehow illustrate a vain 
attempt by the radical group to launch an Islamic reconquista of Maiduguri and 
Borno, and Christians began at this point to be visibly included among the ‘ene-
my’, along with the Nigerian security forces and the secular state as a whole. 
This vision has been put into practice over the past few years despite the fact that 
Abubakar Shekau seems not to have ever reiterated such an anti-Christian agenda 
in his public videos. 
We believe that a statistical, comparative study of lethal violence perpetuated 
against both Christians and Muslims during the conflict can help us move away 
from the difficult analysis of an elusive ideology to a survey of the actual number 
of victims it generates in practice. 
Note on the methodology: Using Nigeria watch to identify  
victims, targets, and religious implications of the Boko Haram 
crisis 
The Boko Haram crisis fits into the category of conflicts where the collection of 
accurate data is a fundamental problem, and the general lack of relevant infor-
mation leaves considerable space for bias and speculation in the analysis. For a 
                                                            
9  Kafir is an Arabic term which means “miscreant” or “infidel”.  
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number of reasons, it has been impossible to determine the exact total number of 
victims resulting from the crisis and to precisely assess their characteristics: Mus-
lims, Christians, civilians, officials, soldiers, Boko Haram members, etc. Fur-
thermore, the clear identification of Boko Haram’s targets, a necessary condition 
to apprehend the group’s agenda, if any, has also been found to be problematic. 
Among the factors accounting for this situation, we can underline the following. 
First, the blurred nature of Boko Haram itself: since the death of Mohammed 
Yusuf in July 2009, the group has had neither a uniform leadership (despite the 
progressive affirmation of Abubakar Shekau) nor an entirely coherent agenda. 
Most attacks reported by the government forces or the press incriminate “sus-
pected” Boko Haram because no claim is made and the identity of the perpetra-
tors remains uncertain. Sometimes, attacks are clearly claimed by Boko Haram’s 
‘original’ leadership, or are consistent with its ideological line, or answer to ob-
vious practical needs (such as assaults on prisons detaining Boko Haram mem-
bers). In many cases, however, the perpetrators could just as well be common 
criminals using the name of Boko Haram or could be conveniently designated as 
such by the police as an easy answer to complex investigations. These ‘usurping’ 
practices have developed to the point that, in some instances, Boko Haram mem-
bers have led punitive raids against their ‘fake’ counterparts (Daily Post 2012). 
Second, the ideological and media war: the fight between government forces 
and Boko Haram can be described in terms of control of the truth and manipula-
tion of public opinion. For example, the Joint Task Force (JTF) – composed of 
the Nigerian army for the most part, and also the police and the State Security 
Service (SSS) – seems to be extremely reluctant to release figures for the number 
of victims among its ranks and, as a result, the military personnel reported killed 
in action, even after major crises, may appear low compared with the level of 
violence reported. Furthermore, government forces rarely admit killing civilians, 
even after clear evidence,10 and tend to report civilians as Boko Haram members. 
A similar strategy is undertaken by Boko Haram, which often denies figures giv-
en by the government and claims more deaths from the JTF than official reports 
do. Nevertheless, the media power is clearly on the government’s side in this 
case, and it is significant that Boko Haram started targeting what it considers to 
be “biased” media, as shown by the attacks on the newspaper ThisDay in Abuja 
and Kaduna.11 
                                                            
10  See for instance the controversy involving government forces during the 2009 uprising, when the 
Nigerian police were filmed perpetrating extrajudicial killings on civilians: “Nigeria killings caught on 
video”, Al Jazeera, 10 February 2010.  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/02/20102102505798741.html (Accessed July 2013). 
11  “Nigeria’s ThisDay newspaper hit by Abuja and Kaduna blasts”, BBC World News, 26 April 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17856362 (Accessed August 2013). 
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Third, the technical difficulty of reporting deaths: there is no well-tested 
mechanism of covering all the deaths related to the violence of the Boko Haram 
crisis. Government reports, press coverage, and individual testimonies are in-
complete, selective, and potentially biased. Especially in the states where the lev-
el of violence has been particularly high, such as Borno and Yobe, it can be as-
sumed that the breakdown of deaths entails severe distortions. 
It is thus striking to observe how NGO reports and press and academic arti-
cles, which aim to provide accounts of casualties, are characterised by an undeni-
able vagueness in their sources and methodology and a lack of critical analysis in 
their breakdowns. In this regard, the manner in which data were collected for this 
article, using the Nigeria Watch database, has the merit of being transparent and 
of admitting limitations. 
 
The Nigeria Watch database 
The database12 monitors and compiles violent deaths occurring in Nigeria since 1 
June 2006. It relies principally on ten Nigerian daily newspapers (Daily Champi-
on, Guardian, Punch, ThisDay, Vanguard, Independent, Daily Trust, The Nation, 
PM News and New Nigerian – the last two were replaced by Leadership and Ni-
gerian Tribune in 2013), which are analysed by information retrieval specialists 
on a daily basis. All events reported in these newspapers and involving at least 
one violent death are listed and described in the database. Furthermore, other 
sources of information, such as the police, the judiciary, hospitals, human rights 
organisations (mainly Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International), as well 
as private security firms, companies, and embassies, are used to cross-check data 
and mitigate methodological biases. As stated on Nigeria Watch’s website: 
[The database] deals with fatalities resulting directly from intentional or unintentional vio-
lence. In a country where civil registration hardly exists, estimates on the number of deaths 
are not very reliable and can vary a lot from one source to another, especially during violent 
events. The press in Nigeria is one of the most developed in Africa …. Yet journalists often 
tend to overestimate casualties and do not always cross-check their information. Moreover, 
the press is mainly based in the Christian South, especially Lagos, and does not cover 
properly the Middle Belt and the predominantly Muslim North. As for the Nigeria Police, it  
underreports crime. It does not publish detailed crime statistics, while people do not trust the 
police and avoid reporting violence …. Such discrepancies are the reason why this database 
includes as many sources as possible, in order to cross-check information and compute aver-
ages. 
                                                            
12  The project was created in 2006 by Dr. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, researcher at the Institut 
de Recherche pour le Développement (France), with the support of private firms. The database and 
more information are accessible online at http://www.nigeriawatch.org/. Since 2013, the analysis of 
newspapers has been conducted from the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA-Nigeria), on 
the University of Ibadan’s campus, with funding from DFID through the Nigerian Stability and Rec-
onciliation Programme (NSRP) and the British Council. 
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An event is defined as one or more violent deaths happening in one or more 
contiguous local government areas (LGAs) and ends after at least seven continu-
ous days with no death reported. Events are described briefly and recorded by 
date (start date / end date), location (state, LGA, city, town, neighbourhood), pro-
tagonists, type of conflict, cause of violence, and number of deaths. The database 
provides scanned copies of each source used, and several documents can be 
scanned for the same event if they bring additional or contradictory information.  
Obviously, the Nigeria Watch project does not assert it can cover all violent 
deaths in Nigeria, but it has proved to be a useful and consistent tool to measure 
trends in violence in a systematic manner. In regard to a study on the casualties 
of the Boko Haram crisis, the database enables one to work with concrete and 
verified numbers, and helps show the inherent limitations of this type of research. 
 
The collection of data on victims and targets 
This study looks at all the deadly events related to the Boko Haram crisis, from 
24 July 2009 (beginning of the so-called Boko Haram insurgency) to 31 Decem-
ber 2012.13 The term ‘crisis’ is used in order to obtain as comprehensive a spec-
trum of the victims as possible. We have considered any death related to the phe-
nomenon: Boko Haram activities (suspected and confirmed), government forces’ 
response and repression measures, and other connected events that do not belong 
to the first two categories. Included, for instance, is the killing of two suspected 
Boko Haram members by an angry mob in Maiduguri on 6 October 2011 (This-
Day 2011). Each event was therefore considered relevant or not on a case-by-
case basis.  
The first set of data was gathered through a search of the words “boko” and 
“haram” in the database. Approximately 360 events comprising about 650 
scanned documents were screened as a result, and 317 remained after the screen-
ing process; indeed, several events had no connection with the crisis even if the 
description bore the name Boko Haram or the acronym “BH”. In some cases, 
especially those involving a large number of deaths, further research was con-
ducted beyond the scanned documents (online or in newspaper archives). The 
events were then classified according to the date, location, total number of 
deaths, perpetrators, security involvement, number of deaths per category, and 
targeted location if any. The perpetrators are divided into 4 basic groups: Boko 
Haram, suspected Boko Haram, government forces (JTF, police, SSS, etc.), and 
others (e.g. mob). Security involvement, either 0 or 1, indicates whether or not 
government forces killed at least one person during the event. The categories of 
                                                            
13  We began our analysis from this date because, aside from the death of Sheikh Ja’afar in 2007 and the 
subsequent deadly events (whose perpetrators remain unconfirmed), no data was available prior to Ju-
ly 2009. 
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victims are comprised of the following: Christians (total), Muslims (total), civil-
ians of unknown faith, Boko Haram members, JTF, police, SSS, other official 
personnel (prison wardens for the most part), Christian civilians, Christian cler-
ics, Muslim civilians, Muslim clerics, traditional leaders, politicians, media 
workers, and expatriates. The categories of targets encompass the following: 
churches, mosques, police stations, army barracks, JTF convoys, JTF check-
points, beer gardens and other recreational places where alcohol is sold, markets, 
banks, schools, prisons, personal residences, immigration and customs offices, 
SSS buildings, and other official buildings. The categories were decided on the 
sample of the first 30 events and adjusted along the way. 
In regard to the categories of victims, several obviously overlap. When it was 
possible to determine, we included both status and religion – in the case of a  
policeman explicitly presented as Christian, for instance. The faith of the victims, 
if not stated clearly, was derived from obvious Christian and Muslims names or 
titles reported in the source of information. Furthermore, people killed in a 
mosque were classified as Muslims while people who died in a church were as-
sumed to be Christians. Boko Haram militants were obviously considered Mus-
lims, although we created a distinct category comprising the total number of 
Muslims minus the number of Boko Haram militants. We attempted to distin-
guish as much as possible between civilians and fighters on each side of the con-
flict. In addition, any time there was a doubt about religious affiliation, victims 
systematically entered the category “faith unknown” in the final calculation. 
From our breakdown, we found a total of 2,993 deaths (including 766 Boko Ha-
ram militants) from July 2009 to December 2012, which is comparable with, but 
slightly lower than, numbers generally found in the literature about the crisis. 
 
Methodological challenges 
Our approach faces a number of obvious challenges. As previously stated, the 
search on the database was conducted through the words “boko” and “haram”. 
This term, increasingly given by the national and international media and used by 
the Nigerian federal government, has become the generic appellation of the 
group, although it has never called itself so.14 A first question is whether the 
search may have missed some events where Boko Haram militants were involved 
but not yet designated as such. In most of the 2000s, articles involving suspected 
followers of Mohammed Yusuf refer to “Nigerian Talibans”. For instance, in the 
reporting of the confusing events of April 2007 that led to the deaths of Sheikh 
Ja’afar Mahmud Adam as well as civilians, militants, and policemen, connections 
are made with the group of Yusuf’s students responsible for several attacks in 
                                                            
14  As previously stated, the proper name is Jamā'a Ahl al-sunnah li-da'wa wa al-jihād. See also the in-
teresting discussion on the meaning of boko, in Newman (2013). 
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Yobe in 2003: the protagonists are, most of the time, called “Talibans” in the di-
verse reports (ThisDay 2007; Vanguard 2007). Since our study begins with July 
2009, this issue may have been mitigated. It seems indeed that from the 2009 
insurgency onwards, the name Boko Haram has been recurring in the press and 
only a few articles may have avoided using the name. This leads to another prob-
lem: the identification of what is Boko Haram and what is not. 
As previously underlined, many articles and reports talk about “suspected” 
Boko Haram. As a result, we classified events and dismissed those that were very 
unlikely to be among Boko Haram activities, although we kept several over 
which there was a legitimate doubt. The frontal attacks against the police, the 
JTF, prisons, and other state institutions, when not claimed by Boko Haram, are 
obviously likely to be part of the group’s activities. Attacks against Christians, as 
well as targeted assassinations of divergent Muslim clerics, are also very plausi-
ble and common in the Boko Haram agenda. Offensives on bars and other places 
dispensing alcohol also fall into a coherent strategy. Robberies and attacks on 
banks can be perpetrated by the radical group for understandable economic rea-
sons but are of course also conducted by common criminals, and the distinction 
between the two can be difficult. Finally, some assassinations imputed to Boko 
Haram do not appear to belong to any logical strategic framework and are there-
fore particularly difficult to classify. 
Furthermore, another difficulty arose from the sometimes contradictory break-
down of deaths from one newspaper to another. When sources gave different 
numbers, we generally used the highest figure, considering that deaths are likely 
to have been underreported in the states where the crisis has been the most vio-
lent. However, we always gave weight to the most specific source – for instance, 
a source citing a witness who stated having seen a certain number of bodies – 
over more approximate sources.  
Focusing now on a few case studies will illustrate better our methodological 
approach. 
 
Case studies 
One instance of crime vaguely imputed to Boko Haram and that we decided not 
to retain in our breakdown is the slaughter of two teenagers in Damaturu, Yobe 
State, in July 2012 (Vanguard 2012). The only source reporting the event was the 
Lagos-based Vanguard newspaper. The article states that “the state Commission-
er of Police, Patrick Egbuniwe, who confirmed the incidence, said the command 
was suspecting members of the Boko Haram Islamic sect” but does not give any 
information justifying this suspicion, and it later adds: “the Commissioner, who 
wondered why the attackers will slaughter 15-year-old set of twins said the inci-
dent occurred on Saturday”. The article also asserts that a primary school was 
224 Chouin, Reinert & Apard  
 
burnt down in the same city – which fits into Boko Haram activities – but does 
not relate the two events. The religion of the twins is not mentioned. Given the 
extreme vagueness of the assumption, reported in a South-based newspaper, 
about a crime which does not make sense in terms of the Boko Haram agenda – 
at least from the information provided – the event was not counted as part of the 
Boko Haram crisis. We do not imply that such crimes cannot be committed by 
Boko Haram members. Some instances show they can; they are not numerous, 
however, and at least one source of motive can usually be roughly identified. 
On the other hand, we retained cases where the involvement of Boko Haram is 
definitely not stated or not even clearly assumed in the source but makes sense in 
the broader context: for example, the killing of an Islamic cleric in a mosque in 
Biu, Borno State, in August 2012 (The Nation 2013b). The relevant report ex-
plains that, on the same day the JTF was distributing “thousands of audio tapes of 
Islamic messages criticising the Boko Haram”, one Muslim cleric and one wor-
shipper were shot during prayers at two different mosques in Biu by unidentified 
gunmen. The article mentions that “the distributed materials were mainly from 
the preaching of the slain Muslim cleric, Sheik Mahmud Ja’afar”, previously 
mentioned. It specifies that Boko Haram’s activities have been deadly in Borno 
State, but it does not clearly state that the gunmen are suspected to be Boko Ha-
ram members nor does it cite any officials suggesting this. However, we consid-
ered this event as part of the Boko Haram crisis because attacks against Muslim 
clerics and communities professing a different vision of Islam and condemning 
Boko Haram have been a recurrent feature in the sectarian group’s strategy. Fur-
thermore, the fact that the JTF was propagandising against Boko Haram through 
Islamic messages the same day as the murders occurred can hardly be a coinci-
dence. 
The choices that we had to make in reviewing the violent events encompassing 
the Boko Haram crisis led inevitably to some level of subjectivity in our method-
ology. Nevertheless, as a meticulous work, our breakdown is available for schol-
ars to assess,15 and every source used in the process can be checked in the Nige-
ria Watch database and the bibliography. 
Generating and interpreting statistical data on body count and 
religion 
Figures collated from our use of the database show that the faith of victims of the 
crisis is inconsistently reported by journalists and other sources, probably be-
cause they do not have this information or because it does not strike them as 
worth mentioning. As we processed the press cuttings and complementary 
                                                            
15  The final spreadsheet can be accessed at http://ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/xls/table-boko-haram-conflict.xls 
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sources related to 317 Boko Haram-related events that occurred from July 2009 
to December 2012, we attempted to identify the religious affiliation of all the 
fatalities. The results of this investigation are presented in Table 10.1, which 
shows the total number of victims reported in our breakdown, including Boko 
Haram militants (who appear among Muslims).16 
Different facts emerge from this table. Firstly, the faith of a majority of the 
victims remains unknown. More precisely, we do not have religious indications 
for about 61 per cent of the victims, representing 1,527 alleged civilians and 309 
members of the Nigerian armed forces or other officials. Clearly, in this case, the 
civilian category may include unidentified members of Boko Haram and gov-
ernment agents, for in several instances available data did not make it possible to 
differentiate them from civilians. Such is the case with the July 2009 crackdown 
on the sect in Maiduguri. Although gross estimates of the number of casualties 
circulate, the conditions in which the massive repression of the sect’s uprising 
was conducted, the difficulty of differentiating civilians from Boko Haram fight-
ers among the many corpses recovered in neutral clothing, disturbing videos 
showing members of the federal forces assassinating disabled young men who 
could not seriously be considered as combatants, and the expedient way victims 
were buried in mass or individual graves by a variety of actors, prevent the de-
termination of precise figures. We shall see below how we propose to overcome 
such a difficulty and establish facts about the numbers of Muslim and Christian 
victims recorded in this conflict. 
 
 
Table 10.1 Faith affiliation of deceased victims in the Boko Haram crisis (2009-2012) 
Recorded victims n= Sub-categories of victims n= 
according to faith 
All Muslims 897 Muslim civilians 56 
  Muslim clerics 21 
  Boko Haram militants  
  Nigerian forces/officials 766 
Muslims minus Boko   
Haram militants 131 
 
Christians 260 Christian civilians 245 
  Christian clerics 6 
  Nigerian forces/officials 9 
 
Faith unknown 1,836 Civilians 1,527 
  Nigerian force/officials 309 
 
Total 2,993  
                                                            
16  As explained in this chapter, there are legitimate doubts over certain official reports, which may have 
amalgamated civilians and Boko Haram members. 
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Secondly, Table 10.1 shows a clear difference between the established num-
bers of Muslim and Christian civilians killed. At first glance, this could lead us to 
think that for each Muslim civilian killed, five Christian civilians fell victim to 
the conflict. This interpretation, however, may not reflect the reality, as two fac-
tors need to be taken into account: 1) the relative disparity with which Christian 
and Muslim deaths are reported by the media; and 2) the relative size of the sta-
tistical populations. In fact, Christian victims are probably more likely to be re-
ported in national newspapers because this type of information coincides with the 
interests – or anxieties – of the bulk of their readers, who are located, in the main, 
in the southern part of the country, the stronghold of most of the large Christian 
communities. In a way, we can say that an event involving a Christian civilian 
who fell victim in northern Nigeria to the Boko Haram crisis is far more likely to 
find its way into the columns of the Nigerian (and, for that matter, international) 
printed media than a similar event involving a Muslim civilian. The death of a 
Christian in northern Nigeria or the Middle Belt resonates with the well-
established underlying fear among many Nigerians of seeing their country get-
ting gradually engulfed in another civil war motivated by an explosive combina-
tion of ethnic and religious strife. This general statement, however, is not always 
verified in practice, and there are some cases where violence directed against 
Christian targets, although reported by the press, did not allow for a comprehen-
sive breakdown of victims, and the number of Christians killed is likely to have 
been underestimated. This is, for instance, the case with the uprising of July 2009 
in Borno as well as the series of bomb attacks claimed by Boko Haram at Jos on 
Christmas Eve 2010, both events being particularly deadly. Finally, we need to 
recognise that the statistical samples of Christian and Muslim civilians are small, 
respectively 13.4 per cent and 3.1 per cent of the entire population of alleged ci-
vilians documented in our database (n=1,828).17 Basically, we cannot derive 
strong conclusions from a sample that does not take into account 83.5 per cent of 
the civilian victims of the crisis who themselves represent over 51 per cent of the 
total number of recorded victims.  
On the other hand, the strong predominance of Muslim over Christian non-
civilians killed during the conflict, at the rate of six to one, may well be repre-
sentative of the fact that the Nigerian military and police forces fighting Boko 
Haram predominantly comprise Muslims, although no statistical data exist to 
support such a statement – and questions surrounding the reality of the Islamisa-
                                                            
17  This figure was obtained by adding Muslim civilians, Christian civilians and civilians of unknown 
faith. 
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tion of the security forces remain an extremely touchy topic in Nigeria.18 Once 
again, our statistical sample does not allow us to argue beyond conjecture. 
Similarly, the fact that Muslims clerics seem to have paid a higher price than 
pastors and other Christian clerics mirrors the reality of the campaign of terror 
led by Boko Haram against strongly discordant voices among the Islamic schol-
arly community, through planned assassinations typically conducted by two men 
on a motorcycle firing an automatic weapon at close range at their targeted vic-
tim in the street. 
Table 10.1 suggests that the key to a discussion of the religious factor in the 
death of thousands as a result of the crisis lies in our capacity to speculate in an 
informed way on the faith of the 1,836 unknown faith victims. Without resolving 
the question of the religious affiliation of unknown faith civilian and non-civilian 
victims, representing respectively approximately 51 per cent and 10.3 per cent of 
the total number of casualties, one wonders how analysts could discuss the Mus-
lim-versus-Christian nature of the conflict. 
Clearly, there is no satisfactory and indisputable way of attributing a religious 
affiliation to these 1,836 victims. Whatever strategy is used to do so, we need to 
acknowledge its experimental nature, expose clearly how figures have been 
reached, and remain open to criticism. In this paper, we have opted for a method 
based on available demographic data. Although the latter remain fragile, disput-
ed, and scarce, they seem to be the only quantitative sources that can assist us in 
building a case. Our core hypothesis is simple: on a state-by-state basis, to corre-
late our data on civilian19 victims of unknown faith affiliation with existing in-
formation about the relative demographic weight of Muslims and Christians 
across the area affected by the Boko Haram crisis. However, simple concepts are 
seldom translated into practice with ease, and the following paragraphs will ex-
pose choices that were made to circumvent a number of methodological obsta-
cles. In any case, we understand that our assumption that all civilian victims are 
random collateral damage of actions by Boko Haram and Nigerian security forc-
es – and therefore equivalent to random demographic data – is a mere theoretical 
position in which we are constrained by the limitations of our data.  
First, what demographic data are we talking about? Nigeria is well-known for 
generating contested or even ‘made-up’ census data. This is attested by a vast 
literature that criticises its alteration and falsification for political reasons (Bam-
gbose 2009). Added to this general concern about the value of the census data, 
we must also deal with the fact that religion – as a discrete category on question-
                                                            
18  A recent petition circulated by a Nigerian NGO was widely debated over the Internet. See for instance 
“Group drags IGP Abubakar to President Jonathan over ‘Hausanisation & Islamisation’ of Nigeria Po-
lice”, News Express, 6 May 2013. http://www.newsexpressngr.com (Accessed October 2013). 
19  Members of the Nigerian government forces and officials are treated separately, using a different 
method. See later discussion. 
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naires used by enumerators – was excluded from all recent national surveys for 
being too sensitive. As a result, it is impossible today to reliably assert the rela-
tive percentage of Muslims and Christians who live in the different states of Ni-
geria. As we go back in time, however, we find that the first and last censuses 
incorporating ‘religion’ as a category were conducted in 1952 and 1963. Despite 
many controversies, these two censuses – especially the one conducted in 1952 – 
seem to be considered much more genuine (ibid.) than all those that followed, 
including the last one conducted in 2006. The downside of this is that they pro-
vide a snapshot that reflects a fifty-year old reality far from that of present-day 
Nigeria. Furthermore, fifty years ago the administrative divisions of Nigeria were 
quite different from now, and it takes considerable patience and a pinch of bold-
ness to attempt a projection of the figures recorded then onto the new administra-
tive framework made up of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). 
Such an approach was adopted by Philip Ostien, a former lecturer in law at the 
University of Jos in Plateau State and an independent scholar since 2008. His 
projections were published in different forms in 2007 and 2012 (Ostien 2007; 
2012a; 2012b). In Table 10.2, we reproduce the results obtained by Ostien for the 
13 states where we recorded at least one victim of the Boko Haram crisis without 
a recognised religious affiliation. 
 
 
Table 10.2 Relative proportion of Muslims and Christians recorded during the 1952 
and 1963 censuses and projected onto the 2013 administrative map of  
Nigeria 
 % Muslims % Christians % Muslims % Christians % Muslims 
States Census 1952  Census 1952  Census 1952  Census 1952  Census 1952  
 (Ostien 2007)  (Ostien 2012b) Ostien 2012b) (Ostien 2012b) (Ostien 2012b) 
Adamawa  N/A 3.8 32.9 16.0 34.6 
Bauchi 74 1.1 76.3 1.6 83.4 
Borno 84 0.6 80.9 2.7 88.3 
FCT N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Gombe 74 2.5 70.1 6.2 75.0 
Jigawa 98 0.4 98.4 0.8 98.0 
Kaduna 61 10.2 57.3 25.1 55.7 
Kano 98 0.5 97.8 1.1 97.0 
Katsina 95 0.3 95.2 0.4 94.6 
Niger 44 3.5 46.8 4.0 62.4 
Plateau N/A 11.4 25.5 23.2 26.1 
Sokoto 94 0.5 96.3 0.4 98.9 
Yobe 84 0.5 87.3 1.0 94.8 
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Figures computed by Ostien differ slightly in his 2007 and 2012 studies, as the 
author refined his methodology. In addition, his 2007 work focused on Shariah 
states only, which left out Adamawa and Plateau on our list as well as the FCT. 
Interestingly, in 2007 he was able to obtain and publish comparative estimates of 
the relative percentage of Muslims per state from the World Christian Database 
(WCD), dating to 2002. Aware of potential biases, and “assuming the truth lies 
somewhere in between (the 1952 census and the WCD data)” (Ostien 2007), he 
proposed averaging the two percentages to produce a new estimate. Table 10.3 
reproduces these data and proposes an update of Ostien’s estimate on the basis of 
his revised 2012 interpretation of the 1952 census. The result, in column 5, is a 
theoretical percentage of Muslims per state, which we will consider to be our 
low-end estimate, as we are averaging the 1952 census – giving a lower percent-
age of Muslims than the 1963 census – with a Christian-affiliated source which 
provides the lowest estimates known. Following Ostien, we can agree that “there 
are many pitfalls here, but for many reasons, it is not easy to do better” (ibid.). 
 
 
Table 10.3 Low-end estimate of percentage of Muslims in selected states 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 % Muslims % Muslims % Muslims % Muslims % Muslims 
 Census 1952 WCD estimate Average of 1 Census 1952 Average  
State (Ostien 2007) 2002 (Ostien  and 2 (Ostien (revised by of 2 and 4 
  2007) 2007) Ostien 2012b)  
Adamawa N/A N/A N/A 32.9 N/A 
Bauchi 74 61 68 76.3 68.7 
Borno 84 49 67 80.9 65.0 
FCT N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Gombe 74 49 62 70.1 59.6 
Jigawa 98 70 84 98.4 84.2 
Kaduna 61 51 56 57.3 54.2 
Kano 98 69 84 97.8 83.4 
Katsina 95 74 85 95.2 84.6 
Niger 44 52 48 46.8 49.4 
Plateau N/A N/A N/A 25.5 N/A 
Sokoto 94 74 84 96.3 85.2 
Yobe 84 49 67 87.3 68.2 
 
 
To provide low-end estimates for Adamawa, Plateau, and the FCT, we needed 
to resort to other data, as no WCD estimates were available for them. For FCT, 
the only recent estimate in the literature is the informed opinion of Medugu 
(2012), who suggests that there should be roughly as many Muslims as Chris-
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tians. This is not really satisfactorily, but for lack of a better assessment, we shall 
adopt it in this study. For Adamawa, we decided to adopt the percentage of Mus-
lims obtained during the 1963 census (34.6 per cent, after Ostien) (Ostien 
2012b), which is slightly higher than the one obtained in 1952 (32.9 per cent, 
after Ostien) (ibid.) and therefore probably more credible. Finally, in the case of 
Plateau, we retained the percentage proposed by the Ostien in his 2012 study of 
Plateau State (2012a), which we found to be the lowest figure available (16 per 
cent). All final estimates are listed in Table 10.4. 
 
 
Table 10.4  Minimum and maximum estimated % of Muslims in states  
 affected by the Boko Haram crisis 
State Estimate Estimate 
 % Muslims % Muslims 
 Min.  Max.   
Adamawa 34.6 65.0 
Bauchi 68.7 97.0 
Borno 65.0 97.0 
FCT 50.0 50.0 
Gombe 59.6 73.0 
Jigawa 84.2 98.0 
Kaduna 54.2 55.7 
Kano 83.4 97.0 
Katsina 84.6 94.6 
Niger 49.4 91.0 
Plateau 16.0 26.1 
Sokoto 85.2 98.9 
Yobe 68.2 94.8 
 
 
On the other hand, to obtain high-end estimates, we relied on recent scholar-
ship when available. For instance, several recent studies developed within the 
framework of the Nigerian Research Network and commissioned by the Oxford 
Department of International Development suggest a link between the overall per-
centage of Muslim population and the percentage of elected Muslim politicians 
(Alkali 2012). Figures provided by these authors were adopted in the case of Ad-
amawa, Bauchi, Borno, and Gombe because no other data was available. For all 
remaining states, we adopted results obtained from the 1963 census, which were 
the highest available. Although 100 per cent of elected politicians in Yobe State 
are Muslims (Alkali 2012), Christians are present in this state, and we therefore 
preferred to rely on the percentage obtained from the 1963 census (94.8 per cent, 
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after Ostien) (Ostien 2012b). Table 10.4 presents low-end and high-end estimates 
of the relative percentage of Muslims in all the states selected in this study. 
Based on these figures, we can now extrapolate how many of the 1,527 civil-
ian victims recorded as “faith unknown” may actually have been Muslims. Re-
sults are presented in Table 10.5. Overall, we estimate that between 64 and 90 
per cent of the 1,527 civilian victims were Muslims, while between 10 and 36 per 
cent of them professed another religion, most probably Christianity. Clearly, the 
religious landscape of northern Nigeria is not as dualistic as we tend to believe, 
and other forms of worship and belief coexist with Islam and Christianity. How-
ever, social pressure has taken its toll on such belief systems to the extent that 
they tend not to be publicly and explicitly acknowledged by actors. For the pur-
pose of this study, we therefore simplified the reality and considered that Islam 
and Christianity were the two main acknowledged religions in the area under 
scrutiny.  
 
 
Table 10.5 Estimation of the percentage of Muslim and Christian believers among the 
civilian victims labelled as “faith unknown” in the Boko Haram conflict 
State Number of  Number of Number of Number of Estimate Estimate 
 victims  assumed assumed assumed % Muslims % Muslims 
 recorded as  Muslims Muslims Muslims (Min.) (Max.) 
 “faith unknown” (Min.) (Max.) (Mean)   
Adamawa 62 21 40 31 34.6 65.0 
Bauchi 15 10 15 12 68.7 97.0 
Borno 837 544 812 678 65.0 97.0 
FCT 41 21 21 21 50.0 50.0 
Gombe 15 9 11 10 59.6 73.0 
Jigawa 1 1 1 1 84.2 98.0 
Kaduna 53 29 30 29 54.2 55.7 
Kano 183 153 178 165 83.4 97.0 
Katsina 1 1 1 1 84.6 94.6 
Niger 16 8 15 11 49.4 91.0 
Plateau 53 8 14 11 16.0 26.1 
Sokoto 2 2 2 2 85.2 98.9 
Yobe 248 169 235 202 68.2 94.8 
Total 1,527 976 1,373 1,174    
Total % 100 63.9 89.9 76.9    
Estimated total  
% of Christians 36.1 10.1 23.1 
 (Min.) (Max.) (Mean) 
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For the 309 members of the Nigerian armed forces and officials killed in the 
same conflict and labelled as “faith unknown”, we decided not to apply the same 
methodology because soldiers, policemen, SSS operatives, and other categories 
of personnel can be drawn from many different parts of the country. There are no 
available data on the ‘state of origin’ of these victims, nor do we have general 
statistical data on the religious affiliation of the different components of the 
armed forces, police, etc. On this basis, we decided to consider hypothetically 
significant the ratio we recorded in Table 10.1 between identified ‘Muslims’ 
(n=54) and ‘Christians’ (n=9) in the category ‘Nigerian forces/officials’. On this 
basis, we propose that 85.7 per cent of our group of 309 victims could have been 
Muslims (n=257), while the remaining victims could have been Christians 
(n=52). Due to the lack of comparative data, we tentatively adopted this percent-
age as our high-end hypothesis, and introduced a ratio of circa 50:50 as a low-
end hypothesis, giving an estimate of 155 Muslims and 154 Christians.  
Using the methodology presented above, we are finally able to provide esti-
mates of the alleged total number of Christians and Muslims killed during the 
Boko Haram crisis between 2009 and 2012 (Table 10.6). This table clearly indi-
cates that whatever configuration is used (low-end or high-end estimate), the 
number of Muslim victims is always higher than the number of Christian victims. 
Boko Haram members aside, the number of Muslim victims is expected to be 
two to three times higher than that of Christian victims.  
Returning to Table 10.1, it is striking to realise that figures derived from our 
database and showing known religious affiliation of victims provide us with a 
reversed perspective, with 260 Christian against 131 Muslims casualties, i.e. two 
times more Christians that Muslims. Clearly, as we discussed above, this is an 
artefact of the much stronger visibility of Christian casualties in the media and in 
other open sources. Such a visibility sustains the popular idea in some circles that 
Christians are the primary victims of the Boko Haram insurgency. However, such 
a view needs to be challenged, as we know that most of the terrorist and counter-
terrorist attacks that resulted in massive casualties produced a large number of 
collateral victims among civilians, whose faith is usually not reported. Our meth-
odology helps us to reframe the debate by including the large majority of the 
anonymous, collateral victims whose voice is ordinarily suppressed from scholar-
ly and non-scholarly discussions alike. There is no reason to believe that the bulk 
of these collateral victims are not demographically representative of faith distri-
bution in north-eastern Nigeria, and, if this hypothesis is correct, we should 
therefore accept the idea that the conflict has resulted in the majority of its vic-
tims being among civilian Muslims populations. 
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Table 10.6 Estimated faith affiliation of deceased victims in the Boko Haram crisis 
(2009-2012) 
Recorded victims  n= % Sub-categories of n= % 
according to faith   victims 
Muslims   Muslim civilians 
  (Minimum)a     2,028 67.8   (Minimum)b 1,032 56.5 
  (Maximum)c 2,527 84.4   (Maximum)d 1,429 78.2 
 
Muslims minus Boko    Muslim clerics 21 
Haram militants:   Boko Haram militants 766 
  (Minimum) 1,262 42.2 Nigerian forces/officials 
  (Maximum) 1,761 58.8   (Minimum) 209 
     (Maximum) 311 
 
Christians   Christian civilians 
  (Minimum)e 466 15.6   (Minimum)f 399 21.8 
  (Maximum)g 965 32.2   (Maximum)h 796 43.5 
 
   Christian clerics 6 
   Nigerian forces officials 
         (Minimum) 61 
      (Maximum) 163 
 
Total 2,993     
Notes: 
a) This figure was obtained by adding the total number of known Muslims (n=897, see Table 10.1), 
the estimated minimum number of Muslims among civilian labelled as “faith unknown” in Table 
10.1 (n=976, see Table 10.5), and the estimated minimum number of Muslim victims who were 
either members of the armed forces or officials (n=155). 
b) This represents the minimum % of Muslims among civilian victims only. 
c) This figure was obtained by adding the total number of known Muslims (n=897, see Table 10.1), 
the estimated maximum number of Muslims among civilian labelled as “faith unknown” in Ta-
ble 10.1 (n=1373, see Table 10.5), and the estimated maximum number of Muslim victims who 
were either members of the armed forces or officials (n=257). 
d) This represents the maximum % of Muslims among civilian victims only. 
e) This figure was obtained by adding the total number of known Christians (n=260, see Table 
10.1), the estimated minimum number of Christians among civilian labelled as “faith unknown” 
in Table 10.1 (n=154, see Table 10.5), and the estimated minimum number of Christian victims 
who were either members of the armed forces or officials (n=52). 
f) This represents the minimum % of Christians among civilian victims only. 
g) This figure was obtained by adding the total number of known Christians (n=260, see Table 
10.1), the estimated maximum number of Christians among civilian labelled as “faith unknown” 
in Table 10.1 (n=551, see Table 10.5), and the estimated maximum number of Christian victims 
who were either members of the armed forces or officials (n=154). 
h) This represents the maximum % of Christians among civilian victims only. 
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Conclusion 
Establishing a precise number of victims in this crisis, as well as identifying both 
their religion and status, has proven a perilous enterprise. Our breakdown – 
which stops on 31 December 2012 although Boko Haram-related violence has 
continued since – has inevitable flaws, and it is assumed that even within the 
time-frame studied some important events may have been missed. Nevertheless, 
the data presented here, made available to the academic community, is the result 
of a transparent approach. What is most significant in our contribution is proba-
bly not the number of casualties we arrive at, but the percentages resulting from 
the data analysis. Indeed, beyond the religious divide, one striking conclusion is 
that 62 per cent of the victims of the Boko Haram crisis are civilians (inclusive of 
clerics), reinforcing the idea that modern conflicts mainly affect non-combatant 
populations (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2007). Our data suggest that 
roughly 25 per cent of the victims are Boko Haram activists and 13 per cent are 
Nigerian security force members and other state officials. It should not been for-
gotten that, as discussed above, a number of civilians may have been presented as 
Boko Haram members in government reports and that the army has been very 
careful not to disclose too many of its casualties. 
As for the religious affiliation, we estimate that a minimum of 42.2 per cent 
and a maximum of 58.8 per cent of the victims are Muslims (excluding Boko 
Haram members). The proportions in regard to the Christian populations are re-
spectively 15.6 per cent and 32.2 per cent (Table 10.6). Therefore, and most like-
ly, Muslims are particularly hit by the ongoing crisis. However, our data also 
show that attacks against Christians have been continually increasing, both in 
scale and frequency, from Christmas Day 2010 and the bombings in Jos. Yet, we 
need to warn against engaging carelessly in a debate over which community suf-
fers the most, as it may serve the strategy of Boko Haram’s leadership aimed at 
fomenting antagonism between Christians and Muslims. By targeting Christians, 
the sect tugs at Nigerian identity’s heart-strings and deeply challenges the fragile 
basis of the nation’s unity. Boko Haram sees the secular state as a colonialist 
reminiscence and Christians are fully integrated in this colonial picture. Never-
theless, the state and its security prerogatives remain a privileged target, as our 
data accounts for more than 100 official buildings (police stations, army bar-
racks, prisons, etc.) attacked, with subsequent fatalities, over the period exam-
ined. The Nigerian state itself is greatly accountable for the aggravation of the 
situation. The long-lasting flaws in public administration, the fluctuating strate-
gies, and the blind and deadly repression that reminds us of the darkest pages of 
the colonial wars have left civilians from both faiths with very little means of 
protection. 
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Our paper aims to trigger debate on the issue of casualties and religion in the 
Boko Haram crisis. How should data be collected and presented? How should 
such data be interpreted? To what extent is the religious approach pertinent in 
identifying the victims? Our initiative is thus far unique in regard to the Boko 
Haram phenomenon, even if it also demonstrates clearly the limitations and diffi-
culties of such a task. The Nigeria Watch database, moreover, is a pertinent tool 
in analysing the current crisis. 
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Boko Haram: A chronology 
 
Manuel Reinert & Lou Garçon 
 
 
1995: Creation of the Sahaba group (“The Prophet’s Companions”), under the 
leadership of Mallam Abubakar Lawal. Mohammed Yusuf, born in 1970 in Yobe 
State, is thought to be among the followers.  
2000-2003: In Borno State, rivalry increases between Governor Mala Kashalla 
and Senator Ali Modu Sheriff. The latter, running for governor, criticises the 
flawed implementation of Shariah in the state and rallies a group of political 
thugs. Many of the recruits are students of imam Mohammed Yusuf. Subsequent-
ly, Sheriff and Yusuf strengthen ties. 
2002: Mohammed Yusuf, who has been expelled from two mosques in Maidugu-
ri because of fundamentalist preaching, becomes the head of the Sahaba. Yusuf 
detaches himself from his mentor Ja'afar Mahmud Adam, an influential Salafi 
cleric from Kano, because of doctrinal disagreements. He gradually removes the 
older Sahaba clerics and radicalises the group’s ideology, giving birth to the or-
ganisation later known as Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (“Peo-
ple Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”) or, 
more commonly, Boko Haram.  
April 2003: Ali Modu Sheriff is elected Governor of Borno. An intimate of Mo-
hammed Yusuf, Alhaji Buji Foi, is nominated Commissioner for Religious Af-
fairs. Yusuf is permitted to develop a compound with a mosque and a Quranic 
school in Maiduguri. 
2003: In mid-2003, a group of 200 young men, composed of Mohammed 
Yusuf’s students for the most part, decides to break away from the secular state 
and found a religious community in the Yobe countryside, calling themselves Al 
Sunna Wal Jamma (“Followers of the Prophet’s Teaching”). Following conflicts 
with local communities and authorities, the congregation relocates to Kanama, 
near the border with Niger. From 23 to 31 December 2003, the group launches a 
series of deadly attacks on police stations and government buildings in Kanama 
and four other cities of the North. Military troops are deployed to contain the in-
surrection and they kill several militants. A majority of the surviving members 
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returns to Maiduguri, where they reintegrate into Mohammed Yusuf’s communi-
ty. Yusuf is blamed by the authorities and has to leave Nigeria; after a long stay 
in Saudi Arabia, he is eventually permitted to return. 
June 2004: Four members of Boko Haram are killed by prison guards in a foiled 
jail break in Yobe State capital, Damaturu.  
23 September 2004: Suspected Boko Haram members launch a militia attack on 
police stations in the towns of Gwoza and Bama in Borno State, killing several 
policemen and civilians. They move to the Mandara Mountains along the Nige-
ria-Cameroon border. Soldiers are deployed and kill an estimated 27 sect mem-
bers. 
10 October 2004: An affiliate group of Boko Haram attacks a police convoy in 
Kala-Balge near the Chadian border. The militants kidnap 12 policemen and all 
attempts to trace them fail.  
2005-2007: Boko Haram focuses on recruiting new members and shoring up its 
resources. Little is known about Boko Haram’s activities during this period of 
time. Yusuf is arrested on numerous occasions, but seems to be protected by 
some powerful men as he is systematically released and permitted to return to his 
stronghold in Maiduguri. 
April 2007: The doctrinal conflict between Mohammed Yusuf and Ja’afar 
Mahmud Adam reaches a peak when the latter is murdered in his mosque in Ka-
no. This event is seen as a violent resurgence of Boko Haram after three years of 
apparent inactivity. 
11-12 June 2009: Following the shooting of 14 of his followers in a joint military 
and police operation in Borno State, Mohammed Yusuf threatens the federal state 
with reprisals, in a video addressed to the president. The incident follows a disa-
greement over Boko Haram members’ alleged refusal to wear crash helmets dur-
ing a funeral procession to bury some of its members. 
26-31 July 2009: Boko Haram launches a short-lived uprising in Borno, Bauchi, 
Yobe, Gombe, Kano, and Katsina, which is quelled by a military crackdown that 
allegedly leaves more than 800 dead – mostly sect members and civilians. The 
mosque in Maiduguri used as the sect’s headquarters and Yusuf’s compound are 
destroyed. Approximately forty Christians are executed by members of the sect 
and twenty churches are burnt down. Hundreds of Boko Haram members are ar-
rested, including Mohammed Yusuf. Handed over to the police by the army who 
arrested and interrogated him, Yusuf is summarily executed while in custody on 
30 July. Alhaji Buji Foi, the former Commissioner of Religious Affairs and a 
financier of Boko Haram, is also captured and later killed at the police headquar-
ters in Maiduguri.  
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June 2010: Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf’s second-in-command, announces in a vid-
eo that he has taken over as leader of the sect. Authorities had announced his 
death after the crackdown on the sect in Maiduguri in July 2009. 
7 September 2010: Boko Haram raids a prison in the city of Bauchi, freeing more 
than 700 prisoners – including at least 100 members of the sect. This attack will 
be followed by many others on prison facilities in northern Nigeria. 
24 December 2010: Approximately ninety people are killed during attacks in Jos 
and Maiduguri. A series of explosions claimed by Boko Haram in nine Christian 
neighbourhoods of Jos result in the death of 32 people, while immediate reprisals 
kill about fifty. The same day, Boko Haram members open fire on two churches 
in Maiduguri, killing six. The bomb blasts in Jos spark a month of sectarian vio-
lence, claiming more than 200 victims among Christians and Muslims alike.  
29 December 2010: Suspected Boko Haram gunmen shoot dead eight people in 
Maiduguri, including the governorship candidate of the ruling All Nigeria Peo-
ples Party (ANPP) in Borno State. 
8 April 2011: Goodluck Jonathan is declared winner of the presidential elections 
with 59 per cent of the votes. This announcement sparks a series of post-electoral 
violence in parts of northern Nigeria. 
29 May 2011: Three bombs rip through a beer garden situated inside military 
barracks in the northern city of Bauchi, killing 13 and wounding 33. Boko Haram 
claims responsibility. (More than 25 beer gardens and markets associated with 
barracks have been targeted by Boko Haram militants since 2009.) 
6 June 2011: Muslim cleric Ibrahim Birkuti, an outspoken critic of Boko Haram, 
is shot dead by two motorcycle-riding gunmen outside his house in Biu, 200 km 
from Maiduguri. (More than twenty Muslim clerics opposed to the sect were  
assassinated between 2009 and the end of 2012.) 
7 June 2011: Alleged attacks by the sect on a church and two police posts in 
Maiduguri leave at least 14 people dead. 
16 June 2011: A Boko Haram suspect detonates a car bomb in the car park of the 
police headquarters in Abuja, leaving at least two people dead in the first report-
ed suicide bombing in Nigeria.  
20 June 2011: Seven people, including five policemen, are killed in a gun and 
bomb attack on a police station and a bank in Kankara, Katsina State. Multiple 
attacks on banks have been attributed to Boko Haram, which allegedly serve to 
refinance the sect.  
27 June 2011: Boko Haram’s gun and bomb attack on a beer garden in Maidugu-
ri leaves at least 25 dead and dozens injured. 
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July 2011: The government announces that it will set up a panel of experts to 
initiate negotiations with the sect. Five police officers held responsible for Mo-
hammed Yusuf’s murder are charged by a federal high court in Abuja. 
3 August 2011: Government says it rejects negotiations with Boko Haram.  
25 August 2011: The sect storms two banks and two police stations in Gombi, 
killing at least 16 people. This is the first reported attack in Adamawa State.  
26 August 2011: A Boko Haram suicide bomber drives his vehicle into the Unit-
ed Nations building in Abuja, killing 25 people and injuring more than 100. This 
is the first time the sect targets the international community. 
17 September 2011: Babakura Fugu, brother-in-law of Mohammed Yusuf, is shot 
dead outside his house in Maiduguri two days after acting as an intermediary in a 
peace meeting between Nigeria’s ex-president Olusegun Obasanjo and Boko Ha-
ram. The sect denies any involvement in his murder. 
22 October 2011: Boko Haram claims responsibility for the murder of a  
cameraman working with the government-owned National Television Authority 
(NTA) in Maiduguri. The sect says the cameraman was spying on the militants.  
November 2011: Boko Haram announces there will be no dialogue with the gov-
ernment until all of its members are released from jail.  
4 November 2011: Boko Haram carries out a series of attacks on security facili-
ties, banks, and churches in Damaturu and Potiskum, Yobe State, leaving  
approximately 150 people dead. Two Boko Haram suicide bombers fail to deto-
nate their bombs inside the headquarters of the Joint Task Force (JTF) and blow 
themselves up outside the military compound. The Borno governor’s convoy is 
targeted on its way from the airport to the governor’s mansion.  
7 December 2011: A bomb attributed to Boko Haram kills eight in the Oriyapata 
district of Kaduna city. 
17 December 2011: A shootout between sect members and policemen following 
a raid on the hideout of a Boko Haram sect leader in the Darmanawa area of Ka-
no State kills seven, including three police officers.  
22 December 2011: Boko Haram places bombs in various parts of Maiduguri, 
killing twenty people. Meanwhile, four policemen and a civilian are killed in  
another gun and bomb attack on a police building in Potiskum, Yobe State.  
Approximately 100 people are also killed following multiple bomb and AK47 
attacks by Boko Haram and ensuing gun battles with military troops in the Pom-
pomari outskirts of Damaturu, Yobe State.  
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25 December 2011: A man driving a vehicle laden with bombs blows himself up 
outside Saint Theresa Catholic Church in Medulla, Niger State, killing 26 wor-
shippers and 17 bystanders. Three secret police (SSS) operatives and a Boko Ha-
ram bomber are killed in another suicide attack on a military convoy at the gates 
of the SSS headquarters in Damaturu. A policeman is killed in a botched Boko 
Haram bomb attack on a church in the Ray Field area of Jos. 
30 December 2011: Four Muslims are killed in a Boko Haram bomb and shoot-
ing attack targeting a military checkpoint in Maiduguri as worshippers are leav-
ing a mosque after attending Friday prayers.  
31 December 2011: President Jonathan declares a state of emergency in parts of 
Borno, Niger, Plateau, and Yobe states and announces the closing of all northern 
borders.  
2-11 January 2012: Boko Haram issues a three-day ultimatum to southern Nige-
rians to depart from the North. 
6 January 2012: Eight worshippers are killed in a shooting attack on a church in 
Yola. Boko Haram gunmen also shoot dead 17 Christian mourners in the town of 
Mubi in the north-eastern state of Adamawa.  
9 January 2012: Boko Haram gunmen shoot dead a secret police operative along 
with his civilian friend as they leave a mosque in Biu, Borno State. Nigeria’s 
President Goodluck Jonathan says Boko Haram has infiltrated the executive, par-
liamentary, and judicial wings of government. 
18 January 2012: A key suspect in the 2011 Christmas Day bombing in Abuja, 
which had left more than forty people dead, escapes police custody. The scandal 
forces the Inspector General of Police, Hafiz Ringim, to resign. 
20 January 2012: Boko Haram launches coordinated attacks on police facilities 
in the city of Kano, leaving an estimated 250 people dead, most of them civilians 
– the highest death toll in a single attack since 2009. Among the victims is 
Enenche Akogwu, a journalist working for Channels Television, as well as three 
Indian nationals. Boko Haram gunmen also free between 50 and 100 jailed mem-
bers in Kano.  
24 January 2012: In Kano, security forces kill Uzairu Abba Abdullahi, a textile 
seller and member of the sect, who is suspected of having planned the attacks 
that took place in Kano on 20 January. 
2 February 2012: Six people suspected to be dissident members of the sect are 
shot dead in Maiduguri by Boko Haram. A sect spokesman declares to journalists 
that the sect will execute any of its members who take the side of the govern-
ment.  
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7-9 March 2012: The Nigerian army arrests Abu Muhammad, a leader of a group 
close to Al-Qaeda and suspected to have kidnapped the British and Italian engi-
neers Chris McManus and Franco Lamolina on 12 May 2011 at Birnin Kebbi in 
north-western Nigeria. On the basis of the information given by Muhammad,  
security forces raid a hideout in Sokoto. The hostages are killed by their abduc-
tors during the operation. Although Boko Haram is suspected, there is no clear 
evidence that the sect was actually involved in the abduction and killing of the 
two foreigners. 
8 April 2012: A suicide car bomber fails to reach the church he was targeting and 
detonates his bomb on a busy street in Kaduna on Easter Sunday, killing at least 
41 people. The army claims that Boko Haram has executed its own spokesman, 
Abul Qaqa II, and that the sect is riven by internal divisions. (In January 2012, 
the SSS said it had captured Boko Haram’s previous spokesman, Abul Qaqa I.) 
26 April 2012: Boko Haram bombs the offices of the newspaper ThisDay in Abu-
ja and a building that houses several media outlets including ThisDay in Kaduna, 
killing four people in Abuja and three in Kaduna. The sect claims the newspaper 
has been reporting “lies” about the militants and condemns an article dishonour-
ing the Prophet, published in 2002.  
29 April 2012: Suspected Boko Haram gunmen attack two Christian services at 
Bayero University in Kano and kill 19 people, including two university lecturers.  
10 May 2012: Muhammad Ali, the branch leader of the Shiite Islamic sect in Ka-
no city, is killed by armed men suspected to be Boko Haram members. Authori-
ties fear a conflict between Boko Haram and other northern Nigerian sects.  
17-19 June 2012: 100 people are killed and more than 300 injured during attacks 
by Boko Haram on churches in Kaduna and Zaria. In reprisal, Christian youth 
mobs kill about twenty people they suspect to be Hausa-Fulani in Kaduna. 
21 June 2012: The US State Department lists three Boko Haram commanders – 
Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kambar, and Khalid al-Barnawi – as “Spe-
cially Designated Global Terrorists”. 
6 August 2012: Seven policemen die in a Boko Haram suicide attack against a 
police station in Sokoto. The station is situated a few metres from the house of 
former Nigerian president Shehu Shagari.  
21 August 2012: A Muslim religious leader and one of his followers are executed 
in a mosque in Biu by suspected Boko Haram militants. In Maiduguri, men of the 
Joint Task Force (JTF) begin to distribute anti-Boko Haram video tapes to locals.  
5-6 September 2012: The sect destroys more than two dozen mobile telephone 
towers across northern Nigeria. Boko Haram states that the attacks are meant to 
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avenge the mobile phone companies’ cooperation with Nigerian intelligence ser-
vices.  
23 September 2012: The JTF says it has killed 35 Boko Haram militants in Dam-
aturu and arrested sixty others. 
24 September 2012: The army and the police announce the death of a command-
er of Boko Haram – Abubakar Yola – and the arrest of 156 militants by troops of 
the Restore Sanity Operation in Mubi, Adamawa State. 
6 October 2012: Three Chinese nationals working as cooks are executed as they 
are leaving a market at Gubio, not far from Maiduguri. Some media reports also 
mention the assassination of a Ghanaian and two Indians in Maiduguri. 
7 October 2012: Soldiers of the JTF declare that they have killed thirty members 
of Boko Haram in Damaturu, including its leader Abubakar Shekau, and arrested 
ten others in Kandahar. 
8 October 2012: An officer of the JTF is killed in Maiduguri when Boko Haram 
members hit his convoy with an IED. In reprisal, soldiers attack civilians sus-
pected of supporting the sect in the Gwange area of Maiduguri, setting on fire at 
least fifty houses, stores, and vehicles and killing thirty people.  
12 October 2012: United Nations Security Council passes a French resolution 
approving an African-led force to assist the army of Mali in combating seces-
sionist and Islamist groups in the northern part of Mali.  
28 October 2012: At least eight people die and 145 are wounded in an attack by 
alleged Boko Haram members against St. Rita’s church in Kaduna. In reprisal, 
groups of Christian youth attack Muslims in the area.  
1 November 2012: Amnesty International releases a report denouncing grave 
human rights violations by both Boko Haram and the Nigerian security forces in 
northern Nigeria. The same day, Abu Muhammad Ibn Abdulazeez, presenting 
himself as a spokesman of the sect, declares that Boko Haram is ready to negoti-
ate with the government. 
20 December 2012: Gunmen seize French engineer Francis Collomp in his com-
pound in Katsina. In a statement sent to journalists four days later, Boko Haram 
splinter group Ansaru claims responsibility for the kidnapping. 
11 January 2013: France launches the military intervention “Opération Serval”, 
officially aiming to uproot Islamist groups in control of northern Mali and to re-
store Mali’s territorial integrity. The groups include Ansar Dine, MOJWA, and 
AQIM, with the alleged cooperation of Boko Haram. 
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19 January 2013: Gunmen attack the convoy of the Emir of Kano. The emir sur-
vives but his driver and two guards are killed in the attack.  
8-11 February 2013: Nine female polio vaccinators are killed in two separate 
shootings in health centres of Kano. Three days later, three North Korean doctors 
are hacked to death in Potiskum. Boko Haram is suspected of both attacks. 
11 February 2013: Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan pays an official visit 
to France. The discussions with French President François Hollande focus on the 
situation in Mali and the rise of Islamist militancy in the region. 
16 February 2013: Ansaru, a splinter group of Boko Haram, kidnaps seven for-
eign expatriates from a Lebanese construction company, Setraco, at Jama’are in 
Bauchi. It is the largest kidnapping in northern Nigeria in recent times. 
19 February 2013: Four children and three adult members of the French Moulin-
Fournier family are kidnapped by gunmen in northern Cameroon while visiting 
the Waza National Park, near the border with Nigeria. After contradictory state-
ments, Boko Haram finally claims responsibility.  
7 March 2013: During his first official visit to Maiduguri, Nigerian President 
Goodluck Jonathan rejects the amnesty programme for Boko Haram members, 
suggested by the Sultan of Sokoto. 
10 March 2013: Ansaru executes the seven abducted construction company ex-
patriates in response to troop movements perceived as signs of a rescue mission 
by the British forces in Bauchi. 
18 March 2013: More than seventy people are killed in the bombing of luxury 
buses at a station in the Sabon Gari district of Kano – home to many Christians 
from southern Nigeria. Boko Haram is suspected. 
4 April 2013: Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan sets a committee of experts 
to work on an amnesty programme for Boko Haram militants.  
11 April 2013: Boko Haram rejects the idea of an amnesty. 
19 April 2013: Cameroon’s President Paul Biya announces the release of the 
French Moulin-Fournier family held by Boko Haram, after the family had spent 
two months in captivity.  
22 April 2013: Fighting between military forces and Boko Haram militants 
leaves more than 185 people dead at Baga in Borno State, near the border with 
Chad. Violence began when gunmen opened fire in a video-viewing centre.  
14 May 2013: President Goodluck Jonathan declares a state of emergency in the 
states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in an attempt to combat the activities of 
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Boko Haram head-on. This involves the largest contingent of military personnel 
mobilised in Nigeria since the Civil War. 
June-October 2013: Multiple confrontations between Boko Haram members and 
the JTF in Borno (along the Cameroon border and many other parts of the state), 
in Yobe, and to a lesser extent in Adamawa, resulting in hundreds of deaths. The 
“Mechanised Division’s Operation BOYONA” makes use of the air force and 
heavy artillery to bomb suspected Boko Haram camps and hide-outs.  
19 August 2013: Lieutenant-Colonel Sagir Musa releases a statement claiming 
that Abubakar Shekau is likely to have died between 25 July and 3 August 2013 
from gunshot wounds following a clash with the JTF in the Sambisa forest near 
Cameroon. The statement creates confusion among top army officers. 
25 September 2013: Abubakar Shekau appears in a video sent to news agencies. 
He mentions some recent developments of the conflict, such as the attacks in 
Benisheik on 17 September, which resulted in about ninety deaths, and mocks 
the military for claiming him dead. The JTF states the authenticity of the video is 
doubtful. 
29 September 2013: An attack on the College of Agriculture in Gujba, Yobe by 
suspected Boko Haram members kills forty students. 
4 October 2013: Newspapers cite sources reporting that the retaliation operations 
following the events in Gujba have resulted in the deaths of more than 180 Boko 
Haram members and a few soldiers. Since the state of emergency was declared, 
the press has reported six events, mentioning between 50 and 190 fatalities.  
13 November 2013: Boko Haram and Ansaru are formally designated “Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations” by the US Department of State. 
 
  
Annex 1 
The charter of Jama’at Ansar Al Muslimin Fi Bilad 
al-Sudan 
 
(a.k.a. Ansaru) 
Broadcast on Internet on 18 January 2012 
Translated from Arabic by Mathieu Guidère 
 
 
 
The name of the the group 
Jama’at Ansar Al Muslimin Fi Bilad al-Sudan 
(“The Supporters of Muslims in the Land of the Blacks”) 
 
The motto of the group 
Fighting in the Name of Allah 
 
The logo of the group 
The Holy Quran is between two machine guns and on top of each machine 
gun, and there is a banner that reads “There is only one God and Mohammed 
is His Prophet”. It signifies that the implementation of the religion can be 
achieved only through the Holy Book of the Quran and steel (weapons). 
 
The methodology of the group and its beliefs 
 We are in this religion with all who entered it before us, including brothers and 
others who followed the Prophet with faith. 
 The basics of faith and the details of religious matters are clear from the words of 
Allah and the words of His Prophet. This is why these words have to be followed 
to the letter, and one should never follow anything else that contradicts them. 
 Our allegiance is to Allah, His Prophet, and all of the believers in Him. 
 Those who pray the five prayers and pray in the direction of the Qibla and show 
their Islam are Muslims. They have the same responsibilities and obligations as 
us, and they have the same rights as us. We will not hurt them, and they will not 
suffer any injustice at our hands. 
 We will not call any Muslim an infidel or accuse him of blasphemy unless there 
is proof and unless all of the conditions of such a case exist. We will be fair and 
we will be just. We will judge Muslims according to their Islam and religion, 
and we will make jihad and fight against criminals according to their crimes. 
 This jihad is a duty for all of us Muslims. The world and the religion will not be 
good without it.  
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He said, ‘O my people! Have you considered, should I stand on a manifest 
proof from my Lord, who has provided me a good provision from Himself? 
I do not wish to oppose you by what I forbid you. I only desire to put things 
in order, as far as I can, and my success lies only with Allah: in Him I have 
put my trust, and to Him I turn penitently. (Quran, Hud: 88) 
And this is why our beloved Prophet decided to take up arms and engage in ji-
had. 
 The meaning of jihad in the Book and the Sunnah has many forms and methods. 
 In the end, our methodology depends on the words of Allah and His Prophet and 
according to the guidance of the Prophet and the basics of religion. If we have dif-
ferent opinions, we will always go back to the Holy Book of the Quran to settle 
these differences. 
 
The targets of the group 
Our goals and targets are noble, fair, and supreme. These goals include defend-
ing those who believe and fight against the infidels so there is no disorder, and 
for all religion to be for Allah. 
 
These goals will be clearer if we say that we follow all the goals of the Sha-
riah, which are known as the five or the six necessities. These necessities are 
defending and saving religion, human life, money, mind, fidelity and honour. 
This comes straight from the Godly covenant, which brings only the truth. It is 
what balances everything in life, and it lowers the words of infidels and raises 
the words of Allah. 
 
The means 
Our way is to engage in jihad in the name of Allah. Everything that helps us 
reach our superior and noble targets and goals in science, religion, education, 
the calling, guidance, and spiritual and material readiness are all found in ji-
had, which is the pinnacle of Islam. Through it, injustice is lifted from Muslims 
and through it we fight tyrants and save the weak and battle the infidels. It 
heals the hearts of the believers and helps them be calm and peaceful inside. 
Thus they routed them with Allah’s will, and David killed Goliath, and Al-
lah gave him the kingdom and wisdom, and taught him whatever He liked. 
Were it not for Allah’s repelling the people by means of one another, the 
earth would surely have been corrupted; but Allah is gracious to the world’s 
creatures. (Quran, Al-Baqarah: 251) 
 
Why should you not fight in the way of Allah and the abased men, women, 
and children, who say, ‘Our Lord, bring us out of this town whose people 
are wrongdoers, and appoint for us a guardian from You, and appoint for us 
a helper from You’? (Quran, Al-Nisâ’: 75) 
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Make war on them so that Allah may punish them by your hands and humiliate 
them, and help you against them, and heal the hearts of a faithful folk, and re-
move rage from their hearts, and Allah turns clemently to whomever He wishes, 
and Allah is all-knowing, all-wise. Do you suppose that you will be let off while 
Allah has not yet ascertained those of you who wage jihād and those who do not 
take, besides Allah and His Apostle and the faithful, anyone as (their) confidant? 
Allah is well aware of what you do. (Quran, Al-Tawbah: 14-16) 
 
As for other methodologies in other policies and systems, such as Democracy 
and other ignorant systems, they have all proven to be failures. We do not see 
any one following and abiding by these ignorant ways unless he is wrong, and 
he should be guided and should repent from these devious ways and return to 
the one righteous path. 
 
Membership 
Any Muslim male or female has the right to be a member in order to be able to 
support and help their brothers who are suffering from injustice. Anyone can 
be a member who loves jihad and wants to join it to fight the infidels and to 
help the word of Allah be the prevalent one. 
 
As for people who want to work in the name of the group and to be a part of 
its operations: they will have to abide by some legitimate rules and considera-
tions, and they will have to be able to help; they have to be clean from any 
disabilities, and they have to have complete faith in and allegiance to the group 
and its leadership. 
 
This allegiance is not obligatory for any person who is not a part or a member 
of the group. 
 
An official member who pays allegiance to the group has responsibilities and 
rights that are not applicable to people who are not members. Any person, 
whether a member or not, will not be faced with injustice; and if any differ-
ences occur, the problem will be settled by a committee of judges. Know that 
we will never do anything that is against the Shariah, the Sunnah, and the Holy 
Book of the Quran: 
O mankind! Indeed We created you from a male and a female, and made 
you nations and tribes that you may identify yourselves with one another. 
Indeed the noblest of you in the sight of Allah is the most Godwary among 
you. Indeed Allah is all-knowing, all-aware. (Quran, Al-Hujurât: 13) 
 
 The Charter of Jama’at Ansar al Muslimin Fi Bilad al-Sudan 249 
 
Empowerment and support group 
They are tasked with helping and supporting the group on all levels. It depends 
on the abilities and the needs of the group. They are trusted and protected by 
the group, and their wives and children and secrets have to be protected. 
When dealing with them, there has to be: 
 A benefit from such dealing 
 Safety from harm 
 The existence of a documented permission 
 
General command 
The general command of the group consists of its Amir and the princes of dif-
ferent areas, the leaders of the committees who represent the Consultative 
Council of the group. They all work as one cooperative and complete unit, as 
Allah has said: “and their affairs are by counsel among themselves” (Quran, Al-
Shurâ: 38). 
 
First: Its judgment: Binding1 
 
Second: Its type. It is a necessary private emirate, and it can expand to include 
some of the characteristics of a general emirate. This depends on the abilities 
and the specific needs of the group, which are decided by the Consultative 
Council of the group. 
 
Third: The conditions of leading the emirate 
 To be a true Muslim 
 Maturity and puberty 
 Sanity 
 Maleness 
 Freedom 
 Justice 
 Shariah science 
 Wisdom 
 Freedom from any disabilities 
 
Fourth: The things that would prevent someone from leading the emirate 
 Death 
 Lack of faith in God / being an unbeliever 
 The emergence of any disabilities or obstacles 
                                                            
1  Translator’s note: According to Islamic jurisprudence, the judgments of an amir and general command 
are binding on all members of the related group. 
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 Straying away from religion and the true path, which can harm the calling and the 
group 
 Any treason against the group and its principles and basics. For example, execut-
ing things in ways other than the group stated. 
 Captivity, depending on the decision of the Consultative Council of the group 
 
Fifth: The rights of the Amir over the members of his group 
 They must obey him in doing good 
 Help and support him to do right 
 Advise him 
 Think well of him 
 Respect him 
 Stop people from talking badly about him 
 
Sixth: The duties of the Amir 
 Being fair and just in his duties and rights 
 Thinking well of the members and being kind to them 
 Advising Muslims 
 Making sure that the wives, children, and safety of Muslims are protected 
 Preparing for jihad mentally and financially 
 Keeping secrets 
 Being a good role model for Muslims in general and jihadists in particular 
 Working to maintain the unity of the group 
 Working to reunite Muslims 
 Handling and managing the affairs of the group 
 Protecting the women 
 Taking care to achieve the interests of the group 
 Gathering and raising money according to the Shariah and spending it also in 
accordance with the Shariah. 
 Settling differences between the brothers 
 Coordinating work with the Consultative Council of the group 
 Heading the consultative sessions and choosing the best opinions after consult-
ing with others 
 
Seventh: The powers of the Amir 
 Managing the affairs of the group completely 
 Obligating the members of the group to follow the decisions and the instruc-
tions that the group issues 
 Choosing the princes of the committees for the different areas and districts 
 Choosing the persons responsible for special and temporary missions 
 Choosing the person who will replace him if he is not there 
 Issuing decisions, guidelines, and instruction for the group, with the exception 
of crucial decisions which have to be taken with the presence of the Consulta-
tive Council of the group, such as: 
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 Changing any of the basics and principles mentioned in the covenant of the 
group 
 Opening a new battlefront 
 Making peace or truces with enemies 
 Deposing himself from leadership 
 Deposing any member of the council or any judge of the group 
 Dealing with any foreigner organisations 
 Deposing any of the district princes 
 
Consultative Council (Leadership Council) 
 
First: The judgment of the Consultative Council: Binding 
 
Second: Identifying the Consultative Council (Leadership Council) 
The Consultative Council of the group consists of its general leadership and 
management. It consists of its prince, the princes of the districts, the heads of 
the committees, and others from the best men of the group who are wise and 
are known for their rightful decisions and opinions as well as experienced and 
specialised personnel. 
 
Third: The mission and duties of the Leadership Council  
(the Consultative Council) 
 Helping the Amir manage the affairs of the group and its policies 
 Taking care to achieve the interests of the group 
 Appointing the Amir or deposing him when necessary 
 Watching and monitoring the Amir and holding him accountable for his actions 
 Every member has the right to call for the assembly of the council with the 
leadership of the Amir in cases of any urgent and crucial matter. If the urgent 
matter is related to a quarrel with the Amir, he has the right to call for the as-
sembly. In this case, the council is tasked with choosing someone to settle the 
quarrel without having the Amir present. 
 Picking a judge other than the judge of the group when necessary 
 Picking the members of the Consultative Council  or deposing them 
 Paying allegiance to the Amir – and their allegiance is obligatory for the 
members of the group, as they will have to follow it. 
 
Leading the Districts 
 
First: Identifying the Amir (Leader) of a District 
He has the same respect and position as the Amir but in his own area and dis-
trict. Upon choosing him, there are some local considerations to be borne in 
mind. 
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Second: The conditions 
It is essential for the leader of each district or area to meet all of the conditions 
of the group leader (Amir). 
 
Third: His rights 
He has the same rights in his district as the group leader or Amir. 
 
Fourth: His duties 
He has the same duties as the group Amir towards the people in his district. He 
also has to report to the Amir of the group everything that happens after con-
sulting with his men in order to guarantee the unity of the group. He also has 
to consult his men concerning how to execute the decisions of the Consultative 
Council. 
 
The Local Consultative Council of the District’s duties are: to investigate how 
to execute what the Consultative Council has decided and investigate every-
thing that is related to their district after the district leader reports it to the 
group leader. 
 
Fifth: The powers of the District Amir 
1. Choosing the best men from his district to consult with them about the affairs of 
the district. 
2. Choosing the people who will carry out the special operations and the temporary 
operations in his district. 
3. He has the right to look into and manage the affairs of his district, but he will have 
to present it and confirm it with the leadership first to maintain the chain of com-
mand. 
 
Committees and organisations 
 The Shariah Committee 
 The Military Committee (includes the Medical Committee) 
 The Economy Committee 
 The Media and Foreign Affairs Committee 
 The Social Affairs Committee 
 The Judicial Committee 
 The Security Committee 
 
The Calling and Guidance Committee 
This includes a group of qualified people who have qualifications in religious 
sciences / theology and Shariah-related qualifications. 
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Their mission: to guide the group in a way that pleases Allah and to investigate 
any ignorance that could misguide or make the brothers stray from the one true 
path. 
 
This committee consists of its head and three branches 
 The Calling and Guidance Branch 
 The Composition Branch 
 Printing and Distribution Branch 
 
Third: The powers and permissions of the head of the committee 
 Organising a practical working program for the committee and presenting it to 
the Amir 
 Working hard to implement the proposed program 
 Establishing legitimate Shariah schools 
 Picking the correct and suitable people for teaching and dispatching them to do 
the job after consulting the Amir 
 Revising and enhancing everything that the committee issues before it is print-
ed 
 He has the right to cancel or revise any research topics that are proposed by the 
members 
 He has the right to research and expand that research in order to fix any issues 
 He is tasked with researching the religious/theological issues that are present-
ed to the committee 
 
The calling and guidance branch 
The mission of this branch is to call people to Islam and then to guide those 
who enter the religion and help them understand Islam and follow its guide-
lines and the words of the Quran and the Sunnah. They are also tasked with 
spreading Shariah science in the ummah and warning Muslims against the 
treacherous traps that are laid by their enemies to make them stray from Islam. 
 
Printing and distribution branch 
This branch is tasked with printing and distributing everything that the com-
mittee issues, by any means and any ways possible 
 
The composition branch 
The duty of this branch is to pick a group of suitable people and qualified per-
sonnel to head the scientific department. They will do this by using any means 
necessary. This is done in order to fight the upcoming theological challenges in 
the future. 
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The Military Committee 
First: Identifying it: This committee is considered one of the main supporting 
pillars of the group. It represents the protective fortress that protects Muslims 
from the attacks of their enemies. It is also the way to strike terror into the 
hearts of the enemies. 
The task of this committee: Supervising and dealing with and managing every-
thing that is related to the military affairs of the group. This has to be done in 
coordination with the other committees to guarantee the safety of the affairs of 
the group. 
 
Second: Its composition: It consists of its leader (the general commander) and 
seven branches, namely: 
1. Recruitment and Training Branch  
2. Funding and Supply Branch 
3. Industrial Branch  
4. Recon Branch 
5. Military Engineering Branch 
6. Military Planning and Studies Branch  
7. Medical and Nursing Branch 
 
The powers of the Military Committee leader 
1. He is appointed and can be removed by the Amir 
2. Determining the practical program of the committee and presenting it to the 
Amir 
3. Doing his best in order to implement the program 
4. He has the right to issue military decisions with the approval of the Amir 
5. Supervising the implementation of the military instructions 
6. He is tasked with building training camps for the entire group  
7. Supervising the general military actions 
8. Supervising the utilisation of all of the means necessary to satisfy the military 
needs of the branch, including weapons and materials 
9. He has the right to handle and manage the foreign ammunition according to the 
terms of the agreement 
10. He has the right to hold all of the committee members accountable 
 
Recruitment and training branch 
The duties of this branch of this committee are the following: 
1. Determining a training program for the soldiers 
2. Supervising the implementation of such a program 
3. Studying the characteristics of the newly recruited soldiers and then dispatching 
them to the locations that are suitable for them, with the help of the Social Af-
fairs Committee. 
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Funding and supply branch 
The duty of this branch is to supervise the spending of money on the jihadists 
in order to fulfil their military needs. 
 
Recon branch 
The duties of this branch of the Military Committee are: 
1. Watching the roads, centres, and military locations 
2. Recon and scout the movement and the locations of the enemy 
3. Scouting the jungles and the roads that the leadership and the soldiers go 
through 
 
Military engineering branch 
The duties of this branch of this committee are the following: 
1. Drawing the blueprints of buildings, training camps, ditches, military shelters 
and centres. 
2. Drawing maps that will enable the leadership and the jihadists to easily retreat 
and infiltrate. 
 
Military planning and studies branch 
The duties of this branch of the Military Committee are: 
1. Carrying out the strategic battle study for the group and planning for enhancing it 
in the future 
2. Planning for the affairs of the group 
 
Industrial branch 
Its mission: Preparing and manufacturing anything that is related to the military 
affairs of the group or any other committees. 
 
Medical and nursing branch 
The duties of this branch are very practical, as it is tasked with keeping the ji-
hadists safe and healthy. This is achieved through the following: 
1. Determining a health program for the group and presenting it to the military 
commander and then to the Amir 
2. Working on implementing the program 
3. Choosing the doctors and nurses 
4. Providing the necessary medicines and equipment and maintaining them 
5. Issuing medical orders 
6. Helping and serving the wounded and the sick and cleaning the clinic 
 
The Judicial Committee 
Identifying it: This is the committee that includes the best judges, who will 
settle any quarrels and differences according to the Shariah. It is their task to 
spread fairness and justice between brothers. They are also tasked with provid-
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ing justice to the plaintiff and correcting the defendant. This is one of the pil-
lars of any successful group, as Allah has said: “We did not create the heavens 
and the earth and whatever is between them except with reason, and indeed the 
Hour is bound to come. So forbear with a graceful forbearance” (Quran, Al-Hijr: 
85). 
 
The jurisdiction and powers of the group’s judge 
 The judge of the group as well as the district judge is appointed by the Amir, 
but replacing him requires the presence of the Consultative Council 
 The judge is independent in his work 
 He has the right to summon and question anyone and the person will have to 
answer 
 If there is a quarrel that involves the Amir, the judge has the right to look into 
the case with the Consultative Council, and he has the right to summon the 
Amir and the latter will have to answer. 
 
The Economy Committee 
This consists of a group of specialised people who have experience in econom-
ics. They are known for their honesty and faith. 
 
First: Their mission: Supervising the economic affairs of the group according 
to the Shariah. 
 Preventing the use of any money that is acquired through ways that are not 
compliant with the Shariah 
 Looking into any funding to see if it is halal or haram. 
 Staying away from any money that might not be compliant with the Shariah. 
 Looking into where to spend the money 
 
Second: This committee consists of its secretary general (the head of the com-
mittee) and three branches: 
 Accounting Branch 
 Exchequer 
 Project Study Branch 
 
Third: The powers of the head of the Economic Committee 
 Organising an appropriate program for the economic needs of the group 
 Working to implement the program 
 Looking into the investment projects that are presented to the committee 
 He is not permitted to give himself or any other member money without the 
permission of the Amir 
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Fourth: The accounting branch 
The mission of the Accounting Branch is to manage the reports about the in-
come of the group and its expenses before the money enters the Exchequer. 
 
Fifth: Exchequer branch 
The duties of this branch are: 
 Preserving the money of the group 
 Managing the income and the expenses 
 
Sixth: Project s tudy branch 
The duty of this branch of the Economic Committee is to study all the projects 
that are given to it and determine the best working program for these projects 
and to study how to benefit from them. 
 
Seventh: The legitimate sources of income of the group 
 Zakat 
 Voluntary charity 
 Spoils of war 
 Investments from current projects 
 Endowments 
 
The Media and Foreign Affairs Committee 
 
First: Identifying it: This is an executive body. Its mission: distributing and 
publishing everything that the group issues; and it also manages and handles 
the foreign affairs of the group. 
 
Second: The jurisdiction and power of the head of the committee 
 Organising a program for the committee and presenting it to the Amir 
 Working on implementing and developing the program 
 Reporting to the Amir concerning the current media status of the group 
 
Third: This committee consists of its chief and five branches 
The First one: The maintenance and preparation branch. Its mission: 
 Providing the required equipment and developing it 
 Maintaining the current equipment and fixing it 
 
The Second one: The archive branch. Its mission: 
 Monitoring and watching the public media of the world and collecting what is 
needed from it 
 Archiving everything that the group issues 
 Taking care of what is urgent in their field 
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The Third one: Publishing and distribution branch. Its mission: printing and 
publishing everything that the group wants to publish and distribute through 
any means necessary. 
 
The Fourth one: The composition branch. Its mission: choosing suitable and 
qualified people so they can train to the required standard and can perform the 
mission and the duties of the committee. 
 
The Fifth one: The foreign affairs branch. Its mission: working on the affairs 
and relations between the group and other Islamic groups worldwide, with the 
permission of the Amir. 
 
The Social Affairs Committee 
Identifying it: This committee consists of men of faith and honour and trust 
who have the ability to keep secrets. 
Their duty: Counting the members of the group, registering them in a way that 
makes it easy for the group to monitor its members and their rights. 
 
The duties of the Social Affairs Committee: 
 Counting and registering the members of the group 
 Registering their private social statuses 
 Counting the dead 
 Counting the prisoners 
 Helping those who are in need, financially and emotionally 
 
The Security Committee 
This is an executive body that consists of men of faith and honour and trust 
and the ability to keep secrets.  
Their duty: Doing their best in order to determine and uncover the secrets of 
the enemy to the jihadists.  
 
We hope, our Muslim brothers, that we have covered everything that needs to 
covered and said. 
 
He is the Living One, there is no god except Him. So supplicate Him, 
putting exclusive faith in Him. All praise belongs to Allah, Lord of all 
the worlds. (Quran, Al-Ghâfir: 65) 
 
  
Annex 2 
One of the first videos of Ansaru, 
available on 1 June 2012 
 
Translated from Hausa by Nathaniel Danjibo 
 
 
 
 
The Enlightenment/Information Committee presents an important message from 
JAMA’A ATU ANSARIL MUSLIMINA FI BILADIS-SUDAN 
 
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. 
 
We reject the reports and explanations that some newspapers and other channels 
of information propagated and fashioned with regards to this blessed group, Ja-
ma’a atu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis-Sudan, which wishes the people well. 
 
Without any cogent reason or reliable source, they have spread the news that 
Muhammed Nuhu is our leader and that we came out to fight the Jama’a atul 
Alul Sunna Lid Da’awatis Jihadi. At the same time, some of them [the media] 
thought that we connived with the Jama’a atul Alul Sunna Lid Da’awatis Jihadi 
in order to confuse the people, and they have spread other rumours.  
 
In order to set the record straight and enlighten the people concerning the various 
lies, we have decided to provide a full explanation with regards to this group. 
This had already been provided by our leader, Abu Osama, who explained that 
the reason we took these steps is because of the occurrence of evil and terrorist 
acts in Nigeria, which the infidels are carrying out against Muslims. He ex-
plained our [...] clear intentions, calling on the real religion to enlighten the peo-
ple.  
 
Assisting Muslims and defending them from terrorism and evil acts inflicted up-
on them, taking revenge on anybody who inflicts evil on Muslims, restoring right 
values for Islam and for Muslims [...]  – these were what led to our emergence. 
These are our crystal-clear intentions and the reasons for our emergence. There is 
no connivance or its like with the Jama’a atul Alul Sunna Lid Da’awatis Jihadi, 
save the fact that they are our brethren in Islam. We accept them as we do every 
Muslim. Sometimes they are on the right path, and sometimes they commit error. 
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We are together with them when they are on the right path, and we strengthen 
and support them. However, we do not support them when they commit error. 
 
However, in our understanding, the leader of the Jama’a atul Alul Sunna Lid 
Da’awatis Jihadi has gone slightly beyond his bounds by refusing to admonish 
his followers. In our understanding, he has erred with the kind of position he be-
stows on himself, referring to himself as the imam, and the teachings he be-
queaths to his followers on the problems confronting the country. Furthermore, 
we do not support his teachings concerning these problems. This is, however, a 
different issue altogether. 
 
The issues that the media are projecting, that there is absolute enmity and disa-
greement between us and the leader of the group [Boko Haram], are further per-
petrated lies. Allah the Eternal knows better. However, the deeds of the Jama’a 
atul Alul Sunna Lid Da’awatis Jihadi continue to perplex and worry us. 
 
On the 10th of April of this year [2012], that is of the Western calendar – which 
is the same as the 18th of the month of Jumadal Ulla in the year 1433 of the pil-
grimage of the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) – some among the fol-
lowers under the leadership of Jama’a atul Alul Sunna Lid Da’awatis Jihadi were 
trying to murder a servant of Allah, their fellow Muslim brother and a leading 
Islamic scholar without committing any offence save that he is among those that 
would not continue to obey what is contrary to Allah’s injunction; those that are 
now with Ja’ama tul Ansaru Muslimina Fibiladis-Sudan. 
 
They carried out these attacks at about 7:30 pm. Before then, another brother, at a 
location the targeted brother used to visit, confirmed that they had come armed to 
this location in search of the targeted servant of Allah. They intensified their 
search for him until Allah the Eternal made it possible for them to find him at a 
particular time on a given day at the place of another brother, who confronted 
them and tried to escape. Then they took out their weapons in broad daylight and 
opened fire on him and those with him in the car. However, Allah the Eternal and 
Knowing thwarted their mission.  
 
The beginning of these attacks took different forms, like when they were seen 
carrying out the attacks and in the presence of many witnesses. In fact, some 
among the leaders have also confirmed this. They chided them and condemned 
these attacks. Still, some amongst them have tried to say that the group was not 
aware of the attacks. We, however, know that if the group carried out the attacks, 
it would not come out to accept responsibility. And in fact, more than one year 
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ago, this is the same group that issued an assassination verdict in various write-
ups of their leader, such as [in Mohammed Yusuf’s] book, where they tried to 
justify the execution of anybody who disobeys the imam. And in other sections 
of that book, they have conveyed this same message […]. According to what he 
[their leader] said on one of the cassettes, either a person is repentant and joins 
the group or he will have himself to blame.  
 
Because of these kinds of statements that the group issues, and indoctrinating the 
people who obey them, for a long time now some members of the group [Boko 
Haram] have boasted that they will phase out our group. Now they have started. 
Why does the group not learn from the Messenger of Allah when he was con-
fronted with such situations? Take for example the Hadith of Abdullahi the son 
of Umar in the Sahih Buhari, when they went to a certain war. Then Khalihu Ibn 
Walid killed some Muslims by mistake. When they returned from war and the 
issue was reported to the Messenger of Allah, then the Messenger of Allah raised 
his hand up to Allah and said […]: In the multitude, everybody is a witness and it 
is written and read until this date. Even the knowledgeable scholars, such as Ab-
dullahi Ibn Umar, dissociated themselves from such acts, and they refused to re-
vere Khalihu even though he was appointed the commander of the war by the 
Messenger of Allah for the expected jihad.  
 
The second example is the killing of Osamatu Ibn Zayed, in Sahil Buhari and 
Sahil Muslim and several books of the Hadith, when he killed a Muslim in error. 
The Messenger of Allah was very hard on him, to the point that Sahid Ibn Osama 
was gravely troubled. He said: “I wished that this had happened before I became 
a Muslim” – because of the way the Messenger of Allah kept reminding him. In 
Fat-hil Bari, Alhaju Ibn Haja brought another example […] about the son of 
Umar when a report came that a certain non-believer was killed before Istitaba, 
when Shariah had said such should be executed after Istitaba. There and then 
Umar dissociated himself in the presence of the gathering and said, “Oh Allah, I 
did not carry out the act and I am not in support of it; and when the report came 
to me, I did not rejoice. I expressed my sadness.”  
 
It then behoves us that, if we are following in the footsteps of real leaders before 
us, it is expected that if such happens, the Jaa’matu Alul Sunna Lid Da’awatis 
Jihadi group – if it did not sanction the attacks and is not in support of the attacks 
and is not happy with the attacks – it is expected that the group should come out 
into the open to exonerate itself. It is the tradition of the Messenger of Allah; it is 
the tradition of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. And if these kinds of attacks hap-
pened without the knowledge of the group, then we would say that it is incum-
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bent upon all of us to be on the right path. We should refrain from blood shed-
ding and the destruction of people’s wealth without any reason derived from ei-
ther the Koran or the Hadith. We are saying this because these attacks are not the 
first nor are they the second. In fact, apart from that, we doubt their true inten-
tion.  
 
Last year, they murdered Mallam Tuja, the father of Abba Jinel at Bama Park in 
Maiduguri, without any cogent, acceptable reason embedded in Shariah. Not long 
after that, recently, they have killed Babagana Zarami, the older brother of Bashir 
Abulabule, without any cogent reason acceptable to Shariah. And if we had to 
give an explanation of these attacks, carried out on the blood and wealth of Mus-
lims without any acceptable reasons derived from Shariah, these types of attacks 
would not have taken place. Yet they have boasted that they are responsible for 
carrying out the attacks. 
 
Oh brethren, we should know that apart from shirk,1 the gravest sin before Allah 
Eternal is the taking of a life, without a basic reason from His verses or the Had-
ith of His Messenger. Another offence that may be greater than this, an offence 
that may be greater than murder, is reverence and obedience to, or an invitation 
to join, leaders who have chosen the wrong path by carrying out evil deeds – re-
gardless of whether a person is knowledgeable or ignorant about what these lead-
ers do.  
 
Taking instruction from any leader or champion or any teacher or imam for the 
purpose of carrying out evil acts without any reason is contrary to Shariah. It is 
amongst what leading Tawhid scholars would classify as shirqup da’a [wrong 
predication]. It is for this reason that Ibn Kaiyul, when he was explaining, asked 
[...]: What is reverence beyond expectation? Allah’s Messenger said [...]: Rever-
ence is accorded based on what Shariah has approved, and be mindful of what 
the Messenger of Allah has termed ma’aruf [accepted]. There is something you 
know that Shariah approves of; there is something you know that Shariah does 
not approve of; there is also that which you are doubtful concerning whether or 
not Shariah has approved of it. You should know then that only the first is con-
sidered al-ma’aruf [acceptable].  
 
Whatever you know that Shariah approves of is ma’aruf, but whatever Shariah 
does not approve of is forbidden. If, in the latter case, you decide to revere your 
parent, a leader, an imam or a champion, you will be guilty of shirqa, shirqu [the 
wrong] type of reverence. Allah said […], let us excel in our spiritual deeds […]. 
                                                            
1  Associating others with Allah. 
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And even if it is the Maliki school of thought, or hanifiya Hanafi, or hambaliya 
Hanbali, or shfi’iya Shafi’i, that you tend to break in order to abide by the word 
of Imam Malik or Abu Hanifa or Imam Shafi’i or Imam Ahmed, teachers have 
said you will be guilty of shirqut type of reverence […]. Then what if the one 
you are according reverence to without investigation is not as knowledgeable as 
the pious forebears? 
 
Some love their parents or their teachers or their leaders, hoping that they will 
not instruct them on things that are not of Allah. If someone finds himself in this 
situation of reverence, he will be guilty of shirqul muhabba, which is an offshoot 
of shirqut da’a. If you have not forgotten the explanation of Ibn Khailil, he stated 
that […] is when someone is worshipped or followed ignorantly. According to 
the explanation of Ibn Khailil, if you do wrong things ignorantly you are guilty of 
shirqa and not just offending Allah the Eternal. Therefore, brethren, it is im-
portant that we become mindful; we should know that for all our actions and 
whatever we say, we shall stand before Allah the Eternal, who will judge us. 
 
My brethren, we should continue to exercise patience with regards to the troubles 
we receive from our brothers. We should not let that make us deviate from our 
noble intention; we should not be lackadaisical and embrace evil deeds. It is in-
cumbent upon those who support wrongdoing to wake up; they must know that 
Allah the Eternal forbids any wrongdoing, even in the slightest way, by those 
who offend him, or the wicked and oppressive or those who commit bidi’a [for-
bidden innovation]. […] Let us refer to the Tafsiri [lesson] of Qurbal […] that 
forbids wrongdoing by a group or belonging to a group that is notorious for evil 
deeds. Does the magnitude of the bidi’a extend to unbelief or not? If you go 
against Allah’s wish […], you should not expect mercy […]. It is under this verse 
that teachers make reference to [...] Izfuyanu Sarhi. Someone that associated with 
an evil king came to seek clarification from Izfuyanu Sarhi. The person said he 
was only a tailor to the evil king, and asked if he himself was guilty of commit-
ting evil against others. Izfuyanu Sarhi said to him: “You, in fact, are among the 
wicked ones from the beginning.”  
 
Then my brother, why should you be the one that will be instructed to kill your 
brother or provide a clue to how he will be targeted or something similar to that? 
In fact, even if you are instructed to destroy your brother, the Messenger of Allah 
said […]: Do not hate one another; do not turn your back on others; do not be 
angry with one another; and do not allow an unbeliever to cheat your brother 
Muslim. He is your Muslim brother and the Messenger of Allah said you should 
not oppress your fellow Muslim […]. You must not oppress him; you must not 
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dismiss him so that an oppressor will oppress him; you must not ignore him 
when he is in most need of your help. […] The Messenger of Allah said all of 
this. But you stay put and are instructed that you do not have any business with 
anybody; you should not speak to him even though he is your Muslim brother. 
The Messenger of Allah said you must not stop speaking to him; yet the imam 
said you must not speak to him. Then you accept the words of the imam and re-
ject the words of the Messenger of Allah. The Messenger of Allah says do not 
hate him because he is your fellow Muslim brother, but your champion says you 
should hate him because he is not your brother. Then you decide to follow the 
words of your champion and reject the words of the Messenger of Allah. It is 
important for us to know that this is a grievous offence, which will make us 
dread what will befall us if we do not desist.  
 
We should learn from real and reliable scholars, such as Abdullahi the son of 
Umar and Sa’ad the son of Abu Wakkas, when they aver that Allah says war 
should only be executed in order to avert trouble. But you prefer war so that there 
will be trouble. Because if you kill your fellow Muslim brother, do you avert 
trouble or do you invite trouble? Remember Abubakar among the Companions of 
the Messenger of Allah, the one that shows us mercy with the Hadith he wrote 
derived from the Messenger of Allah, where he says that if a Muslim and a fel-
low Muslim confront each other with weapons with the intention to kill each oth-
er, the one that is killed and the one that kills will both go to Hell. The Compan-
ions of the Prophet said: “We understand the fact that the one who killed enters 
Hell; but the one that is killed, what is his offence?” “The Messenger of Allah 
said he too came with the intention to kill.”  
 
In this era, reliable mujahideen are those like Abu mis Abin Zarkhawi, who said: 
“It is better for me to be beheaded in public rather than kill a Muslim without any 
reason.” Shariah has confirmed that it is not right for you to allow anybody to 
oppress you, to shed your blood or confiscate your property while you fold your 
arms and watch him. So several Hadith, also in Sahih Muslim, have taught, but 
especially that of Abdulrazak and the others. An example among the Compan-
ions of the Prophet is Abdullahi son of Umar, son of Ahs, as recorded in Aqbul 
and Sahih Muslim. He was to be oppressed by someone, a commander of Islam 
who wanted to confiscate his farm. He did not understand why and therefore re-
fused. He and his people took up arms like […] Sahid Abu Zayd, one amongst 
the Companions of the Prophet […]. Indeed, Shariah said you are not expected to 
remain idle and allow others to come and kill you or confiscate your property. 
This means that if anybody seeks to oppress you, Shariah has authorised you to 
defend yourself. However, we must not go beyond what Shariah has approved 
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and say we will imitate what they do. This would make us deviate from our noble 
intention; it would send us to perdition. Our real enemies, atheists and Christians, 
will rejoice when they see us fighting amongst ourselves, and our enemies will 
be laughing at us. This will make the Lord Almighty angry with us.  
 
Oh Allah, may you increase in us the knowledge of Shariah, give us the perse-
verance, and confirm us in the tradition of your Messenger […]. It is better to do 
the kind of thing that Abu the son of Adam did when he said to his bother: “If 
you want to stretch out your hand to kill me, I will not stretch out my hand to kill 
you, because I am afraid of Allah the Almighty and Everlasting.” When his 
brother killed him, what was his life like? Allah said […]: Brethren, let us know 
that oppression and wickedness towards Muslims is one of things that will not 
make us succeed […]. 
 
 
  
Annex 3 
Islam and Western education in Nigeria:  
Between accommodation and confrontation 
 
Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos 
 
 
Boko Haram violently rejects the Western model of education, but its position 
does not reflect the general feelings of the population. On the contrary, many Ni-
gerian Muslims have adopted and invested in modern education, especially the 
Yoruba. From a historical point of view, it is quite interesting in this regard to 
compare their process of accommodation with the confrontational attitude of 
Boko Haram. In the South-West, in particular, the way the colonial authorities 
attempted to appease local apathy, opposition, and resistance to British education 
is also instructive. In the beginning, indeed, many Yoruba Muslims ignored or 
boycotted missionary schools because they feared their children would be con-
verted to Christianity. As a result, the Lagos-based colonial authorities decided in 
1889 to fund Arabic courses in Christian schools. In the same vein, the British 
paid Muslim teachers and established government Muslim schools, first in Lagos 
in 1896, then in Epe in 1898 and Badagry in 1899. 
Meanwhile, Yoruba Muslims set up their own organisations to encourage lit-
eracy and disseminate the message of Islam. Generally restricted to the educated 
urban elite, especially in Lagos, these groups clearly opted for adapting the 
Western model to Islamic requirements, unlike Boko Haram. Interestingly 
enough, some of these groups were and are still considered sects. A quick review 
of the Ahmadiyyah, the Islamic Society of Nigeria, and the Young Ansar-ud-
Deen shows how Islamic reform could cope with the challenges of modernity 
without resorting to violence. 
The Ahmadiyyah Brotherhood, to begin with, was created by an Indian proph-
et, Mirza Ghullam Ahmad, and imported to Nigeria around 1913 through publi-
cations found in London. It mainly reached the Muslim educated elites in Lagos, 
where a Moslem Literary Society and a Juvenile Moslem Society were set up. 
The Ahmadiyyah did not reject modern education and aimed to benefit from both 
Western and Islamic training. In Nigeria, it was the first Muslim organisation to 
establish its own denominational primary school, opened in Lagos in 1922 and 
followed by a secondary school in 1948. It was also the first to translate the 
Quran into Yoruba in 1976. In the same vein, it did not reject the Nigerian secu-
lar state. Some of its members or sympathisers were high-ranking officials, such 
as Kafaru Oluwole Tinubu, a senior police officer, and Musliu Adeola Kunbi 
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Smith, an Inspector General of Police who was a ‘crescent bearer’. But the Ah-
madiyyah always remained an elitist organisation. In 1939, for instance, it partic-
ipated in the formation of the “Crescent Bearers” to promote Western literacy 
amongst the Muslim community. This offshoot was self-restricted to a maximum 
of thirty members, who had to be between forty and sixty years of age. Moreo-
ver, the Ahmadiyyah was always considered a heterodox sect, and some clerics 
even declared that it was not Muslim at all. Saudi Arabia finally refused its 
members entry to perform the hajj and, in 1973, the Ahmadiyyah was banned by 
Pakistan, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and the World Muslim League. In 1974, it even-
tually had to change its name to Anwar ul-Islam. 
The Islamic Society of Nigeria was launched in 1924 by Lawal Basil Augusto, 
a founder of the Nigerian Ahmadiyyah who renounced Mirza Ghullam Ahmad as 
prophet. Like its predecessor, it touched Muslim urban educated elites. Before 
seceding from Ahmadiyyah, Lawal Basil Augusto had actually established the 
first Muslim grammar school in 1916, and in 1924 he was to become the first 
Muslim lawyer in West Africa. The Islamic Society of Nigeria championed edu-
cation for girls and aimed to acquire land to build schools, publish books, pro-
duce Islamic literature, and fund libraries – the same fundamental objectives as 
its successor in 1964, Jamaatul Islamiyya. Unlike Boko Haram, it did not reject 
Western modernity and the secularity of the state. Amongst its members were, 
for instance, Hamzat Adisa Subair, a co-founder of the National Bank of Nigeria 
and the first Nigerian Muslim to qualify as a professional chartered accountant, 
and Professor Aliu Babatunde Fafunwa, a federal minister of education and the 
president of Jamaatul Islamiyya from 1995. 
Young Ansar-ud-Deen (“The Followers of the Religion”) was created in 1923 
to disseminate the message of Islam, translate the Quran into local languages, 
encourage literacy, compete with mission schools, and provide quality Western 
education free of Christian indoctrination. Like the Ahmadiyyah and the Islamic 
Society of Nigeria, it was initially based in Lagos only, where it opened its first 
primary school in 1931. It then extended into the hinterland and was quickly rec-
ognised as a pioneer in education. In 1939, for instance, it inspired the formation 
of the Young Nawair-ud-Deen in Abeokuta, which built many schools and be-
came the Nawair-ud-Deen Society of Nigeria in 1966. In 1942, Ansar-ud-Deen 
opened another primary school, in Okepopo, and in 1946 it established a training 
college in Otta to solve the problem of shortage of Muslim teachers. It also gave 
scholarship awards to study abroad. With eighty schools all over Yorubaland in 
1955, it was formally registered as the Ansar-ud-Deen Society in 1961. However, 
religious mission schools were later on nationalised by the military regime in the 
1970s. Moreover, Ansar-ud-Deen never succeeded in establishing an Islamic 
university, unlike NASFAT (Nasrul-Lahi-il-Fathi), a newer organisation. The 
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Ansar-ud-Deen Society is still active today and has no relationship whatsoever 
with the homonymous terrorist group Ansar Dine in northern Mali. The Nigerian 
Ansar-ud-Deen has always believed that a reformist Islam could co-exist with 
Western innovations. It permitted women to pray in the mosque and rejected 
Salafism. According to Sheikh Abdur-Rahman Olanrewaju Ahmad, its leader 
since 2002, Boko Haram is thus a social deviance, which does not represent the 
message of Islam because the Quran emphasises the need for education and 
study. 
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Islam and political parties in the Sudan 
 
Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos 
 
 
Religious 
organisation 
Political 
party 
Period in power Main leaders 
Ansar / 
Mahdists 
Umma 
Party (UP) 
Coalition with the PDP from 
Independence in January 1956 
until the first military coup of 
November 1958. Following the 
return of civilians to power and 
elections in June 1965, it formed 
a coalition government with the 
National Unionist Party (NUP) 
under the Premiership of a UP 
stalwart, Muhammad Ahmad 
Mahgoub. After the elections of 
April 1968, it joined another 
coalition government with the 
Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP), but was banned by Jaafar 
Muhammad Nimeiri in May 
1969. After the fall of the mili-
tary junta, it won elections in 
April 1986 and came back to 
power under the premiership of 
Sadiq al-Mahdi, first with the 
DUP, then in a larger govern-
ment of national unity with the 
NIF following a second round of 
elections in April 1988. Follow-
ing the Islamist coup of June 
1989, the UP joined the opposi-
tion in exile in Eritrea under the 
umbrella of the National Demo-
cratic Alliance (NDA). However, 
it left this coalition in March 
2000, when political parties were 
legalised without requiring a 
special authorisation from the 
government, except for elections. 
Sadiq al-Mahdi, who re-
placed his father Said Abd 
al-Rahman al-Mahdi after 
the latter’s death on 24 
March 1959. Within the 
UP, he was contested by 
Prime Minister Abdallah 
Khalil because he tried to 
negotiate an agreement 
with the NUP after the 
elections of February 1958. 
When Sadiq al-Mahdi died 
in September 1961, his 
homonymous son replaced 
him and was briefly Prime 
Minister between July 
1966 and May 1967. After 
the military coup of June 
1989, Sadiq al-Mahdi Jun-
ior stayed for a period in 
Khartoum and eventually 
fled to Asmara in Eritrea, 
where he joined the opposi-
tion in exile (both the UP 
and the DUP) under the 
umbrella of the National 
Democratic Alliance 
(NDA) in November 1996. 
He returned to the Sudan in 
November 2000 to reorgan-
ise the UP and participate 
in a government of national 
unity, following the signa-
ture of a comprehensive 
peace agreement in Nairobi 
(Kenya) in January 2005. 
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Khatmiyya People’s 
Democratic 
Party 
(PDP) 
From January 1956, coalition 
with the UP to succeed the NUP 
government of Ahmed Ismail el 
Azhari, in power since January 
1954. Led by Said Ali al-
Mirghani, the Khatmiyya initially 
supported Ahmed Ismail el 
Azhari to form a political body, 
the Ashigga, in 1944 and opposed 
the UP by participating in 1950 in 
the launch of a National Front, 
the predecessor of the National 
Unionist Party (NUP). 
Said Ali al-Mirghani. Un-
like his arch-rival Said Abd 
al-Rahman al-Mahdi, who 
preferred to cooperate with 
the British coloniser to 
avoid the domination of 
Cairo, he favoured Egypt. 
But he was weakened by 
the military coup of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser in 1952 and 
the fall of General Mu-
hammad Naguib in 1954, 
who was quite popular in 
Khartoum because of his 
Sudanese origin. 
Khatmiyya Democratic 
Unionist 
Party 
(DUP), a 
merger of 
the PDP 
and the 
NUP 
 
Coalition with the UP under the 
Premiership of Muhammad Ah-
mad Mahgoub after winning the 
elections of April 1968 and until 
the coup of Jaafar Muhammad 
Nimeiri in May 1969. After the 
fall of the military junta, the DUP 
won elections in April 1986 and 
came back to power, first with 
the UP, then in a larger govern-
ment of national unity with the 
NIF in April 1988. However, the 
DUP left the government when 
the UP and the NIF refused to 
acknowledge the peace agree-
ment it had signed with the SPLA 
(Sudan People’s Liberation Ar-
my) in Addis-Ababa in Novem-
ber 1988. Pressed by the Army to 
give more funds to fight in the 
south, it then formed a last coali-
tion government with the UP and 
without the NIF in March 1989, 
just before the coup of General 
Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir. 
Mohammed Osman al-
Mirghani, who succeeded 
Said Ali al-Mirghani after 
the latter’s death in Febru-
ary 1968. Another member 
of the family and the party, 
Ahmed Ali al-Mirghani, 
was President of Sudan 
from May 1986 until the 
military coup of June 1989. 
He then went into exile in 
Egypt, where he died on 
November 2008 after a 
brief return to Khartoum on 
November 2001. 
Muslim 
Brothers 
Islamic 
Charter 
Front (al-
Jabhah al-
Islamiyah 
al-
Qawmiyah) 
Established in the mid-1960s and 
briefly in power when its leader, 
Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, entered a 
coalition government in August 
1979. The organisation was often 
called the Muslim Brotherhood 
(al Hizb al-Akhwan al Muslimin) 
after its Egyptian model. 
Hassan al-Turabi, until he 
launched his own NIF in 
1985 against the old guard 
of the Muslim Brothers, 
who grew closer to the 
Ansar and denounced the 
speculation of Islamic 
banks. 
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Muslim 
Brothers 
National 
Islamic 
Front (NIF) 
From April 1988, government of 
national unity with the UP, the 
DUP and a few southerners. Af-
ter the coup of June 1989, which 
banned political parties, a transi-
tional parliament was established 
in January 1992, and Hassan al-
Turabi grew closer to General 
Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, 
who officially dissolved the mili-
tary junta and put in place a civil-
ian regime in October 1993. In 
October 1992, the NIF thus par-
ticipated in local elections con-
ducted according to the Islamic 
principles of consultation (shura) 
and consensus (ijma). However, 
it lost in Khartoum, where it cir-
cumvented the results by placing 
clients as heads of districts. 
Likewise, during the general 
elections of March 1996, which 
were boycotted by the democratic 
opposition, only 53 per cent of 
the seats in the parliament were 
contested; the rest were allocated 
through a process of “silent con-
sensus” (ijma al-sikouti). The 
turnout varied between 72 per 
cent, according to the govern-
ment, and 5 per cent, according 
to the opposition. More probably 
the figure was 45 per cent of 
registered voters, as against 80 
per cent in 1986. Bashir was de-
clared the winner with 75.7 per 
cent of the votes. 
Hassan al-Turabi, who had 
refused to join the military 
junta when Jaafar Muham-
mad Nimeiri imposed Sha-
riah in September 1983, 
remained in the opposition 
when the NIF became the 
third-largest party in the 
Sudan at the elections of 
April 1986. From April 
1988, he then participated 
in a government of national 
unity with his brother-in-
law Sadiq al-Mahdi (UP) 
and even became Vice-
Prime Minister in Decem-
ber 1988. But he was dis-
missed in March 1989 and 
briefly jailed as Foreign 
Affairs Minister of Sadiq 
al-Mahdi, when General 
Omar Hassan Ahmad al 
Bashir took power three 
months later. Hassan al-
Turabi was later to be a key 
element in the Islamist 
junta throughout the 1990s. 
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Muslim 
Brothers 
National 
Congress 
(Mutammar 
al Watani) 
Succeeding to the NIF when a 
new constitution re-introduced a 
multiparty system in June 1998, 
it remained in power until the 
dissolution of the parliament 
(December 1999) and the proc-
lamation of a state of emergency 
by General Bashir to get rid of 
Hassan al-Turabi. 
Hassan al-Turabi, who 
began secret negotiations 
with Sadiq al-Mahdi and 
the opposition to establish a 
prime minister and elect-
governors in order to coun-
terbalance the absolute 
powers of General Bashir. 
He was then suspended and 
deposed from his post of 
General Secretary of the 
National Congress in May–
June 2000 
Muslim 
Brothers 
People’s 
National 
Congress 
Officially in power from June 
2000, as a continuation of the 
National Congress without Has-
san al-Turabi. However, the latter 
still had some supporters within 
the party. He was arrested on 21 
February 2001 because he had 
just negotiated in Geneva an unu-
sual alliance with the SPLA. 
Released on 13 October 2003, he 
was again placed under arrest on 
30 March 2004, jailed in the 
prison of Kober, and accused of 
plotting a coup. 
General Omar Hassan Ah-
mad al Bashir: he got 86 
per cent of the votes during 
the presidential elections of 
December 2000, which 
were contested by Jaafar 
Muhammad Nimeiri (just 
back from exile) but boy-
cotted by the democratic 
opposition (DUP, UP) and 
Hassan al Tourabi’s faction 
of the People’s National 
Congress. 
Source: Fluehr-Lobban (1987); Hunwick (1992); Pérouse de Montclos (2003); Warburg (2003).  
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